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War and Economic Development: Essays in Memory of David Joslin

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military capacity successfully to fight Germany, Italy, and Japan all at once and alone. Not only was the Empire "disjointed, disconnected and highly vulnerable," the First Sea Lord, Admiral Chatfield, wrote in 1936, but it was open to debate whether it was in reality strategically defensible at all.

Lawrence R. Pratt is a professor of political science at the University of Alberta. He pays tribute to the influence on his work of Donald C. Watt, Professor of International History at the London School of Economics, and this book can profitably be read along with Watt's important recent book *Too Serious a Business: European Armed Forces and the Approach to the Second World War*. Professor Pratt's detailed study of the formation of British Mediterranean appeasement policy solidly supports Watt's thesis that the chiefs of staff of all the European great powers were reluctant to risk war right up to the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939.

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Winter, J.M., ed. *War and Economic Development: Essays in Memory of David Joslin*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975. 297pp.

This volume contains 11 papers and an introductory essay written in memory of the late British economic historian David M. Joslin by his students, colleagues and friends. Arranged in chronological order, the essays treat a broad range of topics relating to the impact of war on economic development in Europe. Not surprisingly, most of the papers, 8 of the 11, deal with Great Britain. Four of the papers focus wholly or in part on the First World War. Others consider such diverse subjects as the effects of war taxation on the English economy in the late 13th and early 14th centuries, and the economic costs of the Dutch Revolt in the late 16th and early 17th centuries.

In the opening essay, Edward Miller makes a persuasive case that heavy taxation in the period 1294-97 significantly reduced living standards of all ranks of English society. He further argues that war taxes in the subsequent 50 years altered the economic structure in a variety of ways, and had particularly adverse effects on agriculture. He argues that taxes led to declines in agricultural prices and eventually in reductions in the amount of land under cultivation. Other economic factors were also at work during the period, of course. The weakness in Miller's paper lies in his inability to assess the relative importance of various factors. General deflation, apparently accompanied by (and probably caused by) declines in the money supply occurred during the period, together with sharply rising labor costs after 1320. The existence of these factors leaves his case that taxation played a leading role in the decline of agriculture unconvincing.

Next, G.R. Elton traces the transition, in the early Tudor period, in the right of the English Crown to collect direct taxes from a right to do so only in time of war or impending war, to a right to do so on "whatever grounds of need could be put forward." He draws the conclusion that, "Down to 1529, [the historian] can treat all taxation (and its effects) as the product of war; thereafter he needs to distinguish. It then becomes desirable to follow up the collection of revenue by an investigation of expenditure, in order to ascertain whether the impact of government on the economy through direct taxation may be ascribed to actual war . . ." (p. 46). While the evidence marshaled concerning the change in the right to tax is impressive, the conclusion fails to account for the obvious fact that revenues are fungible. Investigation of expenditure is desirable in any case.

Third, Geoffrey Parker examines the economic consequences of the Dutch war of liberation—the so-called Eighty

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Years War. He concludes that the conflict was very costly in terms of economic development to both the Netherlands and Spain. He refutes the case sometimes made that the northern Netherlands benefited economically from the war as a result of the growth in trade with the East and West Indies. Acknowledging that that trade sector grew, Parker goes on to show that it was a relatively unimportant part of the Dutch economy, and further asserts that "there is every reason to suppose that [the trade] would have been still greater if a permanent peace with Spain had been arranged." (p. 64)

Peter Mathias, in a fascinating paper, argues that advances made in British military medicine in the late 18th century were important influences on the greatly improved civilian health standard of the 19th century. The advances, mostly preventive, rather than curative in nature, were stimulated by the great premium placed on health by the military because of the need to keep forces at effective levels. They were made possible by the authoritarian nature of the military as an institution, together with the practitioners' belief in the scientific, experimental method.

