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Much attention has been given to the role of seapower and naval forces in the conduct of war. The Navy's combat capability is obvious and its rationale is increasingly discussed in terms both of the deterrence of conflict and of the political uses of seapower. Political and technological changes affecting the international environment may require a revision in how we think about the use of naval forces short of war.

THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL PRESENCE MISSION

by

James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver

The evolution of the concept of seapower and more specifically, American naval theory, can be understood within the general framework and its gradual acceptance of how Mahan saw the relationship among national power, foreign policy, and seapower. Yet, Mahan's comprehensive notion of command of the sea was not fully realized for the United States until World War II when, in Mahan's words, the "overbearing power" of a "great Navy" did indeed drive the Japanese Navy from the Pacific seas even as earlier the German U-boats' *guerre de course* of late 1939 through early 1943 had been suppressed. Following some initial ambivalence, American foreign policy after World War II moved to its now familiar globalist posture. Thus, the U.S. Navy retained and even enlarged during the 1950's the preponderant position it had held at the end of the war. By 1960 the Navy had successfully competed with the Army and the Air Force for a piece of the strategic deterrence mission. When this mission was added to its existing capacity for tactical air war, command of the sea, and amphibious war, it was clear that the U.S. Navy comprised a multifaceted and versatile set of military instruments. American seapower in the early 1960's encompassed a mix of missions and capabilities that seemed to fulfill the Mahanian vision of "driving the enemy's flag from the sea or allow[ing] it to appear only as a fugitive; and which by controlling the great common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the enemy's shores."[1]

The Navy seemed particularly adapted to the demands of a foreign policy that required an American global presence and interventionary capacity to "bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and success of liberty . . . [to] do all of this and more."[2] In sum, the U.S. Navy was the embodiment of the expansion of military power in the 20th century and at the same time admirably suited to the posture of flexible response and the "strategy of conflict."

By the 1970's, however, the handful of academic, journalistic, and official theorists of seapower had begun to raise questions concerning the future of seapower. Congressional appropriations seemed to substantiate the reality of a "renaissance of seapower," but questions have persisted. This paper will review the effort to redefine the future of seapower, especially its use short of war. Thus, we will examine in some detail the so-called "presence" mission—as well as outline some of the constraints which impinge on the broader roles of seapower.

Dimensions of Contemporary Naval Theory. Naval force in the abstract has certain virtues over other coercive instruments of diplomacy. For one thing, the traditional legal rules by which naval force operates are by and large, unambiguous, well-known, and widely accepted. Moreover, the high degree of control and thus flexibility inherent in the deployment of naval force is not available to land or air services. As Army Col. Zeb Bradford conceded recently, one of the "lessons" of Vietnam is that:

> . . . ground power can be quite inflexible once committed however much inflexibility it may provide on a tactical level . . . while . . . ships can often reverse course and make a clean break, ground forces rarely can do so once engaged.[3]

In contrast to land operations, naval demonstrations of force can be as explicit or as subtle as desired. Thus, for example, reports in January 1976 that Soviet warships were moving off Angola could be, on the one hand, discounted by the Kremlin when reported in the West, while on the other hand they could still serve as an impressive indication of Soviet concern to Africans on the eve of an important all-African conference which was convened to debate the Angolan Civil War.[4] This kind of demonstration of serious strategic concern can be managed without violating norms of sovereignty. Further, it can be carried out without legal quarrel and without menace or other than verbal opposition.

Moreover, the more precise choreography of force available to navies—interdiction, blockade, warning shots—are, in the abstract at least, plausible options which can be taken in isolation without provoking the escalation of violence that might be predicted if similar exercises were undertaken on land. Thus, "expressive" and "coercive" exercises can take place without civilian casualties, and in fact, without a shot being fired. Indeed, if a government decides in the cool light of morning to minimize the situation, navies are peculiarly adapted to a more considered and calculated interrelationship of force and negotiation: Sufficient time in which to make decisions can usually be obtained by comparatively easy engagement and disengagement, and targets of influence can be chosen so that they are proportional in value to the desired goal of diplomacy. It is with these kinds of observations that a case can be made that, as Laurence Martin has put it, "reliance on naval force . . . is itself a contribution to moderation in international society."[5]

If the U.S. Navy has served at mid-century as among the most flexible of instruments of American foreign and military policy, it is no less susceptible to some new constraints now affecting those policies. One of these is the cost of high technology weapons systems. Navy planners must be as concerned or even more so than their counterparts in other services about the receptivity of the American people to the rising costs of military technology. A recent analysis of major weapons systems development underway in FY 76 reveals that Navy technology is now far and away the most expensive technology being purchased by the Pentagon, and with the possible exception of the B-1 bomber, will continue to be so for the foreseeable future.[6] Moreover, the apparent growth of skepticism on the part of the American public towards combat intervention of any substantial intensity and for any significant length of time may undercut the willingness of political leadership to exploit that portion of the Navy's force and mission profile devoted to the projection of power ashore.[7] Finally, of course, technological change, e.g., precision-guided munitions and the general growth of Soviet power intersects directly with the course of the U.S. Navy. Indeed, perhaps the most dramatic manifestations of Soviet military expansion have been in terms of their naval capability—a capability which many analysts, going too far, would contend effectively consigns the Mahanian doctrine of "command of the sea" to history.

Constraints and Conceptual Change. The net effect of these closing domestic and foreign constraints on thinking about U.S. naval power has been to force a restatement of U.S. naval missions and within this restatement give much closer consideration to what have been termed the "war-deterring" as opposed to the "war-fighting" missions.[8] Former Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Elmo Zumwalt's redefinition of U.S. Navy missions[9] and his subsequent requests for ship construction, weapons development, and procurement funds, included and emphasized the Navy's war-fighting capability. Nevertheless, the rationale for this "war-fighting" or combat capability is now framed increasingly in the language of war deterrence and the political uses of naval force.

The appointment of Vice Adm. Stansfield Turner as President of the Naval War College in 1972 is perhaps more than mere coincidence.[10] From 1972-1974, Turner revamped the War College curriculum and encouraged research oriented towards the exploration and understanding of the political constraints impinging on the U.S. Navy of the future. In his final report on his 2 years at the War College, Turner took explicit note of what he regarded as the prevalent inadequacy of contemporary seapower theory as well as the professionals responsible for using that power:

> Our final and complete supremacy at sea in World War II, followed by the lack of opposition at sea in Korea and Vietnam, encouraged intellectual complacency and indifference in some fundamental areas of the naval profession. As a result, for example, most of today's influential thinking on strategic deterrence and strategic arms limitations comes from civilians, with only modest input from naval officers.*[11]

However, there does seem to be an emerging school of thought within the U.S. Navy that argues that war-fighting missions and forces of the U.S. Navy (or navies in general) are and will be increasingly constrained; and, therefore, thought must now be given to war-deterring missions and forces. Comdr. (now Capt.) James F. McNulty has summarized this perception:

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*There is a small but growing number of naval officers who are reexamining traditional ideas about naval strategy and developing new ones, as attested to by the sources cited in this article and the pages of recent issues of this journal. Ed.

