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The Influence of Transnational Actors on the Enforcement of Sanctions Against Rhodesia

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Economic sanctions have been considered, at least in theory, as the most powerful and most effective means of compelling a government to pursue or to desist from a specific course of action. When the Rhodesian Government in November 1965 declared independence from Great Britain, first the British Government and then the United Nations imposed economic sanctions against Rhodesia to compel that Government "to return to legality." The experience of the past 10 years shows that not only have economic sanctions not brought about the intended political changes, but also that Rhodesia has, in fact, prospered. Professor Strack explains why in this article, which is excerpted from his forthcoming book, Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia, to be published by the Syracuse University Press in 1977.

THE INFLUENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA

by

Harry R. Strack

Introduction. Prime Minister Ian Smith, speaking for his government, declared in November 1965 that Rhodesia was independent and sovereign, not subject to the laws of any other country. The British Government took vigorous exception to this unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) and firmly claimed continued sovereignty over Rhodesia. Ruling out the possibility of using military force, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, asked the Parliament to impose sanctions against Rhodesia to insure a "return to legality" by the Rhodesian Government. The United Kingdom informed the United Nations of its actions and, eventually, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Rhodesia. At the time these sanctions were considered by the United Kingdom Government to be the most effective and efficient instrument—short of military force—to compel the Rhodesian Government to comply with its demands.

According to the theory of sanctions, external economic pressure is supposed to cause internal political change. The major declared goal of the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia is to cause an internal political change which will terminate the "illegal rebellion" by the Smith regime. Such a termination will allow the United Kingdom Government to discharge its perceived responsibilities as the de jure sovereign of Rhodesia and will allow the United Nations to end what it perceives to be a threat to international peace and security. Of course, with so many different actors involved in the application of sanctions against Rhodesia, there are somewhat different conceptions of exactly what political changes would have to occur in

Rhodesia before the sanctions could be removed.

The prohibitions contained in the sanctions applied by both the United Kingdom and the United Nations involve the isolation of Rhodesia from all international contacts except those concerning humanitarian needs and communications. The application of these sanctions was gradual—escalating along three continua: from unilateral to multilateral; from selective and partial to universal and comprehensive; from recommendatory to mandatory. The process took 30 months to complete from 11 November 1965 to 29 May 1968. Although the Security Council passed many more resolutions dealing with Rhodesia and sanctions after May 1968, the only new sanction occurred in S/RES/277 (18 March 1970) which required that states "interrupt any existing means of transportation to and from Southern Rhodesia." Since air links had already been covered, this sanction was interpreted to mean road and rail links. All the other resolutions either repeated earlier sanctions or condemned states for violation of sanctions resolutions or urged stricter enforcement.

Gradualism notwithstanding, in the debate on sanctions in the House of Commons in November 1965, Prime Minister Wilson reflected the general intent of the House that sanctions should be both effective and quick when he said, ". . . action which is speedily effective will do less lasting damage to Rhodesia's economy, and to the possibility of a reasonable settlement, than pressures which are long drawn out and inflict a continuing agony on Rhodesia."[1] Wilson expressed his belief to the House that sanctions would, indeed, have a "serious and speedy effect."[2] At the Commonwealth Conference at Lagos in January 1966, he predicted that, due to the sanctions, Rhodesia would have to end her UDI in a matter of "weeks not months."

These intentions and beliefs about sanctions were stated over 10 years ago. But this decade-long attempt to isolate Rhodesia from international contacts by international sanctions did not produce the intended internal political change. For 10 years Rhodesia has successfully avoided isolation. At least during this period such success generated both material and symbolic benefits: economic deprivation has been averted, public morale has been enhanced, and subjective feelings of legitimacy have been stimulated.[3] The record of a decade of sanctions suggests that Wilson's intentions, beliefs, and predictions were simplistic and naive. However, viewed from the perspective of 1965, they seemed to have merit.

On paper, Rhodesia in 1965 appeared to be extremely vulnerable to economic sanctions. The Rhodesian economy was highly dependent upon foreign trade. In 1965 exports earned 38 percent of Rhodesia's national income and 34 percent of it was spent on imports, which are startling high figures for any country.[4] Indeed, Rhodesia seemed to be an "ideal" target for economic sanctions.[5] Its foreign trade represented a sizable percentage of its gross national product; it was highly concentrated in one or two trading partners (exports: 47 percent to Zambia and the United Kingdom; imports: 53 percent from the United Kingdom and South Africa). The exports were concentrated in one or two products (41 percent in tobacco and asbestos).[6]

