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The Devil and John Foster Dulles

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PROFESSIONAL READING 101

corollary thereto is that under no circumstances should our embassies employ indigenous personnel for any task, however menial (an example of drivers is given). Also, why do some Western powers continue to accredit Communist "diplomats" already expelled from another nation? Since "by Soviet definition, the truth is whatever enhances Soviet interests of the moment," democratic governments should enforce "the message that the price of the benefits of membership in civilized international society is civilized behavior."

To students of the subject, there is much in *KGB* that will come as no surprise. But there is enough that is novel to warrant the suggestion that the book would do well in the hands of every young naval officer embarking on foreign assignment. And if he lets it out of his hands, this should be to pass it on to a colleague.

CURTIS C. DAVIS
Lieutenant Colonel, USAR (Ret.)

Hoopes, Townsend. *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973. 505p.

Townsend Hoopes has neither written nor tried to write a definitive history of America's foreign policy from 1953 to 1959. He has, instead, focused on one of the key elements of that policy, the character of John Foster Dulles and, in that respect, has produced a solid psychohistory based on the Dulles papers themselves.

Mr. Hoopes' main thesis is that the Eisenhower administration pursued a rigid and shortsighted foreign policy, one designed during the Truman years to combat a monolithic Soviet threat, and one which failed to recognize how this threat had been altered by Stalin's death.

The author's first premise, not original, is that John Foster Dulles was foreign policy in the Eisenhower administration. His second premise, obvious in

the title, characterizes John Foster Dulles as more of a religious zealot on crusade than a pragmatic diplomat representing national policy, a man who believed himself to be the champion of good, battling immorality and evil.

To support these premises, Hoopes gives an accurate rundown of Dulles' career, starting with his family background (a combination of churchmen and Government officials) and following through his political allegiance to Dwight Eisenhower. He does not, however, fully discuss the development of Dulles' devil-theory view of the Soviet Union, instead simply stating that as early as 1946 the future Secretary viewed the onsetting cold war as "a moral rather than a political or economic conflict."

Dulles' view of Soviet actions was based on a literal interpretation of Lenin's "armed camp" writings. The Secretary of State refused to acknowledge that any softening in the Communist position—any detente—was possible and attributed gaps in the Soviet hard line to a zigzag policy. Such gaps were to be exploited rather than explored.

The Secretary of State is portrayed as taking an equally dim view of relations with China, the puppet of Moscow, "composed about equally of sentiment and illusion." Hoopes suggests Dulles missed an opportunity to lessen the Sino-American split during the relatively calm years between 1955 and 1957 and that the "brilliant" 1958 exercise in brinkmanship was necessitated only by "years of mismanagement and errors of omission."

Dulles' motivations were not limited to a hatred for communism. He also had an intense desire to remain Secretary of State and as such pandered to the right wing of the Republican Party headed by Joseph McCarthy. This, Dulles believed, was the one force that could cost him his secretaryship. Drawing from this relationship, Hoopes accuses Dulles of allowing a "reign of terror" to proceed

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against the State Department during the years of McCarthy's power.

Balanced against these accusations of Dulles being shortsighted, stubborn, tactless, and hypocritical, Hoopes cites the formulation of the Japanese Peace Treaty as an act of lasting importance. SEATO is also described as having had constructive potential—albeit economic rather than military.

The author portrays President Eisenhower as a strong—if too infrequent—restraining force on his Secretary of State. In Korea, in Indochina, in the Middle East, and in the Formosa Straits, it was Eisenhower who took the cool and correct view of the possibilities and military limitations of American policy.

The author's work also reflects the afterglow of Vietnam. Dulles approached the 1954 Geneva conference with distaste and later played a significant role in frustrating these accords. Even if there is little evidence that the Geneva agreements were ever viable, regardless of American action, Dulles did, intensify and espouse a long-lasting, damaging policy in Southeast Asia, a policy born from ignorance of the area and an erroneous view of world communism.

Townsend Hoopes is a writer of skill and academic achievement. This book is excellent history. If it is to be faulted, it is only that he presents his case within the first 200 pages, and what follows is somewhat anticlimactic. Most importantly, he successfully delineates the importance of objectivity and an awareness of the real and changing world in the conduct of foreign policy.

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Loory, Stuart. *Defeated*. New York: Random House, 405p.

"Wounded, confused, drugged, demoralized, numbed by political intervention, knotted in bureaucratic tape and nursing a feeling of be-

trayed . . . Duty, Honor and Country have been replaced by a new trinity—Me, Myself and I . . . it is now an organization incapable of defending the nation against attack . . . it is defeated." These are the charges against the Armed Forces of the United States in 1973. The charges have been prepared and signed by Stuart Loory, a former White House correspondent for the *Los Angeles Times* and the co-author of "The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam." Under a grant from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and bearing a letter from the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York addressed to its "Dear Brothers in Peace," asking for its antimilitary representatives to cooperate with him, Loory toured many of the installations where U.S. military forces are stationed. *Defeated* is an indictment of the U.S. Military Establishment and hierarchy but purports to be in sympathy with the private, sergeant, and lieutenant.

These are serious charges and bear serious examination. They are akin to rape: easy to allege, difficult to prove, and impossible to defend against. They should not be taken either defensively or lightly, but examined in open court and on the best evidence. A number of basic questions are implicit in this examination: are the charges true, are they in perspective, and is the evidence based on impartial and objective investigative methods or is this a search for warts? In short, is this a fair, reasonable, and accurate portrayal of the U.S. Military Establishment?

The book is a logic nightmare, a potpourri of selected "facts" loosely intertwined around the general subjects of major weapons systems' operational capability, corruption within the officer and NCO ranks, racial and drug problems, and careerism (versus dedication). There appears to have been no attempt at serious fact-gathering; rather, Loory uses selected small samples from those who were willing to talk to him and