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Since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Soviet Navy has developed a well-equipped, flexible, offensive force. Shedding its former predominantly defensive role, the Soviet Navy now possesses not only the largest submarine force in the world but also a modern surface warship fleet, capable of operating routinely in distant oceans. There has been much discussion of the effect of the Cuban confrontation on this expansion. Was that crisis the "catalyst which activated a vigorous Soviet response"? Did the Soviets resolve to "turn the tables"? Or, had they already planned to expand and strengthen their naval forces as a result of longstanding political ambitions and a growing U.S. threat? Lieutenant Commander Ullman maintains that the impetus for the Soviet naval development antedated the Cuban missile crisis.

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND SOVIET NAVAL DEVELOPMENT MYTHS AND REALITIES

by

Lieutenant Commander Harlan K. Ullman, U.S. Navy

To many Western analysts, one of the most significant and long-term effects of the United States-Soviet confrontation in the Caribbean during the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis was on the Soviet Navy and its subsequent expansion in terms of capability and in scope of operations. According to this argument, the Soviet "leadership," seeing its policies outflanked and overrun because of its maritime¹ inferiority vis-a-vis the United States, embarked on a deliberate plan to develop and to procure a naval force capable of both supporting foreign policy objectives and protecting "state interests" almost anywhere on the world's oceans. Accordingly, subsequent evidence, such as the increase in the scale of Soviet naval operations (for example, the size and pattern of deployments to the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Caribbean

and exercises such as Okean 75) and the expansion of naval capabilities in ballistic missile submarines (FBM's) as well as in more conventional force aspects (the Kiev class VTL/STL aircraft carriers and the Kara cruisers),² is cited as underscoring the results of the Cuban missile crisis and Soviet perceptions of naval inferiority.

Thus, if this argument is correct, it could be suggested that had First Secretary Khrushchev not decided to station "offensive" missiles in Cuba, the Soviet Navy would never have been able to sever as dramatically the umbilical cord previously linking it to coastal and anti-invasion defense, anticarrier operations, and support of the army's maritime flanks. But is it correct?

In order to sort out some of the myths from the realities concerning the impact of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis

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on the development of the Soviet Navy, three basic questions must be addressed: (1) Was it the opportunity or the catalyst which activated a vigorous Soviet response? (2) Was it the causal factor which transcended previous views and precipitated a significant reorientation in maritime/naval policies? or (3) Were there perhaps some other effects—positive, negative, or neutral—which became relevant to Soviet naval development?

Catalyst, Cause, or Other. For the missile crisis to have catalyzed Soviet views, some preexisting support (or pressure) for an expanded naval capability within the Presidium, Central Committee, Ministry of Defense, and the navy would have been necessary. Impediments to this position would have been limited resources, perceived utility of naval force, bureaucratic politics, interservice competition, and timing. The Cuban missile crisis would have removed or circumvented them and thus reinforced the argument for an expanded naval capability. If, however, Soviet naval inferiority as demonstrated by the October crisis was a causal factor in the sense that the confrontation produced a major reorientation of naval priorities, then it is reasonable to conclude that the party and military leadership experienced a more significant change in perceptions. Alternatively, had the events in Cuba resulted in neither a reevaluation of naval options nor a dramatic change in naval priorities, then one might expect more of a continuity of views prevailing throughout the political and Defense Establishment. Regrettably, for purposes of analysis, no Soviet equivalents of the Pentagon Papers, Watergate tapes, or annual posture statements exist that confirm or deny the validity and relevance of any of these three conditions of Soviet naval development. This is not to say, however, that substantial amounts of evidence are not available,

providing one assumes that some, at least, of the statements and actions of the Soviet "leadership" are indeed genuine representations of policy and intentions and not merely forms of deliberately misleading propaganda and polemic. With this assumption and the four types of evidence discussed below, charting the impact of the missile crisis on Soviet actions becomes possible.

