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Beyond Boom and Crash

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Gelb and Betts felt compelled to extend their study and to take a look at Nixon's and Ford's policies. It is understandable that they would feel it necessary to review this later period before pronouncing judgment. However, the coverage is so brief that the insight and research is not of the high caliber of the remainder of the book.

After supporting their thesis that the system worked, the authors develop two schools of thought on Vietnam, summed up and evaluated as follows:

The Win School would have America vindicate mistakes in victory, while the Reformist School would have it avoid another mistake. Neither is comforting. The former gives promise of only threats and force. The latter suggests a certain naivete. . . . The problem, then, is not so much prevention as extrication, and the solution is not so much governmental restructuring as changing fundamental attitudes about and within the system.

Finally Gelb and Betts conclude that the basic lesson of the Vietnam war is "the need for pragmatism more than doctrines, formulas, and ideologies."

In the area of its main effort, an explication and analysis of Washington decisionmaking on the Vietnam war up to Tet 1968, the book is excellent and makes a fine contribution to the growing body of literature on the war. Upper level Political Science courses interested in the study of Presidential decisionmaking will find it especially useful.

DOUGLAS KINNARD
University of Vermont

Gorshkov, S.G. *The Sea Power of the State*. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1979, 290pp.

It may be that Admiral Gorshkov's book will be as frequently cited and as seldom read as Mahan's *The Influence*

of *Seapower Upon History* is nowadays, but there seems little question but that it "will influence navies and governments for the rest of this century." This last judgment is from a review article, "A Primer on S.G. Gorshkov's *Sea Power of the State*," that appeared in the Spring 1977 issue of this journal. That review was of a translation prepared by the Naval Intelligence Support Center, and while the translation was widely available to those who knew how to seek it out, one couldn't pop into the local bookstore for a copy. That inconvenience has been erased with this, the commercial publication of the "authorized" English version.

Because of the earlier review here, this note will not presume to provide further analysis of the work but rather is intended to announce the book's availability and to applaud the decision of the Naval Institute Press to arrange, with Great Britain's Pergamon Press, its American distribution.

Some of Gorshkov's views, particularly on differing American and Soviet rationale for and contribution to several episodes in World War II, will be offensive to some readers, but an awareness of those views adds, as does the study of this book, to our understanding of the design and purpose of the man and the powerful and impressive Soviet fleet that he has built. *Sea Power* is essential, not just to the naval officer, not just to the military professional, but to all who ponder international security questions.

W.R. PETTYJOHN
Commander, U.S. Navy

Heilbroner, Robert L. *Beyond Boom and Crash*. New York: 1978. 111pp.

In an age known to Michael Harrington as "The Twilight of Capitalism," one rarely encounters authors temerarious enough to protest that reports of the demise of capitalism are, indeed, greatly exaggerated. Witness the personification of capitalism, Henry Ford,

resigning from the eleemosynary institution that bears his name, protesting that too few people understand that philanthropy is often the child of capitalism (*The New York Times*, 12 January 1977, p. B6). Witness the phenomenon of stagflation that, in the opinion of some, now puts John Maynard Keynes in the antediluvian category of Adam Smith. Examples could be multiplied; see, for example, the discussions in the April 1978 issue of *Commentary*: "Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy."

Now comes Robert L. Heilbroner, author of *The Worldly Philosophers* and *An Inquiry into the Human Prospect*, to propose, with Yugoslav economist Branco Horvat, that after competitive capitalism (1700-1875), monopoly capitalism (1875-1930), and welfare capitalism (1930-1973), we have begun a fourth period—that of planned capitalism. To be sure, Heilbroner is no Micawber. He contends that "deep changes will be required," and that the shift to economic planning is "the only institutional transformation that can . . . give a new measure of life, albeit a limited one, to the capitalist system." Simply put, Heilbroner's thesis is that a merger of the irresistible logic of economics and of ecology justifies and commands "planning the economic process in a way that has never before been necessary."

Heilbroner adamantly contends that planning is the salvation of capitalism, rather than its bane. He says it best himself:

It is not planning, as such, that will be the Trojan horse of democracy, if democracy perishes. It will be severity of the seismic disturbances against which planning was meant to safeguard us, or the unwillingness or inability of a society to make bold alterations in its institutions, while these can still be carried out through appeals to reason and by democratic means.