> Military power of demonstrable capability does remain one of the key determinants in the calculus of relative power among states, but in the present environment, military force serves as a makeweight more influential in its unused potential than in its realized capabilities. . . . Naval forces, operating in the presence role, must now be seen as uniquely appropriate to this end. . . .[12]

But, if naval presence seems especially well suited to contemporary international society, surprisingly little systematic thinking has centered on what exactly is the substance of the mission. As Admiral Turner lamented:

> Another example of the lack of rigorous thinking is our approach to naval presence. Despite the Navy's increasingly important role in peacetime deterrence, there is no body of doctrine or writing on how to accomplish this deterrent mission. The lack of serious original thinking in this and other areas, such as our lack of precision in definition of military missions, is costing us dearly in terms of either duplicatory preparations—or lack of preparation.[13]

Ken Booth has gone so far as to assert that the admiral's complaint might be directed not just at the analysis of the presence mission but at the entire literature on naval analysis.[14] These caveats having been stated, let us take brief note of what analysis there does exist with respect to the concept of presence specifically; and, more generally, the role of naval force as a war-deterring instrumentality.

James Cable's work is one of the most extensive treatments of the "presence" function. Presence is equated with the concept of "gunboat diplomacy" and limited naval force:

> Gunboat diplomacy is the use, or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory of the jurisdiction of their own state.[15]

To Cable, one can separate this kind of action from limited war because "limited naval force" is restricted in its execution to obtaining a political goal not extending (necessarily) to punishment. The range of this concept is enormous—covering everything from the Italian Navy's landing at Corfu in 1923, to the injection of Task Force 74 into the Indo-Pakistani crisis, to the voyage of DesDiv 31 through the Makassar Strait to assert the right of innocent passage and even the rescue of the *Mayaguez.* Yet, as Booth notes, Cable's comprehensive definition of gunboat diplomacy and his relatively small number of categories diminishes the analytical strength of his effort.[16]

Notwithstanding these impediments, Cable does usefully point out that the distinguishing feature of contemporary and future gunboat diplomacy is the greater intimacy between a mission of presence and the political intentions which confer upon that mission in its particular content. While the linkage is not new, recognition of the problems one's environment imposes on it may well be new.

The factors affecting a naval presence are remarkable in their diversity and in the numerous combinations these elements can form. Comdr. (now Capt.) Jonathan T. Howe has outlined some of the problems in his description of two events in which the U.S. Navy played a role—the resupply of Quemoy in 1958 and the more nebulous actions of the Sixth Fleet in 1967.[17] Among the considerations which affected the U.S. response in these crises were the estimated intentions of the Soviet Union to intervene, defense estimates of U.S. capability, congressional and public opinion, and the degree of dependence on British support. Howe traces the effects of each factor (and combinations of two or more) on U.S. response to these crises. His attempt is notable because he treats naval presence as an integral part of U.S. foreign policy.

Howe draws other conclusions that are useful and—in light of recent events—prescient. He notes that crises often blossom suddenly and public opinion does not rise in significance with them. In other words, dissent suffers a lag and gives breathing room for responses. This was certainly the case in the *Mayaguez* affair in which naval power was employed quickly and successfully. This use of naval power was not without its cost (a total of 41 killed, 50 wounded, and the loss of several helicopters). But these costs did not include (at least so far) public outrage. Thus, the *Mayaguez* incident stands in contrast to the Tonkin Gulf incident which was initially also greeted by public and congressional support. Later, however, when gunboat diplomacy and naval presence were revealed to be the initial stages of a broader escalation and intervention, public support was withdrawn.

Almost all analysts of the presence mission point to the flexibility of the naval force in contrast to the use of, for example, ground forces. They are not easily withdrawn once in place and logistics support established. Placing troops on alert or calling global strategic alerts very nearly exhausts the repertoire available to nonnaval forces. In contrast, as Lt. Comdr. Kenneth McGruther notes in a recent review of "naval diplomacy" in the Indo-Pakistani case:

> . . . the key factor which makes a naval force preferable for the presence mission is the great degree of flexibility left to the diplomat even after the introduction of force into a crisis. A naval force is highly maneuverable; its proximity to the coast can itself be taken as a measure of one's intent. . . . Most importantly, a naval force, since it operates in its own milieu, can usually be kept out of hostilities until it chooses to participate, thereby leaving the final decision on commitment both as to time and degree to one's own diplomats.[18]

Similary, Howe concludes that warships can be:

> . . . effective instruments of foreign policy. . . . Warship activity appeared to be an excellent indication of Washington's intentions. In 1967, fleet maneuvers, in keeping with U.S. policy, were deliberately restrained and aggressive only at the time of presumed Soviet threats. Highly publicized augmentation in 1958 demonstrated U.S. determination. In both cases, a Soviet emphasis on naval activity as a true reflection of American intention increased the significance of warship movements.[19]

But the description of the purportedly unique capabilities of naval power does not constitute a theoretical exposition and analysis of the presence mission—a point McGruther made succinctly:

> . . . analysts have thus far not been able to apply the naval presence mission to platform planning or tactics development nor have the relationships between naval strategy and foreign policy integral to this concept been well described. In fact, the presence mission has tended to be asserted rather than analyzed.[20]

McGruther attempts to address the first of these problems—those of platform planning and tactics. The far more nebulous question of naval strategy and foreign policy remains relatively unexplored although Edward N. Luttwak's *The Political Uses of Sea Power* in Robert Osgood's words " . . . makes an important contribution toward closing the gap between concepts and definitions, on the one hand, and experience, on the other."[21]

Luttwak's analysis, unlike most previous analyses of the presence mission, advances a conceptual framework for understanding the nature of the presence mission in terms of "passive" and "active suasion." It also points towards certain operational and force planning problems. Admiral Turner poses the implication of Luttwak's analysis directly: "Are there different operating policies that would yield a great presence capability?" And with respect to intermission tradeoffs Turner asks: "Is the presence mission becoming sufficiently important to warrant building or designing forces for that purpose?"[22]

The Future of Naval Force Short of War. Thus, naval "theory" seems to be moving towards some sort of accommodation with the broad changes in world politics stemming from the dramatic expansion of technologies of violence during the 20th century and changes in the world balance of naval power. The articulation of "war-deterrence missions" is now underway. The concepts and subsequent policies, missions, and forces directed at nuclear war deterrence were completed almost two decades ago. The current debate and dialogue centers on subnuclear war deterrence through the exploitation of the perceived uniqueness of seapower deployed in short-of-war missions and force configurations. The theoretical and strategic concepts now under discussion borrow heavily from the deterrence theory of the late 1950's and early 1960's. In fact, the idea of "suasion" implemented by means of closely calibrated "Inputs of Naval Suasion"[23] is similar to Herman Kahn's intricate force escalation scenarios. The difficulties of application encountered by the actual attempt to implement a strategy of escalation in Vietnam might tempt one, reasoning by analogy, to dismiss *a priori* the description and analysis of Cable, Luttwak, or McGruther. Such a step strikes us as premature. We will note grounds for some skepticism concerning the future of the political uses of naval power concepts, but these doubts and questions do not center on the conceptual parentage of suasion or naval presence.