The first piece of evidence is the relationship between naval policy and the larger issue of Soviet defense policy. Given the traditional domination of the army, degrees of navy subordination, and the defense "debates" which grew out of the succession problem following Stalin's death (1953-1955) and, later, out of Khrushchev's strategic "new look" (1959-1961), certain linkages between the criteria which set defense and naval requirements become obvious. Also, as confirmed by later observation, the cycle between party congresses, defense debates, and/or major issues is more or less predictable, with the convening of the congresses representing ratification or legitimization of the 5-year plan for the entire economy.³ Thus, if strategic nuclear criteria set minimum defense requirements, they also affected naval requirements in a similar though not necessarily totally congruent way.

The second piece of evidence is explicit Soviet military doctrine, including pronouncements by political and defense leadership. A certain amount of skepticism is justified in approaching Soviet statements because of their propaganda value. Still, the same propaganda must be fed to the Soviet readership as well, which might perhaps defeat any covert or misleading purposes. Skepticism may prudently be further tempered in regard to published Soviet works of purposefully limited distribution, thereby presumably reducing the readership to "need to know." Their likelihood of reliability is thus increased.⁴ For example, to

discount the significance of Sokolovskii's three editions of *Military Strategy* on propaganda grounds would be to deny any Soviet need to disseminate publicly official doctrine on the nature and conduct of war. This is not the case under most circumstances.

Third, evidence in the form of ship and other construction programs is particularly significant. For example, a dramatic shift in numbers or types of ships being constructed several years after Cuba could be important in interpreting the magnitude of the Soviet response. Similarly, the absence of significant apparent change in the form of continuity of production could signify a minimum or insignificant reaction to specific naval inferiority.

Finally, deployment and operational patterns can demonstrate the actual use of navies short of war. Because training and fleet exercises in most navies are normally conducted according to standard doctrinal conceptions of the types of conflict *likely* to occur (despite the ultimate validity or correctness of that doctrine), such operations as are conducted can indicate how those navies are meant to be utilized during conflict. (Whether or not they would be utilized according to doctrine in time of war is another question.) Additionally, the use of navies during crises is another indicator of the political and military utility perceived to exist by the controlling leadership. Hence, any substantial impact of the Cuban confrontation on the Soviet leadership might be demonstrated by, or at least linked to, subsequent naval operations.

Keeping these four categories of evidence in mind will make easier tracing the development of the Soviet Navy and deducing the relevance of the Cuban missile experience.⁵

Chronology. After Stalin's death in March 1953, the succession crisis brought Nikita Khrushchev into a dominant position of political leadership.

Following the "antiparty coup" in June 1957, he remained firmly in control until October 1964. The primary defense issues which confronted Khrushchev and the Presidium were: relations with the United States and Western Europe under conditions of nuclear inferiority; maintenance of hegemony in Eastern Europe; and allocation of limited resources among the defense, industrial, and consumer sectors. For Khrushchev, the concept of "finite" or "minimum deterrence," first floated by Malenkov in the immediate wake of Stalin's death and then sunk by Khrushchev among others, held a certain deadly attraction, particularly in light of the many competing factors for allocation of resources.

The 20th Party Congress in February 1956 had negated the "inevitability of war" thesis which, as promulgated by Lenin, had pertained specifically only to wars between capitalist states but had been applied by Stalin to wars between capitalist and socialist states. This negation, in turn, implied that perhaps the objective of gaining full nuclear "superiority" was not essential. As early as the second half of the 1950's, Khrushchev probably realized that Soviet nuclear inferiority was not necessarily tantamount to political inferiority, provided the West perceived that a credible Soviet deterrent existed and, in consequence of that perception, the probability of nuclear war remained mercifully small. Under those conditions, one can perhaps imagine Khrushchev considering whether reallocation of resources from defense sectors into other areas was possible. By 1959 and the 21st Party Congress, Khrushchev had clearly decided that was indeed possible. Thus, an "extraordinary" party congress was convened only 3 years after the 20th Congress and the general line of Khrushchev's program was adopted, though strenuous debate would still follow.

