

Naval War College Review

Volume 30
Number 4 *Autumn*

Article 9

1977

Professional Reading


Thomas H. Etzold

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

Etzold, Thomas H. (1977) "Professional Reading," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 30 : No. 4 , Article 9.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol30/iss4/9>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.



PROFESSIONAL READING

REVIEW ARTICLE

INDIVIDUALS, IDEAS, AND INSTITUTIONS

Recent Writings on American Foreign Policy

by

Thomas H. Etzold

Some years ago, when after decades of parsimony the Congress at last was appropriating monies to construct or purchase modern embassies and consulates, one of the old hands in the Foreign Service remarked of the goings-on that the Department of State seemed to be suffering from an edifice complex. Reading an assortment of books on American foreign affairs makes readily apparent the fact that historians and political scientists have developed a similar neurosis, for their writings abound with references to "architects," "building blocks" and "pillars," and more "structures," "frameworks," and "foundations" than one could count in a dozen issues of *Scientific American* or *Popular Mechanics*. These terms refer, of course, to the enduring trinity of topics in foreign affairs analysis, namely; individuals, ideas, and institutions, three categories that permit rough grouping of the books treated here.

Individuals. It is one of the ironies of history that great men are fated to be misunderstood at best, and very likely vilified, at least for a time. Greatness earns hostility from competitors and carping critics alike. Great deeds and

forceful personalities also generate a more legitimate sort of controversy. For in statecraft, traditionally as well as today, important elements of the problems remain susceptible only to intuitive treatment, so that one cannot command consensus by the appearance of "scientific" decisionmaking in the manner, say, of Herbert Hoover.

In the history of American foreign affairs, the result of this irony has been that, as of 1977, every Secretary of State since World War II, with the possible exception of George Marshall, appears in the literature either as a nonentity (Edward Stettinius, William Rogers), or predominantly as a villain (James Byrnes, Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Dean Rusk, Henry Kissinger).

Since the Second World War, two of those men have impressed their world views on American foreign affairs to an extent scarcely approached by any of their colleagues and contemporaries: Dean G. Acheson, and Henry A. Kissinger. Acheson has become known as the "architect" of containment and the cold war, and Kissinger as the individual who closed the door on Acheson's edifice and then, with Richard M. Nixon collaborating, set

110 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

about fashioning a new "structure of peace."¹ Because of their preeminent influence on postwar international order and America's role therein, Acheson and Kissinger have received a more-than-average share of attention, and, one suspects, of criticism, a fact which makes favorable assessments of either both rare and valuable as counterweights to the natural correlation between attention and criticism.

It has been almost 25 years since Acheson turned over the Department of State to John Foster Dulles. Sometimes inside, sometimes outside, but never far from high government circles from 1945 to 1949, Acheson presided at the State Department from 1949 to 1953. He was indeed "present at the creation" of the postwar international order, as he claimed in the title of his most significant volume of memoirs.² During the years between his departure from office and his death in October 1971, Acheson wrote, lectured, and served as a senior statesman-advisor to Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon (Acheson was too critical, and too much involved in Democratic Party politics, to be called on in the Eisenhower years). Even Kissinger is said to have respected Acheson's opinions.

Alive, Acheson continually stimulated controversy by his style, personality, and politics; in death such controversies have continued without abatement. While Secretary of State Acheson drew the fire of rightwing anti-Communists for failing to demonstrate eagerness to rid the State Department of all "205 card-carrying Communists" discovered there by Senator Joe McCarthy; for "losing" China; for advocating the pusillanimous policy of containment; and for limiting aims in Korea. (In one of the most alliterative phrases of the era, critics complained about Acheson's College of Cowardly Containment.) In subsequent years Acheson became the target of leftist or liberal ideologues, who indicted him as

the master builder of the cold war, the developer of containment into a global ideological struggle and a "militarized" foreign policy. Only since his death has there emerged a clear line of favorable assessment to countervail the long-standing, if somewhat contradictory, negative appraisals of his contributions to postwar American foreign affairs.

The most recent book on Acheson, by political scientist David S. McLellan, is likely to stand as a milestone in the evaluation of that public servant, and not only because it is generally favorable in tone.* In treating Acheson's times and policies, McLellan has successfully presented an overview first of the challenges for U.S. policymakers inherent in postwar circumstances, and second of the extent to which American foreign policy represented a coherent and effectual response. In doing so, he has demonstrated the integrity of Acheson's views and actions in this context.

For Acheson the great question of the postwar period was "whether the West could achieve the unity and discipline needed to preserve itself in an age of revolution and totalitarianism."³ The inability of the United Nations to diminish great power conflicts after World War II, and its corresponding inutility in controlling atomic energy and weapons, made the division of Europe, and indeed of the world, a virtual certainty after about 1947. Thereafter Acheson's policies were intended to strengthen and unite the West while denying significant accretions of power to the Soviet Union. Thus he emphasized the American connection with Western Europe and the need to integrate a rehabilitated Germany into Western economy and defense.

