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Napoleon and Talleyrand: The Last Two Weeks

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of the stranger, and then say to him, "There! take that for your answer. And yet you have no right to take notice of it: for it was only said to my family and behind your back."

And on 27 November Adams, having carried the day, informed the Russian Government that the United States would oppose any attempt by European powers to restore to Spain her late colonies. His government, the Secretary informed Alexander, "could not see with indifference the forcible interposition of any European Power, other than Spain, either to restore the dominion of Spain over her emancipated colonies in America, or to establish Monarchical Government in those countries, or to transfer any of the possessions . . . to any other European power."

Clearly, the Secretary of State did not view a Presidential message to the Congress as an effective or as a proper response to a foreign power. Thus, Monroe's Message was an announcement to the American people that the Administration already had taken firm action against those European nations which threatened to restore colonial rule in Latin America and that it had dealt as strongly with Russian designs in the Pacific Northwest. While May is correct in pointing out that the Monroe Doctrine of December 1823 was motivated by domestic political considerations, all Presidential messages to Congress, according to Adams, were supposed to be for that purpose. To be sure, Monroe's announcement aided Adams' Presidential hopes in that it undercut Henry Clay's argument that Adams was weak in his support of Latin American independence and of American interests in the Pacific Northwest. The substance of the policy generally referred to as the Monroe Doctrine, however, had been effected more

quietly and had been begun much earlier through diplomatic, not public, channels.

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Norman, Barbara. *Napoleon and Talleyrand: The Last Two Weeks*. New York: Stein and Day, 1976. 299pp.

When studying the death of empires, historians usually concentrate upon long-term trends and underlying causes leading to the regime's collapse. The collapse itself is usually treated as an inevitable consequence of larger historical forces or as an afterthought. The way in which a regime perishes, however, is often important in and of itself, for its manner of dying influences significantly the options and choices of its successors.

Barbara Norman has written an interesting study of the last days of the Napoleonic regime. She notes that in the spring of 1814, a Bourbon restoration was by no means the inevitable result of Napoleon's defeat. Allied statesmen and French leaders had numerous alternatives including a dictated peace to the Emperor, a regency for Napoleon's son, occupation and partition of France, or replacing Napoleon with Bernadotte, a former marshal and satellite of the Tsar. Thus restoring Bourbon rule was only one of several possible results of Napoleon's defeat.

At this juncture, Talleyrand, a former bishop, former revolutionary, former imperial official and perpetual schemer played a major role in helping the Bourbons to regain their throne. Talleyrand created a provisional government at Paris and convinced many in both the allied and imperial camps that a restoration was the only viable alternative.

Unfortunately, the author says little about Talleyrand's own motives. Did he act as he did because he believed

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that a monarchy, having no stake in trying to regain Napoleon's conquests, was the only form of government capable of bringing stability to France and Europe? Or did he betray Napoleon because he had hopes of obtaining power and influence from the new regime? The author also fails to discuss the Tsar's scheme to place Bernadotte on the French throne and his reason for giving up his plan. Finally, the author says almost nothing about Austrian and English policies and their impact upon the fate of France.

What the author has done is to provide a well-written, well-researched narrative account of an important aspect of Napoleon's downfall. She has also described the important role that Talleyrand played in deciding the future of France.

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O'Neill, James E. and Krauskopf, Robert W. eds. *World War II: An Account of its Documents*. Washington: Howard University Press, 1976. 269pp.

In June 1971, the National Archives and Records Service sponsored a well-received conference in Washington, which was designed to establish a dialogue between archivists and historians in the use and location of the primary historical sources of World War II. Topics discussed included wartime diplomacy, military biography, and access to archival sources. Virtually everyone who attended the meeting felt it was a success, but to transform a conference into a published volume is a difficult, if not overwhelming, task.

Everything said in such a gathering may not be worth publishing. Papers delivered by promising young scholars may not measure up to professional expectations and may lack publishable quality. The old sage may reproduce a paper delivered at an earlier military

history symposium, or the last chapter of his latest book, or even a discarded lesson plan from last fall's graduate seminar. At the National Archives and Records Service conference such was not the case. The leading archivists and historians of World War II were invited to be the participants. Among the established scholars presenting papers were Louis Morton, Henri Michel, Barbara W. Tuchman, Selig Adler, Albert Blum, and Noble Franklin. Their papers are good—in fact very good. They provide an excellent dialogue between the archivists and historians of the Second World War. By themselves these papers are a valuable contribution to scholarship. But the editors of *World War II: An Account of its Documents* were not content with simply collecting 18 well-written essays into a book. In addition, they compiled biographies of the contributors, a bibliography of the finding aids to materials on the Second World War, a thorough and exhaustive index, and a brief yet complete summary of the discussion that accompanied the papers during the conference. The photographs, most of them from the National Archives files, are informative and seldom found in other books. The editors' efforts produced a solid piece of work designed to serve the needs of both the academician and savant of World War II.

Of the papers delivered, several are particularly noteworthy. The late Louis Morton's essay on the different historical interpretations of the events that led to Pearl Harbor is most perceptive and interesting. After reading his cogent article, one has a better understanding of why Japan attacked America's mighty fortress in the Pacific. Also fascinating and informative was the essay by Henri Michel, the secretary-general of the *Comité d' Histoire de la 2^{ème} guerre*, entitled the "Archives of the French Resistance: Methods of Collection and Results." A clandestine organization by its very nature does not