Specifically, the implications for the military were formally presented in

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Khrushchev's speech before the Supreme Soviet in January 1960, described by Western observers as introducing Khrushchev's "strategic new look." In essence, the objective, never completely realized, was to place emphasis on strategic forces while attempting to reduce or to minimize expenditures on conventional forces.⁶ The initial stage of the debate, running from late 1959 until the 22d Party Congress in October 1961, has been well documented in Western literature. It resulted in a partial compromise between Khrushchev (and the so-called "radicals" who favored the strategic shift) and the "traditionalists," mostly army leaders, who would not renounce the necessity of maintaining a very strong conventional capability. What has not been quite so well publicized was the effect Khrushchev's "new look" had on the navy and what arguments were put forth representing the navy's position.

By the time of the 21st Party Congress (1959), Soviet naval missions and force structure had been redesigned in large part to counter the threat of carrier-launched nuclear attack aircraft. This development was a noticeable change from the Stalinist years when doctrine held that a potential maritime invasion was to be met by a substantial submarine force and swift, powerfully armed cruiser attack groups. Support of the army's flanks as well as traditional coastal defense also remained key missions. Furthermore, certainly by 1959, strategic attack by submarines was becoming a significant mission. With the change in emphasis that accompanied the increased importance of the strategic forces' role, the navy would have to promote a linkage between strategic criteria and naval capability if the more conventional missions were to justify enlarging naval force levels.

Meanwhile (and perhaps critically), American naval strength was experiencing a revolutionary change with

the marriage of underwater-launched, nuclear-equipped ballistic missiles to nuclear-powered submarines. As early as 1956 the Soviets acknowledged the potential of these systems in their open press.⁷ The remarkable conceptualization, procurement, and deployment of Polaris by 1961 deeply concerned the Soviets. Thus, the currents of strategic emphasis, reinforced by a qualitative change in U.S. seaborne nuclear capabilities, produced a considerable effect on the direction of Soviet naval development.

It is not surprising, then, that from 1960 onwards Soviet naval discussion remained fairly unanimous in outlining the navy's major missions, which appear to have been: to prevent and frustrate sea-based nuclear attack, to participate in nuclear attack, to support the army's maritime flanks, to maintain coastal defense, and to defend local fleet operating areas. Even though there was agreement on these missions, there was room for debate over the specifics of force structure.

Within the navy, the primary rationale for force structure was the necessity to oppose successfully the U.S. sea-based strategic systems of Polaris and the attack aircraft carrier. Strategic attack, the other part of strategic capabilities, was quite obviously of great importance, but how the justification, procurement, and deployment of Soviet FBM's affected the other naval missions is not known outside Russia. In pursuing the anti-FBM requirement, two options were developed. The first option, primarily advocated by Admiral Kasatonov, argued for a "balanced force" consisting of attack submarines, ASW aircraft, and surface ships.⁸ The prime advocate of the second option was Admiral Platonov, who suggested that the anti-FBM task required only attack submarines and ASW aircraft and depended far less on surface ship support.⁹ Thus, as early as 1960, the role of the surface ship had emerged as a

crucial issue in the debate on naval rationale and forces.

A representative example of how the "well-balanced" naval force would operate against Polaris was made by Kasatonov in 1961:

The essence of the problem is to create effective means for the distant destruction of [Polaris] submarines from the air which will make it possible to employ for their destruction the most effective modern means of destruction—missiles with nuclear charges launched from submarines, aircraft and surface ships and possibly from shore launching mounts.

The use of a single weapon [ASW submarines] in the struggle against such a formidable enemy as missile-carrying submarines is an emergency measure caused by the status and capabilities of the ASW forces and weapons at this moment.¹⁰

The role of the surface ship in this scheme would be extensive. First, the use of ships in coordination with the other branches of the naval and air forces would support ASW operations, lend defense in depth, and thereby increase the effectiveness of the anti-Polaris forces. Second, surface ships would screen the deployment and operation of Soviet submarines engaged in anti-FBM missions. Third, surface ships would still be required for anti-mining operations and coastal defense, besides providing support for the ground forces ashore. Last, and this is highly inferential, underscoring all these arguments was the navy's conviction that without visible signs of naval strength deployed on the oceans, i.e., surface ships, it was virtually impossible to have and to maintain effective service.