Ten years experience has demonstrated that in reality Rhodesia was not as vulnerable to sanctions as economic theory suggested. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to investigate all possible reasons for the contradiction between the theory of sanctions and the reality of sanctions.[7] One major explanation of the contradiction is that when sanctions were being considered, formulated, and designed, the problem was approached from a *state-centered orientation*. In the only reference to his "weeks not months" prediction in his memoirs, Harold Wilson writes that he received advice that the oil sanctions would bring the Rhodesian economy to a halt and Portugal would not challenge the determination of the United Nations.[8] The central question at the time seemed to be: Will the countries important to Rhodesia's international relations apply and enforce the sanctions? Another simple, but critical, question ought to have been considered: Will the massive interlocking, international economic elites apply and enforce the sanctions?

Transnational Actors. "A good deal of intersocietal intercourse with significant political importance takes place without governmental control," as Professors Nye and Keohane point out.[9] It may involve transfers of money and materials, transfers of information and ideas, and transfers of people between states which are handled by nongovernmental elites. While these elites act independently of governments and though the resulting transactions bypass the traditional decisionmaking institutions, these elites nevertheless affect the context within which these institutions make decisions.[10] In other words, transnational relations can affect the environment within which governmental decisionmakers must act by establishing parameters to their decisions and activities.[11]

Governments may be either unable or unwilling to control such transnational relations. They may be unable to exercise control because of their inability to detect the transactions or, having detected them, because of an inability to create and finance the necessary administrative structure. "The impact of transnational relations creates a 'control gap' between the aspirations for control over an expanded range of matters and the capability to achieve it."[12] Also, governments may be unwilling to control transnational actions because they do not wish to maintain a high degree of political control over their societies, which might violate philosophical principles upon which the society and the government rests. In addition, governments may be unwilling to exercise control because they wish to use these transnational relations to enhance their national economic position or to give aid to another country without officially acknowledging the relationship.

Moreover, on the global level, some transnational actors may be immune to, or not subject to, political control by any state or group of states. An economist, Jack Behrman, has described how multinational enterprises are skillfully able "... to weave between the different requirements of national governments...." and thereby limit the choices available to those governments and, in reality, challenge their national sovereignty.[13] An interesting example is the International Olympic Committee which, while stressing its supposed immunity from political control, resisted for many years U.N. pressures to expel the Rhodesian National Olympic Committee from its membership.[14]

Given the extent and variety of transnational relations, will internationally imposed sanctions, not involving the use of military force, produce the intended effect? Their application to Rhodesia illustrates the importance of transnational actors, two of which will be discussed: the very large—multinational corporations, and the very small—individual tourists.

Multinational Corporations. Under careful management, the Rhodesian economy underwent a remarkable expansion and growth since the sanctions campaign was launched in 1965. For example, between 1965 and 1972, the following increases occurred:[15]

Sale of principal crops and livestock	65.0%
Mineral output (value)	68.5
Volume index of manufacturing production	66.1
Retail trade index (value)	92.0
Imports (value)	14.4
Exports and re-exports (value)	6.2
Gross national income	38.8
Rhodesian Stock Exchange Index	191.5

Employment of both Africans and non-Africans generally kept pace with population increases, and the annual rate of inflation was one of the lowest in the world. In addition, the sanctions, by protecting the Rhodesian market from intrusion by foreign-made goods and by forcing conservation of foreign exchange, have stimulated a mini-industrial revolution. The range of output expanded from 602 products in 1963 to 1,059 in 1966 to 3,837 in 1970.[16]

This is not to suggest that the economy is without strains. Much of the improvement in the economy after UDI was attributable to spending existing foreign reserves and to the utilization of surplus industrial capacity. Short-term problems (e.g., maintaining employment levels) were solved at the expense of preparing for the solution of long-term problems (e.g., infrastructure development and capital equipment replacement). Moreover, sanctions have been largely responsible for a deterioration in Rhodesia's "terms of trade"—as Prime Minister Ian Smith noted:

> . . . the imposition of sanctions created many trading problems for us. . . . We find that we are compelled to export at a discount and import at a premium. The result is that we lose out on both transactions. This has the effect of reducing profit margins internally, and at the national level, it has an adverse effect on our balance of payments and foreign reserves.[17]

In crude terms, the Rhodesian economy is like an automobile stuck in low gear, slowly moving forward at full engine acceleration. The economy is moving forward (i.e., expanding), and it has the general confidence of the European community in Rhodesia. The fuel to drive the engine has consisted partly of import substitution, the use of excess industrial capacity, and increased productivity. The first two elements are almost exhausted, and there are limits as to what the latter element can continue to achieve. New fuel will have to consist of exporting secondary products (e.g., consumer goods), increasing mineral exploitation, and producing capital goods—all of which will increase the need for foreign capital.[18]

