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Book Reviews


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PROFESSIONAL READING

Barron, John. *KGB: the Secret Work of Soviet Agents*. New York: Reader's Digest Press, distributed by Dutton, 1974. 462p.

It is a pity that this valuable volume did not appear at the height of the spy-story vogue; it would probably have gained much greater review exposure than now. The author, a prize-winning journalist and a senior editor of *Reader's Digest*, served in the Navy during the 1950's. He attended the Intelligence School, gained a specialty in the Russian language, and then performed a 2-year tour of duty in Berlin. In addition to this field experience, he has been able to make use of the *Digest* editorial offices around the globe and also succeeded, with the assistance of several foreign and American security services, in interviewing all but two Soviet agents who have defected to the West since the close of the Second World War. His book includes an extensive bibliography, detailed chapter annotation, 4 charts, 42 unusually clear photographs of people and places, and 4 appendixes. These last are attention-getters all by themselves.

The first two appendixes trace the rise of the Soviet security apparatus in general and of military intelligence in particular. The fourth is an alphabetical roster of Soviet citizens engaged in clandestine operations overseas—a zesty dish for an attaché to dip into as occasion may warrant. However, it is the third appendix that makes for the most compelling perusal: the translation of a classified Soviet document entitled

"The Practice of Recruiting Americans in the USA and Third Countries." Sampling this manual is akin to seeing ourselves in the distortion mirrors at the local amusement park's fun house.

Mr. Barron's style is flat, but the outlandish content of his book compensates for this deficiency. The coverage is global, with special attention to the Western Hemisphere; the treatment is topical; the time frame primarily from the decade of the 1950's on. It is the author's opinion that the U.S.S.R. "today embodies the last of the great nineteenth-century colonial empires" and that an analysis of its state security organ demonstrates "how little the basic structure of Soviet society has changed in more than half a century." Just as in the Romanov era, the paranoid suspicion of foreigners persists, so that each and every visitor "unknowingly passes through... an invisible KGB cocoon that effectively shields him from what the KGB does not want him to see or hear." The tools of character destruction and/or assassination remain standing procedures, although we are advised that the leadership recently directed the KGB "that henceforth people would be liquidated in peacetime only in special circumstances."

The author advances a variety of recommendations for our people serving in Communist lands. His basic tenet is an insistence on appropriate allotment: in 1971, for example, why should there be only 108 Americans in Moscow with diplomatic immunity while there were 189 Soviets in Washington? And the

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corollary thereto is that under no circumstances should our embassies employ indigenous personnel for any task, however menial (an example of drivers is given). Also, why do some Western powers continue to accredit Communist "diplomats" already expelled from another nation? Since "by Soviet definition, the truth is whatever enhances Soviet interests of the moment," democratic governments should enforce "the message that the price of the benefits of membership in civilized international society is civilized behavior."

To students of the subject, there is much in *KGB* that will come as no surprise. But there is enough that is novel to warrant the suggestion that the book would do well in the hands of every young naval officer embarking on foreign assignment. And if he lets it out of his hands, this should be to pass it on to a colleague.

CURTIS C. DAVIS
Lieutenant Colonel, USAR (Ret.)

Hoopes, Townsend. *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973. 505p.

Townsend Hoopes has neither written nor tried to write a definitive history of America's foreign policy from 1953 to 1959. He has, instead, focused on one of the key elements of that policy, the character of John Foster Dulles and, in that respect, has produced a solid psychohistory based on the Dulles papers themselves.

Mr. Hoopes' main thesis is that the Eisenhower administration pursued a rigid and shortsighted foreign policy, one designed during the Truman years to combat a monolithic Soviet threat, and one which failed to recognize how this threat had been altered by Stalin's death.

The author's first premise, not original, is that John Foster Dulles was foreign policy in the Eisenhower administration. His second premise, obvious in

the title, characterizes John Foster Dulles as more of a religious zealot on crusade than a pragmatic diplomat representing national policy, a man who believed himself to be the champion of good, battling immorality and evil.

