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Where Does the Marine Corps Go From Here?

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their own destinies, a new understanding of the relations between the governors and the governed developed, a new sense of the potentialities that lay in ordinary men and women, a new appreciation of possibilities of a better life for people in every continent and every nation.

And finally, he adds: "If we can understand our proper relation to the American Revolution, I believe we will be much better able to cope with the often demoralizing and confusing world in which we live today."

His last chapter "Novus Ordo Seclorum," which is an impressive summary of his 1,814 pages of history, merits a careful reading and will be welcomed by all for its retrospection.

Because the story of our American Revolution has been treated by Smith as all body and soul, it merits a permanent place in the personal library of every naval officer at sea or at home. Reading a few chapters, such as the ones on Arnold's March, the Boston Massacre, or Bunker Hill, will easily whet the appetite for a complete reading of this impressive work.

When the reenactment of the battle at Concord Bridge took place in April 1975, a sign fluttered over the festivities which read: "The Revolution is not over." The words have deep meaning for the revolution indeed is not over—and the United States must continue to give it impetus and direction. America must reawaken itself to what President Ford called the "American concept and fulfillment of liberty that have truly revolutionized the world." Reading these volumes will be helpful in stimulating this revival, for Professor Smith has successfully recreated and revived the era of the American Revolution—the People's Revolution.

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Binkin, Martin, and Record, Jeffrey.
Where Does the Marine Corps Go From Here? Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976. 93pp.

This study examines the U.S. Marine Corps to determine its role in current and future U.S. defense requirements. Binkin and Record believe the Marine Corps with an amphibious assault capability is necessary but that there should be changes in the Corps' posture and mission orientation. Their findings are that the Marine Corps is not organized to meet the likeliest threats to our national interests; that its air arm requires too large a proportion of the Marine Corps' budget; and that to maintain the present size of the Corps, many people who do not fit the "good men" category must be accepted.

After presenting their critical findings the authors make the following recommendations:

1. Retain only four regiments with associated air, and structured primarily for amphibious warfare.
2. Transfer one BLT from the Pacific to bolster U.S. capabilities in the Middle East.
3. Sharply reduce the size of the Marines' tactical air capability.
4. Disband most of the Marine Corps Reserve.

Should these recommendations be adopted there would still be a question of what to do with the remaining Marine personnel. The authors offer four possibilities:

1. Reduce USMC personnel ceiling to reflect the new structure as presented in the four recommendations stated above. A personnel strength of 112,000 would result.
2. Assign the Marine Corps ground responsibility in Asia presently borne by the Army. Corps personnel strength here would be 175,000.
3. Give Marines the assignment as the U.S. quick reaction force, thus replacing the Army's 82d Airborne Division. A Corps of 142,000 would result.

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4. Organize Marines for combat in Central Europe; this would require 175,000 personnel.

When one evaluates the study and its recommendations, the authors' assumptions should be kept in mind. Binkin and Record use the term "likeliest threats." Without entirely disagreeing with their categorization, one must remember that their views are based on certain assumptions which are not easily identified as such but which are stated as facts.

Their assumptions are important in their examination to determine regions where amphibious operations are "likely" or "unlikely." The authors evaluate Latin America, Africa, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia as "unlikely" areas because U.S. public opinion does not favor a security role in the developing world and Asia. Binkin and Record state that "this view seems unlikely to change." Such a critical assumption neglects the fact that Americans have changed their attitudes before. The 1920's and 1930's were strongly anti-interventionist and anti-war. During and after the Korean war, many Americans held similar views. Still, we fought two wars.

This study assumes the "likely" regions for amphibious operations are Japan, on the flanks of NATO, and in the Middle East. The authors state that the presence of indigenous and/or U.S. forces in these areas may lessen the need for amphibious assaults. However, Japanese defense forces, while modern, are small and have a widely dispersed island nation to defend. In Europe SACEUR would probably want to agree with the study that he could hold long enough to permit administrative reinforcement, but with recent growth of Soviet military strength, SACEUR cannot be positive NATO could hold. Regarding the Middle East, the study states that amphibious operations in this area cannot be prudently discounted. In view of U.S. overtures to the Arab world,

prudence may dictate otherwise! Thus other strategic factors must be taken into account when considering the authors' area analysis.

