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United States Foreign Policy and World Order

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American society is changing and so is the position of women in it. An increasing number of military wives today have full-time outside employment. Equally important but probably more widely recognized is the second-career problem, which the military in former times did not have to face. Both present problems in how to accommodate to the requirements of the military while recognizing the competing claims exerted by the military's linkages with/and position within civilian society. The book presents ample material that should lead the reader to reflect on the pressure family life demands place on the military career as presently structured and as it may evolve.

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Nathan, James A. and Oliver, James K. *United States Foreign Policy and World Order*. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1976. 598pp.

This volume is a broad history of the United States and its interaction with other actors on the international stage over the past 30 years. It is a history of success and failure in particular episodes of the cold war, but more than that, it is a history of how little the outcomes of these individual policy decisions have affected the underlying concepts and assumptions on which foreign policy is built. Thus the central "lessons" learned from Nazi aggression and the years immediately following the Second World War have been applied and re-applied ever since. In a 1965 speech, for example, President Johnson was able to say that "the central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. [The lesson of Munich, 1938.] To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next ... [domino theory]. The rulers of Hanoi are urged on by Peiping... a nation that is helping the forces of

violence on every continent [monolithic communism]." These are the same assumptions about the state of world politics that had led the United States to become involved in Korea and are described by the authors as the culture in which American policymakers have operated and continue to operate since the latter days of the Second World War.

The book is divided in two parts. The first covers the events on the international stage, but the second, perhaps the most interesting and certainly the most thought provoking, deals with the changes that have been forced on the American system of government by our assumption of the mantle of world leadership: these changes have led to the ever-increasing power of the executive branch at the expense of the Congress, for example; power that was necessary if the United States was to have the ability to respond quickly to events in a crisis.

The history opens with the first, decidedly unfriendly encounters of the West with the fledgling Bolshevik government in 1918 and links the direct origins of the cold war to the events of WW II. The inability or, as seen in the eyes of the Soviets, the unwillingness of the Western allies to give material aid to the struggling Russian armies in the field gave little impetus to good will after 1945. These doubts about Anglo-American intentions were well founded. By early 1943, despite the much publicized Allied landings in North Africa, the Western forces were engaged with no more than 12 German divisions. The Soviets were engaged with 185. Indeed, the invasion of France and the opening of a second front, promised to Stalin throughout the war, was only to come after the Soviet victory in central Europe was inevitable—and the Russians were convinced that it was Allied policy to bleed them white. Similarly, the Soviets viewed Western plans for the unification and reconstruction of

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Germany, the same Germany that had so recently devastated the Russian homeland and caused the death of some 20 million Russians, as a rebirth of the policy of encirclement and a manifestation of the West's continuing threat. In response, Stalin felt that he could not allow the Soviet Union the luxury of returning to a peacetime footing. This continued partial mobilization was, in turn, interpreted by the Americans as a threat to Europe of "barbarian invasion." It was in this atmosphere of bitter distrust and misinterpretation that the arrangements for peace in Europe were made—and the lines of the cold war were drawn.

Too often scholars analyze foreign policy and foreign policymakers in a vacuum. Nathan and Oliver, however, have taken great care to correlate carefully the elements of domestic political issues with those of foreign policy. Many, if not most, of the important decisions that shaped and maintained the cold war are correctly traced as much to personal bias, domestic power plays, and election politics as to a genuine assessment of international realities. Much of the apocalyptic rhetoric of the Truman years, around which the attitudes of the next 30 years formed, is seen as purposely overdramatized to mobilize the American public and a Republican Congress in support of a strong world role for the United States. Even more serious was President Kennedy's 1963 decision to maintain troops in Vietnam "until 1965—after I'm reelected," even after he was convinced that they were serving no useful purpose. The upcoming election year determined that he not appear a "Communist appeaser." President Nixon was also unwilling to negotiate a settlement in Vietnam in 1969 "for fear of the domestic consequences of the Viet Cong flag going up over Saigon" before the 1972 election.

This is a particularly well-written account of events, well documented

and, unlike so many similar books, easy to read. Furthermore, it makes excellent use of documents, such as NSC 68, that have until recently been classified and thus unavailable to the researcher.

Considering the grand designs of the book, nothing less than a historical overview of U.S. policy and the forces that have shaped that policy during the course of 30 years, the work can be considered outstanding. Each of the 11 chapters in the first part of the book is a concise work in itself, complete with an introduction and a conclusion, and each covers a time period during which one particular mind-set was in vogue. This arrangement, of course, makes it an excellent book for students and betrays the authors' current active role in teaching. The second part of the work is of equal quality in its analysis of how our governmental structure has adapted itself to meet the demands made by our policies.

The length, over 580 pages, is a definite impediment to the casual reader, but, if taken either a chapter at a time or all at once, it gives an excellent background from which to view where we have been in the past 30 years and speculate on where we are going in the future.

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O'Connell, D.P. *The Influence of Law on Sea Power*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975. 204pp.

The announced purpose of this volume is to bring into focus disputed questions that contemporary international law poses for naval planning, thereby creating a "structure" for further analyses. In this respect, the author succeeds reasonably well.

The book approaches the relationship of international law to seapower from several directions: the interpretation of several important maritime treaties, such as the Hague Conventions