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Population Growth Control: The Next Move is America's

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the rather extensive Pearl Harbor literature. It clearly shows how and why the controversy became polarized between those who blamed officials in Washington and those who blamed the officers in the field.

In describing the controversy, Melosi raises several issues by implication. It would be unfair to criticize him for not having written another kind of book; but it would also be unfair to prospective readers to fail to point out that Melosi by describing the polarization of views in the political controversy has only scratched the surface of the issues he has raised. He properly describes the shock resulting from the attack and the public indignation that the United States could be surprised. Something must have gone wrong, many people said. Was it incompetence on the part of the field commanders and in Washington? Or, did Roosevelt seek to maneuver the Japanese into attacking first? The question remains, the controversy continues, and probably will forever.

Another aspect has been inadequately examined in the literature to date. Whatever the faults and discrepancies of the command structure in Hawaii and the means and methods of communication between Washington and the field, they were essentially those of a peacetime military establishment. True, the Atlantic Fleet had been at war for all practical purposes for several months; true, both Adm. Harold R. Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, and Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, had bent every effort towards preparing the Navy and the Army for war; true, in late 1941 war with Japan was seen as inevitable—but the fact remained that a peacetime mind-set prevailed in Hawaii and in the Philippines. (General MacArthur had several hours warning but his B-17s were still on the ground, wingtip to wingtip, when the Japanese attacked his forces.) Even though Stark had sent a war-warning message, the Pacific Fleet still

saw war as only hypothetical, regardless of its likelihood. This may partly explain the complacency in the field and the failure to implement the sound and workable defense plans for Hawaii that had been prepared several months earlier, both of which were unknown in Washington. Incidentally, the Hawaiian defense plans were so good on paper that CNO used them as examples to be followed by other commands.

Pearl Harbor remains a matter of controversy but not so much because of doubt about the facts. Probably all the important evidence is in. It is controversial because more work remains to be done in analyzing and interpreting the data. The polarization resulting from the political controversy, which Melosi describes so well in its partisan context, is an insufficient explanation of why America was surprised. More complete and satisfactory analyses await the pens of other scholars.

B.M. SIMPSON III

Mumford, Stephen D. *Population Growth Control: The Next Move is America's*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1977. 167pp.

As illegal Mexican immigrants, feeling the consequences of Mexico's high birth and unemployment rates, continue to pour into the United States, most Americans are becoming aware of the population explosion in developing nations. Naval officers and others may likely find themselves on duty in any number of nations where the birth rate is soaring as the death rate is plunging, thanks to control of yesteryear's worst communicable diseases but without parallel birth control.

Since the 1960s social scientists have been reporting on the problems resulting from population pressures in most nations of the world and on occasion, physical scientists also write about the problem.

Now Stephen D. Mumford, with a doctorate in public health, offers a slim,

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volume with considerable specific information and some clear conclusions. With a refreshing lack of stilted social science jargon, he presents in readable, concise prose a lot of material in a relatively few pages. That feat alone contrasts with many other books and articles in which scholars use so much behavioral terminology that they befog the points they are trying to make.

Mumford's own field work centered in Korea, and to a lesser extent Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand. His observations match those that some of us have experienced for years in Latin America or African nations. Recent desperate action by India and Pakistan in unsuccessfully making sterilization compulsory underscored the fact that nations suffering the worst from the baby boom do not have the technological tools to implement a population policy which can significantly reduce birth rates. Mumford believes that the security of the United States itself will be threatened by the alarming world population growth. That point alone justifies a reading of this study by any career officer determined to defend the survival of our country.

At the beginning of the Christian era world population totaled 250 million, approximately the same as that of the Soviet Union in 1974. From the time of the Roman Empire to the beginning of the industrial revolution, world population increased from one-quarter of a billion to 1 billion. By 1950, it had climbed to 2.5 billion. It took more than 100 years to add that second billion to the total. But in a mere 15 years, between 1960 and 1975, humankind added our fourth billion and a fifth billion people will be added to this overcrowded planet in only 10 years.

Americans, smug because our own family pattern now consists of two or fewer children for young couples, should reconsider. The industrial nations of Europe and Japan depend on food imports already. U.S. wheat must

help feed the Soviet Union and India. The poorer nations produce additional citizens faster than they produce food or additional jobs. Given the soaring birth rates in most nations, the majority of the world's countries, which are poor, will get poorer.