The study's discussion of amphibious doctrine should also be viewed with some restraint. Doctrine is dear to Marines, because it was developed through hard experience and blood. At one point the authors use the vulnerability of helos in the *Mayaguez* incident as an illustration of weakness in the Corps' vertical envelopment doctrine. Perhaps Binkin and Record do not realize that the *Mayaguez* operation had little relationship to a Marine or Navy amphibious operation. The *Mayaguez* rescue was commanded from Washington for political purposes and was conducted within that context.

When the study expands its analysis to include all Marine air, cost statistics are irrefutable. The authors question the need for a Marine tactical air capability, but the answer is that here again the Corps has become wedded to doctrine by experience and blood. The Navy may not always be able to support operations ashore with carrier air, so Marines want their own. The U.S. Army has its air force for similar reasons.

Operations ashore involve support in addition to tactical air. The study takes note that naval commitments may prevent naval air and seaborne base support for long periods of time. Marines know this and have pressed the Navy to develop an adequate gunfire capability and to modernize amphibious shipping. The lightweight 8-inch gun and the LHA have been part of the Navy's answer and have gone further than the study reflects. R. & D. projects under consideration will help meet the study's criticism also.

The study uses Marine disciplinary problems as additional justification for restructuring the Corps. Again statistics cannot be refuted, but other factors merit consideration. These factors are: the statistics were taken mostly from a

time when Marines were crowded aboard ships off Vietnam for as long as 88 days without a break; race relation problems are common to all services; Marines tend to use court martials more freely than other services. However, all these problems are to a great extent solvable. Higher recruiting standards recently initiated by the Marines should lower the number of disciplinary incidents.

The Navy/Marine team must continue to provide the strategic planner with the special options offered by an amphibious force. Binkin and Record's study should motivate the Marine Corps and Navy to review deployment plans, R. & D. and personnel procedures in order to maintain this important capability.

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Corse, Carl D., Jr. *Introduction to Shipboard Weapons*. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1975. 398pp.

The efforts of the United States Naval Institute to revitalize its practice of publishing texts dealing with the basic aspects of the naval profession are most commendable. Lieutenant Commander Corse's fine book is the sixth volume in the *Fundamentals of Naval Science Series* which thusfar has focused on the disciplines of shipboard organization, operations, and navigation.

In his preface, the author informs us that his intention is to provide a basic textbook on shipboard weapons systems which can be utilized in its entirety as an integrated program or in segments dealing with specific topics. Lieutenant Commander Corse envisions the majority of his readers as prospective naval officers, but he has selected and organized the material in a manner which will make this book an excellent reference for a newly commissioned officer to carry with him to his first command.

is divided into five parts: Introduction to Fire Control, Sensors and Detection Devices, Guns, Missiles, and Antisubmarine Weapons. The author explains that he is limiting his scope to include only those systems found on surface combatants, and, with the exception of a short digression on the Polaris fire control system in chapter 25, he follows this plan. Although the table of contents gives the appearance of a balanced analysis, an emphasis on gun systems is most evident—of some 390 pages of text, 230 pages are dedicated to guns and their support systems. A very good argument can be made that the solution of the gunfire control problem has been the basis for modern shipboard weapon technology and consequently a sound knowledge of these fundamentals is a prerequisite to understanding newer systems. Lieutenant Commander Corse's approach supports this philosophy, but there is some concern in this reviewer's mind that the detailed gun sections are inconsistent with the broader perspective utilized for other systems.

The sections on gun fundamentals are well prepared, and it is to the author's credit that he has based his development of linear rate systems on the MK-68 system and allowed the venerable MK-37 system to take its proper place in history. The discussions of digital MK-86 and MK-92 systems, which are included in the DD-963 and FFG-7 programs, are timely and informative. Further sections dealing with the MK-45 lightweight 5 inch/54 gun, the 76mm Oto Melara gun, the 20mm Close-in Weapon System (CIWS), and guided projectiles make excellent reading for naval officers without intimate knowledge of these new systems.

The chapters on sensors cover the full range from electro-optical devices to sonars. The introduction to radar fundamentals utilizes a clear approach characterized by excellent pictorial presentations and an absence of confusing technical detail. Sonar and MAD techniques