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# Russia's Struggle For Maritime Prestige During the Era of Navalism

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*The Soviet Union's efforts to build a powerful fleet, its interest in a naval station to serve its Mediterranean squadron, its feelers through Persia to a warm water port, and its special development programs to meet operational requirements have antecedents in tsarist times. The goals of that earlier flexing of muscle were confounded by technology and politics. An earlier version of this paper, "Russische Seemachtbestrebungen in der Epoche des Navalismus," appeared in Marinerundschau No. 2, 1978.*

# RUSSIA'S STRUGGLE FOR MARITIME PRESTIGE DURING THE ERA OF NAVALISM

by

Commander Dieter Matthei, Federal German Navy

The Era of Navalism. The growing exchange of goods prompted by the rapid development of technology in the 1890s brought about a search for more and more new markets, resources and raw materials. The interest of those concerned concentrated on overseas areas not yet taken by economical and political consolidation. The relationship between state powers was determined by a kind of foreign policy that incorporated into its concept the vastness of the oceans. "Without direct access to the sea, without participation in the use of the global surface of water," a modern nation would appear not to be able to exist any longer.<sup>1</sup> The man-of-war (which had met with a fundamental change in significance ever since advanced technology had made its entry into naval affairs) grew into the role of the representative and the holder of a nation's power. Technical innovations such as steel shipbuilding and the introduction of steam power had created

new dependencies that became manifest in demands for more effective naval stations and legally established ship acquisition programs.

The approaching new era, for which the American historian William L. Langer coined the term "The New Navalism" in *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*,<sup>2</sup> was characterized by a systematic buildup of oceangoing fleets as "a prominent image of a nation's power."<sup>3</sup> The close connection between politics and technology was very clearly exemplified by a policy setting in at that time and aimed at the establishment of overseas bases. This new display of maritime power received its decisive impetus from the teachings of the American naval officer, Alfred T. Mahan, who pointed at the interdependencies between geographic factors, national character, trade and overseas expansion as the determinant factors of a seapower. He pointed out that it wasn't a nation's capability for cruiser

warfare that made it a seapower, but the existence of a strong oceangoing fleet of battleships.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the term seapower may be used with two different connotations, one being the maritime means that enable a nation to exert maritime power, and the other being the nation herself capable of including the seas in her overall political concept.

**Basic Prerequisites for the Buildup of Russian Seapower.** Even though Russia had coastal borders twice as long as those of the United States, unfavorable climatic conditions and a location away from the centers of the world's trade and commerce stood against her development of power at sea or overseas. In addition, there was the economic backwardness of a predominantly agrarian state most clearly evidenced by an almost chronic lack of funds. Only the Black Sea harbors remained ice-free throughout the year, but the access to them was under the control of a foreign power. St. Petersburg on the Baltic Sea as well as Archangel on the White Sea were cut off by ice for almost 5 months of the year. Similar conditions were found at Petropavlovsk and Nikolayevsk on the Pacific. It was not until Russia had acquired the Maritime Territory that she came into an almost ice-free harbor, Vladivostok, situated in the bay named after Peter the Great.<sup>5</sup> It took, however, until 1901 before this port could be linked to the industrial centers of the European part of Russia by way of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the efficiency of which at that time left a lot to be desired. Moderate flourishing of overseas trading was discernible only in the Black Sea where better climatic conditions and a more favorable economic structure, indispensable prerequisites, prevailed. Ships of the Volunteer Fleet, a government-owned shipping company, with Odessa as their base, maintained connection with the Far East. However, they were not able to turn this connection into regular sea

trading as most of the time there was very little freight, if any, on the return trip. Even though the share of Russia's own flags in maritime traffic rose by 20 percent during this period, and the departures to Eastern Asia tripled,<sup>6</sup> development of external trade strategies incorporating the high sea into its concept still lay in the future.

Until the midnineties, general politics were oriented on continental objectives, just like politics in the field of economics and trade, and were marked by the expansion into Turkestan and Transcaspia and by the desire to take possession of the Dardanelles. The entry of a British squadron into the Marmara Sea had clearly demonstrated the impressive potential of this strategic waterway to threaten Russian Balkan politics. The Dardanelles problem to Russia was not only of military significance and prestige, but also was a matter of economic policy, as Russia's finances had become dependent on grain exports shipped mainly via the Black Sea harbors.<sup>7</sup>