McLellan confirms Acheson's claim to have had a large role in shaping the

*David S. McLellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1976), 466pp. index. illustrations, \$17.50.

postwar world, and attributes both his influence in office and his controversial bent out of office to a combination of outspokenness, logic, and integrity. He numbers among Acheson's failures his errors in the Far East, especially regarding the People's Republic of China during the Korean War; his inability to bring about the rearmament of Germany; and an approach to worldwide communism that proved piecemeal, and therefore less than effective. His successes, which in McLellan's view clearly outweighed his failures, came in the "establishment of a strategic basis for dealing with the Soviet Union";⁴ in bringing about sufficient European unity to permit the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; in good relations with the United Nations, the American public, and the Congress; and in successful management of the bureaucracy. McLellan emphasizes that Acheson and Truman were concerned principally with power, and not ideology; and he makes a strong case for the idea that they acted defensively rather than aggressively.

What Acheson built, Kissinger razed; at least so it would seem from Administration rhetoric in the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford years. Cold war gave way to détente; the United States moved from meaningless strategic superiority toward parity and sufficiency vis-à-vis the Soviet Union; and American foreign policy worldwide turned away from the defense of dominance via military means and toward acceptance of the "realities of interdependence."

The result, in favorable assessment: "The world is a safer place today because of [Kissinger's] courage and vision. It may even be a little better."⁵ In negative assessment:

Suppose that Kissinger is, in the common parlance, "some kind of nut or something." . . . Before Kissinger and his detente, the Free World nations had a Cold War, but hard currencies. They had some

inflation, but only in the controllable degree which accompanies increases in Gross National Product. Subsequent to Kissinger and SALT, every great Western nation slid into double-digit inflation, the disappearance of governmental stability, and a loss of confidence in national security. The only beneficiaries, other than the oil-rich Arabs, are the Soviets themselves. . . . Everything Dr. Kissinger touches turns out very much like his great wheat deal.⁶

Although Kissinger has so recently left office that one can scarcely arrive at a measured assessment of his legacy, there are already more books written about him than there have been about Acheson in the last 25 years. The two books quoted and cited here, one quite recent and the other now going on 2 years old, represent the sharply contrasting strains in the growing literature of "Kissingerology."

For Stoessinger, Kissinger stands as an archetype of the scholar-statesman, a familiar historical figure. Indeed, this view forms the organizational scheme of his book.* The first section contains seven chapters on Kissinger's ideas about statecraft as developed out of his personal experience and academic reflections; the second section consists of six chapters on Kissinger's application of those ideas, convictions, and methods in Indochina, détente with Russia, relations with China, Europe, the Third World, and the Middle East. The book concludes with a chapter reflecting on the "anguish of power."

Stoessinger emphasizes Kissinger's search for stability in the world order, because of his view that stability is requisite to peace, and therefore it should be the first goal of statecraft. The great danger to stability, according

*John G. Stoessinger, *Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power* (New York: Norton, 1976), 234pp. index. \$8.95.

112 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

to Kissinger, is revolution; that is, the ideological pursuit of unlimited objectives in a manner threatening the survival of other states. From this perspective, Stoessinger writes, "peace became a kind of bonus that history awarded to those statesmen who were able to create a stable international equilibrium of states that recognized each other's right to permanent existence."⁷ To Kissinger, the end of the cold war and the beginnings of détente flowed from just such a recognition on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union; each state, after 25 years of denying the other's legitimacy, would have to admit that its principal adversary was present to stay in the international arena, and rightfully so. This implied no necessary friendship, no lessening of the need for adequate national security. It merely altered some of the assumptions as to appropriate methods for attaining a more secure environment.

Another major ingredient of Kissinger's statecraft according to Stoessinger was his conviction that effective diplomacy depends on the willingness to use force. In this, of course, Kissinger was not unique. In recent times, Dean Acheson also shared that conviction, and indeed described his actions as attempts to develop situations of strength from which to negotiate. No less a figure than George F. Kennan, so often critical of contemporary American employment of military forces, went on record in the late 1940's saying: "You have no idea how much it contributes to the general politeness and pleasantness of diplomacy when you have a little quiet armed force in the background."⁸ This conviction in Kissinger's diplomacy underlay the tough approach of the first Nixon administration to peace negotiations via bombings in Southeast Asia.

Finally, Stoessinger has focused on a paradox that leads, in his opinion, to "the anguish of power": political decision consists in choosing lesser evils

over greater ones. Thus the responsibility of power is to choose; the anguish of power is to know that political choices and the actions flowing from them are inevitably evil. He gives Kissinger high praise for refusing simply to avoid decision. Kissinger "knew that abstention from evil did not affect the existence of evil in the world, but only destroyed the faculty of choice."⁹

In all, Stoessinger's volume is a thoughtful—and thought-provoking—treatise on statesmanship as well as on one particular statesman, and the only book on Kissinger to date that deserves to be designated "required reading."