Multinational corporations are important to the Rhodesian economy. Many Rhodesian firms are associated with, or are subsidiaries of, parent companies located in other countries. Four giant corporations with interlocking holdings and directorships form the nucleus of transnational investment in Rhodesia: Anglo-American Corporation, DeBeers Consolidated Mines, Charter Consolidated, and Rand Selection Corporation. In referring to this group, one observer makes the cogent point that it probably depends neither on British nor South African capitalism but is rather an "independent super-state, an economic empire centered in Southern and Central Africa."[19]

One advantage for Rhodesian firms associated with external companies has been the capital inflow from the parent company. There has been considerable South African capital inflow in the mining and tourist areas. However, one should not overestimate its amount. Indeed, on balance, the capital outflow to parent companies in the form of dividends and profits from their investment may have been greater than the capital inflow. In order to decrease this outflow, a 15 percent tax on the profits of subsidiaries of foreign companies operating in Rhodesia was instituted on 1 April 1973. It was estimated that this tax would yield about R$6.5 million in revenue based on an anticipated capital outflow for the 1973-74 fiscal year of R$50 million.[20]

Another advantage of association with external firms has been that often the parent firm can provide technical information and licensing for local production. South African mining companies provided the technical expertise for prospecting and developing mineral sites and at least two firms, Anglo-American and South African Manganese, maintained sophisticated geological laboratories in Salisbury.[21] Many other examples could be provided.

On the whole, more foreign transnational investment has been sought—and since visible promotion campaigns outside southern Africa are precluded by sanctions—South Africa remains the major target for these campaigns. Nevertheless, information collated by the Sanctions Committee of the U.N. Security Council suggests that Rhodesia may be obtaining sizable investment capital from corporations in Europe. A Swiss company was suspected of arranging a loan of US$6 million to Rhodesia Railways in 1974. A multinational consortium of European banks and corporations produced a complex plan to provide R$68.5 million to develop the facilities of the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Company (RISCO) in 1972.[22]

In the area of foreign trade, the multinational corporations are indispensable to Rhodesia. In 1966 Rhodesian Minister of Finance John Wrathall declared that "exports are Rhodesia's life blood. Our success or failure as a nation depends on our ability to make good, by whatever means possible, the loss of the export markets which have been closed by sanctions."[23] By 1973 Rhodesia did "make good," and the means used involved increasing the volume of exports while decreasing their price. In his 1972 Budget Statement, Wrathall stated that with one major exception, tobacco, " . . . the country is virtually exporting to the limit of its physical capacity."[24] However, this limit was not attributable to a lack of exportable goods, but rather to the inability of the railways to move the goods to the seaports of Mozambique and South Africa.

The latest U.N. survey of Rhodesia's exports covers the year 1973 and estimates a total of US$640 million. Acknowledged trade with countries such as the United States, Malawi, Zambia, and Switzerland accounts for about 11 percent. Another 16 percent is estimated to have been received by the countries of the South African Customs Union. About 73 percent of Rhodesia's exports constitute secret trade which reaches the world markets via indirect and devious routes.[25]

Clearly the role of South Africa and Mozambique is crucial to the Rhodesian effort to sustain and promote its international trade. (The effect of recent events in Mozambique remains to be seen.) Rhodesian products have been sent to these two countries for shipment to buyers all over the world. The records of the importing countries show these goods as having originated in South Africa or Mozambique. If any government challenges a buyer, the buyer can produce false declarations and certificates of origin. With the Rhodesian linkage to the product thus obscured, the buyer has been protected from possible prosecution and forfeiture of the product. This method is also used to shield the ultimate destination of goods which Rhodesia imports. An influential economic study group in South Africa, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, in June 1966 made several recommendations to aid Rhodesia; the first was that "the South African firms should undertake to market Rhodesian products to the world in a way that the country of origin cannot be traced."[26]

While noting the importance of South Africa and Mozambique to Rhodesia's international trade, other countries have been engaged in the effort to thwart the sanctions. (There is less information available on these cases.) For example, a Rhodesian air freight firm established a subsidiary in Gabon. Rhodesian aircraft displaying the subsidiary's colors transported consignments of Rhodesian beef to Gabon and, via Gabon, to Greece. On the return flight from Greece, the aircraft stopped at various European airports to load freight allegedly destined for Gabon but really destined for Rhodesia.[27] In 1973 three Boeing 707 model 720 jets were bought by the Swiss firm Jet Aviation from the bankrupt West German firm CALAIR. Jet Aviation then resold the planes to a Liechtenstein company, IAC, and prepared the planes for a flight from their storage in Basle to Lisbon. In Lisbon the West German markings were replaced with Rhodesian markings for the flight to Salisbury.[28] When sanctions were being planned, who could have foreseen the importance of countries like Gabon and Liechtenstein?