**The Function of Maritime Power in the Political Concept of Czar Alexander III.** A forcible solution of the Dardanelles problem was out of the question because of Russia's insufficient maritime power<sup>8</sup> and Britain's predominant maritime position in the Mediterranean. Russian policy could only aim for such limited objectives as, e.g., the opening of the Dardanelles passageway for Russian warships and the closing of the Black Sea to nonneighboring countries. If these objectives could have been realized, Russia would have been spared the necessity of building up two naval potentials; at the same time, however, Britain's position in the Mediterranean would have been gravely shaken. The situation set the Russian Naval Staff several tasks. First it was necessary to protect the coastline in the St. Petersburg area, with its concentration of industrial capacity, against a potential enemy threat. The buildup of numerous

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flotillas of torpedo boats and the ordering of 50 submarines give evidence of such considerations.<sup>9</sup>

For the Black Sea, the construction of a potent fleet with a nucleus of ironclads and the establishment of a coastal defense organization were planned.<sup>10</sup> Insurmountable difficulties because of a lack of her own naval stations curbed Russia's ability to put pressure on the Dardanelles from the West by way of permanent presence in the Mediterranean. Any Russian force in the Mediterranean remained dependent on friendly states bordering the Mediterranean as far as coal supply was concerned. Because of ice in the Baltic Sea, it was even impossible to maintain a year-round connection with the home base in St. Petersburg.

In the event of a military contest with Britain, Russia's naval strategy would aim at a disruption of British sea trading.<sup>11</sup> Yet the necessary prerequisites to achieve this goal, such as coaling stations and a sufficient number of suitable ships, still could not be met. The idea of commerce raiding warfare with cruisers was reflected also in plans to employ the merchant vessels of the Volunteer Fleet as auxiliary cruisers. In 1885, despite Russia's desolate financial situation necessitating considerable cuts into the military budget,<sup>12</sup> a fleet construction plan submitted in 1882 by the Minister of Naval Affairs, I.A. Shestakov, became effective. This plan visualized the construction of 15 ironclads, 10 cruisers and 11 gunboats over a 20-year period. Its extension to 20 ironclads and 24 cruisers, ordered only a little later, points out the significance beginning to be attached to a strong maritime component of future armament. Within the overall schedule individual portions of the plan, upon pertinent appropriation, were passed at 5-year intervals.<sup>13</sup>

There was no intention to draw level with the British Navy but rather to form a fleet which, with allied navies, was

capable of coping with British naval forces, particularly in the Mediterranean. Even though planning as a whole still followed the concept of cruiser warfare, the ironclad gained in importance. From the early nineties on, Russia began to put more emphasis on bringing the oceans into her overall political concept. Both the journey of the tsarevitch to Eastern Asia on board the cruiser *Pamjat Azova* in 1891 and the dispatch of a squadron of the cruisers *General Admiral*, *Admiral Nakhimov*, and *Rynda* under the command of Admiral Kasnakov to New York's Columbus Celebration in 1892 served the purpose of presenting the Russian flag more intensively on the seven seas than before.

These activities culminated in the attempt to gain a footing in the Mediterranean by taking advantage of discord between Britain and France over the occupation of Egypt and Tunisia, respectively. Since 1886 Russia had sent more and more vessels into the Mediterranean but had not been able to maintain a permanent presence there. In the fall of 1893 a Russian force commanded by Rear Admiral Avellan went to Toulon in order to repay the French visit to Kronshadt in 1891. The cruisers *Admiral Nakhimov* and *Rynda*, returning from the United States, joined the ironclad *Imperator Nikolai I*, coming from the Baltic Sea, and the cruiser *Pamjat Azova* off Cadiz. The gunboat *Terets*, stationed in the Mediterranean, later joined the other vessels. Strength and composition of this force signalled the political quality of this visit. France was looking for an ally against the powers of the Triple Alliance while Russia was striving for a naval station to serve a future Mediterranean squadron. Such a station would be the *conditio sine qua non* for any further advance of Russian naval forces into the Mediterranean. France, as it were, could only favor a permanent stationing of Russian warships in the Mediterranean, as her

own position against Britain would have been considerably improved this way. The press of those days consequently spoke not only of an imminent cession of naval stations in Bastia, Ajaccio or in Tripolitania, but also of a possible union of portions of the Russian Fleet with the French Mediterranean Fleet.<sup>14</sup>

The balance of power in the Mediterranean verged on being upset by these endangering Russian intentions, as even then French naval forces were on a par at least with the British forces and France, in case of mobilization, after 3 days would have gained "supremacy at sea" if the British Mediterranean Fleet were not reinforced by units from Britain or if a coalition of several Mediterranean powers were not accomplished.<sup>15</sup> Russia, however, shrank from too close an engagement with France as she feared an entanglement with Germany and Italy for which she was not in the least prepared.

