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## The Oil Crisis

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dations, he again suggests the President must increase his use of communications and the media to form favorable public opinion, and that the President is otherwise at a severe disadvantage in the opinion arena. Taylor suggests 1 to 2 hours of Presidential television press coverage weekly to allow "recurrent public questioning" of national policy, and implies that this step will improve the national consciousness.

In summary, Taylor predicts that the American people will pay the price necessary to achieve their "total security" once they are enlightened. His book could add to that enlightenment.

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Vernon, Raymond, ed. *The Oil Crisis*. New York: Norton, 1976. 301pp.

The events following the outbreak of war between Israel and the Arab states in October 1973 had traumatic impacts on the world's economic and political systems that are still being felt. The "oil crisis" is the term commonly used to describe the embargoes and production cutbacks by the Arab oil producers and the fourfold increase in crude oil prices by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The oil crisis strained the NATO alliance and was a major factor in the double-digit inflations and severe recessions that wracked the industrial nations' economies in 1974 and 1975.

Raymond Vernon has edited and contributed to a collection of essays by a multidisciplinary group of international scholars whose efforts were sponsored jointly by the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University and by *Daedalus*, the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. This volume will aid readers to understand the nature of the oil crisis and help them to put it in perspective. Although most of the essays are related to others in the work, many of them could be read independently.

Raymond Vernon opens the book with an interpretative essay which focuses on what was learned about the oil crisis by the interaction of these scholars. Other essays provide analyses of the economic background and development of the crisis; of the actions of the oil-producing countries, the United States, Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union during the crisis; of the role of the multinational oil companies; of the functioning of OPEC, and of the efforts of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for international energy cooperation. The book concludes with three essays in a section called "Synthesis," which Vernon, in the preface, says, "should be read in the same spirit as the Japanese novel *Roshomon—Three Versions of an Incident*."

One conclusion the authors reach which is worth noting is that the multinational oil companies showed a greater ability to adapt to the embargo and output restrictions than did the governments of the importing states. Robert Stobaugh's analysis of the distribution of crude oil supplies during the embargo period indicates that the companies rearranged their worldwide production and distribution of oil to equalize the shortages in the consuming nations according to an "equal-suffering" rule. It is doubtful that following chauvinistic national government guidance would have led to an oil allocation which would have been better when longrun political and economic interdependence are considered.

Readers of this journal will be interested in Klaus Knorr's essay, "The Limits of Economic and Military Power." In response to the question "Why this reluctance to resort to force [by the oil-importing nations]?" Knorr says that the magnitude of the military effort against the Arab oil producers would have had to have been far in excess of a modest show of force or small expeditionary force given the

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capacity for resistance by the potential targets. With the exception of the United States, the size and configuration of the armed forces of the Western industrial nations and Japan make them incapable of any sustained, large-scale, overseas military operation. The United States may have had sufficient military strength, but a number of domestic and international political factors constrained its use against the oil-producing states.

Is the world likely to see other successful employments of economic coercion based on the model of the oil crisis? Most of the authors of *The Oil Crisis* do not think so. The special conditions that enabled oil to be used as a political and economic lever do not exist for other commodities and manufactured goods. This means that other Third World raw material producers are unlikely to be able to repeat the oil crisis, but it also means that industrial nations are not likely to be able to exert effective economic counterpressure on oil producers.

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Vigor, P.H. *The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality*. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. 256pp.

The debate in progress in the United States over Soviet military capabilities and intentions requires some basic understanding of Soviet attitudes toward war and their readiness to use warfare as a means of attaining various political goals. This is a complex area to explore since it involves examining the history of Soviet and pre-Soviet Communist statements on this subject, traditional Russian attitudes and the examples of Soviet use of force since the Bolsheviks came to power. Professor Vigor, who is Head of the Soviet Studies Center at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, has met the challenge

admirably in his study of Soviet views on war, peace and neutrality. His book is documented, analytic and concise. It discusses in turn each of the three basic elements contained in its title and closes with a chapter that attempts to relate the theories developed to actual practice as evidenced by selected cases. The book also contains a bibliography with a brief description of the more important sources.

The key section of the book is the chapter that discusses Soviet views on war. Soviet attitudes toward war are developed from their beginnings in the writings by Marx and Engels through Lenin's contributions, Stalin's statements, and the pronouncements by the more recent Soviet political and military leaders. One of the most useful sections of this chapter summarizes the different types of war as seen through Soviet eyes, and attempts to explain why the Soviets make these distinctions. This section is particularly useful as an introduction for the beginner attempting to understand Soviet viewpoints on the different types of wars and also as a timely review for the more advanced reader.

In several paragraphs that relate to the Soviet Navy, Professor Vigor indicates that the Soviet Navy is a "staunch proponent" of the concept that a future world war might not necessarily be nuclear. He also states that the idea of a limited war between capitalism and communism appears to have originated with the Soviet Navy which recognizes that operating at close quarters with NATO navies could precipitate a conflict that would not necessarily be nuclear. With regard to power projection overseas, Professor Vigor states that there are not sufficient landing craft and supply ships in the Soviet Navy to deliver large numbers of Soviet troops abroad and keep them supplied. He does not place much credence in the capability of Soviet ships to practice gunboat diplomacy. He sees the Soviet