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The Modern Japanese Military System

James Auer
U.S. Navy

James H. Buck

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Burgoyne's campaign in 1777. Burgoyne, at the end of a 4,000-mile supply line, was never able to build up even 30 days' rations. Nearly every senior serving officer, Burgoyne, Howe, Carleton, and Grinton, has been blamed for Burgoyne's failure. Lord George Germaine deserves a good share of the blame, and he has received it. There was certainly enough to go 'round. But the key to the whole situation was supply. With a well-ordered flow of supplies, Burgoyne would never have had to linger at Skenesborough for weeks or have had to send the expedition to Bennington and could probably have been in Albany by mid-August 1777. This would have changed the whole face of the war. There would have been no Saratoga and probably no French alliance. Of Burgoyne's invasion from Canada, Professor Bowler correctly writes: "No campaign of the war better illustrated the logistical problems of operations in America or the consequences of failure to understand them."

The supply picture was further complicated by the proclivity of the British and the Hessians to plunder indiscriminately and to destroy what they could not carry away. Their wanton behavior alienated many Americans who might otherwise have helped them to overcome the difficulties of getting food, grain, and forage from the countryside.

And there was the question of peculation. Many senior officers, civil servants, and commissaries made fortunes during the American Revolution and returned to England to purchase estates and live happily ever after. Craft was so common that it seems to have been tacitly condoned. (Generals Gage, Howe, Clinton, Cornwallis, and Carleton are free of this taint.)

Unfortunately, the British learned very little from the American experience. As far as I know, no attempt was ever made to assess it in comprehensive terms as Professor Bowler has done.

His is an enlightening book, and I recommend it to all officers, not only to logisticians.

SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH

Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)

Buck, James H., ed. *The Modern Japanese Military System*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, Inc., 1975. 253pp.

Despite numerous articles on Japan's postwar armed forces, the number of serious books on the subject, in Japanese and in English, remains small. The unpopularity of anything military in Japan after 1945 was nurtured by the largely U.S.-controlled Occupation. Starting in 1947, this outlook began to change. In 1950 General MacArthur wrote to Prime Minister Yoshida about the creation of a "National Police Reserve" of 75,000 men, which was an undisguised army (still today called the "Ground Self-Defense Force"). This preexisting unpopularity was thus joined by suspicion resulting from the creation of Japan's postwar armed forces having been ordered from outside its own national government, ironically enough by the same Occupation Government which earlier had virtually directed that Japan adopt a MacArthur-written Constitution. The ninth article of that famed "peace" Constitution forbade the nation to ever possess ground, sea, or air forces.

Both the Self-Defense Forces and the Constitution have survived, and the controversy has not altogether faded away. In 1973 a Japanese District Court ruled that these forces were unconstitutional and the final decision by Japan's Supreme Court remains years away. Much Japanese literature on the nation's armed forces, to the astonishment of outsiders unfamiliar with the political history of postwar Japan, has dealt with the simple question of the legitimacy of national defense. In addition to being uninteresting, much of this literature

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has been little more than political diatribe.

For these reasons, the appearance of James H. Buck's study is all the more valuable. Colonel Buck, a Japanese linguist and expert on postwar Japan and its armed forces, has gathered an impressive group of both American and Japanese scholars and has skillfully directed their contributions to aspects of the Self-Defense Forces in which they are specialists. In several cases they are virtually primary authorities.

Maj. Tom Brendle's chapter on the recruitment of military personnel in Japan's all-volunteer forces is exemplary of the quality of the book in general. An active duty U.S. Army officer who graduated from and has taught international relations at West Point and who has served as a frontline troop commander in Vietnam, Brendle wrote his doctoral dissertation at the prestigious Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy on the Ground Self-Defense Force. His chapter updates and highlights his research on Japan's postwar military recruiting, all obtained from primary source material and all of which would interest the American reader who could otherwise have only limited knowledge of the subject. Major Brendle's research sheds light on the influence of background, education, and national economic growth on recruitment and retention for over 20 years.