The heaviest resistance to the navy's "well balanced" force arguments came from the First Secretary. Whether

Khrushchev was disposed personally against surface ships, whether surface ships represented a linkage to conventional forces and were thereby subject to the same constraints as other conventional forces under the strategic "new look," or whether bureaucratic and interservice competitions disfavored the navy's first option, Khrushchev was quite pointed in his January 1960 speech to the Supreme Soviet. "The submarine forces assume great importance while surface ships can no longer play the part they once did."¹¹

Throughout the next 2 years, the debate over the role of surface ships continued. Signs of the contest were reflected from time to time in the form of determined arguments by naval Commander in Chief Gorshkov (or one of his surrogates) and occasional disparagements made by the political leadership—the most famous remark being attributed to Khrushchev when he referred to a new Soviet DLG as a "flaming coffin." However, by Navy Day 1961 (30 July), an important speech given by Marshal and future Defense Minister A.A. Grechko had pointedly noted the inclusion of surface ships as one of the navy's most important combat components.¹² Indeed, Khrushchev signaled the perseverance of the "balanced force" arguments nearly a year later on 11 May 1962, when he reversed his position against "flaming coffins... fit only for making state visits":

Comrades, a few days ago I visited Leningrad, acquainting myself with the work of ship building. Naval vessels... are very good. In the past we frequently criticized our naval comrades for shortcomings in the development of the navy and demanded that it be more perfect. This criticism has not been wasted. What I saw are ships which fully conform to contemporary naval development, the contemporary development of

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military science and technology.¹³

No doubt, what had transpired was the transition of the navy's argument from Platonov's view of early 1960, when considerable opposition to conventional forces (i.e., surface ships) existed and the political leadership's opinions were rigid, to the more "well-balanced" construct advocated by Kasatonov at a time when the controlling leadership was more sensitive or responsive to the military's views. The navy had joined with the other services in some of the criticisms voiced against the strategic "new look," but by linking surface ships to strategic criteria the navy was successful in preserving them. A telling point emerged from those debates: if the strategic criteria shaping the arguments for naval force structure changed or became obsolete (e.g., if finding and destroying Polaris became impossible or dysfunctional), the centerpiece of naval rationale would crumble. It is also highly important to the influence of the Cuban missile crisis on Soviet naval policy that the arguments over the place and the role of surface ships in Soviet naval development were settled (at least temporarily) perhaps as much as a year before the October confrontation occurred.

The building program for major

Soviet combatants confirmed this sequence of events. Described in great detail elsewhere,¹⁴ a summary demonstrates the key decision dates. While this chart has been purposely simplified and does not include all combatant, coastal, amphibious, and support construction dates, it is still significant that key decisions do not appear to have been made as a direct result of the Cuban missile crisis. That does not mean, however, that critical changes in procurement of individual weapons systems, force levels, or modernization programs were unaffected by Cuba, although on these points specific evidence is mostly lacking.

The publication of the first edition of Marshal Sokolovskii's *Military Strategy*¹⁶ was concurrent with the Cuban missile crisis in the fall of 1962. The navy was less than satisfied with the naval aspects as treated by Sokolovskii and his 15 editors (none of whom was a naval officer) and engaged in a running attack which was finally successful nearly 2 years later when Sokolovskii, in his second edition, accepted the "naval" version of naval strategy. A thorough reading of *Military Strategy* seems to demonstrate, in Western terms anyway, a fair treatment of naval strategy and mission. The navy's vociferous response

Design/ Conception Date	Ship Type	Units in Service	Description
1957/1958	<i>Moskva</i> CVS	2	ASW helo cruiser
1957/1958	<i>Kresta</i> I	4	Missile cruiser
1957/1958	Y	33	FBM
1957/1958	C	14	SSGN
1957/1958	V	17	SSN
1960/1961	<i>Krivak</i>	9	Missile destroyer
1960/1961	<i>Kresta</i> II	5	Missile cruiser
1960/1961	<i>Kara</i>	3	Command missile cruiser
1960/1961	<i>Kotlin</i> AAW	7	SAM-AAW destroyer
1963??	D	9	Extended range FBM
1964/1965	<i>Kiev</i>	1 building	Air capable carrier

perhaps was indicative of crucial issues under consideration. Further, it is evident the two prominent factors in the navy's arguments were the urgency of the Polaris threat and the need for surface ships to support the anti-Polaris mission.

