

1976

Sea Power in the 1970's

B. M. Simpson III
U.S. Navy

George H. Quester

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Recommended Citation

Simpson, B. M. III and Quester, George H. (1976) "Sea Power in the 1970's," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 29 : No. 4 , Article 23.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol29/iss4/23>

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in 1907 and the Treaty on the Prohibitions of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea Bed and Ocean Floor and on the Subsoil Thereof; distinctions between the rules applicable to various maritime zones such as the territorial sea, internal waters, contiguous zone, and high seas; and finally, the influence of new weapons and technology on contemporary legal constraints. Numerous case studies are presented, all of which provide an interesting historical perspective to the practice of states regarding the use of force at sea both in peacetime and in wartime.

A fundamental insight provided by Professor O'Connell is that international law in order to influence decisively how an armed engagement is actually fought must have a reasonable degree of political, and hence psychological, support by the parties to the conflict. This insight strikes at the heart of the matter of the influence of law on seapower. International law—particularly the law of war and the use of force short of war—largely depends on the voluntary support of the affected states. History has demonstrated that if a nation is forced to choose between military action necessary to ensure its survival and strict adherence to legal constraints, it will generally choose the former. Thus, O'Connell's thesis that legal constraints are more likely to be operative during the early stages of a limited conflict as opposed to the later stages of a general war is valid.

In a thought provoking chapter entitled "Rules of Engagement," he discusses the problem of developing appropriate guidance for forces afloat. There are two schools of thought. The "Nelson touch" school considers that detailed and restrictive rules of engagement will prevent the on-scene commander from taking requisite initiatives that cannot be determined beforehand and stresses maximum freedom for him.

The other school argues that in a period of sophisticated weaponry and instant communications, the coercive use of armed forces should be fully controlled by the highest national command authority. O'Connell makes a valid point that it is difficult to promulgate detailed rules of engagement to cover every hypothetical situation. He suggests that general rules be promulgated to cover three broad situations—low tension, high tension, and hostilities.

Because of the extensive number of topics covered in this brief book—such as the scope and nature of the law of self-defense in the contemporary maritime milieu and the rights of neutrals in various operational and high seas zones—the substantive coverage of any particular question from a legal as well as a historic standpoint is necessarily superficial. However, with this caveat, the book is recommended to anyone interested in an up-to-date discussion of the effect of international law on maritime conflicts.

BRUCE HARLOW
Captain, JAGC, U.S. Navy

Quester, George H. *Sea Power in the 1970's*. New York: Dunellen, 1975. 248pp.

Serious scholarly attention devoted to the important subject of seapower is always welcome. Rapidly changing technology and political and economic developments which have been manifest in the recent and continuing law of the sea conferences make such attention necessary. The nine papers contained in this volume were originally presented in 1972 at a Conference on Problems of Naval Armaments sponsored by the Cornell University Program on Peace Studies. Unfortunately, this collection does little more than scratch the surface of the complex and largely unexplored question of the utility and effect of seapower in the decade of the 1970's.

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The first chapter is an argument for a larger and better navy, which is premised on the growing Soviet naval and maritime capability. The second chapter purports to refute the first on grounds that naval forces in the foreseeable future will be largely symbolic. However, both articles answer different questions and thus their arguments never really mesh. For example, in the event of a war or shooting conflict with the Soviet Union, the needs of the Navy will be very different than they would be in noncombat situations. That we must be prepared for the first while hoping for and engaging in a highly politicized environment which does not involve combat is largely ignored.

The three essays on the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Far East are good, overall surveys of the respective areas, their problems, and the prospects and possibilities for conflict. Of equal value is the concluding chapter on political, economic, and legal problems which have already changed the maritime environment and which portend even greater changes in the future. Interested readers will find these four chapters the most valuable.

There is an excellent chapter on the relative merits of land-based and sea-based deterrent systems. This chapter concludes that the sea-based systems are the most stable, but it does not address the deeper question as to whether a sea-based deterrent system is really an attribute of seapower or whether it is essentially a deterrent system which happens to be at sea as a matter of convenience. This issue could—and should—stir debate. Unfortunately, it is not addressed.

While issues are raised and problems are identified in these nine essays, the book lacks an introduction showing their relationship and how one affects the other. This modest volume's chief merit is that it is a beginning of what should be serious study of an ex-

traordinarily complex subject. Hopefully, others will continue the work.

B.M. SIMPSON III
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Sharp, Tony. *The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany*. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1975. 220pp.

Tony Sharp has transformed his doctoral dissertation into a detailed, dispassionate account of wartime Allied negotiations over the zonal arrangement for a defeated Germany in 1945, and his work should prove useful to scholars. Going beyond earlier diplomatic works, the study correctly emphasizes the connection between the establishment of the zones and contemporary military developments.

In setting out the establishment of occupation zones, the author has presented new and interesting material. Particularly effective is his well-documented account of the administrative processes within the British Government which resulted in a zonal plan. Committees inside the Foreign Office and the military coordinated their work, even in the face of American and Soviet reluctance to proceed, so that the British were able to place their draft before the European Advisory Commission and, with minor revision, eventually push it through. The author is equally convincing in his presentation of the negotiations surrounding French participation in the occupation of Germany. Perhaps of greater importance is his treatment of British policy after the Yalta Conference, as he argues that British conceptions of their declining role in Allied affairs, along with a more realistic view of the political situation in the liberated countries, led them in April and May 1945 to attempt to undo their own zonal plan, agreed to by the Allies, in order to prevent Soviet hegemony in Central Europe. They hoped first to advance Western military forces