The laying of the foundation stone for a naval port at Libau, in timely coincidence with the above mentioned events, as well as its urgent completion, showed that Russia had recognized the weakness of her position. In spite of the conclusion of a Franco-Russian treaty of alliance in 1894, no naval stations were ceded.

When the Toulon visit ended, the force sailed into the eastern Mediterranean in order to exert pressure on Greece and Turkey and to coax one of these nations into ceding a naval station to the Russians. Because of its proximity to the Dardanelles, a station in the Aegean Sea would have been much more valuable than one in the western part of the Mediterranean. For almost 3 months the force lay at anchor in the port of Piraeus, but negotiations for the installation of a coaling station on the island of Poros (where Russia for some time had owned 7-1/2 acres of land built up with some houses) did not yield any result.<sup>16</sup> The firm position of the British Government, who warned of

the serious complications liable to spring from the cession of an island in the eastern Mediterranean, not only served to back up Greece's position but also kept Turkey from joining the negotiating parties.

By the spring of 1894 Russian efforts to improve her maritime strategic position in the Mediterranean had definitely failed. The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War finally induced Russia to shift the emphasis on her maritime interests to Eastern Asia. Consequently, the Russian ships, except *Terets*, sailed to Vladivostok.

During that time, however, Russia had not neglected her interests in the extreme northern latitudes. There, the installation of a port on the ice-free Murman and the Norwegian coasts offered the possibility of unrestrained access to the free ocean. Pretending to build up a base from which to pursue more efficiently her interests in fishing, Russia started careful exploration of the Murman Coast with respect to its suitability for the construction of a naval base. By supporting Norwegian autarkic tendencies and by exerting pressure on Sweden, Russia even tried to get hold of the Varanger Fjord and Port Victoria at the Ofoten Fjord (today's Narvik).<sup>17</sup> These plans, reaching far ahead of their time, not only failed because of the political situation and the geographic problems to be expected, but also because of the opposition of leading navy officials.<sup>18</sup>

**The Beginning of the Construction of a Modern Navy.** The nonexistence of an efficient dockyard and engineering industry, a well-established, reliable civil service and a sufficient stock of skilled labor proved to be a drag on the systematic buildup of the fleet. The requirement to build every hull in a home yard was easily met, but engineering raised problems so that foreign help in that area had to be enlisted. The British firms Messrs. Maudsley, Sons and

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Field, Messrs. Humphreys and Tennant, as well as Messrs. Hawthorn and Leslie were predominant in the design and construction of propulsion plants, whereas since 1890 the French firm Belleville maintained an unchallenged position in the area of water tube boilers. The development of ships' armament and armor plate production were also strongly influenced by French firms, but Russia succeeded in presenting noteworthy domestic developments (12" gun built by Obukov and distribution of gun mounts on the ironclads of the *Sinop* class). Technological novelties were regarded with responsiveness as was proved by experiments with submarines conducted by the engineer Drzeviecki and the installation of oil furnaces on the battleship *Rostislav*. The design and construction of ironclads and cruisers even then showed traits of independent development whereas the design of destroyers was oriented on the *Posadnik* and the *Kapitan Kazarki*, both built at Schichau's. The new ironclads laid down between 1886 and 1894, with the exception of the three units of the *Sinop* class, represented six different designs with respect to the distribution of gun mounts and to their operational characteristics, exemplifying the search for the best suited type of battleship. With the following units of the *Poltava* and *Peresvet* classes, the Russians finally adopted the technique of building warships by classes. The design of every Russian cruiser of that time corresponded to the then valid concept of cruiser warfare. This development was initiated by the construction of the *Admiral Kornilov*, designed by French engineers, and it also influenced the construction of armored cruisers. Even the giant armored cruisers *Rjurik*, *Rossija* and *Gromoboi* still combined the operating profile of a commerce raider with that of an armored cruiser.<sup>19</sup> As was proved later on, these units were a failure because of over-

emphasis on offensive capability (high speed, great range of action, high caliber armament) over defensive needs (insufficient armor).

To meet operational requirements Russia did not shrink from special development programs, either, so she built a number of landing craft in Odessa for limited amphibious operations and took measures for mine warfare in the Black Sea. Disregarding the regulations relative to the Straits, Russia transferred two minelayers ordered at a Swedish dockyard in Göteborg to Sevastopol, camouflaged as passenger liners.<sup>20</sup>

Owing to the energetic promotion of the Russian Navy by Czar Alexander III, Russia took third place behind Britain and France by 1893.<sup>21</sup> As the progress in the development shows, a realization of the 1882 naval acquisition program seemed possible, even in spite of the still existing shortcomings in naval administration and in the yards.<sup>22</sup> The decisive obstacle proved to be the lack of any private competition and the lack of funds which, except in rare cases, prevented placing orders abroad.<sup>23</sup> Efficiency of fleet personnel was indeed brought up but compared to international standards it still lagged behind with respect to practical and tactical skills because the lack of ice-free harbors prevented continuous sea training and year-round operation of ships.

