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Rebels Under Sail, The American Navy during the Revolution.

Craig Symonds

William M. Fowler

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urgently rebuilt if international crises are to be managed. Expanded domestic exploration and production must be encouraged and actively supported. Substitute energy technology must be vigorously pursued and funded.

All of these measures, however, will only ameliorate energy dependence on Western and Eastern Hemisphere sources through the year 2000. They cannot solve the problem. "Independence by 1985" is toasted as a misleading catch-phrase.

In the interim, the United States must maintain a strong domestic and export economy to pay for massive energy imports. Both will require an active oceanic commerce and a foreign policy which supports it. To be effective, these interests must be buttressed by adequate military capability—particularly a strong Navy to insure sea control.

The final third of the paper focuses on the comparative weakness of the U.S. Fleet vis-à-vis the growing modern missile forces of the U.S.S.R. The author categorically states that our failure to maintain a first-rate Navy has undermined overall national U.S. military capabilities and has significantly increased both the probability and risks of war.

Captain Bucknell argues that the U.S. Fleet is deficient in offensive capability and would likely be faced down or defeated in any direct naval confrontation overseas with the Soviet Fleet in the near future, unless circumstances favored us. To overcome this deficiency, the fleet should be modernized with standoff cruise missiles and nuclear propulsion. Innovative ASW approaches are required to mitigate the effects of numerical shortfalls versus worldwide commitments.

While it is difficult for this reviewer to argue with the general thrust of Captain Bucknell's position, the limited presentation of this argument does not support his case. It is heavily dependent

on generalizations which assume a greater knowledge by the reader on the breadth and detail of sea warfare and comparative battle strengths than can be reasonably expected. Further, some corrective imperatives such as a rapid transition to nuclear propulsion to meet numerical force deficiencies would appear desirable but impracticable for the same economic reasons which make overall energy solutions unlikely in the foreseeable future.

While these shortcomings are identifiable, they are also understandable. The short format of this paper does not allow for an adequate or balanced comparison of naval strengths and weaknesses of the United States and Soviet fleets and the strategies which such study would recommend.

The real strength of this paper is the terse but extraordinarily complete overview of U.S. energy problems over the next few decades. The bibliography and notes are excellent, particularly on recent energy studies and policies since 1972. This presentation supports the national requirement for a revitalized Navy to meet the potential Soviet threat at sea, but inadequately sketches the naval balance, necessary forces, or strategies to carry it out except in broad generalities. One hopes Captain Bucknell will soon have the opportunity to expand on his evaluation of the Navy and its future course.

F.N. MANGOL
Commander, U.S. Navy

Fowler, William M. *Rebels Under Sail, The American Navy during the Revolution*. New York: Scribner's, 1976. 345pp. Index.

With disarming candor, William Fowler warns his readers in the introduction to this volume to beware "Bicentennial fever" whose symptoms, apparently, are hyperbolic references to national "firsts" and unwarranted enthusiasm for all things 200 years old.

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He has followed his own advice in the writing of *Rebels Under Sail*. Not only has he successfully avoided bicentennial hyperbole and cant, but he concludes with forlorn solemnity that "the story of the Continental Navy reveals itself as a rather drab and unimportant sideshow of the Revolution." In doing so, he is not attempting to "debunk" anything for even so great a naval enthusiast as John Adams wrote in 1780 that "recollecting the whole history of the rise and progress of our navy, it is difficult to avoid tears."

The sad truth is that the oceangoing Continental Navy never really got off the ground—or rather out to sea—except in the minds of a few proto-Navalists in the Continental Congress and its Marine Committee. The result is that the history of the Continental Navy is one redolent with administrative infighting, professional bickering, and political wheeling and dealing, but little accomplishment. This history Mr. Fowler has chronicled faithfully and has at the same time managed to present in an interesting and readable package.

Since very little of the history of the Continental Navy concerns victories at sea, Mr. Fowler has spent considerable energy in recounting those vital aspects of naval history that are so frequently ignored by battle-oriented historians: administration, organization, financing, construction, and, altogether too briefly, the daily lives of the officers and sailors who manned the ships. He has approached these intertwined subjects topically which on the one hand helps to spotlight them, but which on the other forces him to abandon the chronological narrative. As a result, the nonspecialist may become confused as the book jumps about in time, backtracking to events already described elsewhere in order to examine their influence on a different aspect of the struggle to build, fit out, man, and fight a Continental Navy. There is another pitfall awaiting the nonspecialist.

Though Mr. Fowler has provided definitions for some naval terms (a trunnel, for example), he has not done so for others (such as tumble home).

Rebels Under Sail is an engaging volume despite its sorry tale of frustration and defeat, and it is really the only serious single-volume history of the Continental Navy that is available. It does not supplant Gardiner Allen's 1962 two-volume history, *A Naval History of the American Revolution*, but it does provide a briefer portrayal—one that is accurate, readable, and honest—of the American Navy during the Revolution.

CRAIG SYMONDS
U.S. Naval Academy

Harries-Jenkins, Gwyn and van Doorn, Jacques, eds. *The Military and the Problem of Legitimacy*. London: Sage, 1976. 217pp.

Normally a collection of 10 papers from the 1974 Eighth World Congress of Sociology at Toronto would not be expected to interest many outside of the group of scholars who were sharpening their techniques and perceptions at one of their periodic meetings. But when one considers the nature and magnitude of the worldwide cultural change of the last 25 years and when one realizes that military professionals and high-level institutions have apparently not fully appreciated the implications of such change, then this expression of intellectual concern not only becomes important, but it becomes a matter of serious interest to the thoughtful military professional.

The editorial introduction by Harries-Jenkins and van Doorn defines the issue clearly. "In short the germinal issue is whether the traditional legitimacy of the military is still acceptable in a situation where armed forces are increasingly alleged to be a dysfunctional element within society."

Later van Doorn states: "... legitimacy is the capacity of a social or