To support these premises, Hoopes gives an accurate rundown of Dulles' career, starting with his family background (a combination of churchmen and Government officials) and following through his political allegiance to Dwight Eisenhower. He does not, however, fully discuss the development of Dulles' devil-theory view of the Soviet Union, instead simply stating that as early as 1946 the future Secretary viewed the onsetting cold war as "a moral rather than a political or economic conflict."

Dulles' view of Soviet actions was based on a literal interpretation of Lenin's "armed camp" writings. The Secretary of State refused to acknowledge that any softening in the Communist position—any detente—was possible and attributed gaps in the Soviet hard line to a zigzag policy. Such gaps were to be exploited rather than explored.

The Secretary of State is portrayed as taking an equally dim view of relations with China, the puppet of Moscow, "composed about equally of sentiment and illusion." Hoopes suggests Dulles missed an opportunity to lessen the Sino-American split during the relatively calm years between 1955 and 1957 and that the "brilliant" 1958 exercise in brinkmanship was necessitated only by "years of mismanagement and errors of omission."

Dulles' motivations were not limited to a hatred for communism. He also had an intense desire to remain Secretary of State and as such pandered to the right wing of the Republican Party headed by Joseph McCarthy. This, Dulles believed, was the one force that could cost him his secretaryship. Drawing from this relationship, Hoopes accuses Dulles of allowing a "reign of terror" to proceed

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against the State Department during the years of McCarthy's power.

Balanced against these accusations of Dulles being shortsighted, stubborn, tactless, and hypocritical, Hoopes cites the formulation of the Japanese Peace Treaty as an act of lasting importance. SEATO is also described as having had constructive potential—albeit economic rather than military.

The author portrays President Eisenhower as a strong—if too infrequent—restraining force on his Secretary of State. In Korea, in Indochina, in the Middle East, and in the Formosa Straits, it was Eisenhower who took the cool and correct view of the possibilities and military limitations of American policy.

The author's work also reflects the afterglow of Vietnam. Dulles approached the 1954 Geneva conference with distaste and later played a significant role in frustrating these accords. Even if there is little evidence that the Geneva agreements were ever viable, regardless of American action, Dulles did, intensify and espouse a long-lasting, damaging policy in Southeast Asia, a policy born from ignorance of the area and an erroneous view of world communism.

Townsend Hoopes is a writer of skill and academic achievement. This book is excellent history. If it is to be faulted, it is only that he presents his case within the first 200 pages, and what follows is somewhat anticlimactic. Most importantly, he successfully delineates the importance of objectivity and an awareness of the real and changing world in the conduct of foreign policy.

BERNARD D. COLE

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Loory, Stuart. *Defeated*. New York: Random House, 405p.

"Wounded, confused, drugged, demoralized, numbed by political intervention, knotted in bureaucratic tape and nursing a feeling of be-

trayed . . . Duty, Honor and Country have been replaced by a new trinity—Me, Myself and I . . . it is now an organization incapable of defending the nation against attack . . . it is defeated." These are the charges against the Armed Forces of the United States in 1973. The charges have been prepared and signed by Stuart Loory, a former White House correspondent for the *Los Angeles Times* and the co-author of "The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam." Under a grant from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and bearing a letter from the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York addressed to its "Dear Brothers in Peace," asking for its antimilitary representatives to cooperate with him, Loory toured many of the installations where U.S. military forces are stationed. *Defeated* is an indictment of the U.S. Military Establishment and hierarchy but purports to be in sympathy with the private, sergeant, and lieutenant.

These are serious charges and bear serious examination. They are akin to rape: easy to allege, difficult to prove, and impossible to defend against. They should not be taken either defensively or lightly, but examined in open court and on the best evidence. A number of basic questions are implicit in this examination: are the charges true, are they in perspective, and is the evidence based on impartial and objective investigative methods or is this a search for warts? In short, is this a fair, reasonable, and accurate portrayal of the U.S. Military Establishment?