Phyllis Schlafly, an author and journalist, and Chester Ward, a retired Navy rear admiral, certainly agree that Kissinger demolished the structure of American foreign policy that antedated his accession to power first as national security advisor and then as Secretary of State.* Indeed, in their overlong and highly emotional analysis of Kissinger's alleged mental disorders and invidious influence (as the authors see it), they accuse him of having destroyed every important strategic advantage and source of political influence that the United States might have possessed or exercised in the cold war. Kissinger, they write, "conned Richard Nixon with the concept of 'nuclear sufficiency' that Kissinger admits is not sufficient to protect our allies."¹⁰ He "imposed on U.S. grand strategy the theory that strategic nuclear power is not usable."¹¹ And in what the authors judge to be stupidity, if not treason, he failed to bring about an enlargement of conventional forces corresponding to the increased importance of conventional forces at a time when nuclear capabilities were supposedly unusable.

*Phyllis Schlafly and Chester Ward, *Kissinger on the Couch* (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1975), 846pp. index. \$12.95.

Because of its *ad hominem*, hyperbolic style, *Kissinger on the Couch* received scant critical notice upon its publication; the few early reviews focused on the book's many obvious weaknesses and its rude tone without appreciating that at the same time it was likely to stand as one of the most comprehensive statements of dissent from the principal lines of grand strategy carrying forward from the McNamara years and through Kissinger. The arguments of those opposing SALT are based on concern for the security of the United States, and a belief in the utility for defense and deterrence of some kind of military superiority. They receive bad press, or no press, in the United States at present. This condition is not conducive to the rounded public discussion that such subjects require, so that this book deserves attention as a thoroughgoing critique of what the authors consider to be the prevalent and "unfounded defeatist attitudes about the capabilities of the United States."^{1 2}

Ideas. The ideas prominent in policy discussions at present may lead some observers to suspect that Kissinger's much-vaunted attention to strategic arms will turn out to have been ancillary to his reorientation of American foreign policy toward the so-called "new international agenda." During Kissinger's tenure as Secretary of State, the idea of interdependence came into its own. It is certain to be of the highest importance in coming decades, first because it represents the intellectual framework of Kissinger's move "from confrontation to cooperation" with the world's great powers as well as with the Third World; and second, because it demarks the principal differences in assumptions and methods between the cold war diplomats from Acheson to Kissinger and the policy intellectuals, including Kissinger himself, of the years since 1968.

The word "interdependence" has been used so widely and variously in

recent literature that it is perhaps necessary to sort out the principal definitions and to indicate which are most meaningful in consideration of contemporary foreign policy. There are at least four such definitions.^{1 3} One is the idea that all mankind depends on the same biosphere, so that for a healthful environment each person depends on the constructive self-restraint of everyone else. A second meaning of interdependence is the thought that every people and government in the world depends on the nuclear-capable powers to refrain from a mode of warfare that would have catastrophic and global effects. A third meaning is the view that the relationship between domestic and foreign affairs in most countries, and certainly in the major powers, is growing closer. In a fourth definition, the one most important for policy, interdependence is the "global web of transactions" in trade, resources, investment and monetary affairs. The common thread through all of the meanings is the idea that international cooperation is essential.^{1 4}

Conceptually, interdependence represents a thoroughgoing challenge to the assumptions about international circumstances and foreign policy methods characteristic of American foreign affairs since the Acheson years. It has been argued in recent months that the United States shaped the postwar international order by means of the calculated use of threats and pain, that is, a "diplomacy of violence," on the explicit assumption that "force could be productively wedded to diplomacy."^{1 5} In an interesting combination of types three and four of interdependence, as outlined above, some authors have suggested that in the Vietnam and Watergate eras, the external methods of the United States collided with America's traditional internal values and institutions to produce a public "stunned" into a dangerous apathy about issues of national security and national interest.

114 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

The amelioration of this condition, so it is argued, can come only through recognition of the realities of interdependence: the United States must bring about greater consonance between the methods of its policy and the morals of the polity; and it must recognize that because human fate is interdependent in many important respects, the injury done to others in foreign affairs ultimately is done to one's self.

The attractiveness of the idea of interdependence has resulted in a "sudden" literature on the subject, a voluminous outpouring of books and articles within a very short time. Some of these books are of enduring worth.