Likewise, Professors Theodore McNelly and Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., are recognized authorities on constitutional and public opinion issues, respectively, concerning Japan's postwar military. Their contributions are fresh updates of previous scholarly articles on the same subjects. Both authors write clearly and objectively and, in addition to reviewing the historical contexts of their subject areas, they provide realistic projections of future development. Of particular importance to readers not expert in postwar Japanese attitudes are Mendel's data which suggest that despite the fact

that an overwhelming majority of Japanese now support the existence of the Self-Defense Forces, despite the fact that there has been an obvious resurgence of Occupation-inspired abnormally repressed Japanese nationalism, and despite the fact that Japan could obviously financially support a far larger military establishment than it now maintains, the same public opinion does not support any increase in the present small size of the armed forces. Mendel's data also suggest this nationalistic feeling is more prone to pacificism than to military expansionism. Even the pro-American conservative Japanese Government, virtually the only party strongly supporting the Self-Defense Forces, is even more strongly supporting an unwritten policy of limiting Japan's defense expenditures to less than 1 percent of national GNP, a figure which due to inflation is likely to make it difficult for the forces even to continue their present level of relative modernization into the 1980's.

David Hopper's chapter on business involvement in defense affairs is fascinating reading on a subject about which precious little is available in English. For the moment his readers must be content to accept what he has written and wait for his book which is in final preparation.

Despite their expertise, Leonard Humphreys' and Martin Weinstein's essays, while worth reading, are not up to the quality of the rest of the volume. Professor Humphreys had the unenviable task of tracing more than 1,500 years of Japanese military tradition, and his noble efforts are necessarily general and simplistic, particularly in regard to the lack of any ties between previous military traditions and the present day Self-Defense Forces. Nonetheless, his suggestion that the Self-Defense Forces might beneficially be linked with the military traditions of the Meiji era is interesting, if only a long-term possibility.

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Weinstein remains convinced that Japan's post-World War II early leaders such as Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida figured out as early as 1946 exactly what the postwar political situation to the present and beyond was going to be like, wisely planned accordingly, and have virtually created the present Japan-United States security system to meet Japan's own desires to provide for its own internal defense while relying exclusively on the United States for external defense. Once Weinstein's assumption is granted, it is possible to make some facts fit the argument. However, Weinstein implies that since these forces would not be effective against external attack, they must be intended for internal security purposes. One wonders what role the most expensive items in Japan's defense arsenal: helicopter-carrying destroyers, F-4 Phantoms, and teardrop hull submarines are supposed to play in domestic population control. Mr. Osamu Kaihara, an articulate ex Defense bureaucrat and the foremost advocate of what Weinstein claims Japan has done, is on record in several well-written books and articles criticizing the lack of design and mission definition of Japan's armed forces. The result, Kaihara states, is that no mission, internal or external, can be carried out efficiently.

The most notable lack of the book as a whole is the absence of even one chapter commenting directly on what at least would interest military readers, namely the military effectiveness of Japan's armed forces. Despite their problems and unpopularity, if they were a significant regional or international military body, their import would be obvious. If they are of minimal value to any present or future military conflict, their existence is merely academic. A chapter on military effectiveness pointing out how almost totally ineffectual the forces would be by themselves but how they could have a significant effect if they were to be employed in

support of U.S. forces under the Mutual Security Treaty and how they could be made significantly more effective within the budgetary, public opinion, political, and constitutional realities of present day Japan would have made this very worthwhile reading volume even more valuable.

JAMES AUER

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Bucknell, Howard. *Energy Policy and Naval Strategy*. Beverley Hills, Calif.: Sage Professional Paper in International Studies, Sage Publications, 1975. 68pp.

Captain Bucknell's Sage paper examines U.S. energy needs, shortfalls, and strategies and concludes that, notwithstanding vigorous national energy policies, dependence on seaborne foreign petroleum will remain a critical element in the Nation's economic, social, and political health through the remainder of this century. Given this unavoidable dependency, the U.S. Navy must be revitalized as the touchstone of a viable foreign policy.

Two-thirds of the paper carefully outlines and defines U.S. energy problems through the 1990's in a thorough and balanced fashion. Energy sources, requirements, and potential substitutes are well researched and presented with the aid of an ample number of graphics.

Few direct or related issues are ignored. Optimistic and pessimistic forecasts are fairly reviewed and evaluated. Even the capital and social demands of overlapping economic and ecological interests and concerns are highlighted and weighed. The costs of reacting to necessity are staggering, but the author persuasively argues that the predictable consequences of inaction are unacceptable.

Captain Bucknell also argues that national policy options are limited. Real energy conservation must be effected, and petroleum stockpiles must be