The Employment of Maritime Power in Pursuit of Overseas Interests at the Turn of the Century. In the midnineties, the Russians fully realized the significance of a presence on the high seas for their nation's welfare. The naval officer Klado picked up Mahan's ideas and by numerous publications on the subject brought them to the attention of the public. He succeeded in convincing the reigning house that Russia, in order to be able to engage in world politics, had to have an oceangoing fleet.<sup>24</sup> Such considerations, of course, had their impact on Russian politics, which were

aimed more and more at the political and economic penetration of Northern China and Korea. The reinforcement of the naval forces stationed in the Far East, and the setting up of a force called the "Naval Forces of the Far East" under the command of Vice Admiral Tyrtoov in 1895, were designed to help establish and secure the expansion. The situation of Vladivostok with respect to this objective proved most unfavorable, so that the acquisition of a naval station in the Yellow Sea area was considered. By the insistence of Muraviev, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russia succeeded in taking possession of the Liaotung Peninsula in 1898. The ice-free ports of Port Arthur (Lushun), which was supposed to be turned into a naval base, and Dairen (Luta), which was to be built up as a port for merchant shipping,<sup>25</sup> however, did not satisfy the naval staff, which instead wanted to gain a footing on the southeast coast of Korea. It is true that the Russian Pacific Squadron no longer had to pass the winter off Nagasaki but, as a glance at the map will show, acquisition of Port Arthur by no means had changed fundamentally the strategic situation. An attempt made a year later to achieve the objective at Masampo, in spite of the employment of naval forces off Chemulpo (Inchon), failed because of Japanese resistance.<sup>26</sup> The Russian naval staff, however, not only clung to the demands made so far, but also began to adjust to future opposition from Japan. The Japanese regarded Russian plans as a threat to their own pre-dominance in the Eastern Asian area, gained only recently at a heavy cost.<sup>27</sup>

Russia succeeded in building up within a comparatively short period of time an impressive naval presence in Eastern Asia, but at the cost of a total absence on other oceans. From 1900 on, Russia had at her disposal the strongest fleet of battleships of all the European powers in Eastern Asia, next in strength and size only to the Japanese.

If in the beginning it had looked as if the concentration of naval forces had been caused by the Boxer uprising, it soon became evident that Russia pursued more portentous goals. Hence, conclusion of an Anglo-Japanese alliance aiming at putting a stop to Russia's expansionism was a logical consequence. It soon became obvious that the Russian Government was unable to bring forth conditions favorable to the realization of Russian imperialism. All planning work suffered from overassessment of her own capabilities<sup>28</sup> and lacked a clear concept. In particular, there was little understanding of the requirements an expanding technology held in store for those striving to be a modern naval power.

Russia's efforts to boost her own sea trade<sup>29</sup> were made to the disadvantage of the naval forces in Eastern Asia, as was proved by the forced buildup of the commercial port of Dalniy and the neglect of Port Arthur. Port Arthur as a naval station remained rather insignificant as long as adequate maintenance and docking facilities were not available, and as long as the bar across the port entrance prevented large ships from putting to sea except at high water.

Another playground of Russian expansionism was Persia. The demands made by influential Russian circles to advance to the Indian Ocean in order to take possession of a warm-water port in the Persian Gulf were more than just an attempt at acquiring a coaling station on the way to Eastern Asia. Because it was to be expected that Britain would not remain inactive over such activities, Russian naval experts flatly denied the acquisition of a port like Bandar Abbas, which could not be defended anyway.<sup>30</sup> The necessity inherent in Russian politics of having to operate in three distant theaters, Eastern Asia, Persia and the Dardanelles, at the same time proved a serious disadvantage, especially to the Russian Navy, as Russia neither succeeded in solving the

problem of naval stations in the Mediterranean<sup>31</sup> nor in securing maritime communication to Eastern Asia by the acquisition of coaling stations. The Russian Black Sea Fleet remained locked up in the Black Sea and to a great extent dropped out as a political factor in overseas expansion.