In 1975, Bayless Manning, the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., New York, delivered a series of lectures at Claremont College concerning the implications of interdependence for American foreign affairs in the coming century. The published version of the lectures remains one of the most graceful and brief statements of the large changes evident in the contemporary international order, as well as of the challenges posed to American diplomacy and indeed to traditional statecraft.*

Drawing lessons from the oil crisis of 1973, recent U.S. economic relations with Japan, and shifts in great power relationships in various specific contexts, Manning notes some of the most salient alterations in the conditions of international concourse from an American perspective. In the coming decades, he notes, the United States is going to have to bargain for what it wants; it will no longer be able simply to announce goals and have opposition bend to America's economic, military, and technical supremacy. Further, the United States is going to have to bargain not

only with great states but with lesser states, not only bilaterally but multilaterally. The subjects of such bargaining are less likely to be balance of power and spheres of influence, as in former times, than to be items on the new international agenda: energy, resources, environment, population, the use of space and the seas.

The problems raised by these developments have led Manning to extremely important conclusions, each argued at chapter length in his monograph. He believes it essential that the government communicate to the American public the fact of alteration and the new content of the agenda in international affairs. He pronounces flatly that "separation of the public from foreign policy information will not be an option that is available to the government of the United States. . . . Foreign policy issues are increasingly intermixed with domestic political issues."¹⁶ It is particularly important to explain clearly that under the new circumstances of international diplomacy, the limits of American power—as well as the extent of it—need the most careful understanding. And he argues also for education of the public on the "necessities of negotiation" to reduce public apprehension about American involvement in such processes and to increase public patience.

In another important conclusion, perhaps more timely in 1977 than it was even in 1975, Manning warns that a high degree of ideological content in American foreign policy will not necessarily "produce consensus, eliminate debate, or provide answers to foreign policy problems."¹⁷

Finally, he points to the problems that the new diplomacy is creating for the old establishment. Sustained negotiation, the internal tension between special interests and general interests in developing coherent negotiating positions, the unsatisfactory state of congressional-executive relations in foreign

*Bayless Manning, *The Conduct of United States Foreign Policy in the Nation's Third Century* (Claremont, Calif.: Claremont College, 1976), 131pp. \$4.50.

policy matters, cumbersome congressional procedures in foreign affairs, and bureaucratic problems within the State Department all constitute obstacles to effective American diplomacy amid changing conditions in world affairs.

The changing circumstances of world diplomacy remarked in Manning's essay seem virtually certain to endure at least through the next several decades. The problems of public opinion, ideology, and foreign affairs machinery noted in his essays will assuredly take many years to solve, if indeed they ever are resolved. These considerations assure that his elegant treatment will deserve continued reading.

Another book of essays has made a notable contribution to public analysis and discussion of the issues of interdependence. In 1974 the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar at the Center for Policy Study, University of Chicago, held a conference on the policy choices for the United States demonstrated in part by the new and somewhat uncomfortable dependence manifested in the oil crisis of the preceding year. The papers presented at the conference were published in 1975 under the editorship of Morton Kaplan, the director of the seminar.*

The premise of Kaplan's collection is that the United States faces a "new and critical set of choices . . . that will help shape the world for the next generation."¹⁸ The concern of the group is that as a result of Vietnam and Watergate, discussion seems to be proceeding along the mistaken line that the choices are either isolationism or interventionism. Kaplan and his colleagues propose instead that the more important choice lies between isolationism and interdependence. They reinforce the argument that in the coming years, conflicts

of interest are likely to center on economic issues rather than on power politics.

The method Kaplan's group has employed to explore the problems of choice in contemporary American foreign policy contributes notably to the usefulness of the collection. By taking seriously the possibility of American isolation from the world across a "broad spectrum of activities,"¹⁹ the essays attempt to explore the broad, fundamental question of just what America contributes to the world, and, correspondingly, just what the possession of an internationalist orientation contributes to the United States. This technique has not resulted in a set of answers to the policy choices on particular issues raised in the various chapters—security policy, resources, science and technology, economic policy, national development, domestic politics and social welfare; instead, and by design, it has clarified the problems and the choices in each of these areas.

Although much has been published on the subject of interdependence since these essays were prepared, they remain important as a collection. They are unparalleled for the breadth of issues considered from the vantage of American policy. The inclusion of views skeptical of interdependence as unavoidable reality, and serious consideration of the possibilities involved in an American turn away from internationalism and toward economic sufficiency, provide a viewpoint difficult to find elsewhere, but necessary for balanced or thorough consideration of the topic. Finally, the book contains examples of high-quality analytic thought by well-informed individual scholars. The relatively early appearance of these essays testifies to the foresight of the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, for the topic of interdependence gives every sign that it will continue to increase in importance.

A curiosity of American political life is responsible for the appearance of the

*Morton Kaplan, *Isolation or Interdependence? Today's Choices for Tomorrow's World* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 254pp., \$10.00.