In the first place, the nascent theory of naval presence is dealing almost exclusively with the exploitation of military power *short of war,* whereas Schelling, Kahn, et al., sought, in addition, to develop a theory for the controlled manipulation of war and violence itself. The distinction is important. As we have argued elsewhere,[24] the manipulation of violence entails physical and psychological difficulties of a profound sort—difficulties which were overly discounted in the halcyon days of flexible response and force escalation scenarios. The "short-of-war" environment contains many of the same difficulties and dangers encountered in the use of a diplomacy of violence. Nevertheless, in the absence of casualties, without the engagement of honor, and before the onset of "the dialectic of struggle," it would seem plausible to assume that problems of conflict management are somewhat less intense and hence more manageable in the short-of-war environment.

Second, naval theorists probably are correct in emphasizing the apparent uniqueness of naval power. These purported characteristics of naval power are critically important to the political uses of naval power. Luttwak observes:

> The familiar attributes of an oceanic navy—inherent mobility, tactical flexibility, and a wide geographic reach—render it peculiarly useful as an instrument of policy even in the absence of hostilities. Land-based forces, whether ground or air, can also be deployed in a manner calculated to encourage friends and coerce

> enemies, but only within the narrow constraints of insertion feasibility, and with inherently greater risks, since the land nexus can convert any significant deployment into a political commitment, with all the rigidities that this implies.[25]

To the extent this is true, then it is perhaps more reasonable to envision a variable and flexible "peacetime" repertoire of naval suasion than the metaphors of "turning the screw" or gradually easing up or down the volume of violence that dots the pages of the *Pentagon Papers.*

There are problems of course, and presence theorists are aware of them. Thus, we can find McGruther noting:

> There are dangers in the use of naval ships for force presence. Their inherent uncertainty can also have a strongly adverse effect on nations already at war or on the brink of war, thereby actually destabilizing a crisis and possibly precipitating the very war the force was sent to deter. Another disadvantage is that the opposing superpower, misperceiving the intent of a presence force, could commit itself heavily and initiate an escalatory spiral dangerous to both. A third disadvantage is the possibility of expanding expectation on the part of the client state upon the arrival of a strong naval force belonging to its patron. . . . Finally, one cannot dismiss the possibility of an error, mistake, or miscalculation setting off a holocaust when military forces face each other in an already emotional environment. . . .[26]

It should be noted, however, that the kinds of dangers and risks outlined by McGruther are more likely to be attached to what Luttwak could characterize as active suasion:

> The *exercise* of "active" suasion is . . . any deliberate attempt to evoke a specific reaction on the part of others, whether allies, enemies, or neutrals; the reaction actually obtained would constitute the suasion process itself, in this case labeled as active.[27]

Latent suasion, on the other hand, need not involve these kinds of difficulties automatically:

> For it is the perceptions of American power held by other nations, that the dominant makeweight to those perceptions is the credible mobility of U.S. power, and that the most persuasive indicator of such mobility is that manifested by the routine, day-to-day overseas presence activities of the U.S. Navy.[28]

And if McNulty's analysis is correct, it is latent suasion—the display of presence by means of routine activity—that is the most important element in the use of naval power short of war.

Most presence theorists seem to be quite sensitive to the fact that both the advantages and risks that accrue to their approach to the use of naval power hinge on the ambiguities of perceptions of power. Exacerbating this ambiguity, of course, is the fact that one is dealing with the exploitation of force and military power, albeit force short of war. "Goodwill tours," port calls, and the like are "peaceful" to be sure. But the agent is recognized and indeed, must be recognized, as capable of inflicting damage and injury. Therefore, when one discusses naval presence, one must keep in mind that one is dealing primarily with a coercive force and not merely a cultural entity. The role is that of policeman, not diplomat or Nobel laureate. Failure to acknowledge the essentially destructive root of naval power and presence is to risk using it in a manner that will do damage to a nation's credibility and power as a policing force. And finally, overreliance on these methods detracts from more conventional forms of diplomacy.

On balance, however, many naval presence theorists seem to have successfully taken the difficult and painful step of departing from the Mahanian "command of the sea" paradigm. By their own account, much of the U.S. Navy remains skeptical if for no other reason than that advanced by McNulty that:

> . . . those same new realities which fostered the ascendancy of a conflict avoidance or deterrence national strategy have also set the stage for a basic conflict between the desires of the strategist and the values of the warrior. It is truly difficult for men in uniform, essentially unschooled in the nuances of diplomatic activities, to place much confidence in Naval Presence as an alternative to the possession of superior war-fighting capabilities which have demonstrably kept the peace since 1948. . . . [T]he belief that "to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill," has seldom found favor in the hearts of those who conceive of themselves as warriors, charged with the military security of the state.[29]

Nevertheless, these developments are an impressive example of what can happen when naval policy is reconceptualized in terms of its relationship with the changing context of world politics. Paradoxically, however, the outcome of the effort might well prove inappropriate to what some students of world politics envision for the future. That is to say, the articulation and refinement of the naval presence mission may be but another example of military planning more suitable to an era that is closing rather than a new era that may soon be upon us. As a theory of presence suited to an age of limited threats and limited war emerges, it finds itself confronted with a new political and technological environment which may confound its meaningful execution. For example, while it used to be true that a task force could steam into an ocean or port unopposed and present the leadership of the militarily inferior state with an obvious excuse of pleading *force majeure,* now a minor state could have the capacity to injure severely very expensive ships with a relatively simple volley of precision-guided weapons. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to a review of some of these problems and their implications for the use of naval force in a presence mode.

An Uncertain Future and the Use of Seapower. Prevention of international conflict—deterrence of war—by means of presence missions would seem possible in a naval environment characterized by at least three factors:

- a plenitude of United States naval assets;
- relative predominance of U.S. naval power understood as the capacity of the United States to maintain and/or project significant naval presence virtually any place on the globe; and
- a relatively benign or, at worst, neutral global order and/or ocean legal regime which provides for and facilitates relatively unencumbered movement and use of one's naval assets.

The most important consequence of such an environment is that it allows for the relatively easy movement of variable levels of naval force in and out of areas in which active presence is or may be called for. At the same time, routine or latent presence is easily maintained, thereby reinforcing the psychological prerequisites of keeping international order—the perception of real or potential military power.

But only as long as the ocean environment remains neutral and/or American power is predominant are the apparently unique attributes of naval power manifest or can they be exploited short of war. In other words, the unique attractiveness of naval presence as a means for maintaining a "regulated" international environment favorable to American interests is in large measure a function of the structure of world and domestic politics and the world balance of naval power that has obtained for the last 25 years. Recently, however, intimations of a very different environment have emerged, which bring into question the preconditions for presence.