**Russian Warship Construction.** Under the influence of Mahan's ideas the Russians also turned away from concepts of coastal defense and commerce raiding and went to work on the construction of an oceangoing fleet of battleships which to them seemed best suited to make their national interests triumph. The 1882 program, which had not yet been completed, was replaced by a new naval acquisition program in 1898. At a cost of 396 million marks and within a 5-year period, this program was intended to increase Russian naval forces by 8 battleships, 6 large and 10 small cruisers as well as 36 torpedo boats. As Russia had decided to build an instrument of power that would enable her to exert pressure everywhere and at any time, but above all in Eastern Asia, a recourse only to the Black Sea shipbuilding capacity was out of the question.<sup>32</sup> Therefore, every unit either had to be built in Baltic shipyards or had to be procured abroad.<sup>33</sup> While the battleship *Cesarevich*, built by Forges Chantiers at Toulon, became the prototype of Russian battleships of the *Borodino* class, the battleship *Retvizan*, ordered at Messrs. Cramp in Philadelphia, remained a solitary one. Whether this was caused by the trying experience undergone with the Niclaussee boilers or whether economic reasons played their part remains obscured.

As other navies did, the Russian Navy, too, turned away from the giant cruiser type and, instead, started to develop a protected cruiser of average displacement and high speed. Only the *Pallada* class, conceived by Russian designers before 1898, still made

allowance for the cruiser warfare concept, as was proved by the ammunition and coal capacities of these ships.

The change in concept that had set in in the meantime, however, became manifest in those ships ordered abroad. The cruisers *Bogatyr* built by the Vulkan Shipyards at Stettin, and *Novik*, built at Schichau's, served as samples for 4 and 3 further units, respectively. The destroyers *Sokol* and *Som* were built at Yarrow's and at Laird's, respectively, for Russia's account. Both ships were later copied by the *Ishora* and *Creyton* Shipyard. Another 5 and 4 destroyers, respectively, were ordered at Schichau and Normand's. In spite of great efforts, Russia did not succeed in finishing the ship acquisition program by 1903 as planned. Russian shipbuilding, however, even though still afflicted with serious shortcomings in certain areas, showed considerable ability. A survey of the battleships and large cruisers<sup>34</sup> under construction in June of 1900 demonstrates the effort made by Russia to maintain her position as a major power, even under changed conditions.

	Battleships	Cruisers above 5,000 Tons	Total Tonnage
Britain	15	21	431,319
France	5	15	213,392
Russia	11	8	196,592
United States	8	9	224,700
Germany	8	3	123,100

Russian shipbuilding, however, also suffered from the concentration of its entire capacity in the two major areas of St. Petersburg/Kronshtadt and Nikolayev/Sevastopol as well as from lack of private shipyards and armament industries.<sup>35</sup>

Climatic conditions such as the untimely ice cover of the Kronshtadt sea canal and the low-water level of the Bug River necessitated separating construction into a building site and an outfitting site. More and more, Kronshtadt turned out to be a maintenance and outfitting center while St.



Petersburg became the site of the government-operated weapons and engineering industry (Ishora, Obukov, Baltic Works) and ship construction yards. Conditions at Nikolayev were very much the same, as in addition to government-operated yards, a private firm, The Black Sea Company, specializing in boilers and engineering plants, had been established there. The installations at Libau and Vladivostok were exclusively used for repair operations; no new construction was possible there. Despite all difficulties, Russia finally succeeded in shaking off existing dependencies on foreign shipbuilders. The dominating position of British firms in the area of engineering was lost, and Russia eventually became independent even in the areas of armor plate production and boiler construction, making optimum use of German and French licenses (Krupp and Belleville).<sup>36</sup> A regulation, published in 1900, that construction orders would only be given to Russian shipyards and only domestic materials would be used, gives evidence of this development. The striving for autarky in shipbuilding not only was a matter of national prestige (or, perhaps, an indication of a lack of funds), it also underlined the desire to promote general industrialization. Disregarding a few exceptions,<sup>37</sup> it must be admitted that Russian shipbuilding in terms of production time and quality still lagged behind international standards, the reasons being not so much the unfavorable climatic conditions<sup>38</sup> or lack of technical equipment and skilled personnel but rather the cumbersome bureaucracy and red tape of upper navy command levels and naval administration.<sup>39</sup>

**Problems of Russian Interpretations of Seapower.** As the Russo-Japanese war soon proved, the Russian Government had not been able to meet the exigencies raised by the new era of navalism. There was still very little understanding of the significance of oceans in modern

major power politics and of the consequences of technological progress, a fact which accounts for the incredible attempt of Witte and Kuropatkin to talk the czar into curtailing funds for the navy and the Far East shortly before the outbreak of the war.<sup>40</sup>

The true value of a modern seapower was recognized by only a few, in spite of impressive naval acquisition programs. One of those few was Vice Adm. S.O. Makarov who urged the Russians to grow sea legs. One of his great objectives was the opening of the North East Passage in order to achieve, at least during the summer months, a rapid exchange of elements of the fleet between the Baltic Sea and Eastern Asian waters. But this plan, as well as the plans to turn the port of Aleksandrovsk, founded in the Catherine Bay in 1898, into a naval port failed, the reason being, once again, the narrowmindedness of the naval staff and government.