116 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

third, and last, book to be considered in this section on ideas in contemporary American foreign affairs.* George Ball, former Under Secretary of State and Ambassador to the United Nations, in the election year 1976 put forward his ideas on recent and future policy in a frank bid for appointment as Secretary of State. Where but in America, one must wonder, could someone aspire to become the first minister of state by literary endeavor rather than, say, by marrying the daughter (or some other relative) of the head of state, mounting a coup, or writing generous checks to various individuals and organizations?

Although Ball did not get the appointment, his book remains of considerable interest. He divides his volume into five sections. The first surveys the Nixon-Kissinger policies and style in "correcting aberrations in past policy,"²⁰ with principal attention to opening relations with China, the evolution of détente with the Soviet Union, and the prolonged effort to extricate the country from the Vietnam involvement. The second section discusses new aberrations introduced into American foreign affairs in the course of eliminating some old ones, and pays particular attention to the consequences of Kissinger's style (shuttle diplomacy), and to those of inadequate attention to the Western alliance and to Japan. A third section concerns the need for reform of diplomatic and intelligence agencies. The fourth section addresses new problems for American foreign policy arising out of population growth, resource limitations, poverty, and the diffusion of power in the world community—in short, the issues of dependence and interdependence. The fifth section of the book contains Ball's

prescriptions and exhortations for improved policy, institutions, and national morale.

Ball's book deserves careful reading for several reasons. First, it is a responsible and restrained critique of Kissinger's diplomacy. Second, the critique is balanced by a sense of what is possible in diplomacy and by considered concern for national interests. Third, the critique is augmented by positive recommendations and alternatives, so that it is not merely an extended exercise in negativism. Finally, and despite the fact that Ball did not become Secretary of State to President Carter, it is the best overall statement to date of the intellectual and moral premises that appear to undergird the Carter approach to foreign affairs.

Ball is skeptical of the results of détente; he is unconvinced that lasting beneficial results will accrue to the United States from relations with the People's Republic of China; he is convinced that the starting point for sound policy is the revival of the Western alliance. He believes that the facts and issues of interdependence, and the new preeminence of economics in diplomacy, herald an era in which sustained negotiation will be the hallmark of American foreign affairs, and he believes it is past time to prepare for that change institutionally. His largest point concerns the need to restore public confidence in America's special capability—and responsibility—to contribute to an improved world order; for only in such confidence does he think essential national unity can be regained. Like President Carter, he believes that human rights and liberal values are the logical and proper bases for such a national spirit and consensus.

As noted at the outset of this section, not only Manning, Kaplan, and Ball, but Kissinger himself has joined in proclaiming interdependence as a reality, and not just a policy or an optional frame of mind. Kissinger stands

*George Ball, *Diplomacy for a Crowded World: An American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), 356pp. index. \$12.95.

PROFESSIONAL READING 117

a fair chance of going down in history principally as the Secretary of State who first recognized the new importance of international economic relationships, of interdependence. For the realization of the intimate relationship of American well-being to that of the many other states of the world formed the conceptual outline, and therefore the conceptual legacy, of Kissinger's diplomacy.

Yet one suspects that Kissinger may already be in the uncomfortable position that George F. Kennan occupied in relation to containment policy many years ago. In his memoirs Kennan wrote that the reactions to his public enunciation of containment policy had made him feel "Like one who has inadvertently loosened a large boulder from the top of a cliff and now helplessly witnesses its path of destruction in the valley below, shuddering and wincing at each successive glimpse of disaster. . . ." ²¹ Whether interdependence will mean disaster as policy, one can scarcely tell at present. But it is safe to say that Kissinger's view of the United States as caught up in unavoidable interdependence has informed his view of the meaning of strategic superiority, and vice versa, so that the issues of interdependence will be inextricable from those of strategy, power, and eminence as, in years to come, analysts strive to assess Kissinger's influence on America's place in the world.

Institutions. For many years, one of the most important aspects of American foreign relations received virtually no public discussion: institutions, or organization, for the conduct of foreign affairs. It is one thing to devise policy; it is quite another, and sometimes quite a bit more difficult, actually to conduct foreign relations in such a way as to conduce to the goals of policy and the interests of state. Of course, this is not merely a problem of foreign policy; it is an aspect of the human condition. In

the old proverb, it was said that "There's many a slip 'twixt cup and lip." Carl von Clausewitz made a similar, if somewhat more elegant, point in enunciating the idea of "friction," by which he meant all those difficulties arising in the course of an attempt to translate the abstract into reality, as an idea or plan into action.

