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## The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army, 1881-1925

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they seek a standing army for America, with all the political implications that the word implied? Perhaps Kohn's evidence can be read two ways. At times, at least, he sees a considerable threat from some of the Federalists. As he says, "I became convinced that at no other time in American history—save perhaps the Reconstruction years and the era of the Cold War—had militarism so seriously threatened the United States." Perhaps he is correct, although this reviewer is not fully persuaded. But it is true that the Hamiltonian wing of the party was heavyhanded in its desire to solve national problems, both internal and external. If the book has a hero, it is probably President John Adams, who stood up to the Hamiltonians, and who, according to the author, was a more skillful politician than is generally recognized.

If the Federalists' divisions within their own party and their overreaction to the crisis of 1798 paved the way for their eventual demise, they nevertheless left the country with sound, well-developed military institutions—frontier and coastal fortifications, a small army, a navy and marine corps, and centralized agencies of control. By the end of the decade even the opposition Republican Party could agree with the Federalists that regular forces were necessary. The wars of the French Revolution were demonstrating that the nature of warfare was changing, that experienced soldiers and professional officers were essential at all levels of operations. The militia, as Jefferson conceded in his inaugural address, could not be the Nation's first line of defense in wartime.

Scholars may question some of the author's conclusions, but none can fairly deny that he has given us an exceedingly important book. Nor should one quarrel with his overall assessment of the era: "At no other peacetime period in American history, with the . . . exception of 1865-1877

and the post-1945 years, did military affairs exert more influence on national life than during the twenty years after independence when the American military establishment began."

PROFESSOR DON HIGGINBOTHAM  
U.S. Military Academy

Millett, Allan R. *The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army, 1881-1925*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975. 499pp.

Professor Allan R. Millett's *The General* is an important and convincing book. It is a kind of double-barreled biography. It deals not only with a distinguished officer now virtually forgotten, Gen. Robert L. Bullard of World War I fame, but also with an institution, the U.S. Army. Using Bullard's life as the point of departure and as the focus, detailing his activities and his career development, Professor Millett has described the institutional context within which Bullard performed.

Born in Alabama, Bullard graduated from West Point and served on active duty from 1885 to 1925. His service spanned the years when the Army engaged in Indian fighting and patrolled the West, fought against Spain and Filipino insurrectionists, guarded the border along Mexico, and participated in the First World War. From scattered detachments on duty in isolated posts, the Army grew into the modern force that competed successfully on the battlefields of the western front in France.

The changes involved in transforming an antiquated and fragmented military service into an integrated and balanced entity were many. But the overwhelming pressure that pushed the alterations in Army concepts and procedures, according to Millett, was the drive to professionalism.

During the years of Bullard's service, the Army instituted a series of reforms

that resembled a revolution. Reorganization of the branches, the general staff system, the requirement of specialized education, and the elimination of party politics in the promotion process were only some of the improvements that revitalized the Army and brought it into the 20th century. But the capstone of these many endeavors was the notion that soldiering was a profession.

Bullard was hardly a mover of these changes. Anything but a thinker or theoretician, never a visionary, Bullard was rather a supreme adapter to the conditions as he found them. When political preferment led to advancement, Bullard lobbied on the Hill. When that became outmoded, he desisted. He read the signals correctly, did his duty proficiently, and found himself at the end a lieutenant general and the personification of the military professional motivated by Duty, Honor, Country.

Professor Millett's choice of Bullard as the vehicle through which to portray the changing nature of the military in the 40 years bridging the 19th and 20th centuries seems to me to be somewhat questionable, for Bullard was never at the center of the changes. Rather, he benefited from them. He was, then, a passive figure who accidentally received the good fortune of a system that rewarded the anonymous, dedicated, colorless, hard-working individual.

As a consequence, Millett's presentation of the context of the times overpowers and in the end overwhelms his picture of Bullard the man. Although Millett records Bullard's frustrations and despair, his impatience and agony, his family life and the rest, he fails to make the general come alive.

But that is probably Millett's intention, and if so, he is hardly to be faulted for the superb view he has provided of the Army as an institution

in a time of profound change. What he has written is history rather than biography, and his achievement rates cheers.

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Parsons, Iain, ed. *The Encyclopedia of Sea Warfare*. New York: Crowell, 1975. 250pp.

The history of sea warfare can be easily and sensibly divided into two eras: that of wooden ships propelled by sail or oar and that of ironclads propelled by steam or nuclear energy. This lavishly illustrated volume presents a thumbnail sketch of major naval operations from the first ironclads to the present day. On the whole, the authors accomplish their purpose by providing no-nonsense, factual synopses of significant naval actions from the *Monitor-Merrimack* fight in 1862 onward.

Any summary runs the risk of oversimplification, which is largely avoided in this volume. American readers may be startled by the emphasis placed on actions by the Royal Navy, which clearly indicates that the U.S. Navy is somewhat of a latecomer to the exclusive club of significant, if not dominant navies. Naval engagements in the 19th century were few and far between. Hence, the extraordinary attention given to such otherwise minor naval engagements as Lissa in 1866 and the Chilean-Peruvian war in 1879. By the end of the century, the Japanese at Tsushima and the U.S. Navy at Santiago and Manila demonstrated that two significant newcomers had paid their initial dues to the club of major naval powers.

Even so, it was not until World War II was nearly 3 years old that the U.S. Navy finally commenced its brilliant series of operations in the Pacific, Atlantic, and Mediterranean. In the meantime, the Royal Navy had been