The Constraint of Size. If the capacity to exercise influence via the presence of naval power is in some measure a function of the predominant size of one's naval forces, then the future of American seapower is uncertain. The U.S. Navy has undergone a drastic reduction in total size since the mid-1960's. Obsolescence overtook more than 475 naval vessels by the turn of the decade. By the mid-1970's the Navy had retired virtually all of these ships and had settled on a fleet reconstruction target of 600 ships encompassing a mix of high-capability high-cost and low-capability low-cost ships. Most new construction was seen as coming at the high mix end of the spectrum to include aircraft carriers, attack submarines, a new class of SSBN (the *Trident*), cruisers (including a proposed new class), and the *Spruance*-class frigate/destroyer. Other than the *Knox*-class destroyer, only the patrol frigate would be added to the "low" end of the spectrum and even that ship would run to 3,600 tons and be in the words of a Defense Department spokesman, "the most heavily armed ship of its size in the world."

In early 1976, the Defense Department put forward a five-year shipbuilding program that envisaged the construction of 111 new ships by the mid-1980's at a cost of about $35 billion. But the proposal, launched in the midst of a Presidential campaign, aroused considerable controversy within the Defense Department, and ran into political crosscurrents in Congress. Reports of disagreement between the Secretaries of Defense and the Navy Department on the one hand, and conflict within the Navy between the Chief of Naval Operations and Adm. Hyman Rickover on the other, complicate any accurate projection of the size and composition of the Navy over the next decade. The Navy Department and the Secretary of Defense seemed to disagree as to the ultimate size of the Navy (the Navy reportedly asked for 160 new ships at $55 billion) and how rapidly the country should build to such a size. The disagreement within the Navy centered on Admiral Rickover's long insistence that the Navy of the future should be nuclear. The latter position seemed to have been affirmed by Congress in the Defense Department Appropriations Act of 1975 which stipulated that future major combatants would of necessity be nuclear. By 1976, however, the CNO and the Defense Department saw the costs of such a requirement seriously limiting the ultimate size of the Navy and sought, therefore, some relief from the strict provisions of Title VIII—and also, it would seem, relief from the pressure applied by Admiral Rickover as the CNO issued a stinging public rebuke to Rickover.

The reaction of Congress to this situation has been characteristically fragmented. Within the Sea Power Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee—a traditional bastion of pro-Rickover nuclear Navy sentiment—the Defense Department's shipbuilding budget for FY 77 was increased by more than $1 billion for two strike cruisers, one *Trident* submarine, and start-up costs on a *Nimitz*-class aircraft carrier—all of which were above the Ford administration's request. However, subsequent action by the Senate Armed Services Committee deleted all of these add-ons as well as two ships—an attack submarine and one strike cruiser—originally requested by the Administration. The Carter administration has not only confirmed these actions, but also has added to the recision list the Navy's fourth large aircraft carrier and several patrol frigates.

These actions suggest that even allowing for the possibility of incremental increases in the inevitable bargaining attendant on the Executive-Legislative and Congressional policy-making process, the Navy's size will approximate that of the FY 77 Five-Year Plan. If this is the case then the ultimate size of the Navy will be closer to 525-550 ships than the 600 ships desired by the Department of the Navy and the CNO. Moreover, considerable skepticism prevails as to the capacity of the American shipbuilding industry to meet even this target within the cost framework proposed by the Defense Department. A history of construction and delivery delays and the most volatile inflationary dynamics of any segment of the defense industry could well result in a size somewhat below that which the Navy reluctantly accepted during the budget battles of late 1975 and early 1976.

The implications for the presence role of a Navy of 500-525 ships is highly problematic. A former Secretary of the Navy has observed recently that such a fleet would require some reduction of American presence at some point on the globe:

> The major difficulty would lie in the lack of sufficient surface combatants and aircraft carriers. In peacetime presence, the principal effect would be that our carrier task groups, deployed amphibious forces and underway replenishment forces would have to be deployed without sufficient carriers and surface combatants to protect them adequately from surprise attack or to enable them to prosecute their missions at the outbreak of war. In our steady state peacetime posture [presumably this means a roughly 500-ship fleet], we would have to reduce our deployments by one carrier task group. This would mean either only one carrier task group in the Mediterranean, or only two task groups to cover the entire ocean areas of the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.[30]

In view of the general drawdown of American presence in Asia, the latter deployment seems most likely. In any event, the diminishing size of the Navy constrains its capacity to undertake the basic mission recently ascribed to the 600-ship navy: "... to assure our simultaneous control of all ocean areas adjoining the Eurasian Continent."[31] In view of recent technological changes, however, one suspects that even with a 600-ship fleet, control of these ocean areas would be extremely difficult and the projection of power ashore more so.

Precision-Guided Munitions and Other Limits on Presence Projection and Sea Control. In the introduction of his recent Adelphi Paper, *Precision-Guided Weapons*, James Digby notes:

> Ever since men began shooting things at enemies, most shots have missed or been ineffective. The remarkable thing that has happened over the past few years is that new weapons have been developed which can hit with most of their shots, usually effectively. . . .[32]

Digby cautions that thinking concerning the use, effects and implications of PGM's is only tentative, but there is consensus that the 1972 bombings of North Vietnam and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War demonstrate the potentially revolutionary effects of PGM's on warfare. Though much analysis and speculation on the effect of PGM's have concentrated on land warfare, the potential proliferation of precision-guided munitions to "lesser" powers does not seem to favor the expressive use of naval power, especially if that power presupposes the classic, vastly asymmetric circumstances of gunboat diplomacy wherein a powerful state attempts to coerce a state with a relatively primitive military establishment. Thus, the International Institute for Strategic Studies recently surveyed changes in naval weapons technologies having to do with armament, fire control, surveillance, ASW, and ship design and concluded:

> . . . the direction of change suggests that the ultimate beneficiaries of the new developments may well be smaller coastal states—both because small navies will be able to acquire an unparalleled capability for detecting, tracking and attacking potential targets and because the existing equipment and doctrine of larger navies may be unsuited to the emerging era of naval warfare.[33]

There is little doubt among most analysts that precision-guided munitions will become more widely developed, accessible and less costly. For instance, India, according to Omi Marvak, a research fellow at the Harvard Program for Science and International Affairs, has already tested an indigenously made remotely piloted vehicle of a type that could readily be converted into a cruise missile. India is also testing inertial guidance and on-board systems and superalloys. The cost of each of these nuclear-capable cruise weapons, Marvak estimates, is only $200,000 to $300,000 apiece.[34]

Assuming therefore the availability and proliferation of PGM's—a process already well underway as the result of aggressive arms sales policies in the West—it is reasonable to infer that the task of naval presence is thereby made immensely complicated. To the extent that PGM's imply increased defensive capacity for a coastal state, projecting power ashore either by means of airstrikes or amphibious assault becomes perhaps exhorbitantly costly. In the absence of a credible threat of projection, how meaningful is presence?

Beyond mere demonstrations, an effective conjoining of surface naval operations with a successful "opposed" landing seems to have become an almost insurmountable obstacle. The critical element of surprise necessary for a successful landing is unlikely. For one thing, the offending state would probably know it had committed an obnoxious act. For another, in an area of cheap and effective defenses, a minor power, if prepared, could inflict major damage to a landing if it were expected. If, on the other hand, the attack was not expected, then an airstrike or amphibious landing would not only represent a failure of diplomatic communication but also the absence of an effective wedding of diplomacy and force.