Comparative Numerical Strength¹⁵

	1962	1974
Cruisers	25	30*
Destroyers	150	78
Escorts	92	115
Patrol Craft	500	440
Nuclear		
Submarines	6	80**
Conventional		
Submerines	420	210
ASW Cruisers		2 + 2 <i>Kiev</i> class

*Includes: 3 *Kara*, 4 *Kresta 1*, 6 *Kresta II*, 4 *Kynda*, 3 modernized *Sverdlov*, and 10 *Sverdlov*.

**Includes: 33 *Y*, 9 *D*, 8 *H FBM*'s.

Sokolovskii stated that the main task of Soviet military strategy was "working out means for reliably repelling a surprise nuclear attack by an aggressor."¹⁷ The navy's role in carrying out that objective was to take place "on a large scale" but "will hardly be decisive."¹⁸ The main aim of fleet operations was to be "the defeat [of] the enemy navy and severing of his maritime communications. In addition, the need may arise for missions to deliver missile-nuclear strikes."¹⁹ Buried much further down in the text was the comment that because missile submarines could be successfully combated, it was "possible to frustrate enemy submarine missile strikes."²⁰ And, in summary, the editors of *Military Strategy* concluded:

The equipping of the Soviet Navy with nuclear weapons, missile-carrying nuclear submarines and long-range missile-carrying aircraft [no surface ships!] provides considerable opportunity for successful combat over wide expanse of ocean and seas against a powerful enemy navy.²¹

The navy responded quickly and substantially on the "aspects of naval strategy which the book *Military Strategy* covered inadequately."²² The navy's criticisms focused on three areas: the threat of Polaris, the viability of the surface ship in modern warfare, and the requirement for all services to participate in armed conflict. A representative article, written by retired Adm. V.A. Alafuzov, appeared in the January 1963 issue of *Morskoj Sbornik*, making these same three points in no uncertain terms. After assigning American FBM's a crucial mission "side by side" with the aircraft carrier in conducting nuclear strikes against the Soviet homeland, Alafuzov repeated four times the need for surface ships in conducting a nuclear war: "The usefulness of surface ships against the rocket-carrying submarine is acknowledged here in contrast to earlier statements sending the surface navy into discard."²³

In criticizing the editors of *Military Strategy* for restricting the operations of nuclear war to the Strategic Rocket Troop and the Ground Forces, Alafuzov maintained: "We think that success in modern war is achieved by the actions of all components of the armed forces, while the role of each one of them will be different in different phases."²⁴

The navy continued its attack, apparently unassuaged by the second edition of *Military Strategy* published in 1963. Indeed, as late as July 1964, Gorshkov made a direct frontal assault on a Khrushchev remark about the obsolescence of surface ships noting: "... in connection with our shortage of resources, some comrades think it would be better to concentrate on the ground forces... Frunze considered this view erroneous."²⁵

The sign, however, of the navy's successful battle in advancing its notion of strategy and preserving the surface ship, as well as the success of the "traditionalists" against Khrushchev's strategic emphasis, became apparent in

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two long articles appearing in *Krasnaya Zvezda* of 25 and 28 August 1964 cowritten by Sokolovskii and Major General Cherednichenko.²⁶ Although demonstrating far more than an understanding of the fundamentals of naval strategy, the writers stated that the "foremost task" of naval operations "will be the destruction of nuclear rocket fitted submarines." However, no mention was made of the surface ship's utility in completing this mission.

Therefore, one is left with the question why, if Cuba played such an important role in shaping Soviet perceptions of naval power, such a controversy appears to have existed, first, over the anti-FBM naval mission and, second, over the utility of surface ships? An answer, partly speculative in nature, is that the Cuban missile crisis, rather than justifying an expansion of naval capability in *conventional* terms, nearly derailed the gains made by Gorshkov and company through late 1962.

Certainly one lesson that Khrushchev was taught concerned the need for strategic forces equality if not superiority. Whatever strategic force levels were envisaged by the First Secretary, it is not unreasonable to assume that the missile crisis served to raise substantially those levels as well as to contribute to the argument for expanded conventional capability along the lines drawn by the so-called "traditionalists." If this analysis is correct, then a reasonable hypothesis concerning the surface shipbuilding program can be drawn.

