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U-Boat Killer

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106 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

advanced society," or by our "disordered times?"—they are not obtrusive. He makes his "study of Roman history . . . its own reward." So much so that one wants to know more about what the author of *The Political Uses of Sea Power* thinks about Roman seapower in earlier and later eras. Augustus' fleet, in Chester G. Starr's words, "was not to fight battles but to render them impossible." From Actium until Constantine defeated Licinius in the Hellespont in A.D. 324, naval forces—and Dr. Luttwak's comments on them—were confined to "waterborne support of the land forces." But it would be good to hear him in the long debate—in which Clark Reynolds has recently participated—over the primary characteristics of ancient land powers and thalassocracies. From Polybius to Procopius (the historian of Justinian's (518-565) wars), when they had to, the Romans also mastered the art of war at sea. It would have been news to Justinian or to his great captain Belisarius, both of Slavonic extraction, that they were not as Roman as the African Septimius Severus, because the strategic center of Polybius' world, which Rome again controlled, had shifted to Byzantium. Belisarius' secretary Procopius, born in Palestine, may have bit a bit more "Byzantine" and Greek, but nobody can be sure of it.

To paraphrase Polybius, only people so stupid as not to want to know how Rome controlled "practically the whole inhabited world" for more than 7 centuries, will not enjoy this book. After the moral decay, miscegenation, slavery, lead dishes, long hair, and lack of industrial investment explanations, the rise and decline of Roman industry needed a three-star military study. This one is well worth a special trip to the bookstore or library.

MacIntyre, Donald. *U-Boat Killer*. Foreword by Adm. Robert B. Carney, U.S. Navy. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977. 175pp.

Captain Donald MacIntyre, DSO, DSC, RN gives his diary account of convoy operations during the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II in this poorly titled, gripping and fast-moving narrative which rivals Alistair McLean's fictional account of the same action in *HMS Ulysses*. First published in 1956, the book is the first in a series of poignant, factual accounts of World War II from the participant's perspective. MacIntyre sets the reader on the pitching deck of a convoy escort in the cold, stormy seas of the Atlantic, shepherding materiel-laden vessels whose numbers were being diminished at rates as high as 500,000 tons monthly by the unrelenting U-boat offensive: the setting is bleak as darkened ships proceed without benefit of radio or radar. A crude sonar searches for the U-boats. Once found, the battle might rage for hours and include such primitive forms of warfare as ramming, pistols, or, occasionally, aircraft-dropped dive bombs.

U-Boat Killer opens with MacIntyre as a young sublieutenant and we steam with him until his retirement from the Royal Navy in 1954 through thousands of miles and seven confirmed kills as an escort commander. Tracing the evolution of convoy operations and the ships and men who manned them, MacIntyre sketches fascinating first-hand vignettes through the book in a casual, classically understated way:

- As leading "ace" of the U-boat force, Otto Kretschmer had sunk 245,000 tons of allied shipping by March 1941. After an almost medieval duel with a destroyer, *U-99* surrenders and Kretschmer turns to a more civilized battle at the bridge table as a prisoner of war.

- Royal Navy escort commanders wargaming against a notional wolfpack maneuvered by a group of tactically experienced WRENS.

PROFESSIONAL READING 107

- Ripping a full one-fourth of *Hesperus'* hull after ramming, and sinking U-357.

- Trying to sink submarines capable of 600-foot depths with depth charges bureaucratically set to explode at 350 feet.

- Development of the wolfpack tactics and the successes and failures of the Coastal Command's ASW aircraft.

The painstakingly slow evolution of tactics and equipment paralleled by the startling numbers of ships being sunk continues despite a production geared for war on both sides. For the Germans, the Lone Hunter became the centrally controlled wolfpack, the snorkel arrived, and depth capabilities increased. For the Allies, radar, H/F D/F equipment, use of aircraft, radio, hedgehogs and acoustic noisemakers finally helped to turn the tide of the war in 1943.

Students of World War II are undoubtedly already familiar with MacIntyre's series. However, for those who are not *U-Boat Killer* provides incisive analysis interestingly described and wholly enjoyable. For everyone, Chapter 15, "The Future," is the author's projection of tomorrow's naval dilemma. It is disarming to realize that these insights were conceived over 20 years ago, and for the most part, accurately describe the situation today. MacIntyre's story does not bore the reader with lengthy descriptions of the slate-blue sea, the young ASW officer's girlfriend, or the pedestrian life aboard a ship; MacIntyre has viciously cut his own repertoire of sea stories to a concise, interesting account which leaves one asking "is this fact or fiction?"

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Pechman, Joseph. *Setting National Priorities—The 1978 Budget*. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1977. 435pp.

This year's edition of *The Brookings Institution's Setting National Priorities*

differs from its six predecessors in three respects. First, this is the first of the volumes which deals with a budget prepared by one Administration and revised by another. Second, this is the first volume which analyzes and criticizes the programs and policies of a Democratic administration. The previous reports, prepared during the Nixon-Ford years, earned the Institution the reputation of a Democratic government-in-exile. Indeed Charles Schultze, who directed the initial budgetary analyses, served as Director of the Bureau of the Budget under Lyndon Johnson and is now the Chairman of President Carter's Council of Economic Advisors. Third, this is the first volume in which substantial portions of the report were written by people not associated with Brookings. The chapter on Social Security was written by Alicia Munnell from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Welfare Reform by George Carcagno and Walter Carson from Mathematica, and Energy by Milton Russell from Resources for the Future.

The most interesting portions of the study deal with the authors' criticisms of the Carter economic and administrative initiatives. They find fault with the new Administration in five areas.

First, the study points out that it is extremely unlikely that President Carter can fulfill his campaign pledges to aid the cities, reform the welfare system, and achieve other social goals if he insists on balancing the budget in Fiscal Year (FY) 1981. According to the report, the budget margin available in FY 1981 will be no more than \$50 billion. This means that growth in the defense budget, real increases in existing domestic programs, and any new programs will have to be accommodated within that figure if the budget is to be balanced.

Second, the authors feel that President Carter's anti-inflation proposals really contain nothing new and are unlikely to be any more successful than