The book is a logic nightmare, a potpourri of selected "facts" loosely intertwined around the general subjects of major weapons systems' operational capability, corruption within the officer and NCO ranks, racial and drug problems, and careerism (versus dedication). There appears to have been no attempt at serious fact-gathering; rather, Loory uses selected small samples from those who were willing to talk to him and

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presents heroic and sweeping generalities. For example, the indictment of the F-111 is based primarily on conversations with a disgruntled mechanic. Perhaps the most obvious display of pejorative bias is the flagellation of Fort Bragg, N.C., for its drug and race problems. Loory's investigation of Fort Bragg was confined to interviews with prisoners in the stockade, principally blacks, and medical officers who were members of the Concerned Officers' Movement, an organization composed of anti-Vietnam war officers. Subsequent discussions with military officials who were present at the time of his visits have confirmed that Loory showed not the slightest interest in the thousands of soldiers conducting their normal training in the 82d Airborne Division or in the Green Berets of the JFK Center—only the dissidents. It should not be the least surprising that such an intensive search for warts yielded a goodly supply to describe in detail. With few exceptions, the wart-discovering approach apparently was used throughout the book—the deliberate search for the corrupt and self-serving officer and NCO, the disgruntled enlisted man, and the inoperable or poorly maintained piece of fighting gear.

There are some areas of the book, however, which are uncomfortably accurate, but in most instances they concern problems already under intensive review within the military services. The discussions of the Army's Efficiency Report system will be heartily endorsed by almost every officer in uniform. This problem of inflated performance reports has received the personal attention of every Chief of Staff since World War II. A number of cures have been attempted, but none to date has been successful. Loory's comments on the excessive number of generals and admirals will certainly find a sympathetic ear in the Congress, which has been pressuring the Department of

Defense toward reductions. A principal factor here is the number of senior officers assigned to special positions outside their uniformed services—for example, attachés. Still, the numbers undoubtedly are excessive, and Pentagon action following congressional guidelines is likely to be forthcoming. The discussions of Lavelle's private war, the aftermath of My Lai and the Army's former domestic intelligence program are both reasonably close to the mark and *deja vu*.

Loory concentrates 61 pages of the book on the escapades of former Sergeant Major of the Army William Wooldridge, Brig. Gen. Earl Cole, *inter alia*. Not only is this discussion old hat with the reading public, but the rip-off's which may have been committed or condoned by this group are not symptomatic of the officer/NCO corps. Loory's "investigative" reporting in this section was confined principally to the Congressional Record.

Loory tries to make a case for military institutional bias toward blacks and civil rights dissenters. That such bias has existed and continues, in varying degrees, is certainly true, but the military services have demonstrated an exemplary societal leadership in this area. No other American institution has acted so forthrightly to change its corporate being with respect to a national social problem.

Loory's use of expert witnesses is subject to considerable skepticism: Lt. Col. Edward King, retired and disgruntled author of "The Death of the Army"; Col. David Hackworth, retired and disgruntled multitoured Vietnam fighter with a hotly disputed reputation at the end of his service, and former Private Andrew Stapp, the organizer of the American Servicemen's Union, all participate in the collective masochism.

To correct these perceived military evils, Loory suggests a number of sweeping changes—Universal Military Service, abandonment of overseas

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stations, and the formulation of a Joint General Staff with its officers permanently divorced from the services (exactly what the Congress has continually tried to prevent through the years). Any of these unoriginal ideas may well be legitimate issues for congressional and executive evaluation, but Loory has failed to present any acceptable credentials to support his judgments.

Defeated is a compendium of wild charges, allegations, and half truths—McCarthyism in print. Like McCarthy, Loory has just enough germs of truth to make his points appear credible, on the whole, to those who would prefer to believe that the country's Armed Forces are indeed "defeated." The book is, at best, sloppy and biased journalism and demonstrates that Loory simply has not done his homework very well. The evidence cannot, however, be discarded out of hand—as in rape, there are many degrees of consent related with the act. To the original questions of fairness, reasonability, and accuracy, the answers all must be no. To the larger question of whether Loory may have pointed out problems and symptomatic conditions that should require the full attention of our military hierarchy, the professional reader must respond with a qualified yes. The military professional is quite conscious of the need for aggressive, thoughtful examination, and overhaul of his institution. There are just enough uncomfortable truths in Loory's book to compel some agonizing evaluations about the status and future of the American Military Establishment, and, to this end, Loory's uninhibited allegations may be useful. The U.S. Armed Forces can well use a first-rate book that provides a hard, balanced, and objective analysis of its status and values. Such a book must be believable and based on thorough investigation, perceptive insights, and a fundamental understanding of the organization, people, and societal role of the Military Establishment in America. Un-

fortunately, *Defeated* fails on all counts.