After Cuba, heated debate over Khrushchev's military designs continued. Evidence indicates that on both the strategic and conventional force levels Khrushchev was heavily opposed by the military in his persistence in minimizing defense expenditures. How much the Cuban crisis served to change Khrushchev's views is unclear. Yet, if the debate over allocation was intensified post-Cuba, and if reductions in expenditures occurred, would not the

navy find its most tenuous program now under careful scrutiny? In this case, the surface shipbuilding program, which apparently survived the 1960-1961 defense decisions, may have been placed into renewed jeopardy with resource allocation problems arising from the aftermath of Cuba. It is also interesting that while the Sokolovskii editors initially understood the navy's primary missions to be conventional, i.e., interdiction of lines of communication, the navy strongly countered with the argument that destruction of Polaris was the foremost requirement. Hence, by justifying force levels on strategic terms, the navy conformed with the First Secretary's policies. Thus, surface ships were seen to have utility for strategic purposes. Other uses, however seemingly attractive, were relegated to less prominent roles.

Therefore, in comparing the evidence supplied by the relationship of defense and naval policies as well as by pronouncements of the leadership and building programs, it becomes evident that the Cuban missile crisis had little immediate impact on Soviet naval development. Providing one assumes that some of the things the leadership did represented policy and intentions, it becomes clear that Soviet naval development followed primarily, if not entirely, from the criteria set by conditions of strategic nuclear war. Against this background, it appears that the utility of surface ships was debated in strategic terms regardless of how else those same assets might be employed in situations short of nuclear war. Nevertheless, the missile crisis may have disrupted some of the navy's plans if a shift in strategic priorities required concomitant resource reallocations which, in turn, threatened the projected surface shipbuilding program.

Over the longer term, however, the Cuban missile crisis may have had more significant effect on the perceptions of the leadership on the utility of naval

forces. This important and less documented area must be discussed because, once having gotten to sea to oppose Polaris and the aircraft carrier, Soviet ships would be continuously operating further from home waters than at any time in history, and they would be in proximity to warships of the primary adversary.

The Political Implications. Thus far, the evidence indicates that in terms of both soft and hardware analysis, the Cuban missile crisis had far less than a salutary effect in encouraging the Soviets to develop a "blue water" navy. Indeed, it is possible that one result of the crisis was the confirmation of the minimum requirement for strategic "parity" or "equivalence" with which future foreign policy initiatives might fare better. On the naval level, the weakest weapons system in the navy's plan was the surface ship which, if the interpretation of the Soviet Navy-Sokolovskii debate is in part correct, ran into troubled waters. But, despite the indications that Cuba was neither a catalyst nor a causal factor in promoting naval force level aspirations, the impact of the crisis on the utility of naval politics and operations is not quite so obvious.

Without question, the scope of Soviet naval operations (even as the total numbers of active units has decreased) has increased immeasurably since October 1962. By mid-1964, the Soviet *Eskadra* had begun regular deployments to the Mediterranean; in January 1968, Indian Ocean deployments were started. Worldwide exercises such as Okean 70 and Okean 75 replaced the previously limited and confined scale of training operations. In times of crisis, while behaving cautiously and circumspectly, the presence of Soviet naval units in proximity to warships of the United States became *modus operandi*. Thus, the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean has

become an accepted fact (even if, during the 6-day war between the Israelis and the Arabs in 1967, the Soviet squadron dispersed to its anchorages). Did the experience of the Cuban missile crisis encourage this expanded scope of Soviet naval operations?

The answer, while not straightforward, appears to be generally negative for several reasons. First, in 1962 the Soviet strategic nuclear capability nowhere remotely approached parity with that of the United States except under the condition of the most finite case of finite deterrence. The magnitude of this inferiority was, no doubt, a critical factor in compelling the Soviets to remove their offensive missiles from Cuba (certainly, the threat of U.S. airstrikes destroying the missile sites was present). Second, while the U.S. Navy imposed a most efficient quarantine, there were few advocates in Moscow who supported the procurement of a naval force sufficiently large to be capable of confronting the U.S. Navy head-on some 4,000 miles from home waters. Third, if Cuba was significant in any area, the demonstration of strategic inferiority under Khrushchev's concept proved to be highly unsatisfactory. But none of these immediate reasons suggests the longer term political consequences of naval inferiority. Indeed, to settle that issue, one must discuss what appear to have been the most crucial factors underlying Soviet naval *raison d'etre*.

