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War and Society

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good), a discussion of Eisenhower's performance as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe; an interesting essay on internal command problems facing the U.S. Army in Tunisia at the time of the Kasserine crisis, and, lastly, an interesting reflective essay on coalition command.

The last essays are collected under the heading of "Some Related Problems." They cover Military Obedience, Hitler Versus His Generals, General Stone (controversial commander of the 4th Infantry Division in Vietnam), and Relieved of Command. While the specifics of each differ considerably, they all bear in some way on leadership and command.

Those who read the book in hope of finding a systematic exposition of the nature of command and what makes some commanders greater than others will be disappointed. But, perhaps, their expectations are too high. If command, in its extraordinary dimensions, is an art, as this reviewer believes it to be, then systematic analysis of its extraordinary practitioners does not really do very much to increase our understanding of it. After all, can one really systematically contrast Rembrandt and Picasso to determine their genius? In the Introduction, Professor Stokesbury speaks of what makes commanders great: "A catalog of the virtues necessary for greatness becomes so all-inclusive as to be meaningless, with the single most essential element impossible to ferret out, and we are still left with one man an unaccountable genius, the next an obvious dud." Professor Blumenson in his preface recognizes: "Command is an art to be mastered, a craft that requires specialized knowledge, a well-developed intuition, high intelligence, and the ability to reason. The process of motivating human beings and controlling impersonal forces during a clash of arms is extremely complicated and difficult, and successful practitioners of the art of command have

been a special breed of men." They are both right.

JOHN B. KEELEY
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Bond, Brian and Roy, Ian, eds. *War and Society*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975. 254pp.

Although there are many books and manuals on war, the study of military history continues to be conducted as if war existed in a vacuum. Military history consists of much more than battle campaigns, a general's memoirs, a didactic warning for the future, or the juvenile tripe found in many of today's publications. Military history encompasses all of history, and to be well versed in the discipline, one must be familiar with man's economic, political, social, and diplomatic past as well. Men of arms have, at times, forgotten that the outcome of war is often decided by a complex array of political, economic, and social as well as military factors. The editors of *War and Society*, the first of what is to be an annual presentation, recognize this interplay of forces and events and have collected 14 well-written, well-researched essays which indeed provide "... a historical study of war and armed forces, and their relationship with society."

This fine collection of essays yields considerable insight into many different aspects of military history. The authors, all of them accomplished scholars, obviously know their subject. All but one of the articles are thoroughly documented—in fact, the footnotes make this volume a good starting point for further research on the subjects addressed. The only article without footnotes was written as a personal memorandum on the Czechoslovak Army and the Munich crisis by Brig. H.C.T. Stronge, who was the military attaché to Prague at the time. His cogent essay is a must for the savant of that particular period. Additionally, students

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of American military history will want to read Reginald C. Stuart's discourse on three of the volumes found in the Macmillan War of the United States series. After reading Stuart's perceptive review of the three books, it is apparent why the Macmillan series has become required reading for the professional soldier. The remaining articles also are very good.

While the essays are excellent, like so many compendia this one exposes the reader to the risk of learning a little about everything and not much about anything. The subject matter found in the compositions ranges from the Renaissance to the era of total war, and as the editors are quick to point out, "... it is intended that future issues will be equally wide-ranging." Be aware that the articles collected for this book are for the specialists in the field and are not designed for the general reading public, to wit "The Fighting Potential of Sixteenth Century Venetian Galleys," "Arrears of Pay and Ideology in the Army Revolt of 1647," and "The Danger of Bombardment from the Air and the Making of British Air Disarmament Policy 1932-4."

The academicians will find this book invaluable. The war colleges and professional service schools will want a copy on their library shelves, but the professional soldier does not have to run out and buy his personal edition (at \$19.00 the price is too high). The first issue is a solid, historically sound piece of work. I await with high expectations the new volumes to come in the series.

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Bowler, R. Arthur. *Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America 1775-1783*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975. 255pp.

In his Introduction, Professor Bowler states that a principal purpose of his

book is "to point out where logistical and administrative problems in America affected the course of the war." He has achieved his stated objective and has done so in a thorough manner that deserves the attention of those on both sides of the Atlantic who are interested in the conduct of the American War for Independence. There has long been a need for this book, for although the perennial shortages that afflicted the small American army are well known, the complicated question of supply as it affected British planning and operations has not before been fully examined.

During the Seven Years' War and from its end in 1763 until the outbreak of hostilities at Lexington-Concord on 19 April 1775, the British Army in America had been able to purchase locally practically all essential food-stuffs, as well as grain and forage. Some salt provisions were shipped by the Treasury in chartered victualling ships, and other assorted items (principally those required by the Artillery and Engineers) were provided by the Board of Ordnance.

One first finds mention of the problem of insuring adequate stocks of food for the British Army in a letter Lt. Gen. Thomas Gage, commanding His Majesty's Army in the 13 colonies, wrote the Treasury from the beleaguered town of Boston on 10 May 1775, just 3 weeks after the near debacle of 19 April, "... all the ports from whence our supplies usually came have refused suffering any provisions or necessaries whatsoever to be shipped for the King's use... and all avenues for procuring provisions in this country are shut up." This letter was the first intimation Whitehall had that the army would have to be fed from the home islands. And, as Professor Bowler makes clear, no single organization charged with providing continuous effective support to the army existed. Nor, given the state of the bureaucracy at the