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Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy

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career opportunities. *Management* is recommended to any officer seeking a contemporary basis for management thought, to any officer schooled or curious in private enterprise management or curious about military application. It is not recommended to any officer looking for an easy book in management and business affairs. It is not a casual treatment of the subject. Rather it is a profound work, 61 chapters of carefully conceived and delivered statements regarding the state of this art. No graphs, no formulas, no quick answers to success. Drucker is verbose, seemingly redundant at times, with good result; he wants the reader to realize fully the significance of his statement and often it bears repeating. The majority of his text deals with American-based business organizations, as they serve as the most visible examples of good and bad management activities. This is not a shortcoming, but a strength. As mentioned earlier, if we are willing to fight for something, it might help to know what it is we are fighting for.

B.J. FAGAN
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U.S. Naval Academy

Higham, Robin, ed. *A Guide to the Sources of United States Military History*. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1975. 599pp.

At first blush a bibliographic essay appears to be something that would interest only researchers with specific questions in mind. However, this extraordinary compendium will appeal to a rather broad spectrum of students of U.S. military history, because it points out quite clearly those areas and topics that have received study, as well as those areas that so far have been neglected.

The editor wisely divided his subject into 19 chapters, ranging from "European Background of American Military

Affairs" to "Museums as Historical Resources." The contributors are highly qualified, competent, and respected historians, such as Russell Weigley, B. Franklin Cooling III, and Dean Allard.

The ground rules given to each contributor were for 20 pages of double-spaced text pages followed by 300 entries. After first surveying the general literature, the contributors were asked to "proceed logically to cover policy, strategy, tactics, planning, logistics and operations as practicable." Following these guidelines, the 19 contributors produced informative and succinct essays on substantive historical topics, as well as comprehensive bibliographies, frequently exceeding 300 entries. The result is a useful reference as well as an impressive summary of U.S. military history.

Unfortunately, the major flaw in this otherwise splendid volume is an excessive number of irritating typographical errors. For some unknown reason, the editor did not list this journal in his introduction with 128 other journals as a source of military history. However, this journal is included in the bibliography on "The Navy 1941-1973." A supplement will be forthcoming in 1978.

B.M. SIMPSON III
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Kahan, Jerome H. *Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975. 349pp.

Quanbeck, Alton H. and Wood, Archie L. *Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force: Why and How*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976. 116pp.

These two recent publications from the Brookings Institution are in no sense two peas from the same pod: the first is as careful, impressive, comprehensive, and balanced a treatment as has yet to appear on the question of forging a

strategic arms policy; the second is essentially a diatribe against the B-1 bomber.

At first glance one might be led to question the need for another book such as Kahan's. Ever since Henry Kissinger's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* appeared in 1957, each passing year has seen the bibliography on strategic nuclear policy and arms control grow by leaps and bounds. In more recent years the works of Chalmers M. Roberts, Herbert F. York, and Harland B. Moulton* would seem to have covered the ground treated by Kahan in the opening half of *Security in the Nuclear Age*. And yet while Kahan's style is neither as lively as Roberts' nor as impassioned as York's nor as detailed as Moulton's, it is an improvement over all three on the level of dispassionate analysis. It is also, of course, more current, bringing the story down to the opening months of 1974.

Kahan's historical treatment runs from the New Look to the Vladivostok Accord and leaves one with the dominant impression that the Nation has yet to think through the nuclear aspects of strategy in the modern world. To start with, nuclear weapons were introduced into our forces simply because they existed. They were just one more weapon, and President Eisenhower made it quite clear early on that they were to be viewed in that light. Speaking to the U.N. General Assembly in December 1953, he spoke of them as "having virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services." As late as March of 1955 he could speak of using them "exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else." The attainment of a

nuclear capability by the Soviets made nonsense of such thinking on any plane other than that of pure deterrence and led the Kennedy-Johnson administrations into a search for more realistic options regarding the use of force. Then came what future historians may come to call The Great Interruption in modern American life—the war in Vietnam, a topic that Kahan all but completely ignores, but which was probably the last thing we needed given the greater priority that should have accrued to finding a way to avoid a nuclear Armageddon.

President Nixon seemed to realize this and set in motion a concerted plan to liquidate the Vietnam venture so that the Nation could return its energies and attentions to more important matters (arms control, China, energy, et cetera). Like other American Presidents, he was seriously hampered, in the initiatives he might put forward for discussion, by the constraints imposed by considerations of electioneering. (Most Americans still agree with Ike in looking at nuclear weapons and confusing them with guns or bullets; the politician who would attempt to campaign on a finite or minimum deterrence platform would not get past the New Hampshire primary.) And yet some progress was made in SALT, although it was quickly condemned by the intellectuals of the guns and bullets crowd, and then came the political demise of Nixon on an unrelated issue. In the absence as yet of a clear mandate from the people, President Ford's options are even more severely constrained and the future for nuclear arms control is no clearer now than it was over a decade ago. The record thus far is something less than confidence inspiring.