The argument has been made that, despite the difficulty in hunting FBM's and, presumably, the low return in destroying them, one key consideration dominating Soviet force structure was the requirement to counter both Polaris and the aircraft carrier.²⁷ Subsumed under this task, *de facto*, would be the capability to oppose any naval force with either conventional or with nuclear weapons. However, opposing the West's strategic systems required nearly a continuous presence and, certainly,

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"forward deployment." How soon and to what extent the political leadership realized the full consequences of naval deployment and interaction is not certain; but, as new ships slid off the building ways and entered service, the Soviets were able to begin deployment of the anti-Polaris, anticarrier forces. This deployment was carried out in a cautious, discreet, and incremental manner, and it is perhaps fair to assume that the political leadership was well aware of the advantages and disadvantages "distant" naval deployments could bring by the time of the 1967 June war.

Conclusions. While the foregoing does not specifically address the possible implications of the Cuban missile crisis in focusing Soviet views on the utility of naval forces, the evidence strongly suggests that had the crisis never occurred, the Soviet Navy probably would have developed along nearly identical lines. Whether or not Soviet strategic forces would have increased to present-day levels may be debated, had Cuba not occurred. My view is that the levels would have also grown almost identically without the Cuban impetus. But Soviet naval development, based on longer term appreciation and marked strategic inferiority was, by and large, unaffected by the Cuban confrontation. Perhaps the surface shipbuilding program was placed in potential jeopardy and perhaps Admiral Gorshkov, in a truly Byzantine style, perceived that the only way to justify a "balanced" navy

was in strategic terms. In any event, the highest common denominator was to build a force with a maximized capability against the most significant threat. Having achieved that aim, the flexibility and capability of forces needed to fight and to survive in that environment, as well as the mixed benefits of forward deployment, have combined to produce an overlap or surplus of options.

Whether this condition will continue or whether the apparent impossibility of locating and destroying a substantial percentage of deployed FBM's will alter Soviet views concerning their naval forces is uncertain. What is certain is that Soviet conceptions of military forces and their utility do not necessarily conform with those of the United States and, unless that crucial difference is understood, the United States may find itself one day engaged in another "type" of Cuban missile crisis, only this time with the roles reversed.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

A 1963 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Lt. Comdr. Harlan K. Ullman, U.S. Navy, is also a graduate of the U.S. Naval Destroyer School, Newport, R.I. He has served two tours of duty in U.S.S. *Forrest Sherman* (DD-931), first as Operations Officer and most recently as Executive Officer. Lt. Comdr. Ullman earned his Ph.D. at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He is now a member of the faculty, National War College, Washington, D.C.

NOTES

1. The writer realizes the distinction between "maritime" and "naval." "Maritime" includes commercial as well as forceful components. This paper chooses to discuss only the "naval" aspects of the maritime balance in light of the Cuban missile crisis.

2. The Kiev class is a vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft carrier presumably charged with a primary antisubmarine warfare (ASW) mission. Two are under construction. In addition, the Soviets have two other helicopter ASW aircraft carriers in service.

3. The 21st, 22d, 23d, and 24th Congresses follow this pattern. In the case of the "extraordinary" 21st Party Congress, convened in February 1959, a 7-year plan was put forth. If the 25th Party Congress is held in February 1976, the same pattern is apparent with a debate or controversy ending in Shelepin's "resignation" from the Politburo in early 1975.

4. Several authors such as H.S. Dinerstein and Raymond Garthoff have noted a close similarity between unclassified Soviet works and their classified counterparts.

