

## Naval War College Review

---

Volume 32  
Number 3 *March-April*

Article 17

---

1979

### Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-1940

Lawrence C. Allin

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

---

#### Recommended Citation

Allin, Lawrence C. (1979) "Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-1940," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 32 : No. 3 , Article 17.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol32/iss3/17>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu](mailto:repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu).

uncommon in the United States (scurvy, pellagra, beriberi, gynecomastia, avitaminosis, and others). Nevertheless, they were quickly forced to work like animals in unsafe mines, on docks, in railroad yards, factories, and shipyards. Harassed and degraded at every turn by brutal guards, they were always undernourished and inadequately clothed to stave off the cold of winter. They rested their emaciated bodies not on beds, but on rough boards—usually covered by a thin straw mat.

The grievously ill received little or no medical attention, and some were subjected to crude, often gruesome experimentation by Japanese doctors and medics. Brutal beatings for infractions of outrageous rules or trumped-up charges were the order-of-the-day. Men too sick to work were often beaten because they couldn't work. Sick men who tried to work rather than face ruthless guards in camp were beaten because they couldn't keep the pace.

It is little wonder then that of about 24,000 Americans of all services (mostly in their late teens or early twenties) captured in the Philippines, more than 13,000 died as Japanese prisoners. Of the roughly 11,000 Americans who survived to be repatriated, more than 5,000 have since died, most from the residual effects of prisoner of war experience.

There have been very few published accounts of Japanese work camps because those who survived them are, for one reason or another, incapable of writing about them or find such effort too depressing to recall. Coleman, however, paints a shocking picture of Yodogawa Bunshaw, one of many such work camps, where he was confined for 8 months. There is no exaggeration here and, difficult as it may be to believe, there were other work camps that were worse; few, if any were better.

Because Coleman is not a professional writer, it is unfortunate that the publisher did not see fit to edit his work. As a result, *Bataan and Beyond*,

lacking literary polish and style, often becomes tedious. Its main fault lies in the overabundance of Coleman's personal exploits that, at times, seem a little "tall" as stories go. Nevertheless, his account of conditions existing in Japanese POW camps is consistent with the facts, and should be of historic interest.

WALTER G. WINSLOW  
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Harrod, Frederick S. *Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-1940*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978. 276pp.

To a Navy that alternately rejects and embraces a systems analyst's dehumanized methods, Harrod's work comes as an important example of how balanced, objective historical study can illuminate present naval problems by examining their past roots.

In his work, Harrod deals with a longstanding and complex problem of the Navy: the nature and maintenance of the enlisted force. He relies on an impressive range of sources to document his work, one of which is U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*. A perusal of its contents since its first publication in 1874 demonstrates that recruiting, training, preventing the desertion of and retaining high-quality enlisted men has long been a problem of the U.S. Navy. Harrod examines this dilemma in a crucial era—1899-1940. It was a period in which traditional seaboard sources no longer supplied the fleet with men who were familiar with the sea and when the Navy was embarking on both quantitative and qualitative material expansions.

In 171 pages of text, Harrod deals with "The Old Navy," the character and life of the men of the "New Navy," their recruitment, training, changing rate structure, recreation and welfare, naval justice and the officer-enlisted relationship. With a terse, almost anti-septic prose, he marshalls extensive and

## 120 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

exhaustive research in a truly scholarly effort.

The problems of recruiting, promises of attractive duty and prospects for retention that plague today's Navy have their analogies in the period Harrod discusses. He analyzes these processes and offers insights into their importance. In an appendix of 13 tables, he delineates an interesting demographic picture of the enlisted force of the period. He also touches on the Navy's assessment of race relations and how racial policies were perceived and implemented in the fleet.

In its broadest sweep, Harrod's work has implications for naval leadership. Any man, officer or enlisted, who has served in the fleet can recall "white-hats" whom he admired, trusted and respected. He can also recall others who were less inspiring. Harrod speaks of both sorts.

A reading of *Manning the New Navy* will supply the officer and senior petty officer with a vantage point from which to view past personnel problems and from which to draw current inspiration for practical leadership.

LAWRENCE C. ALLIN  
The University of Maine

Hutchinson, Martha C. *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. 178pp.

Among the more mundane results of the political terrorism problem has been the large number of popular and scholarly books published to meet the public's interest, as well as to fulfill certain imperatives of a free economic system. Anyone familiar with the literature dealing with terrorism could successfully predict the contents of a stereotypical book-length treatment of the problem. Included would be obligatory chapters treating the IRA, the

PLO, the Cypriot EOKA, the Tupamaros, and the concluding chapter would cite evidence indicating terrorist cooperation across national boundaries and across organizational lines. Naturally, the closing page or so would consist of a bit of prognostication on the prospect of nuclear terror. Several of the general works are quite competent, refreshingly provocative and informative—perhaps to the extent that they deviate from the stereotype—sadly many are not. Among the best might be cited J. Bowyer Bell's *A Time of Terror*, Anthony Burton's *Urban Terrorism*, Edward Hyams' *Terrorists and Terrorism*, and Paul Wilkinson's uniquely analytic *Political Terrorism*.

What is lacking at this point are systematic, in-depth treatments of specific terrorist campaigns. For it is only through the exhaustive (and unfortunately, exhausting) study of the many ways in which terrorism has manifested itself that the (dis)utilities and (dis)incentives for political terrorism can be comprehended. The surfeit of terrorism books does not include a great number of such extensive treatments. Not that it is hard to understand why, given the paucity of evidence, the clandestine nature of the terrorism enterprise, and the shortcomings of the researchers (e.g., linguistic). There are however a few notable works in the vanguard of this approach. Noteworthy works include Jillian Becker's study of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, *Hitler's Children*; Bell's study of Jewish terrorism in mandatory Palestine, *Terror Out of Zion*; and finally John Cooley's impressive and valuable study of the fedayeen (Palestinian terrorists), *Green March, Black September*.

Thus, it is with great anticipation that Martha C. Hutchinson's new book, *Revolutionary Terrorism* is received—a study of the use of terrorism by the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) during the Algerian war. It is odd that the FLN terror campaign, matched in its