Kahan fingers no villains in the piece, seeing McNamara's famous analogy of the "action-reaction phenomenon" as the driving force in the arms race without regard to persons or parties. "The calculus of conservative planning,"²

**The Nuclear Years: The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1945-1970* (New York: Praeger, 1970); *Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970); *From Superiority to Parity: The United States and the Strategic Arms Race, 1961-1971* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973).

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he writes in his restrained way, "was often inconsistent with the objectives of mutual stability and arms control" (p. 132).

The concluding half of Kahan's book delineates the issues for the coming decade, concluding with a plea for the introduction, by both sides, of at least some "principles of stable deterrence."

A mutual stability approach . . . rests on the premise that the U.S. is benefitted if the Soviet Union maintains a strategic deterrent capability comparable in overall strength to our own . . . Accordingly, while . . . retaining a confident deterrent force, the U.S. should also seek to avoid posing a threat to the USSR's deterrent or, more generally, should attempt to avoid causing Soviet leaders to fear that the U.S. is seeking a form of strategic superiority. (p. 272)

That kind of talk will never get very far in an election year, but there may be some possibilities after November. The politician (or analyst) who would seek some guidance in laying out the issues for the coming decade would be well advised to ponder this book long and hard. No brief review can do justice to the precise and lucid manner in which it lays out the cases for alternative nuclear postures and policies, or to the scrupulous manner in which the author presents the opposing arguments of hawks and doves, both American and Russian. (Indeed, this book has more paragraphs starting with "On the other hand" than any I have seen on any subject!) If one believes that the present instability of the so-called nuclear arms race poses almost as great a threat as the weapons themselves, he will find Kahan's analysis helpful in structuring his own ideas. If he does not, if he will have none of stability (or "parity" or "sufficiency" or "détente" or other bad words), he will probably find the book subversive

* * * * *

Quanbeck and Wood's *Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force* should come as no particular surprise to those familiar with Quanbeck and [Barry M.] Blechman's *Strategic Forces: Issues for the Mid-Seventies*, another Brookings study that appeared 3 years ago. Pages 43-50 of the 1973 study outlined a plan calling for cancellation of the B-1 in favor of a force of wide-body superjets in the role of standoff "bombers" carrying cruise missiles. In the 1976 study, Quanbeck returns to the lineup with a new teammate but with no change to the game plan. The basic proposal remains the same, albeit extended now from 7 to 116 pages and replete with all the systems analysis concepts so dear to those now or ever associated with OSD's PA&E office.

The authors do not dispute the need for a manned bomber to serve as "insurance against the failure of the missile forces." They are, however, alarmed at the projected cost of the B-1 program, so much so that they are led to bias the argument against the B-1 by holding that a new jet tanker will be required to service it. (This they do, in the face of repeated denials by the USAF Chief of Staff, on the basis of a remark by the then CINCSAC during a Senate hearing more than 5 years ago.)

The analysis begins by identifying five alternative bomber forces:

- modified B52G/H's (including rocket assistance for faster takeoffs)

- B-1's

- a derivative of large transport aircraft, such as the C-5 or the Boeing 747

- new aircraft (unspecified) designed for maximum ability to survive a surprise attack

- a derivative of large transport aircraft with rocket assistance for faster takeoff

The first two of these forces would be armed with decoys and short-range attack missiles; the other three would carry long-range ballistic or cruise

missiles. The analysis then proceeds by way of a theoretical evaluation of the five alternative forces with cost, pre-launch survivability, and penetration ability as the prime comparative factors. Next come the now all but canonical statements of assumptions, charts, graphs, tables, and comparison of analytical results. From these are drawn two conclusions:

—There are marked economic advantages for a bomber force that carries standoff missiles, which would be an alternative to the B-1 in modernizing the bomber force.

—There appear to be no significant military advantages to be gained by deploying a new penetrating bomber such as the B-1 in preference to this alternative.

The first conclusion may well prove out in the long run, if "marked economic advantages" is long for "it's cheaper;" the second conclusion strikes this reader as nonsensical.

The argument is based on assumptions about ALCM's (air-launched cruise missiles) that suggest they are an already proved weapon of quite remarkable powers, to include that of penetrating to targets heavily defended by SAM's—this despite their inability to perform evasive maneuvers, their zero ECM capability, and their subsonic speed! (Not even to mention the possibility that the next round of SALT will see an agreement limiting the allowable range of ALCM's to less than 400 miles.)