5. There are, of course, limitations to each of the four categories of evidence. If a "debate" develops, one has to know precisely when in order to compare contemporary statements in what is known as "content analysis." That is not always possible. Building programs may suffer from bureaucratic perils and planning which completely frustrate comparing actual output with intended output. Operational and exercise patterns may be more affected by and sensitive to budget considerations and competition than doctrine. While these limitations exist, they are not necessarily fatal nor do they preclude analysis. For further discussion, see my "Despair and Euphoria: Soviet Naval Development 1917-1973," Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Ma., 1973, chap. II.

6. The Strategic Rocket Troop, for example, was established in 1960 as evidence of this trend. It is noteworthy that in 1967 Gorshkov made reference to the plan of using land-based missiles against FBMs, also confirming the policy of upgrading strategic capabilities at the expense of conventional forces. I have arbitrarily set October 1961 as ending one stage of the debate. Indeed, the "debate" continued for several years after; however, by October 1961, a general compromise was reached which halted many of Khrushchev's plans.

7. See Adm. V.L. Vladimirovskii, "Rocket Weapons and the Conduct of Naval Combat Operations," *Sovetskii Flot*, 21 September 1956.

8. Admiral of the Fleet V.A. Kasatonov, a decorated World War II submariner, was Naval Deputy Commander in Chief for almost a decade until his retirement in early 1975. At the time of the debate, Kasatonov was CinC Black Sea Fleet. In 1962 he was transferred to command the expanding Northern Fleet, a promotion in every sense. Another measure of Kasatonov's prominence as, no doubt, Gorshkov's surrogate in the debate, was the fact that he addressed the Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet to which Khrushchev delivered his famous speech of 14 January 1960.

9. Adm. V. Platonov was born in 1905 and was a submariner. From 1958 to 1960 he had served as adviser in the PRC, leaving as the Sino-Soviet rift became hardened. Whether Platonov actually believed in the growing disutility of surface ships or was representing the navy's fall-back position is unclear. In either case, his arguments did not carry the day.

10. V.A. Kasatonov, "On the Problems of the Navy and Methods for Resolving Them," *Naval Collection*, October 1961.

11. N.S. Khrushchev, "Disarmament—Road to Peace and Friendship Among People," *Izvestiya*, 15 January 1960. See also Khrushchev's remarks in *Leningrad Pravda*, 23 March 1960 when the ebullient First Secretary declared that "military ships are good only to make trips for state visits." In this case Khrushchev was referring to combatants besides carriers and battleships of which the Soviets had none in active service.

12. A.A. Grechko, Navy Day Speech delivered at Leningrad, *Pravda*, 30 July 1961.

13. N.S. Khrushchev, "Speech delivered to All Union Conference of Railway Workers," *Trud*, 11 May 1962.

14. The breakthrough in capabilities analysis was done by Michael K. McGwire. See, for example, M.K. McGwire, *Soviet Naval Developments* (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Dalhousie University Press, 1973), pp. 118-131.

15. *Ibid.* I emphasize the numerical and not qualitative (capabilities) comparisons.

16. When *Military Strategy* was actually written assumes some significance. Both Malcolm Mackintosh and Thomas Wolfe note that the first edition was in galley form for nearly a year. The most recent date is the first edition which is footnoted in November 1961 (p. 44) and refers to U.S. recognition of loss of strategic superiority. The bulk of the text was probably finished in late summer 1961 and therefore dwelt on decisions made prior to the 22d Party Congress.

17. V.D. Sokolovskii, ed., *Military Strategy*, Rand, ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 314.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 420.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*, p. 422.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 405.

22. V.A. Alafuzov, "On the Appearance of *Military Strategy*," *Morskoi Sbornik*, January 1963, p. 88. Numerous other naval articles also appeared challenging Sokolovskii.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

25. S.G. Gorshkov, "Guarding the Sea Frontiers," *Pravda*, 26 July 1964. Dr. Thomas W. Wolfe first pointed out the Gorshkov remark in reference to the defense debate.

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26. V.D. Sokolovskii and M.I. Cherednichenko, "Military Art at a New State," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 25, 28 August 1964.

27. Coastal defense, defense of the fleet operating areas, and support of the army also are facets determining force structure and levels; however, none of these tasks are completely "open ocean" in nature and do not require the same types of capabilities.