The basic weakness of the Russian Navy was in its organization and its personnel.<sup>41</sup> Even though some progress had been made in the training of personnel, naval thinking was still narrowed too much by the strict rule of coefficients of action and had severely neglected practical sea and squadron

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### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Commander Dieter Matthei entered the Navy of the Federal German Republic in 1962 and has served in engineering billets in FPB *Luchs*, the frigate *Emden*, and the destroyer *Schleswig-Holstein*,

and as a staff officer in a minelaying squadron. He is now head of a subsection in the *Materialamt der Bundeswehr*. He is educated in history, political science, and international law and is continuing his studies at the University of Bonn. He is the author of the prize essay "Der Begriff der deutschen Nation in der Verfassung und Publizistik der DDR."

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training. The concentration of enlisted personnel in equipages and their billeting ashore during the winter months (with the exception of the Pacific squadron) were bound to have a paralyzing effect with regard to combat readiness and mobilization of the fleet. It still had not penetrated the minds of the people at major command levels that modern technology would take an inexorable toll and would make much higher demands on the training of personnel and the maintenance of material

than was known before. However, as long as intellectual dullness and lack of initiative and responsibility prevailed on the supreme leadership levels, the handful of farsighted men was not capable of turning the tide.

In the end, Russia failed to attain her goal because she had failed to undo the intricate entanglement of technology and politics. Thus, the strength of the Russian Navy as depicted in the navy rosters was deceptive and did not stand up against the hard facts of reality.

## NOTES

1. Walther Hubatsch, "Navalismus und Technik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," *Marinerundschau*, January 1977, p. 52.

2. *Ibid.* Hubatsch regards navalism as "die Summe der politischen, technischen und zivilisatorischen Errungenschaften, die an der Wende zum 20. Jahrhundert . . . gezielt eingesetzt werden, um Herrschaftsausdehnung auf oder über See zu erreichen zwecks sicheren Warenverkehrs, Erschliessen von Rohstoffquellen, Verbreitung bestimmter Kulturauffassungen."

3. Otto Hauser, *Deutschland und der englisch-russische Gegensatz 1900-1914* (Göttingen, 1958), p. 11.

4. Philip H. Colomb (*Naval Warfare, Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated* (London: W.H. Allen, 1891)) came to conclusions similar to those of Alfred T. Mahan (*Influence of Sea Power upon History* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890)), whereas the champions of the "jeune école" in France (cf. the essays of Admiral Aube in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*) considered cruiser warfare capability the decisive element.

5. John A. Morrison ("Russia and Warm Water: A Fallacious Generalization and Its Consequences," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, November 1952, p. 1175) considers the bay as "one of the finest natural harbors in the Far East and open for nearly 11 months in the year." Frederick T. Jane, (*The Imperial Russian Navy: Its Past, Present and Future*, 2nd ed., (London: Thacker, 1904)) had earlier opposed the view that Vladivostok "is frozen up the greater part of the year . . . Small and by no means powerful ice-breakers (NADERNJA, 1,500 ts) keep a channel fully open all the year round."

6. "Prozentualer Anteil der einzelnen Flaggen am eingehenden Seehandelsverkehr verschiedener Staaten," *Jahrbuch für Deutschlands Seeinteressen* (Nauticus 14, 1912) p. 660, and "Die Russische Freiwillige Flotte 1878-1924," *Atlantische Welt*, 7, 1968, No. 2, p. 21.

7. Dietrich Geyer, *Der russische Imperialismus. Studien über den Zusammenhang von innerer und auswärtiger Politik 1860-1914* (Göttingen, 1977), p. 84.

8. Russia had only 3 ironclads and 30 cruisers in 1883. Cf. "Stärkevergleich der wichtigen Kriegsmarinen," *Jahrbuch für Deutschlands Seeinteressen*, 1, 1899, p. 355ff.

9. Cf. Jürgen Rohwer and Walther Hubatsch, "Die Entwicklung der Marinen im späten 19. Jahrhundert," *Seemacht. Eine Seekriegsgeschichte von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: Bernard & Graefe, 1974), pp. 244, 246. Rumors spread in the nineties concerning the construction of a fleet of 300 submarines were just a myth. Cf. David Woodward, *The Russians at Sea* (London: W. Kimber, 1965), p. 119.