In these two cases, it was alleged that the Governments of Gabon and Greece were directly involved with the Rhodesian transactions.[29] In the Boeing case, none of the relevant governments seemed to have been involved. Moreover, these governments declared that they could take no legal action against the corporations involved. West Germany noted that it could not be proved that the persons involved in the sale of the planes to Jet Aviation knew of a subsequent resale to Rhodesia. Switzerland noted that it had no legal means of taking action against Jet Aviation since the aircraft were sold to a Liechtenstein company, IAC. Liechtenstein noted that no company named IAC had been registered in Liechtenstein since 1958.[30] A U.S. Department of State official pointed out that it is very difficult to enforce provisions of export licenses ". . . particularly if you have instances in which you are dealing with collapsible corporations who may be in the chain of title. There is simply no one against whom to enforce the provisions."[31]

A perusal of the Annual Reports of the U.N. Sanctions Committee would reveal that some of the arrangements made by multinational corporations to secure Rhodesian trade are unbelievably complex and intricate. One case will be cited to illustrate this point—*U.N. Case No. 112: Sugar—"Evangelos M."* On 22 January 1971, the United Kingdom submitted information to the Sanctions Committee about the importation of sugar by Kuwait. A ship owned by Panama, registered in Greece, loaded sugar suspected to be of Rhodesian origin at a port in Mozambique for carriage to a firm in Kuwait, which bought the sugar from a firm in Switzerland which declared that the sugar originated in Malawi. Payment transfer was made from a Lebanon branch of a Russian bank to a Swiss bank. Kuwait, Panama, Malawi, and Switzerland deny responsibility and/or legal jurisdiction. For 2 years Greece did not respond. In 1974 several Greek citizens were arrested and tried in the Court of Piraeus. All defendants were acquitted on the grounds that they did not know the Rhodesian origin of the merchandise.[32] Given the complexity of the transaction, it is remarkable that it was even documented in the first place.

Some of the methods used for ensuring successful trade with Rhodesia include: the use of collapsible corporations, resellers, intermediaries, and brokers; the use of countries such as Switzerland whose laws permit contracts for the delivery of *any* goods which are not to be shipped to or do not originate in Swiss territory; the use of falsified documents to mask the origin or destination of Rhodesian goods. More important is the use of the global communication networks of multinational companies to coordinate the Rhodesian trade by locating buyers, matching products with markets, and arranging for the carriage of the products. Such communication is critical.

In light of the complexity and effort often needed in order to trade with Rhodesia, one might ask: Why bother to trade with Rhodesia at all? One answer is that "the primary interest of the global corporation is worldwide profit maximization."[33] Simply put, the price has been right. Irrespective of sanctions, Rhodesia has reserves of cheap labor and low-cost power which permit her exports to be competitive in the world markets. Moreover, buying goods from whatever source at minimum cost may be rationalized as fulfilling a social responsibility on the part of the corporations involved. The Greek importer who was responsible for purchasing Rhodesian beef explained: "I was doing a favour to the State, offering the best meat, and the cheapest, at a time when the meat crisis was an international phenomenon."[34]

Profit maximization, however, is only one of *many* reasons multinational corporations trade with Rhodesia. There are others which can be listed in summary form:[35]

1. Minerals found in Rhodesia are strategic, in demand, and not easily substituted (e.g., chrome). Agricultural products are needed—especially beef and maize.

2. The quality of exports is high; for example:

   a. cotton—low soil stains, moisture, and trash; good fiber length and color

   b. tobacco—low nicotine, high sugar, low pesticides

   c. chrome ore—good lumps

   d. asbestos—good fiber length

   e. lithium—low iron content

3. Productivity and quality control are high—cotton is mostly handpicked; research provides high yield (e.g., maize seed).

4. Contract dependability—Rhodesia meets export commitments; dependable supplier—sanctions-busters receive preferential treatment.

5. Financial integrity—Rhodesia pays bills, is a good risk, and has a reputation for fair dealing.

6. Rhodesia is discreet about transactions—good security, protects identity of customers, publicity avoided.

7. Vertical integration—secondary producers may be tied into Rhodesian primary production. Cost of changing sources of supplies may be high. Unique physical properties of Rhodesian goods may make conversion technically difficult if not impossible.