L.W. JACKLEY
Colonel, U.S. Army

Padfield, Peter. *The Battleship Era*. New York: McKay, 1972. 321p.

Except during a brief appearance of *New Jersey* in the late 1960's, few Navy men on active duty today have ever seen a battleship. Once the dominant factor in naval thinking, battleships are a part of the old Navy and, but for a few floating museums and "mothballed" ships, are extinct.

The eclipse of the battleship by the carrier during World War II was a result of technological developments, much like the rise to prominence of the battleship had been a triumph of the technology of the Industrial Revolution. Peter Padfield has ably chronicled the rise and fall of the battleship in a way that should fascinate navy men and naval buffs alike.

The commencement of what was to be a revolution in naval thinking came on 4 March 1858 when the French laid the keel of *Gloire*. Shellproof iron plates were bolted over timber to give the protection needed to counter the effect of newly developed projectiles. Although considerable expense was involved, the French felt the cost necessary if they were to outflank British naval superiority in the naval arms race. Unfortunately for the French, however, British industrial might proved to be an irresistible force far superior to what the French could muster. A month before *Gloire* was launched, the British launched H.M.S. *Warrior*, a ship that, with 4½ inches of solid wrought iron over wood and engines that combined with sails could give her 14½ knots, was stronger and faster than *Gloire*.

America has the honor of being the scene of the first battle between iron-clads. Yet even before the *Monitor-Merrimack* standoff in Hampton Roads on 9 March 1862, *Merrimack*, renamed

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C.S.S. *Virginia* by the Confederates, had proven the value of ironclad warships in combat with ships of wood. *Virginia* had the day before rammed and sunk the Federal sloop-of-war *Cumberland*. A second ship, *Congress*, fled before this formidable foe but had the misfortune to run aground before being finished off by *Virginia*. The most notable point of the action at Hampton Roads was the invulnerability of iron ships to gunfire.

The iron warships of the 19th century saw only two open sea fleet actions. The first was in the Adriatic at Lissa in 1866 between Austrian and Italian forces. Ironclads were involved in this knockdown, drag-out fight, but only two ships were sunk. A small Italian gunboat blew up after a shell hit her magazine, and the Italian flagship *Re d'Italia* was sunk after having been rammed by the Austrian flagship. This ramming, combined with the sinking of *Cumberland*, unfortunately gave rise to a preoccupation with ramming that lasted almost until the first World War.

The final fleet action in the 19th century involving ironclads occurred at the Battle of the Yalu in 1895 between the Imperial Chinese and Japanese fleets. The Japanese victory can, however, be attributed more to the superior handling of superior ships against poorly handled inferior ships than to any effect of armor.

Mr. Padfield has used exciting accounts of naval engagements and substantial amounts of detail to develop his central theme: the battleship was a product of technology which, in turn, worked to eclipse it. Within 50 years the world's major navies had evolved from wooden ships with muzzle loading guns driven by the wind to steel ships with breech loading guns driven by steam turbine engines. How naval architects and the leading navies kept apace of what must have seemed to be bewildering kaleidoscopic change not only makes good reading, but it also gives some insight into present attempts to

keep abreast of technology.

Battleships were built for battle fleets, the purpose of which was to engage enemy battle fleets and destroy them. This concept, brought into vogue by Alfred Mahan, dominated naval thinking for most of the first part of the 20th century. World War II showed the limitations of the battleship, but recent experience in Vietnam showed a continuing need for big guns, even if they are not used against an enemy battle fleet. Again, the demise of the battleship demonstrates that the ultimate naval weapon is vulnerable to technological development—that obscure weapon system fermenting in the minds of men.

B.M. SIMPSON, III
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Quester, George. *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. 245p.

One of the most fundamental aspects of nuclear diplomacy is the relationship between the number of nuclear actors and the risk of deliberate or accidental holocaust. As the number of nuclear nations increases, the risk of nuclear war also rises, but at a greatly accelerated rate. Recognizing this fact, the major world powers in the late 1960's sought to permanently limit the number of nuclear nations.