10. Donald W. Mitchell reports these in his *A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power* (New York: Macmillan, 1974), p. 196.

11. Such ideas resulted in many publications, e.g., the chapter "Russia's Hope" in Woodward, p. 118 and Jane, p. 244.

12. While expenditures for the army fell, expenditures for the navy jumped from 30 million in 1881 to 51 million rubles in 1893. Geyer, p. 109.

13. The diverging statements of Woodward, p. 117 and Mitchell, p. 192, are owing to the fact that Mitchell included the ships (*Sinop* class) already under construction at that time. Cf. Jürgen Rohwer, "Kriegsschiffbau und Flottengesetze um die Jahrhundertwende," *Marine und* Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1979

*Marinepolitik im Kaiserlichen Deutschland* (Düsseldorf: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Herbert Schottelius and Wilhelm Deist, 1972), p. 222.

14. *The Standard*, 24 July 1893 (permanent presence of a Russian Squadron in the Mediterranean), *Populo Romano*, 13 September 1893 (Bastia) and *Daily News*, 4 November 1893 (Ajaccio Tripolitania).

15. According to a report by the Reichsmarineamt dated 5 January 1893, Britain had at her disposal 13 ironclads, 5 cruisers and 16 torpedo boats; for France, the corresponding figures were 22, 13 and 80 and for Italy 16, 8 and 140 (Political Archive of *Auswärtiges Amt*, File Russia 72 b, Vol. 7). It should be noted that the combat value of the Italian units was estimated as being relatively low.

16. A note of the *Auswärtiges Amt* dated 25 February 1900 on the "Berechtigung Russlands zur Kohlenniederlage a) in Villafranca bei Nizza, b) auf der Insel Poros" does not contain an indication of the veracity of the following quotation of the Russian Mediterranean Squadron "based on Villafrance-sur-Mer, near Nice, a port which France had permitted to use in the past," Mitchell, p. 191. Rights to use the port had been granted to Russia in 1859 by the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia to which this area belonged (Political Archive of *Auswärtiges Amt*, File Russia 72 c).

17. Walther Hubatsch, "Die russische Marine im deutschen Urteil 1890-1914," *Das Bild der russischen und sowjetischen Marine*, Supplement Nos. 7/8 of *Die Marinerundschau* (Berlin and Frankfurt; Main, 1962), p. 22.

18. The German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, von Tschirschky, reported to the *Auswärtiges Amt* on 23 April 1895 that "die Errichtung eines Kriegshafens . . . aber noch längere Zeit auf sich warten lassen (dürfte), besonders weil der Widerstand, dem dieser Plan in russischen Marinekreisen begegnet—die eine Stationierung in jenen entlegenen Gegenden fürchten erst zu überwinden sein wird," Political Archive of *Auswärtiges Amt*, File Russia No. 45, Vol. 2.

19. Doubts about the value of these ships are most clearly expressed by remarks made by Russian naval officers on the *Rossija*: "She can fight for five minutes, at the end of that time she will have won or . . ."; Jane, p. 264.

20. The German Ambassador in Turkey, Radolin, on 23 November 1892 reported that by the end of January or beginning of February two ships, each capable of carrying 400 mines, had arrived at Sevastopol and were incorporated into the Black Sea Fleet as transport vessels under the names of *Bug* and *Donau*, Political Archive of *Auswärtiges Amt*, File Russia 72 b, Vol. 7.

21. "In terms of first class battleships, England then held a comfortable lead with 35 ships while France was in second place with 16 and Russia third with 11. The numbers of armored cruisers were 18, 13 and 10, respectively, protected cruisers of the first and second class numbered 67, 27 and 3," Mitchell, p. 197.

22. In spite of long construction times for ironclads (ranging from 6 to 7 years) 14 ironclads and cruisers each had been finished or were laid down by 1898.

23. Even the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance only resulted in the contracting of the small cruiser *Svetlana*.

24. Czar Nicolai II, known as a "naval enthusiast" (Mitchell, p. 198), lent a particularly willing ear to Klado and so did the Grand Dukes Alexander Michailovitch and Alexei Alexandrovitch who had close ties with the czar and held important positions in the navy. They also engaged in writing on naval topics, following the line of Klado, Jane, p. 704.

25. Morrison rightly writes: "To say that Russia needed Dairen as an "outlet to the sea" is a complete misreading of geography as well as history . . . Dairen is not the natural port for the Russian Far East, (it is) the natural port for Southern Manchuria," p. 1175.