The discussion about standoff 747's loaded down with a gaggle of ALCM's brings to mind a picture of great "battleships of the skies" tooling around out there over the ocean wastes presenting a target of incredible vulnerability. This possibility does not bother Quanbeck and Wood; they simply point out that the Soviets do not now have a proved capability to defend against our bombers at long range and are unlikely to develop such a capability. There is no

best way to see them develop such a capability in record time is to deploy such easily tracked dreadnoughts.

The authors point out that their proposed standoff bombers carry much more fuel than either B-52's or B-1's and therefore would not require any tanker support. Conveniently, they do not bring up the obvious question of the duration of airborne deployments, surely the *single* crucial factor in determining tanker requirements.

In short, the conclusions arrived at by the authors are certainly to be seen as arguable rather than as proved, if not with regard to projected dollar costs than certainly with respect to comparative (or alternative) combat capabilities. So-called cost-benefit analysis can be a valuable technique, the more so when the systems being compared are truly comparable in capability. That they are in the present instance remains to be demonstrated. Finally, and perhaps equally important, it is only fair to point out that one of the best arguments against Quanbeck and Wood is contained in the closing pages (332-33) of Kahan's *Security in the Nuclear Age*.

In the course of arguing his case for the recognition of some mutually acceptable principles of stable deterrence, Kahan points out that "despite the likely continued safety of submarines, diversity is essential for stable deterrence." The particular diversity he favors is one involving a diad of SLBM's and manned bombers, the latter by virtue of their penetration and launch-on-warning capabilities providing a particularly effective hedge against the possibility that the Soviet Union might evade or abrogate the terms of the ABM treaty. He concludes that given the known capabilities of these systems and in the interests of mutual stability, there would appear to be no need to introduce entirely new types of systems (such as ALCM's or air-launched ICBM's) in a misguided effort to provide greater diversity in our strategic

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posture. Or, one is tempted to add, to get off cheaper.

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Knightley, Phillip. *The First Casualty From the Crimea to Vietnam: the War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975. 465pp.

The central issue of this utterly fascinating book comes close to the core of the Republic: under what circumstances, if any, must a free press exercise restraint in favor of the true and legitimate interests of a nation engaged in wartime survival? There is an accompanying corollary of concern to public servants: when, if ever, may officials deceive or lie in order to suppress "bad news"? It was former Pentagon spokesman Arthur Sylvester who, during the heat of the Vietnam conflict, suggested that a government might lie to protect itself, thus giving this age-old controversy a modern update. The issues involved, if history is a guide, remain largely and pragmatically speaking unresolved, adding emphasis to the usefulness of this intriguing and well-written history of wartime foreign correspondence.

Phillip Knightley, the author, is an experienced British journalist of catholic interests. His research is impressive and his documentation is careful and ample. His prejudice is obvious: the burden of proof of honesty must be borne by the government. In this regard, he follows the philosophical lead of the Persians and Greeks of antiquity, as well as the more contemporary view of CBS Vice President William Small, who share the feeling that bad news brings nothing but a desire "to kill the messenger."

This then is Knightley's starting point. Wars, he suggests, may be necessary and in their course heroism, selflessness and national determination may

be found and accentuated. But, no matter, he argues, the "first casualty" turns out to be candor--the truth--which, he feels, gives way to suppression not so much of facts as of trends, developments, and attitudes. He supports his thesis with a brilliant series of historical vignettes tracing war correspondence and reportage from the Crimean War to Vietnam.

There is much to contemplate. Not only does author Knightley allege "coverup" of government press policies and conduct, but he is candid enough to admit the often overlooked inadequacies of the press from the paid propagandists, nee correspondents, in the American Civil War to the "proto-journalists" of Vietnam, men with no journalistic experience save a yearning to make a name out of the misery of Vietnam.

The book's approach is straightforward, the methodology historic and easily analyzed. In the Crimea, for example, foreign correspondence received its first great modern impetus. Rather than crib from foreign papers or rely on letters from serving officers, the British press posted to the front its own great war correspondent William Howard Russell of *The Times* of London. The results were impressive: from a reform of the British Army's officer patronage system, to Florence Nightingale, to the heroic story of that great error, the Charge of the Light Brigade. In the War between the States, the rise of the telegraph added a currency to war reportage but did little for the competency of the correspondents who were generally ill-equipped for the task and largely venal to boot. The first Battle of Bull Run was, to make the point, reported as a major Union victory.

With the flowering of literacy in the Western World, war correspondents developed into a breed apart and from 1865 to 1914 their fame grew, most especially that of Luigi Barzini, whose