8. Lower transportation costs to contiguous states and to other states in Africa compared to suppliers in, say, Europe. Quickness of service.

9. Trading linkages prior to UDI maintained after UDI due to habit, convenience, or personal relationships with Rhodesians.

The role of transnational actors in thwarting the sanctions has been important. In a surprisingly candid statement, Rhodesia's Minister of Transportation underscored this point in 1967: ". . . whatever any particular government says, of course, is quite different to what their businessmen do and this is precisely how Rhodesia . . . is winning the war. . . . It does not matter a hoot . . . what the government says; it is precisely what the people within that country do."[36] The people "within countries" that have been important for Rhodesia are not only the businessmen who represent corporations but also the people who wish to travel to Rhodesia as tourists.

Tourists. Tourism is important for Rhodesia for economic, political, and psychological reasons. Tourism has been a major earner of foreign currency. In 1965 it was Rhodesia's fourth largest source of foreign exchange, exceeded only by the export of tobacco, asbestos, and copper. In that year tourism credits amounted to R$10.3 million; by 1972, the figure had increased 167 percent to R$27.5 million.[37] Moreover, tourism has been an exceptionally efficient source of foreign exchange because of its small import content. "Most of the capital equipment (airports, roads, and hotels) can be built with local materials, while the food, drink, souvenirs, and services needed by tourists can mostly be supplied locally too."[38] The tourist dollar has a high multiplier or velocity effect, especially where import controls exist. Tourism as a service industry is labor intensive and a source of many new jobs.[39] In 1969, for example, Rhodesian caterers had to provide more than 10 million meals for tourists.[40]

Despite the earnings in foreign currency, it should be noted that, in balance of payments terms, Rhodesia has incurred a *net* deficit on foreign travel. In 1965 tourism debits amounted to R$24.6 million; in 1972 it was R$33.2 million.[41] It may be questioned why the Rhodesian Government simply does not drastically reduce the allocation of foreign currency for its citizens' travel outside the country. The answer was suggested by the *Rhodesian Financial Gazette* in 1971 when it noted that it was unlikely that the Government would agree to cut travel allowances in view of the effect it would have on public morale and on the immigration program.[42]

Travel into and out of the country has decreased the sense of isolation and has boosted public morale. Rhodesia's Minister of Foreign Affairs told the Legislative Assembly in 1967:

> . . . we are not in a state of isolation. I have already said it is only the State Department, the Civil Service in Britain and the same sort of people in other places who treat us in a manner as if we were isolated. I think the honorable members will be aware that we have had more tourists this year from all parts of the world than in any other year. I believe something like 20 or 30 a day come from America.[43]

Tourism also served a political function. Prime Minister Smith, in a speech at the opening of Rhodesia's first Holiday Inn, said that he had long regarded tourism as one of the most important industries in Rhodesia, not only because of its importance as a foreign currency earner, but also because it earned "an untold wealth of good will" for Rhodesia.[44] In another speech, Smith said: "I never cease to be amazed at the way our case is distorted overseas. The majority of our tourists go away converted to our cause and this assists us in putting the record straight."[45]

While the government has not provided any empirical evidence to support their case regarding the political value of foreign tourists, it seems to be reasonable. The "average" white tourist, unschooled in the principles of Rhodesian politics, would be unlikely to encounter anything during his stay in Rhodesia which would convince him that the hostility meted out to Rhodesia by the international community has been either reasonable or just. Probably occupied with visiting the tourist areas, a visitor would be unlikely to engage any Africans in a discussion of racial discrimination. If the government did not feel its case to be reasonable, it would presumably have erected barriers to travelers originating overseas—especially from the United States and the Commonwealth.

Rhodesia is fortunate in possessing many and varied tourist attractions including: Victoria Falls, Kariba Dam and Lake, the Eastern Highlands, Zimbabwe Ruins, Sinoia Caves, and many game reserves—the largest being Wankie National Park. Attractions such as these, coupled with many fine hotels, good transportation, and an excellent climate have made Rhodesia one of Africa's leading tourist countries.[46] In a speech in Rhodesia in 1975, the marketing and production manager of the West German National Tourist Board, Berthold Furtwaengler, stated his view of travel to Rhodesia:

> If you come from Europe, there is a tremendous freedom of space here, clean air, friendly people. Since I arrived here I have been tremendously impressed with the friendliness of the people. They seem to want to make visitors welcome. Rhodesia is also much cheaper than Europe. The food is excellent and, from what I have seen of the hotels, they are first class. Many Germans were fascinated by Africa's animals and wide open spaces. I think you have, as a country, a great product to sell.[47]

