

Naval War College Review

Volume 27
Number 5 *September-October*

Article 14

1974

The Imperial Presidency

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Recommended Citation

Cole, Bernard D. and Schlesinger, Arthur M. (1974) "The Imperial Presidency," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 27 : No. 5 , Article 14.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol27/iss5/14>

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praises where praise is due and at the same time feels free to criticize Tracy for his not uncommon failures and shortcomings.

The one real hurdle to the smooth and enjoyable reading of this book is the opening chapter. Dealing with the usual data, where and when Tracy was born, his early life and experience, et cetera, this chapter is as dull and un-inspired as the rest of the book is interesting. The persistent reader who finishes the first few pages will be rewarded by the flowing and well documented work that follows.

JEFFREY P. BACHER
Ensign, U.S. Naval Reserve

Noli, Jean, *The Admiral's Wolf Pack*.

Translated by J.F. Bernard. New York: Doubleday, 1974. 393p.

This interesting and often thrilling story portrays the Battle of the Atlantic as seen through the eyes of U-boat Commanders and crews. The author has obviously gone to great effort to intertwine the historical events of the war with the personal accounts of the men of the submarines who were in the midst of those events. His ability to do this and not lose the thread of the history or bore the reader with excessive history is quite remarkable.

A claim is made on the dustcover that the story provides special emphasis to the technology of undersea warfare. This should not discourage the uninitiated since the author never allows his concern with detail to interfere with the story or overcomplicate it. Nevertheless, at the same time the author is accurate enough in the technical aspects of submarine operations to satisfy the professional.

Continuity throughout the account is maintained by centering it around the commander of submarines, Admiral Doenitz. The book is quite sympathetic to both Admiral Doenitz and the U-boat Commanders without being unbalanced,

or heroic beyond belief. It is a very human account which does not spare the reader the frequently unpleasant details of what war must have been like on those very small and primitive craft. Nor is the reader only exposed to accounts of heroic behavior and clever exploits. The mutiny, surrender and capture of a newly commissioned U-boat is recorded in detail as are the strategic and tactical errors made by all levels of command. The mystery that the Allied development and use of radar must have represented to the German submariner is treated in a very believable way.

Even for the submarine enthusiast there are times when the excitement and drama is lost in the description of yet another merchant ship sinking—no matter how unusual—but these spells are brief and the reader should not be discouraged since the story generally moves along very well. This book merits the attention of both the professional and casual submarine enthusiast.

JOHN R. DEVEREAUX
Commander, U.S. Navy

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. *The Imperial Presidency*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973. 419p.

This book assails and serves as an exposition. It is based on the author's impressive knowledge of the U.S. Constitution but is heavily influenced by Mr. Schlesinger's disenchantment with Vietnam and the policies of the current administration.

It is too soon to write the history of the Nixon administration. The necessary perspective for the middle and later Vietnam periods (post-1962) is only just becoming apparent. The revelations of the Watergate affair demonstrate the possibilities and innuendos that remain to be explored by the historian.

Mr. Schlesinger bases his arguments in Constitutional history. His motivating belief, however, is that "no episode in

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American history has been more accompanied by misjudgement, misconception and miscalculation than the war in Vietnam." The author holds the imperial presidency—particular occupants Johnson and Nixon—responsible for this war.

The American military is characterized as the strongest prointerventionist element in the Government. Schumpeter's condemnation of the military is quoted: "Created by wars that required it, the machine now created the wars it required." This is indeed a serious accusation. It implies that the American military does not function as a subordinate adjunct of the civilian government. Rather, it typifies the Defense Establishment as a self-motivating and self-justifying—ultimately destructive, both to itself and to the state—force akin to the Japanese military of the 1930's.

The author makes no attempt to substantiate this theory. No reasonable effort is even made to establish a causative link between the self-perpetuating military and the imperial presidency; such a link is implicit in Schlesinger's version of how the United States became involved in Vietnam. Undoubtedly many military men, as did and do many civilians, held the belief that the United States was justified in its Vietnam actions. It would be far more accurate to assign responsibility for the improper decisions that were made in Southeast Asia not just to the military, but to those Government officials—both military and civilian—whose lack of perspective and ignorance of history prevented them from placing the Vietnamese struggle in its proper place among American priorities.

Besides the above criticism, the author offers some useful insights into several areas of recent Government action. One such instance deals with the Pentagon Papers. Schlesinger perceptively points out that the information contained therein was "already available

and had been published," albeit in scattered format. Even more enlightening is Mr. Schlesinger's exposition of the Constitution. He believes this document "institutionalized conflict in the very heart of the American polity." The author proceeds to build a strong case against recent Presidents, especially Richard Nixon. Schlesinger's thesis is that the conflict inherent to the American form of government—implicit in the principle of separation of powers—is being increasingly tipped in favor of the executive branch through extra-legal and illegal measures.

The author supports his brief with precedent. The strongest, most powerful Presidents—Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt—are "excused" for taking unprecedented powers because of the crises each faced during his tenure in office. Richard Nixon is castigated for even comparing recent national problems to such events as the Civil or Second World War. In the author's view, President Nixon has not faced difficulties (unless of his own making) as severe as the 1962 Cuban crisis. Mr. Schlesinger deals gingerly with John F. Kennedy—was an imperial president but, in the author's view, a "right" one.

The Presidency's Constitutional opponent—the Congress—does not escape the author's wrath. He characterizes that body as selfish and inhibited by parochialism and ignorance. Schlesinger believes the Congress, by not asserting itself in foreign affairs, has encouraged the President to assume an ascendancy in the Federal Government that the Founding Fathers expressly desired to prevent. The author cites the President's impoundment of congressionally appropriated funds as evidence of this trend extending to domestic affairs.

Mr. Schlesinger offers no real solution to the governmental imbalance he perceives. He only urges that "all decisions . . . be shared decision." None-

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theless, this is a valuable work. It is an indicator of the post-Vietnam political attitude in the United States. This attitude, with its antimilitary overtones,

directly concerns today's military officer.

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Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