The industrial system which supports the economy of the United States depends on raw materials from the poorer, developing nations. The rising price of our imported oil in recent years should remind us of our vulnerability. Mumford stresses that when the overcrowded poor nations begin strangling on their own excessive populations, America's supply lines of vital raw materials will become endangered just as much as if hostile foreign missiles or ships were pointed at our merchant fleets. He fits together in logical sequence trends on food production, the needs of nations, and the sheer numbers which beset us already.

Mumford insists that our national security *requires* that the United States solve the world's population problem. He then looks at our State Department and all other entities of U.S. Government and concludes that only the Department of Defense has the capability to develop the paraphernalia and to help less-developed nations implement effective birth control programs.

His requirements are very specific and he believes the task should have first claim on all DOD resources. Physical and human research problems could be formidable. In most peasant societies, the social psychology of villagers holds fast to bringing as many children into the world as possible. In the days before longevity zoomed upward and infant mortality downward, such an attitude fit a majority of the inhabitants of this perplexed planet. All the basic physical conditions have changed but not the inbred attitudes of most people. Mumford has no suggested solution to this human engineering problem nor does he tell us how the United States

can escape the Communist-inspired charges that any U.S. help in family planning is really an "imperialist plot" to keep nonwhites from outnumbering us. A foolish charge, but didn't Hitler get away with some of the stupidest bigotry of all time in the guise of a New Order among an uncomfortable number of people in the 1930s, and have not the rulers in the Kremlin sold anti-Yankee slogans over and over?

The book has minor flaws. It contains no index, which forces the reader to thumb through subheadings and the table of contents, guessing if a specific topic has been covered.

And the study does not take into account the powerful forces of political propaganda which America's adversaries and Americans who disagree with this "mission" will exploit should we try to carry out the Mumford plan of using the Department of Defense to develop and help implement true birth control among the nations of the world.

But Mumford analyzes the basic problems of global overpopulation clearly and succinctly, and he does so from the admirable perspective of an American who cares deeply for the welfare of his own country.

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Mure, David. *Practise to Deceive*. London: William Kimber, 1977. 264pp.

In 1963 a retired American Intelligence official calling himself "Christopher Felix" produced a stimulating survey of international espionage entitled *A Short Course in the Secret War*. Therein he asserted that "one of secret operations' most vital and complex activities" is deception. That is the subject of this book: Mure's memoir of his share in British intelligence's effort in the Middle East during World War Two to hoodwink the German High Command into believing that the Allied invasion of Europe, when it came, would

come through the Balkans and not through the Channel coast of France. As chairman of the deception team—dubbed the "31 Committee" (its fellow command, "Twenty Committee" or Double-Cross, operated out of London)—Major Mure figured in the scheme from its inception and was active in the supervision of turned agents in Egypt, Iraq, Persia, and especially the Lebanon.

The book is dedicated to the presiding genius of the idea overall, the late Brigadier Dudley Clarke ("Galveston"), a South African whom Mure calls "certainly the most unusual Intelligence officer of his time," "in essence, the supreme artist, absorbed in his own virtuosity." Starting from the sands of defeat in the Western Desert under General Wavell, Clarke stitched together "the first directorate of its kind in history which had no existence other than in the imagination of himself and his Commander-in-Chief." Clarke's deputy, Col. Noel Wyld, directed the deception aspects of "Plan Jael," one arm of the larger "Neptune" scheme on the Western Front.

If Mure's praise of his chief may seem extreme, he freely admits that Clarke's success would have been impossible without use of "Ultra," the intercepts into the German communication system that were perhaps the single most closely guarded secret of the war. For the Middle East theater Mure also concedes that Clarke's triumph would have been severely hampered had he not had control—and the author feels this controversial situation must be taken for granted—of "Cicero," the German double agent serving as valet to the British Ambassador in Ankara. Together "these tremendous duetists" achieved the nearly total deception of Abwehr agent controllers based in Athens, Sofia, and Istanbul.

It is the day-to-day story of how this was done with which Major Mure's book is concerned. He quotes verbatim from message after message from those days