Neglect of organizational considerations in American foreign affairs has had many causes. It may have been due in part to the intimidating complexity of governmental organizations when viewed from outside. In some measure it may have resulted from unawareness of the important connection between organization and results in such areas. Most of all, that neglect was probably a reflection of the incredible boredom that traditional approaches to organizational history have engendered in students as well as in the general public. Government bureaucracies are, of course, still complex and intimidating—if anything more so than in times past. But there has been an increased public realization that institutional arrangements have something to do with performance, an idea stimulated by renewed congressional interest in policy processes and organizations. In another development, the conjunction of studies in social psychology, modern management, and group biography (prosopography, as it is somewhat ponderously known in the trade) has brought new liveliness and interest to the study of American organization for the conduct of foreign affairs.

The most important development of all bearing on the erosion of traditional neglect of institutional considerations in American foreign affairs has been the emergence of interdependence and a correlative requirement for "multilateral diplomacy." Both Manning and Ball made large points concerning the out-moded nature of American institutions in this context. Some 2 years ago the prestigious Atlantic Council went on

118 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

record with the conclusion that there was almost no diplomacy of the old sort remaining. In world affairs, bilateral negotiations, the stuff of which diplomacy formerly had been made, had virtually been superseded by "efforts for multilateral harmonization of policy," for which the State Department, with its geographic and functional bureau organization, was scarcely suited.²² Recently a functionary at the Department of State noted that in 1976 the United States was represented at more than 800 international conferences, presumably most of them convened for the purpose of thrashing out some problem or another. Seven years ago, in fact, the Department of State concluded in a famous self-study that "at the technical, functional, and developmental levels, international co-operation is the largest 'growth' function in our line of business."²³ Recognizing, or perhaps indicating, that times were changing, on 19 March 1975, the House Foreign Affairs Committee requested and received a change of name; it is now the House International Relations Committee, and seven of its ten subcommittees have the word "international" in their titles.²⁴

The writings on aspects of institution and organization in American foreign affairs fall into two main categories. The first is concerned with people in a group, or people as a group. The second category of writings focuses directly on aspects of organization and bureaucracy, rather than on the people within.

Three books concerned with the first category—people in groups—deal with different aspects of professionalism in the diplomatic corps. One addresses the topic of professionalism and policy influence, one that of professionalism and morale, and the last that of professionalism in style and method.

Not until early in the 20th century did the United States establish its diplomatic representatives on a professional basis. According to Robert D.

Schulzinger, of the history faculty at the School of International Studies, University of Denver, this development was supposed to ensure two things: The government and its political leaders were supposed to have the confidence that the foreign affairs of the country were in the hands of a competent, experienced, "serene and imperturbable" group of professionals; and the members of that group were supposed to become prominent, even predominant, in the making of foreign policy.*

Almost everything went wrong with that idea. From the 1920's to the 1970's the diplomats tried again and again to achieve paramount influence in foreign affairs, always to fail. Time and again, political leaders found a State Department and a Foreign Service cumbersome, unresponsive, unready for the implementation of Presidential policy. Part of the problem, as is well known, was that many other officials and agencies had legitimate interests in the conduct of American foreign affairs. Part of the problem—and this is the special contribution of Schulzinger's book—was that as a group, the professional diplomats presented too diverse and incoherent a picture to outsiders. As a result, political leaders would never grant "Foreign Service officers complete independence in foreign policy work, because the politicians never knew precisely where the Foreign Service officers stood."²⁵ At various points in the century, diplomats tried to gain more influence by augmenting their general competence as diplomatic practitioners with specialist knowledge in areas such as international economics. This only rendered them vulnerable to

*Robert D. Schulzinger, *The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training, Outlook and Style of the United States Foreign Officers, 1908-1931* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1975), 235pp. index. \$15.00.

competition via the lateral entry of equally qualified, or better qualified, outside experts.

In the 1960's and 1970's, modern management skills were employed within the State Department and Foreign Service in an attempt to bridge the dilemma of "general readiness as against functional specialization," but without much success.²⁶ It was also a serious blow to the "influence via professionalism" school that Kissinger became Secretary of State in 1973. On the one hand, his appointment demonstrated that "general diplomatic ability was necessary to the direction of foreign policy"; on the other hand, his career showed that "a Foreign Service background was not the only way to learn the diplomatic craft."²⁷

Schulzinger's book raises an issue that goes far beyond the dates indicated in his title, and beyond the bounds of the diplomatic profession as well. Military officers just as much as diplomatic officers face the problems of balancing general competence and specialized skills or abilities. Inside the military and diplomatic services, this balancing most often receives attention in terms of career patterns and advancement. The dimension external to the services, however, relates to the issue of how to make public servants as useful as possible in day-to-day work while making them as good as may be necessary in extreme circumstances. There is every reason to think that the experience of the diplomats may be relevant to that of the military in this larger context.