The Rhodesian Government has assisted tourists in several ways. First, it does not require visas of nationals of Britain and the Commonwealth countries, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, San Marino, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Visitors from countries other than the "Iron Curtain countries," the United Arab Republic, and Israel may be issued temporary permits in lieu of visas when they arrive in Rhodesia.[48] Second, upon arrival in Rhodesia, it has been customary for the Rhodesian passport control officers to ask if the visitor wishes to have his passport stamped. If the visitor declines, the officer would place the entry stamp on a piece of cardboard and insert it in the visitor's passport; the cardboard is surrendered upon leaving Rhodesia.[49] This means that no record would appear in the tourist's official documents that he ever visited Rhodesia. These measures make control of travel to Rhodesia extremely difficult.

Some countries, like the United States, openly acknowledge that they lack the legal authority to prohibit their citizens from traveling to Rhodesia. A memorandum from the Legal Advisor of the U.S. Department of State notes that ". . . the U.S. does not have the legal authority under current domestic law to prevent U.S. citizens who choose to visit Rhodesia from doing so."[50] Furthermore, U.S. citizens traveling in Rhodesia may transfer monies to Rhodesia to support such travel. American Express credit cards are accepted in Rhodesia. The official position of the U.S. Department of the Treasury is that since American citizens are able to travel to Rhodesia, ". . . it would not be appropriate to prohibit the transfer of funds for their maintenance while there."[51]

Even an attempt to halt the *promotion* of travel to Rhodesia in the United States would be difficult if such promotion did not involve direct exports of goods and monies to Rhodesia. Air Rhodesia maintained an office in New York until it was closed by the U.S. Government in May 1974. It was closed not because it provided information on travel to Rhodesia but because its manager engaged in activities which were outside the scope of his license (e.g., exporting clothing to Rhodesia).[52] The international airlines which serve Salisbury obviously want to increase their traffic there. TAP Portuguese Airways and South African Airways provide information on Rhodesia from their international offices; they include Rhodesia in some of their packaged African tours and, in advertising these tours, indirectly help to promote tourism to Rhodesia. For example, in a TAP advertisement in *The New York Times Magazine* of 8 July 1973, Rhodesia is mentioned four times.

Several promotional advertisements were published in the *Journal of Commerce* (New York) under the aegis of the Rhodesian Promotion Council. Mr. C.G. Tracey, Chairman of the Council, hailed these advertisements as being among Rhodesia's major breakthroughs in penetrating sanctions.[53] He is probably right, since the U.N. Security Council decided in 1968 that all member states shall prevent any activities by their nationals "which would promote or are calculated to promote the export of any commodities or products from Southern Rhodesia."[54] In the case of the *Journal of Commerce*, the U.S. Department of State advised:

> . . . we have interpreted the term "promote or calculated to promote" as encompassing only those activities which facilitate the accomplishment of transactions unlawful under the sanctions. Certain general activities, not related to a particular transaction which is prohibited under the sanctions program, may nonetheless indirectly contribute to such transactions. Under the interpretation set forth above, such an indirect relationship would not fall within the meaning of the terms "promote or calculated to promote," especially if the ultimate violation can be prohibited directly. Furthermore, a general prohibition against all activities which might conceivably have the effect of "promoting" violations of Rhodesian sanctions could involve fundamental constitutional questions.[55]

Indeed, a state may be unable to give statutory or legal effect to a provision of a U.N. sanctions resolution because it conflicts with its Constitution—specifically for the United States, with guarantees of freedom of speech and press contained in the First Amendment. Such legal conflicts may have great utility for those transnational actors engaged in relations with Rhodesia.

Conclusion. Whether the transnational actor is a giant multinational corporation or an individual tourist, the problems of restricting their access to Rhodesia are formidable. The detection and tracing of any part of complicated transactions to any one country sufficient for that country to establish legal jurisdiction, let alone prove legal culpability, is remote. So far in the Rhodesian case, the U.N. has been unable to cope with the coordination of effort by the multinational corporations with their international staffs, international funding, and international communication networks. The U.N., as presently structured as an international organization, has no power of its own to execute or adjudicate its policy decisions or to prosecute violations of its policy directives by transnational actors. It must rely upon the power, authority, ability, and willingness of the governments of its national members to ensure the compliance of transnational actors—large or small—with U.N. policy.