It is now increasingly likely that many coastal states will be able to afford an adequate minimal coastal defense. The American experience in Vietnam, thus, may be instructive. For few would contend that North Vietnam for instance was a military power of great significance. The Chinese and Russians withheld "state of the art" defensive and offensive weapons. Nevertheless, in Vietnam, fighter bomber aircraft defenses in the presence of pre-PGM's were forced towards the limits of their defensive capability in order to have a reasonable chance of survival. In the future, air support for surface operations may become even less practical.

Not only has air cover become difficult, even with the achievement of "superiority," amphibious advance from the sea has tended to appear practically impossible except at a prohibitive cost. Even the exercise of "vertical envelopment" provides a marginal advance for helicopters which are even more vulnerable to new weaponry than are fighter bombers. As Brookings analysts Binkin and Record point out:

> Of the 11 helicopters employed in the initial assault on Tang Island [in the *Mayaguez* Crisis] five were quickly destroyed or disabled by small arms and machine gun fire. Moreover, evacuation of the Marines from Tang was delayed as the defenders, estimated at about 150 men, drove off helicopters trying to land on the Island. Withdrawal only became feasible after two U.S. Navy destroyers and two attack aircraft laid a heavy suppressive fire.[35]

Precision-guided munitions may, therefore, severely erode the potential for gunboat diplomacy. Many have speculated that PGM's on land will put a premium on dispersion and concealment. But at sea, dispersion and concealment are the very antithesis of the missions of ships designed to loom awesome and impressive, carriers or CSGN in the case of the United States, and *Kara*-class cruisers in that of the Soviet Union. Moreover, as the advent of PGM's makes unopposed landings less plausible, they also tend to escalate the level of combat activity. The distinction between low and high intensity operations probably has become blurred. The advent of PGM's may, in short, force another rupture in the theoretical and practical attempt to marry force and diplomacy.

PGM's introduce other uncertainties into the projection of influence. First, PGM's may diminish the reliance of allies and clients on "great powers"—especially the United States—against "local" aggression. Thus, alliances may become more explicitly supply arrangements and less territorial guarantees. To this extent, at least, the erosion of the impermeable "hard boundaries" of nation states—one of the more widely touted features of the nation-states' demise—may become less pronounced as nations become more competent in their immediate defense. Supply arrangements will, however, become critical unless middle-range nations acquire the capability to produce their own precision-guided munitions. To an extent, therefore, middle-range powers can further lessen their more apparent reliance on superpowers by gaining the capability to manufacture arms as the Israelis have attempted. On the other hand, since the consumption of stocks in an era of PGM's is said to have increased by a factor of 10, it is probably that no drastic disassociation of lesser states from the major arms suppliers will be feasible in the immediate future.[36]

Second, the rate of consumption and the volume of violence involved in a war involving PGM's may make "projective warfare," i.e., massive bombardment, not only prohibitively expensive but also something only to be considered under the most extreme circumstances. Thus, senior allies, in the future, might attempt even greater constraints on junior partners.

These PGM-induced changes in the military environment might also vitiate another centerpiece of naval strategy—sea control—which is the other side of the coin of naval presence. As Adm. James Holloway III puts it, sea control is "the fundamental function of the U.S. Navy and is a prerequisite of all other naval tasks and most sustained overseas operations by the general purpose forces."[37]

However, cargo ships and their escorts may be vulnerable to PGM's as well as being too slow, perhaps, to affect the battle situation. (The other side of *this* coin is that cargo vessels could be easily and effectively armed with PGM's of their own.) But if surface vessels and escorts prove vulnerable to PGM's, how can effective sea control be maintained and commerce protected? One answer may be to give up some of the "expressive" functions of surface craft in favor of submersible patrol craft. The potential capture of ships at sea would be inhibited at less risk with other likely effectiveness by using "marshals" riding "shotgun" on relatively simple but fast and lethal submarines. These ships would not, of course, "bristle" for show as the *Kara*-class cruiser does and CSGN will, but knowledge of the presence of the undersea lawmen could be assuring to Western commerce against one of the most probable kinds of sea threats of the future. As Capt. S.W. Roskill, the historian of the Royal Navy, has written:

> . . . the scope for employment of submarines on duties either to be performed by surface ships or aircraft [are| limited only by the cost of submarine production. Indeed, the command of the surface sea whereby a maritime power seeks to secure the uninterrupted passage of mercantile or military cargoes, seem|s| likely to increasingly depend on control of the waters beneath.[38]

And in a similar vein, Vice Adm. George P. Steele wrote in May of 1976:

> Today, and for many years to come the really battle-worthy capital ship is the nuclear powered submarine. It has the unique ability to get close enough to destroy the enemy surface ship, using missiles or torpedoes without great risk, regardless of how much airpower is ranged against it. The only adversary that it really need fear is another and better submarine . . . using the same advantages of mobility and stealth.[39]

Moreover, in Europe, the increasingly common prognostication of a short war being the only one that is likely might make the sea control functions of massive carriers and other surface weapons platforms and the supply functions of a huge "sea control" fleet a bit superfluous. Indeed, the Marine Corps does not even include this kind of massive operation in its planning.[40] One might speculate of course that since the rate of fire of PGM's tends to be very rapid implying high ordnance consumption levels, there might well be an increased need for resupply. Hence, the future importance of surface cargo vessels and thus support ships not only remains but increases. However, the compression of combat time envisaged in much speculation concerning PGM-based warfare may lead to sizable stores of prepositioned ordnance and thereby obviate the need for even the most speedy cargo ships, especially in the absence of port facilities.[41]

With long-range in-flight refueling now available for fighter planes, the need for carriers to supply tactical air cover in either brush-fire wars or other engagements might well diminish. Indeed, concern about the vulnerability of carriers and their cost will most likely increase, thereby intensifying doubts about the future role of carriers and thus much of the rest of the fleet, which is to protect them. It was known that Secretary Schlesinger was less than enthusiastic about maintaining a large supercarrier program through the 1990's, but he was opposed by Secretary Kissinger who is said to be impressed with carriers' "expressive" potential. Of course, the first time a carrier, representing over $5 billion and incalculable appeal to the American psyche, is damaged or sunk, this symbolic function may have to be reevaluated.