In discussing this attempt, Cornell University political scientist George Quester has done a first-class piece of research, thinking, and writing in *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation*. Professor Quester marches straight through the politics, complexities, and national fears of this amazingly vital but little understood international issue. His positive, nontechnical, and candid discussion, based on a lifetime of observation and study, deserves a wide readership.

The strength of Quester's work lies in his organization and presentation of

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facts. He approaches the problem of nuclear proliferation as a political, nationalistic, diplomatic, and military interface shaded with superpower superiority and small power pretensions. Quester sees the chances for world ratification of a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as dependent on variables not really in the hands of either Washington or Moscow. He first sets his stage by recounting the steps which, by July 1968 had led to a nonproliferation treaty, drafted largely by the United States and the U.S.S.R., and then ingeniously divides the world into 17 capitals, examining chapter by chapter the policies, politics, and programs of each major subsequently involved nation.

As the most deeply involved of the world's capitals, Moscow and Washington are first discussed, both in terms of their mutual suspicion and allies and the internal considerations each nation has had to deal with. A balanced discussion results, emphasizing these superpowers' fear of eroding sovereignty for the sake of world respectability.

He continues with a view of the nuclear world as seen from New Delhi, capital of a land that can produce nuclear bombs and has, because of her subcontinent political posture, refused to sign the NPT. The economic costs to India (and the political costs to the United States and the U.S.S.R.) are thoughtfully examined. This chapter is an eye opener for the reader since it demonstrates vividly the pride and fear of competent, developing nations that they might be left behind in the division of world power.

The pretensions of smaller powers—particular in the volatile Middle East—coupled with legitimate defense needs are reflected in a chapter titled "Jerusalem." The issue, of course, is the Arab-Israeli stalemate and Israel's determination not to be taken for granted or to be caught off guard.

Stockholm, usually ignored in works

on diplomacy and nuclear strategy, represents the unique position of a modern state forsaking nuclear weaponry. Here Quester may well have sacrificed objectivity (he was the guest of the Swedes for 4 months), but since few people understand the motives behind Sweden's standdown (and its research to enable it to start nuclear development if need be), this chapter is well presented and interesting, even if biased.

South American powers are presented in a fascinating combination of "don't leave us out" coupled with "follow the leader." In Brazil's case, signing the NPT would likely prevent use of nuclear energy, locally produced, from exploiting and opening this vast rich land. Argentina and Chile, for fear of Brazil's growth, refuse to sign the treaty in a monumental reflection of that tired Latin game: "After you, Gaston."

The attitudes of the major commonwealth countries and the German Federal Republic are shown to be in marked contrast. Britain is in the club, but as Quester points out, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand want proliferation stopped, even at their own risk (i.e., not having the weaponry or the active technology), confident that the United States-United Kingdom friendship will suffice to protect the other major English-speaking nations. Not so with Bonn, where fear of U.S. cutbacks and an "America first" strategy leaves Bonn psychologically nude. Although Bonn has signed the NPT, doubts and fears exist and will not disappear even if world ratification comes about.

The positions of Paris, Pretoria, and Peking, all nonsigners, are extremely well presented. With France's pride at stake, that nation does not intend to inhibit its own nuclear diplomacy. With Pretoria the matter is commercial, for South Africa is a major supplier of uranium. With China it is revolutionary politics and world competition (not to mention survival). Author Quester does a splendid job of explaining the vagaries

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and complexities of the policies of these three nations.

Quester ends with an insight into the monitoring instrument of ratified world nuclear agreements—the International Atomic Energy Agency—and warns that the work of this bureaucracy can easily be manacled by any power so disposed.

He allows himself the freedom of four hypotheses, testing the validity and success of nonproliferation, and is encouraged, but practical. This is a competent, able analyst. If he is encouraged, we all have reason to be satisfied.

In terms of current literature generally available, Quester's book neatly complements John Newhouse's excellent *Cold Dawn: the Story of SALT* (Holt, 1973), T.G. Plate's ultracritical *Understanding Doomsday* (Simon and Schuster, 1971), Quester's own earlier *Nuclear Diplomacy* (University Press, 1971), and Roman Kolkowicz's edited but interesting and valuable volume *The Soviet Union and Arms Control* (Johns Hopkins, 1970).