In "War and Industrialisation," Phyllis Deane concludes that war in the years 1793-1815 did not seriously retard the pace of the British Industrial Revolution. Next, Simon Schama, in a long and rather turgid paper, discusses the politics of taxation in the Netherlands in the period 1795-1810. This is followed by perhaps the most interesting essay in the book, in which Clive Trebilcock shows that in the Boer War, which he calls the last *laissez-faire* war, critical shortages of war materials developed. In both the private and public sectors of the armaments industry, significant mistakes were made in the process of expansion to meet war demands. The lessons of the Boer War were apparently not assimilated and exactly the same problems arose in

World War I, a little more than a decade later. The failures of the production and procurement systems in Great Britain in the First World War have often been noted. According to Trebilcock,

It is not sufficient to say that in 1914 and 1915 a production and procurement system organised for the colonial scale was broken by a continental war. The truth is that it was almost broken by an earlier great war, a colonial great war, which advertised its extent by the economic strains it created. Not only that, but many of the weak points in the industrial and military apparatus—over-reliance on the private sector, "contractors promises" poor procurement methods, faulty fuse and shell production—were the same points at which weaknesses developed in 1914 and 1915. (p. 161)

Roy and Kay MacLeod provide a case study of the British optical industry in the First World War, in their description of a rather moribund industry which the war, with considerable government assistance, rapidly transformed. They conclude that, "The experience of the First World War showed that an economic and scientific alliance between government and industry was, whether immediately or in the long term, of vital interest to both." (p. 192) In an essay that is only tangentially related to economic development, D.C. Coleman discusses the shortage of cellulose acetate in Britain during World War I, and the reaction of the private sector to it. A private monopoly, encouraged by the government, arose, enriching selected individuals and creating a public outcry in an episode which came known to be the "Dope Scandal."

In the volume's shortest essay, Joe Lee points out clearly the failures of German agricultural policy both before and during the First World War, which arose from "a failure to understand the basic interrelationships operating in the

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economy." (p. 229) The final essay, by José Harris, describes the history of the making of the Beveridge Report, which is often regarded as crucial in influencing the direction of post-World War II British social policy. The book closes with an excellent, well-organized bibliography of some 35 pages, compiled by Professor Winter and his associates.

An overall appraisal of the volume comes out mixed. Many of the individual essays are informative and thought-provoking. However, the reader is left wondering just what he has learned about the relationship between war and economic development. An overview of this complex relationship is sorely lacking, and there is too little attempt to put the essays into perspective with respect to the rest of the literature, or to draw this immensely diverse collection together. Professor

Winter's introductory essay provides important insight into the literature, but no real overview of the problem. Winter does point out that the contributors take two approaches: Six (Miller, Elton, Schama, Trebilcock, Coleman, and Lee) take an "internal" approach, examining production, finance and other policies as they relate to an economy during a particular war; the remaining five take an "external" approach, examining the effects of war on long-run trends. While this distinction is a useful one for ordering one's thinking, it is not an adequate framework for drawing parallels between the essays or for assessing their contribution to knowledge about the relationship between war and economic development.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

Zumwalt and Westmoreland: Contrasting Views of Military Professionalism

During the first part of 1976, two recently retired uniformed heads of military services and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General William Westmoreland and Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, published their memoirs.* Westmoreland, whose Army career spanned 36 years, served as Army Chief of Staff from 1968 to 1972, while Zumwalt, whose Navy career lasted 32 years, served as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) from 1970 to 1974. Although their tenure on the JCS and their military careers overlapped to a

considerable extent, there are a great many differences in outlook between these two men. Comparing these differences can provide a useful contrast between the different models of professionalism to which American military officers subscribe, the different organizational norms by which military officers govern their conduct, and the differences between two individuals who more than any others dominated military history in the past decade. The differences between Westmoreland and Zumwalt, as manifested in their memoirs, fall into five broad categories.

First, Westmoreland and Zumwalt disagreed about the propriety of retired military officers writing books. In his preface, Westmoreland states that the military life is one of constraint in

*Westmoreland, William C. *A Soldier Reports* (New York: Doubleday, 1976), 446pp. Zumwalt, Elmo R., Jr. *On Watch: A Memoir* (New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., 1976), 568pp.