The recent IISS survey summarizes the point appropriately:

> While improvements in the range and accuracy of anti-ship weapons suggest that all surface ships will be more vulnerable in the future, it seems that larger ships will be particularly vulnerable. This is not only because larger vessels will be easier to locate and target, but also because FPB-type ["fast patrol boats"| systems will

> possess greater speed, firepower and surveillance capabilities. In future [sic], therefore, it may be more advantageous to have larger numbers of less valuable ships which, in multi-ship operations, could match the firepower of larger units while being less vulnerable.[42]

Secretary Schlesinger, in his last posture statement, seemed to sound this same warning that surface ships may not have a future. The cost of congressionally mandated nuclear surface ships may force the Navy to procure more versatile although admittedly less awe-inspiring surface vessels to perform sea control missions. Yet, even small patrol craft may not be as efficient as submersible patrol boats. As he explained:

> Our shipbuilding program has already suffered severely from the impact of inflation . . . nuclear power . . . become[s] the main source of propulsion for the Navy in the future, we must also consider the versatility of nuclear attack submarines on the ASW mission and against enemy surface ships. Indeed, despite their high cost, we may well want to regard them as competitive with surface escorts. . . .[43]

Schlesinger also expressed "doubts" about the future of amphibious capabilities and a competent sealift scenario in "times of rapid mobilization deployment and attack." He answered these "rhetorical" reservations with what seems to be a rather uninspired response that obtaining a plausible sealift prevents us from putting "our mobility eggs" into the single "basket" of airlift,[44] and moreover, if the Russians were to see our sealift capability reduced, they would be emboldened. This, he stated, was "unthinkable." And although amphibious forces and surface ships are useful, he added the rather telling confession that in regard to those areas defended by sophisticated defense systems, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have not "seen anything more demanding than essentially unopposed landings for twenty years" and would have "grave difficulty" in a "high threat environment. . . ." "Nevertheless," he concluded, and not altogether convincingly, "there is a certain salutary value in having reinforced marine battalions aboard their assault ships in sensitive parts of the world."[45] One wonders, of course, how "salutary" these forces are if they are unable to perform their mission at an acceptable cost.

The Soviet Navy. Finally, of course, any assessment of the likelihood that the U.S. Navy can maintain the necessary margin of superiority to exercise effective short-of-war presence or other missions must address the constraints imposed by the major adversary of the United States—the Soviet Union. Debate as to the size, capability, and missions of the Soviet Navy now occupies a major segment of the literature on modern seapower and its use.[46] Opinion concerning the threat posed by Soviet naval forces includes claims that "today, the Soviet Union can boast the world's largest and most modern surface navy; the largest and most modern ocean research and fishing fleets; a potential naval air arm; and one of the most advanced shipbuilding industries in existence."[47] Norman Polmar has concluded that this capability qualifies the Soviet Navy as a "supernavy in every sense of the term; quantity, quality of forces, and operations."

> Thus, a Soviet Navy rebuilt in the 1950's and again in the 1960's, probably with the purpose of fighting the United States and NATO, has provided the U.S.S.R. with a fleet-in-being that can be employed directly in support of political and economic goals without having to fire a shot. The Soviets have learned that a ship

> built to sink another has [many other] uses, while still retaining a potent combat capability.[48]

On the other hand, some observers, most notably perhaps Michael MccGwire and his associates,[49] have suggested that although the Soviet Navy has been required by Soviet political leadership to assume a greater "foreign policy" role, the Navy's capacity to do so while simultaneously carrying out its war-related missions is severely strained. In contrast to Polmar's image of the Soviet Union as the "dominant" seapower today, MccGwire and his group take note of constrained shipyard capacity, limited blue water support ability, marginal air cover, consequent heavy dependence upon politically uncertain overseas basing, and the prospect that significant fleet expansion is quite unlikely in the future.[50] Indeed, Weinland and MccGwire suggest that Admiral Gorshkov's series of articles, "Navies in War and Peace,"[51] rather than heralding a new prominence for Soviet seapower in the Soviet Union's arsenal of politico-military instrumentalities, was in fact an only partially successful plea to defend the limited gains made by Soviet seapower advocates over the course of the 1960's. MccGwire concludes:

> There are no indications that the Navy's relative standing within the political leadership has improved, and if membership of the Central Committee is any guide, Ground Force domination of the military leadership has increased progressively since 1961. Therefore, one suspects that Gorshkov's strictures will fall on deaf ears and that the political leadership will choose to make increasing use of the Soviet Navy as an instrument of foreign policy, but without increasing its relative share of resources.[52]

The latter position would seem to be supported by MccGwire's own analysis and projections concerning ship construction over the next decade, especially with respect to surface combatants. Moreover, recently disclosed Department of Defense comparisons of the U.S. and Soviet Fleets reveal that even during the period of escalating Soviet Fleet size, the United States was outbuilding the Soviets in those classes of ships larger than 3,600 tons, and in view of the Navy's FY 77 Five-Year Shipbuilding Plan, will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.[53] Finally, recent projections concerning Soviet shipyard capacity and construction rates suggest that with the exception of submarines, the Soviets will do well to maintain replacement rates for a navy that now confronts block obsolescence problems as severe as those confronted by the U.S. Navy in the late 1960's and early 1970's.[54]

Official Department of Defense views on the relationship of the two fleets are predictably cautious. However, Secretary Schlesinger, in his last posture statement, took note of the asymmetrical missions of the two fleets, "The Soviet Union, at least for now, stresses defense against United States power projection efforts and interdiction of United States and allied military and economic support shipping on the open oceans."[55] Schlesinger was obviously cognizant of the fundamental differences between the Soviet and American naval force structures.

> . . . once one removes the mission asymmetry and measures the balance, it becomes clear that the naval forces of the Soviet Union and its allies are not generally superior to those of the United States and its allies, and that this should be perceived by well-informed observers.[56]

Nevertheless, Schlesinger was particularly concerned about Soviet antiship capability and the strong Soviet potential for attacks on U.S. and allied shipping. But even here he concluded:

> . . . the United States and its maritime allies could suffer significant

> but not prohibitive shipping losses if the Soviets were to conduct a major antishipping campaign. . . . Although shipping losses might be heavy, the net effect on the U.S. and allied war effort would not be crippling.[57]

The FY 1977 posture statement reaches similar conclusions.[58]

Perhaps the clearest assessment of the capability and missions of the Soviet Navy remains that provided by Barry Blechman of the Brookings Institution:

> Generally, and with the exception of strategic submarines, the Soviet Navy does not appear to be designed to project the Soviet Union's power into distant oceans but to defend the security and interests of the U.S.S.R.—by preventing attacks on its homeland and by limiting the role of the United States and other Western powers in regions close to Soviet shores, notably the Middle East. The Soviet Navy's past building programs, its exercises, its peacetime deployments, and Soviet military doctrine all support the assessment that the primary emphasis in Soviet naval evolution has been and is likely to remain oriented to the accomplishment of these missions.[59]

How this assessment coincides with the maintenance of a viable presence mission is open to question. Still, as former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger summed up in his FY 76 overview:

> . . . [A]s far as peacetime naval presence is concerned, aggregate Soviet activity increased sharply in the late 1960's but now appears to have stabilized somewhat below the overall U.S. level. . . . U.S. forces tend to have a greater surge capability to most theaters of primary interest to the United States and its allies.[60]

Before concluding, however, that on balance the Soviet Navy does not constitute a decisive constraint on the exercise of U.S. naval presence, one should take careful note of the single caveat entered by most observers—that of the Middle East. Blechman has underscored the special position of the Eastern Mediterranean in Soviet and U.S. naval deployments.[61] Moreover, Schlesinger noted in 1975:

> The Soviets could increase their deployments by raising the operating tempo of their forces. During the Middle East war of 1973, in fact, they demonstrated a significant capability to surge and support naval forces to a greater extent than we had anticipated.[62]

Thus, while the more extreme statements of alarm concerning the development and capability of the Soviet Navy are probably overdrawn, the Soviet Union's ability to surge naval forces of considerable size and potency into crisis areas does not augur well for the unfettered exercise of naval suasion. In addition, the apparent severe limitations on Soviet missile reload capacity noted by most observers, including Department of Defense analysts,[63] further confounds the necessarily close calculations associated with the exercise of presence in a competitive environment. The structure and dynamics of naval deterrence in the presence of escalating naval forces are at best complicated. The probability that one of the partners in the relationship is severely limited in its war-fighting options, i.e., to striking first, and—one might surmise with nuclear weapons—imparts a dangerous fragility to the exercise. Nor, for that matter, can one take much comfort from the fact that the Soviet Union has shown a capacity for escalating its naval presence in a part of the world characterized by a large and potent U.S. naval presence, and a surfeit of opportunities for volatile and escalating crises.

Of course, none of this has precluded the exercise of naval presence in the area in the past. But with the advent of significant Soviet naval capability and will to use it in the region, the mission has become increasingly difficult to fulfill. One suspects that it will be no less so in the future.

The "New International Order" and Constraints on Seapower. Especially important to the future of naval missions are some of the broader changes that seem to be emerging within the structure of the international system. Academic, "official," and journalistic writing is now preoccupied with the problem of defining and understanding a vaguely understood set of "new forces" in world politics. Variously characterizing these forces "interdependence" or "transnationalism," would correspond best with Seyom Brown's judgment that:

> . . . both powerful structures–the cold war coalitions and the nation-state system–are being undermined simultaneously, but at different rates, and uneventfully in various segments of the globe. The weakening of both of these structures gives other bases of political community–ethnicity, religion, social class, economic function, generation–more opportunity to assert themselves and to vie for the loyalty of individuals. A companion thesis is that the resultant incoherence in the world's political structure is likely to be profoundly inadequate to the tasks of global management required to assure the healthy survival of the human species.[64]

One example of this "incoherence" is the omnipresent fact of terrorism as an instrumentality of "the other bases of political community" in the new international system. Nor for that matter must future uses of terrorism be confined to nonnation-state actors.

It is not conceivable, for example, that a small state may use and then deny responsibility for a future *Maine*-kind of incident. Yet small nations could derive considerable benefits from a terroristic accident for which it is almost as hard to attach blame as it is to a natural catastrophe such as fire or flood. If the magnitude of difficulty attendant on employing conventional naval force (and land operations) in the face of PGM's is, as we have suggested, then states may resort more commonly in the future to some kind of quasi-official sponsorship or contractual relationship with terrorist groups for "police actions." (One harbinger of this development could be the use by Syria of the P.L.O. in pursuit of a cease-fire in Lebanon in early 1976.) This would obviously change the rules for the use of purely "expressive" force and might be an incentive for powers great and small to search for unofficial agents.

Of course, the "rules" of confrontation in such a circumstance would be ambiguous and would, necessarily, evolve only through usage as the "rules of deterrence" were "learned" and manipulated throughout the cold war.[65] This does not mean, however, that the "rise of the defense" in international society will necessarily portend an increase in the volume of violence (as it did do in World War I). For if great nations used transnational agents as weaker states do, the tendency may be to dampen the potential for great power conflict. If the United States, for instance, were to sponsor a kind of resuscitated Irgun and if the Soviets were in competition with a forthrightly backed P.L.O., it might well have as a consequence the serendipitous effect of widening the interval between conventional and nuclear war.

However, one future contingency likely to trigger a great power response could be the hijacking of a Western ship or a supertanker. Under a broadened definition of piracy, the new "pirates" of tomorrow might well be transnational terrorists based in one or more littoral states. The likelihood that terrorism would move to sea "makes historical sense." In the past, one of the purposes of this kind of activity was not mere destruction but bargaining either by holding people or property hostage. There is reason to believe that this may be possible in the future. The logical response is either to:

- focus on the protection of people and property; or
- focus on the retrieval of people or property; or
- wreak havoc on the perpetrators of terrorism on the seas so that they will be deterred from doing it again.

Reprisals have never seemed to have been particularly effective and they can have unintended consequences (as the United States found out in Vietnam and the Israelis may have discovered in the case of their actions on the West Bank and in Lebanon). The second course may not be technologically feasible or, at least, particularly cost effective. Not only could the party which has to take to the offensive lose as much as it saves in retrieving what has been stolen but the political disadvantages would be poignantly burdensome as President Johnson was reminded at the time of the *Pueblo*. If the assault were to be conducted with the aid of surface ships standing offshore, it should be noted, as Gen. Robert E. Cushman, USMC, recently testified, that there is now no American heavy cruiser capable of providing major caliber support to such an operation—even if such a ship could stand far enough distant from enemy shore defenses.[66] Thus, the answer may be, as in the skyjacking phenomena, more in the prevention than in the cure.

Another unpleasant image of the character of new world order has been outlined recently by Robert W. Tucker.[67] There is a potential for lower level and regionally focused conflict to increase as Third World countries possessing oligopolistic control of raw materials essential to the developed world militantly try to exploit whatever advantages they possess. In Tucker's view, the situation is exacerbated because of ambivalence toward the use of force on the part of the developed nations because of the costs attached to such a course, a growing sense of illegitimacy concerning the use of force, as well as the risk of escalation. In sum, "interdependence" may well come to represent a kind of fractious and conflictual international immobility.

> Even if one accepts the view of an ever-rising interdependence occurring at the expense of the state, the prospect of a growing disjunction between power and order is not thereby excluded.[68]

It is conceivable that in such an environment, threatening and posturing —the exploitation of force short of war—will be even more prevalent than now. In such an international system, the presence mission may well prosper inasmuch as the political use of naval power is oriented precisely to the task of short of war influence activity. But other characteristics of this conflictual interdependence severely constrain the presence mission.

Legal Regime of the Ocean. A possible and most important manifestation of this new "equalitarian interdependence" could be a significant transformation of the legal regime of the oceans. As Elizabeth Young has argued recently,[69] we may be moving away from the traditional doctrines of *mare liberum* towards an incrementally established system of *mare clausum* based on 12-mile territorial seas which close important straits and 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones within which sovereign "territoriality" is enforced. This process of closing Mahan's "great common" may come with decisive suddenness through a U.N. Law of the Seas Conference; or, as seems more likely, more slowly as coastal states gradually develop technological and economic bases (through association with multinational corporations) for exploiting the oceans and seabed. In any event:

> The great navies will find their traditional roaming of the open seas, "showing the flag" in their interest, constrained, psychologically where not physically, by the multitude of new jurisdictional boundaries. The rights of foreign naval vessels within boundaries of quite unfamiliar texture . . . will need establishing not only by theoretical definition, in terms of international convention, but also by subjection to all the normative pressures of practice and experience.[70]

The openness of the "great common" is of course the basis of the purported uniqueness of naval power—its flexibility being based on its extraterritoriality—which is in turn one of the necessary conditions for conceiving and undertaking the presence mission. If, however, a naval force is no longer "highly maneuverable" or does *not* operate in an international medium and does not need to be very concerned "with violating sovereign territory," have we not removed one of the "key factors" which makes the naval force *most* appropriate to the presence mission? More importantly, have we not also undercut much of the mission itself?