George Quester has presented us with a readable, informed, and well documented review of the status of world power in relation to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. He has dealt successfully not only with the major actors, both nuclear and nonnuclear, but with the would-be nuclear nations as well. I much recommend this book for its clarity, nontechnical approach, and most particularly for its candor and astuteness.

R.F. DELANEY

Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy

Sanders, Ralph. *The Politics of Defense Analysis*. New York: Dunellen, 1974. 361p.

The introduction of the technique of systems analysis into the Department of Defense in 1961 by Robert McNamara created a great deal of controversy. The advocates of systems analysis hailed it as the most rational method of dealing

with the nagging question of "How much is enough?" Its critics argued that the method relied too much on quantifying the unquantifiable and ignored the role of experience. Systems analysis was hailed by many as the management tool that enabled the Secretary of Defense to assert his proper control over the vast Pentagon bureaucracy. Others argued that the technique functioned as a device to legitimize the Secretary's disregarding of the military's input into the decisionmaking process. However, a decade later, systems analysis is such an accepted technique in the Department of Defense and its role in the decisionmaking process has been so institutionalized that there is an Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation on the assistant secretary level and each service chief of staff now has his own analysis shop.

In his recently published work, *The Politics of Defense Analysis*, Ralph Sanders, Professor of Public Administration at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, recounts the history of systems analysis and its impact on the Department of Defense over the past 12 years. Dr. Sanders, who spent 6 months on McNamara's systems analysis staff, divides his analysis into three parts: the use of systems analysis, its effect on political practice, and its influence on decisionmaking concepts. Although the book is reasonably thorough and up to date, as a work of scholarship it suffers from a number of weaknesses.

First, there is nothing really new in it. All of what the author says has been presented before and often times better. Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith's *How Much Is Enough* and James Roherty's *Decisions of Robert S. McNamara* are much better sources of the political dynamics of systems analysis. Second, the author relies too much on nonscholarly sources to substantiate many of his arguments. His notes are replete with reference to such sources as *Newsweek*, *Business Week*, and several

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newspapers. Third, Sander's analysis often fails to penetrate beyond the formalities of the decisionmaking processes to its realities. This is particularly true of his treatment of the National Security Council (NSC) system under Nixon. The author would have us believe that it was in the subcommittees of the NSC system that foreign policy was formulated. After reading his account of Nixon's NSC system, one wonders why the State Department was unaware of our new China policy or why the military liaison officer on Kissinger's staff was making "extra copies" of documents for the Pentagon.

Fourth, the book repeats too many clichés and bits of traditional wisdom that simply do not stand up to rigorous analysis. Sanders states that declining defense budgets should lead to a renewal of the kind of interservice rivalry that existed in the Eisenhower era. Defense budgets have been declining in real terms for 5 years but this has not happened yet, nor is it likely to happen as long as the military is confronted with a nonsympathetic Congress, media, and public. Fifth, he leaves many of the critical issues about the politics of analysis unanswered. In discussing whether or not systems analysis can be

used to legitimize decisions already made, Sanders concludes by remarking only that this "raises the interesting question" of whether the analytical capabilities of the services can do nothing more than reaffirm what the military chiefs already have decided. Finally, the book contains a number of inaccuracies. The author has Adm. George Anderson retiring as CNO in 1965 instead of being fired in 1963. Moreover, Sanders asserts that in 1956 General Matthew Ridgway (spelled incorrectly as Ridgeway throughout the book) complained publicly about the Eisenhower administration's defense policies in spite of opposition from the Secretary of Defense. The author is apparently unaware that since Ridgway retired in 1955, he no longer worked for Secretary Wilson.

For those unacquainted with systems analysis and Department of Defense procedures over the past decade, this can be a useful book. But for anyone familiar with the subject, it is as useful as a basic American Government textbook would be to a graduate student in political science.

LAWRENCE J. KORB
U.S. Coast Guard Academy

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People say that life is the thing, but I prefer reading.

Logan P. Smith, Afterthoughts, 1931