The theme of professionalism and morale is also one of great contemporary interest to the military services. This has not always been the case. It has been fewer than 20 years since an American diplomat opened his memoir, somewhat self-pityingly, by quoting the famous line of the great French diplomatist Jules Cambon: "Unlike the military, the diplomat is not the spoilt child of historians."²⁸ In the aftermath

of Vietnam, the military has been feeling just as much self-commiseration as the diplomats, and probably with about as much justice. Here the experience of American diplomats is both instructive and encouraging. Now, 25 years after the public pillorying of some of the most capable men in the diplomatic service, an entire literature has grown up to celebrate their virtues, their foresight, their sturdy loyalty and high competence.

For about 10 years following 1944, diplomats and others who might conceivably have had anything to do with the success of the Communists in China were abused, persecuted, and humiliated. Many career experts on East Asia were driven from the service after having had their loyalty impugned, primarily because they had predicted Communist success in the Chinese civil war. Their tribulations, of course, were merely one aspect of the prolonged Red-hating, Red-baiting period known as the McCarthy era. The hapless China hands of the State Department became the scapegoats, the incorrect foci of hate, frustration, confusion, and error as the American public and Congress discovered in the difficult aftermath of the Second World War that everything was not going to work out all right. The suggestion here is not that in Vietnam the military was as right as those diplomats in the 1940's who foresaw the triumph of the Chinese Communists; rather, it is that the military similarly has become a scapegoat for much that went wrong in the troubled 1960's and early 1970's.

E.J. Kahn's book about the China hands is the story of the Foreign Service officers caught up in the American reaction—perhaps one should say over-reaction—to adverse developments in postwar foreign affairs.* His volume is

*E.J. Kahn, *The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them* (New York: The Viking Press, 1975), 337pp. index. \$12.95.

120 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

high-quality journalism rather than definitive scholarship, and yet it raises the essential points. The nation lost the services of the only experienced China authorities it had available in the Foreign Service just when Far Eastern affairs most required expert attention. More important, the morale of the service was damaged beyond immediate repair. The consequences, as others have remarked in various writings, were not limited to the issue of China or to the time of the latter 1940's and early 1950's. The service became overly conformist, lost a great deal of independence of judgment, and sought to avoid fire by producing safe analyses and recommendations.

All of this ensured that over the next two decades, the service and the Department would contribute less and less to the formulation of original ideas in American foreign affairs. In 1970, the State Department's self-study observed that "In the Foreign Service, conformity is prized above all other qualities."²⁹ Upon becoming President Kennedy's Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith discovered that, as concerned policy recommendations, "Silence was advised."³⁰ One suspects that constructive departures from containment policy would not have been so long in coming had there been more freedom of latitude for initiative, questioning, and creative thinking in the Foreign Service.

While reading Kahn's book, therefore, military men depressed or annoyed by media coverage critical of the military during the Vietnam years may take some comfort in the hope that they may receive similarly considerate rehabilitative treatment in a mere 20 or 25 years, if only they have the patience to wait that long.

There is a long tradition of writing in regard to the third aspect of professional diplomacy here under consideration, namely, the relation of professionalism, style, and method. At least

since the 18th century, diplomatists have been writing about the skills, personal qualities, and other requirements of their profession. To the line of Francois de Callieres, Lord Malmesbury, Sir Ernest Satow, and Sir Harold Nicolson, one might now add William Macomber, who for many years alternated between assignments as ambassador and assistant secretaryships in the Department of State.

Macomber's book is more than a catalog of all the virtues with which a good diplomat must equip himself; it is in addition a very interesting analysis of what has been happening in the American Foreign Service since World War II, and of what must happen to make it more effective in shaping as well as executing policy.* Macomber believes that after the war "diplomats around the world had little trouble in adjusting intellectually to the changed conditions of that world, but they had, and many have had ever since, great difficulty in facing up to the organizational and management requirements inherent in the new circumstances in which they now must operate."³¹ Like Manning and Ball, Macomber emphasizes the enlarging role of negotiation in American diplomacy, and notes that American diplomats are weak in preparation and experience for sustained negotiations such as are likely to characterize foreign affairs in coming years. He writes persuasively of the need to use personnel more efficiently, and to develop them more effectively through revised career patterns. And he offers a lot of good advice to anyone making his way in a medium-sized bureaucracy. A professional, he notes, always speaks well of his predecessor as well as his successor. Many nondiplomats could take that advice to heart.

*William Macomber, *The Angel's Game: A Handbook of Modern Diplomacy* (New York: Stein and Day, 1975), 225pp. index, glossary. \$10.00.

PROFESSIONAL READING 121

In addition to the focus on people in groups, there is the previously mentioned focus on the characteristics of the groups or organizations themselves. The single most important book to appear on that topic in the last 5 years is unquestionably that by Donald P. Warwick, a sociologist at York University, Ontario.* In the 1960's, largely out of realization of what Macomber points out in his book, the Department of State began large-scale efforts to modernize its management methods. There were three principal approaches, all familiar to today's management teachers and students: sensitivity training, team building for problem solving, and management by objectives and programs. Warwick's study had its genesis in the addition of a fourth factor, outside evaluation of the effects of the first three techniques. He and several associates were hired in 1967 to make and to publish in scholarly articles and books an assessment of management reform in the Department. Interestingly, within a short time the climate in the Department changed to such an extent that the proponents of management reform—the sponsors of the study—were out. The study therefore had to be finished under adverse conditions.