Although he maintains that financial and environmental perils clearly indicate the need for "an unprecedented degree of monitoring, control, supervision, and precaution over the economic process," Heilbroner is a fan of neither the wholly planned economy of the Soviet Union nor of multinational corporations. To Heilbroner's mind, the American economy is still the world's most powerful. Although willing to concede that America's manufacturing position may have declined, he says that America's position as the world's breadbasket is practically preeminent. He points out that America has no significant political party that urges us to convert to large-scale "socialism"; he argues that the dollar "would seem to be one of the soundest, not one of the frailest, currencies," and that the American political situation is mercifully stable. Because unrestrained inflation is invariably the consequence of political collapse, he thinks that "a runaway inflation is [not] a matter to be taken seriously."

Unhappily, there is something cavalier about Heilbroner's clarion call for reasoned economic planning in a book of 89 pages of text; he has, in fact, completed more of an outline than of a substantial, clothbound book. Moreover, the little book is marred by a number of editorial errors. Words such as *preferable*, *stanch*, *management*, and *occurrence* are misspelled in the book. These matters aside, this small book is worth reading—if only because it is conspicuous by comparison with other books in its steadfast refusal to argue that capitalism alone is responsible for all the ills of mankind from alienation to acne.

Is it then possible to strike the balance between the desideratum of economic planning and the consequent risk (if not certainty) of political oppression? Perhaps Eric Hoffer said it best:

I used to think it self-evident that freedom means freedom from

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iron necessity. But it is not quite so. The moment necessity no longer regulates and disciplines there is need for imposed regimentation. On the other hand, a society living on the edge of subsistence cannot afford freedom. Thus the zone of individual freedom is midway between the extremes of scarcity and abundance. [*Harper's*, October 1978, p. 78]

One hopes that Heilbroner, in his next work, will define more exactly the boundaries of the area that exists somewhere between the boom and the crash.

JAMES H. TONER
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Holmes, W.J. *Double-Edged Secrets*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979. 231pp.

The code name given to the World War II variant of today's COMINT (Communications Intelligence) was ULTRA. Deriving useful intelligence about Japanese fleet operations involved a painstaking, two-part process: first, the intercept of coded radio transmissions and second, the decryption of those messages from code into plain language—Japanese and then English. Secrecy shrouded the entire process. Documents containing ULTRA material were boldly marked with a warning that reveals the double edge of Holmes' fascinating memoir: "No action is to be taken on information herein reported, regardless of temporary advantage, if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence of the source to the enemy."

Double-Edged Secrets tells the story of U.S. communications intelligence operations in the Pacific during World War II and is written by one of a handful of dedicated men who operated a complex operational intelligence center in a Pearl Harbor base-

ment. Based principally on the recollections of its author, Capt. W.J. Holmes, the book will almost certainly be at odds with many of the official and unofficial accounts of those intelligence activities that are beginning to fill the shelves since recent archival declassification (the Naval War College Library is currently processing over 40 separate titles). However, Holmes' personal narrative captures uniquely the mood of the period and gives rare insight into the problems and personalities of the Pacific Fleet. The reader joins the author at FRUPAC (Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific) headquarters in the middle of an intriguing drama that unfolds in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor.

Communications intelligence was in its infancy and had only recently managed to outlive the famous moratorium of 1929 when President Hoover's Secretary of State, Henry Stimson had withdrawn support for the "Black Chamber" by declaring that gentlemen do not read each other's mail. After sketching a brief history of cryptanalysis in the years just before the war, Holmes plunges into the myriad problems of breaking Japanese operations code. However, there is much more to this fast-moving history than random additives and combinations and permutations of 5-digit groups. Thankfully, his recollection of failures is as good as that of the many victories produced by the dogged, learn-as-you-go work of the cryptanalysts. Their tasks were monumental and the infrequent rewards silently shared until new codes would send the small team back to start all over again. The great breakthroughs in decryption came from a mixture of extraordinarily long hours, odd coincidences, and a good measure of luck. These factors came together repeatedly in large part because of the exceptional personal chemistry, sensitivity, and dedication of the first unit. From the start it was