The U.N. Sanctions Committee, established in 1968, is supposed to coordinate the sanctions effort. In the first 6 years of its existence, it has considered 237 suspected violations of sanctions. Its most important weapon has been publicity. No matter what type of international relationship is involved, the single most important factor in frustrating the relationship is publicity. (Barnet and Müller note that "wherever global corporations encounter image crises, some local law or custom has usually been violated, at least in spirit. . . ."[56]) Evidently, for most transnational actors (and governments), image is important and to be caught evading the sanctions is not regarded as adding stature to their public image.

Although the Sanctions Committee has only considered a tiny fraction of the total sanctions violations, in recent years, it has dealt severe blows to transactions important to Rhodesia: The RISCO case (Case 171), the tobacco smuggling operation in the Netherlands (Case INGO-6), and the Air

Rhodesia interline agreements with 88 other air carriers (Case INGO-4). These particular cases demonstrate that the Sanctions Committee has developed another major weapon—transnational actors! Ironically, as transnational actors have been essential to Rhodesia in the evasion of sanctions, transnational actors have also provided vital information relating to these evasions. *The Sunday Times* (London), the Anti-Apartheid League of the Netherlands, various church groups, trade unions, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (United States), various pro-United Nations interest groups, among others, have been most helpful with information regarding sanction busting operations. The U.N. Security Council gave belated recognition to the value of transnational actors in S/RES 333 (1973): "The Committee recommends to the Council that Member States, as well as the Committee, should, by taking adequate measures, encourage individuals and nongovernmental organizations to report to the concerned bodies reliable information regarding sanctions-breaking operations." These actors are encouraged to report their information to national authorities and/or direct to the Sanctions Committee, thus bypassing national authorities.[57]

The efficacy of the sanctions against Rhodesia is important to the general perception of the United Nations as an effective instrument to promote world peace and security. Sanctions have been neither very speedy nor very effective in achieving the termination of UDI in Rhodesia. In 1973 U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim deplored the fact that the "illegal regime" had not yet been induced to draw the necessary conclusion from imposition of mandatory sanctions. But he also noted that the question of Southern Rhodesia will go down in history as the first case in which the measures provided for in article 41 of the U.N. Charter were implemented. Although the authority was there, practical experience in applying sanctions was completely lacking. It is understandable that it should have taken time to develop the sanctions procedure and gradually perfect the "machinery" by use.[58] In any future consideration of the use of sanctions, practical experience gained from the Rhodesian case should suggest a more sophisticated and incisive approach to the problem of implementation. It is clear that states are not the only actors in the international arena. Some way must be found to deal with the transnational actors if sanctions are to be effective.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Harry R. Strack did his undergraduate work at the University of Pennsylvania, from which he also received the degree of master of arts in international relations. He was awarded a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Iowa. He has conducted field research in England, Malawi, and Rhodesia. In 1971 he accepted an appointment as Visiting Lecturer at Ranche House College, Salisbury, Rhodesia, to which he was reappointed for the summer of 1976. Since 1968 he has been a member of the faculty, Department of Political Science, Villanova University.

NOTES

1. Great Britain, Parliament, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), vol. 721, 23 November 1965, col. 249.

2. Great Britain, Parliament, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), vol. 720, 15 November 1965, col. 634.

3. This is not to suggest that sanctions have failed to achieve some goals (e.g., preventing Rhodesia from acquiring de jure recognition) or that they have not imposed economic costs on Rhodesia; they simply have failed to end the UDI.

4. Robert B. Sutcliffe, *Sanctions Against Rhodesia* (London: Africa Bureau, 1966), p. 2.

5. Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," *World Politics*, April 1967, p. 407.

6. Figures calculated from: Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office, *Annual Statement of External Trade, 1965.*

7. See: Harry R. Strack, *Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, forthcoming).

8. Harold Wilson, *A Personal Record: The Labour Government 1964-1970* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 196.

9. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, "Transnational Relations and World Politics," *International Organization*, Summer 1971, p. 330.

10. Karl Kaiser, "The Interaction of Regional Subsystems," *World Politics*, October 1968, p. 91.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

12. Nye and Keohane, p. 742.

13. Jack N. Behrman, *National Interests and the Multinational Enterprise* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 7, 177.

14. The Rhodesian National Olympic Committee was finally expelled in May 1975.

15. Figures calculated from: Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office, *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, March 1973.

16. Neal J. Dickinson, "Don't Rely Too Much on Manufacturing," *Rhodesia Herald*, 4 November 1971.

17. Statement by Prime Minister Ian Smith to the Rhodesia House of Assembly, *Rhodesia Herald*, 7 April 1973.

18. *Rhodesia Herald*, 20 April 1972.