None of this matters, of course, if this new regime exists only on paper. It must be applied to hydrospace or it does not functionally inhibit naval force or the presence mission. Coastal states must be able to enforce their claims; otherwise, very little will have changed. Under present conditions the presence mission would seem, therefore, to maintain its integrity. But the current and future proliferation of military technology (both conventional and nuclear discussed previously) could change decisively this situation and thereby compromise the use of naval force short of war. The future of this question is murky, but the handful of observers who have examined this issue in a preliminary fashion are not entirely sanguine. Lawrence Martin, for example, has recently predicted an increase in military conflict at sea as jurisdictional claims and conflicts proliferate and as coastal states increase their capacity to enforce their claims to this newest dimension of their sovereignty.[71]

Much, perhaps most, of this conflict probably will be regionally contained, directed by coastal states at each other, and confined to the level of conventional military technology. Nevertheless, the major naval powers probably will not be able to escape the implications of this situation, especially the effects of the acquisition of missiles, missile boats, land-based aircraft (and air defense systems), and even small submarines by many coastal states. "During the next decade," the IISS concludes, "when 200 miles of sea is likely to be added to the effective jurisdiction of coastal states, smaller states will be in a position to support their claims to extended sovereignty by the ability to police and defend large areas of ocean from intrusion by outside powers. Outside military intervention would be much more costly."[72]

Lt. Comdr. Linton Wells II has summarized these developments and some of their implications at the recent Conference on Conflict and Order in Ocean Relations:

> . . . the advent of surface-to-surface missiles has given the coastal states the ability to inflict serious damage on destroyer or cruiser-size ships within twenty miles or so of the coast. Moreover, later versions of these weapons, such as Exocet, Harpoon, or Gabriel are essentially prepackaged rounds. Their performance is minimally dependent on the skill of local mechanics and

> not much more so on that of local commanders. To be sure, these probably can be countered by an alert crew, but the warning times are so short (less than two minutes is the usual figure), that even a brief lapse in readiness on the part of the target could be fatal. The likely proliferation of laser-designated, electro-optical and other guided aircraft ordnance will provide additional complications for the distant water navy.[73]

The volume of recent exports of late model patrol boats, hovercraft, frigates, fast patrol boats, destroyer escorts, destroyers, aircraft such as the F-14, and surface-to-surface missiles such as Gabriel, Exocet and Sea Killer, surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles (Rapier, Seacat, Hawk, Sidewinder, and Sparrow), and even antisubmarine aircraft to the Persian Gulf, for example, is significant. Since the start of the decade these countries have ordered more than 1,800 aircraft, 15,000 missiles, and 100 ships.[74] Present leadership in most of these countries is now pro-American, but will it be in the future? Moreover, this kind of arms buildup is not likely to go unnoticed among other coastal states of the Gulf or other regions. Furthermore:

> The next effect of these arms exports will be to increase coastal state freedom of action at the expense of the maritime powers. This latitude vanishes, of course, should the latter choose to employ all the means at their disposal, but at lower levels of conflict the new equipment can reduce some of the Western navy advantages. On the other hand, the simple knowledge of their possession may lead to an overrating of the developing country's power and thus dissuade attempts to test it.[75]

This latter point is noteworthy for it strikes at one of the key elements of the presence mission. As described by McGruther and others:

> Most important, a naval force, since it operates in its own milieu, can usually be kept out of hostilities until it chooses to participate, thereby leaving the final decision of commitment both as to tone and degree to one's own diplomats.[76]

Yet, if Wells is correct, the decision to commit will of necessity be of a very different sort than that foreseen by McGruther, Luttwak, et al. In the emerging naval environment one cannot be sure that a presence force can avoid hostilities until it chooses to participate. Finally, if "active suasion" now becomes fraught with peril, even the activities associated with latent suasion must be undertaken with a degree of preparation and care that cannot be counted as "routine."

Michael Klare has argued that much of the current preoccupation on the part of the U.S. Navy and DOD spokesmen with the growth of the Soviet Navy is rooted in the fear that the Soviets will be able to neutralize or circumscribe the political uses of U.S. naval power, especially in the Third World.[77] The present analysis suggests that a combination of developments, but especially the confluence of Third World militancy and the advent of new naval weapons technologies, will tend to complicate immensely the use of naval power by a superpower *even if it possesses clear superiority with respect to the other superpower*. Thus, it seems likely that the naval environment will be characterized by a general increase in the destructive capability of small naval forces, particularly those operating in coastal waters.[78] Thus, "superpower rivalry at sea" may well become a much less important element in calculations concerning sea control and the political uses of naval power.

Conclusion. It may be that these changing circumstances will dictate a different set of missions for the U.S. Navy. If one sees our future global "interdependence" as a volatile mix of mutual economic need and uneven but relative military (including naval) autonomy and even in some instances, area or regional self-sufficiency, then something approaching Young's "constabulary" missions looms as a distinct possibility:

> The likelihood is that whenever economic interests on or in the seabed or in the superjacent waters are internationally recognized as exclusive to the coastal state, the continued existence of the traditional high seas regime (whatever the hopes or intentions of the maritime powers) will progressively be degraded into mere legal superstition. In all the heavily used seas—and those of the North Atlantic are the most heavily used—there is no foreseeable alternative to the steady erosion of the old freedoms and the substitution of civil (or military) occupation, nationally or regionally organized. As on land, the symbol of such occupation will be the constable on the beat and the presence of legitimately deployed force: a concept totally at variance with that of the freedom of the seas.[79]

Perhaps Young overstates the case. But if hydrospace does become subdivided, the task of national naval forces may well become primarily that of policing regional coastal economic claims either as distinct national units or as contributors to some form of internationalized constabulary.

In any event, even if one rejects the idea of an alternative future for the U.S. Navy based on the constabular mission (a rather different conception of "presence" than that discussed above), the seemingly irreversible proliferation of military technology alone raises questions concerning the profile of missions employed by the U.S. Navy today. Indeed, the volume of arms transfers raises serious questions about the entire regulatory image of world politics within which the current debate over U.S. naval missions is being carried out. Both the regulatory concept and the idea of using naval power short of war imply a purposeful control of the exploitation of force so as to maximize American power and interests, or more abstractly, "international order." If, however, some approximation of the fractured, conflictual, but interdependent world of Robert Tucker comes to pass, we may be compelled to dust off and reexamine new and different notions so as to deal conceptually and pragmatically with other states in the international system.[80] It may well be that the international system will be characterized by stalemate.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver are members of the Political Science faculty at the University of Delaware. In addition to numerous articles, they are co-authors of *United States Foreign Policy and World Order.*

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