Warwick finds the chief cause of bureaucratic layering and proliferation to be the sense of insecurity that public criticism causes in the members of bureaucracies. The efforts of bureaucrats, he writes,

to protect their jobs or to buffer themselves against the caprice of political employees seem neither irrational nor nefarious. . . . Bureaucrats . . . are human beings, with much the same motivation for security and self-esteem as the rest of the population. . . . So long

as bureaucrats remain a handy scapegoat for public frustration, they are unlikely to relinquish the comforts of a layered structure bedecked with regulations. If the nation wishes to reduce bureaucracy, it must cease beating the bureaucrats and involve them in the process of creating a less threatening, less cumbersome, more satisfying, and ultimately less expensive work environment.³²

He concludes that effective reform can best come from within a bureaucracy that no longer feels abused and vulnerable. He also argues that a lasting solution to the problem of needless bureaucracy will require a revamping of existing relations between the Congress and executive agencies, because of the demonstrated preference of Congress for "known chaos to uncertain rationality."³³

Such a thesis, of course, has application outside as well as inside the Department of State. One can only hope that it will receive the consideration it seems to deserve.

Conclusion. This survey of some of the literature shows several trends of topic and analysis that may be expected to continue in prominence. There is an apparent and widespread conviction that Kissinger's years of leadership were indeed years of transition in American foreign policy. It is evident that this transition has had to do with perceptions of a changing world order and of great alterations in America's role, both strategically and economically, within that world order. Finally, it seems that alterations in the conditions and issues of world affairs, coupled with change in America's position, require immediate adjustments in American institutions, methods, and attitudes. The public can expect to see—and should study carefully—much more writing on these related points. Together they bear most

*Donald P. Warwick, *A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality, and Organization in the State Department* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 252pp, index, \$12.00

122 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

intimately on the fundamental ques- security, and effectiveness in govern-
tions of national interest, national ance.

NOTES

1. Interestingly, the subtitles of Nixon's second and third reports to the Congress on "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's" were "Building for Peace" (1971) and "The Emerging Structure of Peace" (1972).

2. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969).

3. David S. McLellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1976), p. 430.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 404.

5. John G. Stoessinger, *Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power* (New York: Norton, 1976), p. 227.

6. Phyllis Schlafly and Chester Ward, *Kissinger on the Couch* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1975), pp. 11, 12.

7. Stoessinger, p. 12.

8. The quotation is from a transcript of comments following a lecture by Kennan at the National War College, 16 September 1946, Kennan Papers, Box 16, Princeton University Library. I am grateful to my colleague John Lewis Gaddis for making the quotation and citation available.

9. Stoessinger, p. 227.

10. Schlafly and Ward, p. 204.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 197.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

13. Thomas H. Etzold, "Interdependence 1976?" *Diplomatic History*, v. 1, no. 1, Winter 1977, pp. 35-45.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

15. James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, *United States Foreign Policy and World Order* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), pp. 5-11. This volume expounds at length the ideas summarized in the remainder of the paragraph.

16. Bayless Manning, *The Conduct of United States Foreign Policy in the Nation's Third Century* (Claremont, Calif.: Claremont College, 1976), p. 27.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

18. Morton Kaplan, *Isolation or Interdependence? Today's Choices for Tomorrow's World* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 6.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

20. George Ball, *Diplomacy for a Crowded World: An American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), p. vi.

21. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 356.

22. "Decision-Making in an Interdependent World," the first interim report of the Special Committee of the Atlantic Council on Intergovernmental Organization and Reorganization, published in *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Summer 1975, p. 137.

23. U.S. Dept. of State, *Diplomacy for the Seventies: A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970), p. 474.

24. *Congressional Quarterly*, 22 March 1975, p. 605.

25. Robert D. Schulzinger, *The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training, Outlook, and Style of United States Foreign Service Officers, 1908-1931* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1975), p. 4.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 155. See also Thomas H. Etzold, *The Conduct of American Foreign Relations: The Other Side of Diplomacy* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1977), especially chapters two and five.

27. Schulzinger, p. 154.

28. Charles W. Thayer, *Diplomat* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. xv.

29. *Diplomacy for the Seventies*, p. 310.

30. John Kenneth Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), p. 29.

31. William Macomber, *The Angels' Game: A Handbook of Modern Diplomacy* (New York: Stein and Day, 1975), p. 84.

32. Donald P. Warwick, et al., *A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality, and Organization in the State Department* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 214-215.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 214.