

1977

Operation Menace

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Recommended Citation

Simpson, B. M. III and Marder, Arthur (1977) "Operation Menace," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 30 : No. 2 , Article 19.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol30/iss2/19>

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after a discussion of the constraints on the committees' reports, he states that "the degree to which any such considerations apply to the Strategic Bombing Survey I leave to the reader to decide on the basis of the foregoing account . . ." The refusal to draw conclusions is no guarantee of objectivity. That problem lies deeper, as a student of the Survey like MacIsaac knows.

At the beginning of Chapter Three, MacIsaac quotes Bliss Carman: "A fact merely marks the point where we have agreed to let the investigation cease." In studying the Survey MacIsaac has inherited some of its faults as well as some of its virtues. The marshalling of evidence is fair and balanced; MacIsaac has no axe to grind. On the other hand, there are questions he will not pursue and facts that he will not investigate further. The book is interesting and worthwhile. Lieutenant Colonel MacIsaac need not have been so careful to save appearances.

MARILYN Z. WELLONS

Marder, Arthur. *Operation Menace*. London: Oxford University Press, 1976. 289pp.

When France concluded an armistice with Germany in June 1940, Britain alone faced a hostile European continent which Hitler had occupied from the North Cape to the Spanish frontier. The French Navy was at best neutral and there was a real question as to whether the extensive French empire in northern and western Africa would remain neutral or would be open to German penetration.

If Dakar on the west coast of Africa were to come under German control, the vital sealanes around Africa would be threatened and the British strategic position, already desperate, would become even more perilous. While the French colonies in north and west Africa remained loyal to Vichy, some in equatorial Africa had already rallied to

General de Gaulle who continued the battle against Hitler.

Churchill felt it necessary to proceed on short notice in August and September 1940 with the attempt to capture Dakar, because he assumed German attempts at infiltration. De Gaulle assumed that the civil and military population of Dakar would support a Gaullist attempt to wrest the city from Vichy control. Both assumptions were false.

Arthur Marder chronicles and then analyzes how this operation based on false assumptions was plagued from the start by imprudent haste, inadequate planning, poor coordination, false intelligence and just plain bad luck. He has examined the relevant documents and he has corresponded with surviving participants to present a classic case of military and naval failure, even though the men on the scene were by and large intelligent, competent and perceptive. Fortunately for the ultimate success of Allied arms in World War II, the mistakes made at Dakar were not repeated.

A contributing factor to the failure of the Dakar expedition was the unexpected movement of elements of the French fleet from Toulon to Dakar. Adm. Sir Dudley North, based on Gibraltar, did not prevent the passage of the French ships through the straits, partly because of his interpretation of ambiguous standing orders and partly because of confusion and lack of direction from London. North was relieved because the Admiralty had lost confidence in him, fair enough grounds under any circumstances. However, in relieving him the Admiralty implied in writing that he was derelict in the performance of his duty.

Marder examines in some detail North's attempt to remove what he considered to be a blemish on his honor either by retraction or by a formal inquiry. The matter simmered for nearly 17 years and was not resolved until after a formal debate in the House of Lords and a statement by Prime Minister

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Macmillan in the House of Commons. The point of the affair is that any officer may be and should be removed from command when his superiors have lost confidence in him. But in relieving him care should be taken not to imply wrongdoing, unless, of course, formal proceedings are contemplated or can be supported.

The history of warfare is replete with examples of failure and the lessons that can be learned from them are legion. Arthur Marder has performed an admirable service for military professional officers and scholars alike by presenting concisely and completely the details and explanation of why Operation Menace failed. It could be profitably studied in war colleges as a classic case of how not to conduct a combined operation.

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May, Ernest R. *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975. 306pp.

Contrary to the conclusion of most historians, Ernest R. May argues that the issuance of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 can best be understood "in terms of domestic politics." Rejecting notions of national interest as well as the pressures of international politics, May offers the thesis that "The positions of the policymakers [in the United States] were determined less by conviction than by ambition." In short, competition for the Presidential nomination of 1824 produced the Monroe Doctrine as we know it. The author realizes that his is a provocative position and, from the outset, he admits that "the direct evidence of connections between foreign policy debates and the presidential contest is sparse and ambiguous."

Nevertheless, he urges his readers to follow him on this speculative journey for his goal goes beyond the under-

standing of the Monroe Doctrine to a more general call for American foreign policy analysts to reexamine their assumptions. The motivations of policymakers can be more clearly predicted "by an analysis of their domestic political interests than by analysis of their private beliefs or of the options defined for them by apparent actions or intentions of other nations." While May repeatedly asserts that he has no desire to reduce the decisions of policymakers solely to their political ambitions, the logic and force of his argument, especially in relation to the promulgation of Monroe's Doctrine, leave little room for a more eclectic conclusion.

And May is very persuasive in presenting his case. It is difficult to quibble with his assertion that too few historians have bothered to examine the relationship between domestic politics and the Monroe Doctrine. Nevertheless, he is a little wide of the mark if he insists, as he seems to, that this has been a failing of much of the recent work on American foreign relations. Certainly the outpouring of monographs on the cold war has not been remiss in that regard. However, if Professor May is correct about the motives which led to Monroe's Message, the implications for U.S. Latin American policy are important.

Professor May's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine is itself based on two underlying assumptions about the Doctrine's intent: First, that it would be aimed at restricting continental powers from recapturing for Spain or for themselves the newly independent, former Spanish colonies in Latin America, and second, that it would state the position of the United States vis-à-vis the Greek revolution. Tied to these two issues was the question whether or not the cabinet would accept the invitation of British Foreign Secretary George Canning to join in a declaration in opposition to the recolonization of Latin America. Unlike other scholars May assumes that the