19. Giovanni Arrighi, *The Political Economy of Rhodesia* (The Hague: Mouton, 1967), pp. 47-48.

20. *Rhodesia Herald*, 6 April 1973.

21. *Rhodesia Herald*, 1 February 1973.

22. See: United Nations, Security Council, *Official Records: Seventh Report of the Security Council Committee Established in Pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) Concerning the Question of Southern Rhodesia*, S/11594/Add. 2 (Part I), 2 April 1975 (New York: 1975). It is interesting to note that the RISCO case became known when a Rhodesian banker, Kenneth McIntosh, sent secret documents to *The Sunday Times* (London), which reported them in its edition of 14 April 1974.

23. Rhodesia, Parliament, *Parliamentary Debates* (Legislative Assembly), vol. 64, 21 July 1966, col. 727.

24. Rhodesia, Parliament, *Parliamentary Debates* (House of Assembly), vol. 81, 13 July 1972, col. 962.

25. United Nations, Security Council, *Seventh Report*, S/11594/Add. 3, 7 May 1975.

26. *Rhodesia Herald*, 19 June 1966. For further instructions on how to evade sanctions through South Africa, see: *Property and Finance* (Rhodesia), October 1966, p. 24.

27. *Manchester Guardian*, 27 August 1973 and *The Sunday Times* (London), 26 August 1973 and 2 September 1973.

28. United Nations, Security Council, *Sixth Report*, S/11178/Add. 1, 9 January 1974, pp. 68-76 and *Sunday Mail* (Rhodesia), 22 April 1973.

29. *Rhodesia Herald*, 1 March 1972. A former Greek Cabinet Minister, Michael Balopoulos, was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment for his alleged role in the importation of Rhodesian beef, *Rhodesia Herald*, 23 June 1975.

30. See footnote 28 above.

31. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Implications for U.S. International Legal Obligations of the Presence of the Rhodesian Information Office in the United States*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973, p. 85.

32. United Nations, Security Council, *Seventh Report*, S/11594/Add. 2 (Part I), 2 April 1975, p. 72.

33. Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Müller, *Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), p. 151.

34. *Rhodesia Herald*, 14 June 1975.

35. Strack, ch. 5.

36. Rhodesia, Parliament, *Parliamentary Debates* (Legislative Assembly), vol. 67, 26 April 1967, col. 229.

37. Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office, *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, January 1974.

38. *Rhodesia Herald*, 25 November 1971.

39. *Ibid.*

40. *Rhodesian Financial Gazette*, 27 November 1970.

41. Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office, *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, January 1974. The "travel gap" had been reduced from -R$14.3 million in 1965 to -R$5.7 million in 1972.

42. *Rhodesian Financial Gazette*, 23 April 1971.

43. Rhodesia, Parliament, *Parliamentary Debates* (Legislative Assembly), vol. 68, 1 September 1967, col. 1791.

44. *Sunday Mail*, 16 December 1973.

45. *Sunday Mail*, 30 January 1972.

46. The following figures for total visitors (1969) may help place this statement in perspective: South Africa, 328,241; Rhodesia, 299,697; Kenya, 293,314. Source: South African Tourist Corporation, *Twenty-Third Annual Report*, 1970.

47. *Rhodesia Herald*, 14 June 1975. This agrees with this author's opinion after having spent 4 months in Rhodesia in 1971.

48. Rhodesia Government, *Frontier Formalities*, no date.

49. This was the experience of this writer upon entering Rhodesia in May 1971 and it is general information; see, for example, the account of Ilka Chase in her travel book, *Worlds Apart*—as reported in *Sunday Mail*, 6 May 1973.

50. U.S. Congress, *Rhodesian Information Office*, Hearings, pp. 82-83.

51. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 206. In practical terms, it is this author's opinion that it would virtually be impossible for the United States to prevent transfer of monies to Rhodesia. Convertible currency notes are accepted, personal checks may be made payable to a South African agent or to an individual with access to a South African or Swiss bank, traveler's checks could be left blank, credit charges could be converted into South African rand and when presented for payment in the United States would bear no evidence of ever having been in Rhodesia.

52. United Nations, Security Council, *Seventh Report*, S/11594/Add. 2 (Part I), 2 April 1975, p. 140.

53. *Rhodesia Herald*, 11 August 1971 and 29 June 1972.

54. United Nations, Security Council, S/RES 253, 29 May 1968.

55. U.S. Congress, *Rhodesian Information Office*, Hearings, p. 84.

56. Barnet and Müller, p. 119.

57. United Nations, Office of Public Information, Press Release SC/3618, 21 May 1975.

58. *Objective: Justice*, January-March 1974, p. 28.