26. Donald Macintyre, *Sea Power in the Pacific; A History from the Sixteenth Century to the Present Day* (Trowbridge, 1972), p. 126f.

27. In a letter to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Muraviev, the acting Navy Minister, Admiral Tyrtov, on 26 February 1900 (*Krasnyj Archive*, 1926, Vol. XVIII, p. 20ff) not only demanded the acquisition of Masampo with the Kargoto Island, but also requested the appropriation of special credits, in order to bring up the strength of the Russian Fleet in the Far East to a standard of 30 percent above that of the Japanese Fleet. Cf. B.H. Summer, "Der russische Imperialismus in Ostasien und im Mittleren Osten 1880-1894," in Hans Ulrich Wehler, ed., *Zur Geschichte des modernen Imperialismus* (Berlin, 1970), p. 326.

28. By the end of 1903 the Pacific Squadron was scheduled to have 9 battleships and 21 cruisers at its disposal, but when war started in 1904, only 7 and 11, respectively, of the scheduled number of units had arrived in Eastern Asia. "Die Fortschritte fremder Kriegsmarinen," *Jahrbuch für Deutschlands Seeinteressen*, 6, 1903, p. 46.

29. Between the years 1890 and 1900 the Russian merchant fleet grew by 70 percent. *Taschenbuch der Kriegsflotten* (Bruno Weyer, 1905), p. 538.

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31. During the Cretan disorder, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Muraviev, in 1897, tried to acquire Souda Bay as a naval station. He failed because of the resistance of the Minister of Finance, Witte, who gave preference to Russian expansion in Eastern Asia. (William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1929), p. 362) whereas the Minister of War, Kuropatkin, had an eye on the Dardanelles.

32. "Die Fortschritte fremder Kriegsmarinen," *Jahrbuch für Deutschlands Seeinteressen*, 3, 1901, p. 62. Only 2 cruisers and 9 torpedo boats were designated for the Black Sea.

33. Orders for the construction of the following large protected cruisers were placed abroad: *Bajan* at La Seyne's, *Varjag* at Cramp's, *Askold* at the Germania Shipyards and a small type cruiser (*Bojarin*) in Denmark.

34. "Die Fortschritte fremder Kriegsmarinen," *Jahrbuch für Deutschlands Seeinteressen*, 3, 1901, p. 41.

35. The negative consequences resulting thereof ("the absence of competition" which leads "to comparatively high prices that the Admiralty has to pay for the construction of ships and engines") were recognized even at that time by sensible Russian naval officers. Cf. A. Stroumillo, "The Russian Navy from T.A. Brassey, *The Naval Annual 1898* (Portsmouth: Griffin, 1898), p. 100.

36. In Russia, four firms operating with foreign capital (i.e., Chantiers de la Baltie, S.A. Franco-Russo-Kronshtadt, Chantiers Navale Nikolayev) were engaged in the construction of Belleville boilers. These boilers had become the standard boiler type. Jane, p. 410.

37. The designs of the ice-breaker *Yermak* (built by Armstrong/Elswick) and of a minelayer type drafted by the Russian Vice Adm. S.O. Makarov were far ahead of their time, Mitchell, p. 202. The same applied to the 12" gun of the *Borodino* class, developed by the Obukov Works, which in 1917 proved superior in range to the guns of modern German battleships having the same caliber. Hans J. Brennecke and Herbert Hader, *Panzerschiffe und Linienschiffe 1860-1910* (Herford: Koehler, 1977), p. 128.

38. Even the hulls of the big battleships were constructed in large roofed-in sheds. Jane, pp. 342, 352.

39. In his diary, the Russian naval officer, Wladimir Ssemenov (Berlin: Rassplata, 1908), points out the desolate state of affairs in the Technical Committee and in the Board of Construction and Supply. In Sevastopol in one year alone, 40 officers were found guilty of bribery. Mitchell, p. 199.

40. Cf. Kuropatkin's entry in his diary quoted by Sergej Gorshkov, *Morskaja moschtsch gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1976), p. 149 of the German translation.

41. The German naval attache in a report to the Reichsmarineamt (Political Archive *Auswärtiges Amt*, File Russia 72 b, Vol. 8) dated 1 April 1893, not only criticized the lack of a "seaminded population" and the "low state of public education," but also relentlessly uncovered the deeply rooted weakness in the body of officers. The "beginnings of a promising development" which he noted did not, however, culminate in the (expected) success as the ensuing events clearly demonstrated. (*Der Krieg zwischen Russland und Japan 1904-1905*. Prepared by the Admiral Staff of the Navy, Restricted, Vol. 3, Berlin, 1909, p. 161.

