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## "The FY 1979-1983 Defense Program: Issues and Trends," and "Setting National Priorities: the 1979 Budget"

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considerations of substance and result? Although the author has deliberately confined his study to the area of bureaucratic policy, it is difficult to share his enthusiasm for Eisenhower's program without further discussion of its security implications. Was the New Look the optimum strategy for America in the 1950s? Did reliance on massive retaliation, subordination of limited war capabilities, modification of force structures and roles serve the interests of the nation? Did determination of strategy by budget rather than by threat, concentration on balanced budgets, establishment of fiscal ceilings as the initial step in defense calculations enhance the nation's security? Did politicizing the Joint Chiefs and formalizing the NSC staff system to suppress dissent contribute to a sounder estimate of defense policy? These are questions which bear on the "success" of President Eisenhower's management of strategy. For no matter how effective the President was in formulating and implementing a strategic program, his reputation in defense management must ultimately rest on the success of that program in protecting national interests. It is hoped that Professor Kinnard, having so ably described the mechanics of Eisenhower's defense policy management, will in the future address his talents to evaluating the worth of that effort.

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Korb, Lawrence J. *The FY 1979-1983 Defense Program: Issues and Trends*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978. 45pp., and Joseph A. Pechman, ed. *Setting National Priorities: the 1979 Budget*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978. 318pp.

"How much is enough?" is the question that Robert S. McNamara asked when he was making decisions on defense spending. The two studies

reviewed here examine the answer that the Carter Administration has given to this vital question as shown in the size and composition of the FY 1979 defense budget. Lawrence J. Korb is Professor of Management at the Naval War College and the author of several studies of the defense budget and Pentagon decisionmaking. The Brookings Institution volume contains two chapters (61 pages) on the defense budget, authored principally by Herschel Kanter and Charles A. Sorrels, members of the Brookings defense analysis staff that has produced much-discussed studies of U.S. defense policy. These two analyses would be excellent companions to the FY 1979 posture statement of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. The Brookings volume comes from a noted liberal research institute, while Korb's monograph is published by a prominent center for conservative thought.

This review will contrast the major arguments in the Korb and Brookings analyses of the defense budget and then, more briefly, mention other parts of the FY 1979 federal budget that are treated by Brookings. Both Korb and Brookings provide fine overviews of defense spending, examining it in several dimensions. Although President Carter continues the trend that started in 1975 of increasing defense spending in dollars of constant purchasing power, in FY 1979 outlays for national defense will represent only 5.1 percent of gross national product (GNP), the lowest share of GNP going to defense since before the Korean war.

Korb provides more detail and explanation of the different ways of measuring defense spending and the various categories into which overall defense spending can be divided than is available in the Brookings study, although both works make extensive use of statistical tables. Korb's comparison of the Carter defense program for FY 1979 and projected out into the 1980s shows lower levels of defense spending

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and a slower growth rate in overall defense spending than projected by the last budget of President Ford. Carter is doing what he promised during his Presidential election campaign. Korb notes, however, that the \$5 to \$7 billion of defense spending that candidate Carter argued could be cut without impairing national security may already have been eliminated by the Ford administration and Congress in the FY 1977 budget. Korb generally sees the spending reductions made by Carter relative to the FY 1979-1983 figures projected in the Ford budgets as creating problems for the U.S. defense program in its efforts to compensate for the vast increase in Soviet defense spending since the 1960s.

The Brookings study does not compare the Carter and Ford defense programs in detail, but does show that the Carter budget projections through FY 1983 will fall \$24 billion short of what it estimates will be necessary to fund all of the programs currently in the "Five Year Defense Program" (FYDP). This inconsistency illustrates one of the problems with the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) used by the Department of Defense. While decisions are ideally made on a long-term programming basis, they must be squeezed into annual budget ceilings. However, the Congress may reverse its usual behavior and add funds to the Carter defense budget instead of cutting that budget. Signs of Congressional concern for the adequacy of the defense budget are the additions of \$3 billion to the Administration budget by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. On the other hand, in May 1978, both the House and Senate rejected amendments to increase their respective Budget Committee's recommended defense spending ceiling because of concerns about the size of the federal budget deficit.

Defense policy issues that are addressed by both Korb and Brookings are

(1) the Carter Administration's emphasis on the NATO central front, (2) the Navy shipbuilding program, and (3) the strategic nuclear forces. Korb's monograph provides a very useful placement of defense policy in the context of the National Security Council (NSC) guidance. He does an excellent job in a few pages of showing how an administration's first defense budget usually establishes the national defense priorities for that administration. (Although Carter presented the FY 1978 budget to Congress, the FY 1979 budget is really the first one produced entirely by the Carter Administration.)

The major concern of the Carter Administration is the ability of U.S. general purpose forces to fight a short, intense war on the NATO central front. Real spending is to increase for such forces by at least 3 percent per annum even if other parts of the U.S. defense program must have a slower rate of real growth or even cuts. The United States has also obtained a commitment from other NATO nations to try to increase their defense spending in real terms. Brookings supports this NATO emphasis and even suggests that U.S. antitank weapons in this area could be increased further by cutting funds from reserve component forces that they see having little utility in this NATO scenario. Korb is more cautious; he argues that although it is necessary to improve NATO central front capability this effort should be part of a balanced strengthening of the U.S. defense posture. Korb warns, "Since history teaches us that we rarely fight the wars for which we plan, this lack of flexibility could be serious."

One of the areas that the Carter Administration has cut sharply in order to hold down overall defense spending while giving extra support to the NATO central front has been the Navy shipbuilding program. On this issue the views of Korb and Brookings are very different. Korb sees the Carter cuts of

\$18 billion and 83 ships by 1982 as compared to the Ford shipbuilding program as moving the Navy's primary mission to sea control at the expense of power projection though nothing is said of such a change in mission in Secretary Brown's FY 1979 posture statement. Korb believes that the loss of projection power will require the United States to abandon defense of NATO's northern and southern flanks and cause a loss of defense capability in the Pacific and other parts of the world.

The Brookings analysis, however, questions whether the United States should continue the orientation toward a carrier task force-dominated Navy. Brookings views the carrier and its escorts as being very expensive and not contributing much to the ability to fight the NATO war. Land-based tactical air forces are proposed as a less vulnerable substitute for sea-based tactical airpower to defend NATO's flanks. Although Brookings argues for shifting naval resources from carriers to attack submarines, it does not believe that the United States is likely to move in this direction. Consequently, Brookings anticipates Congressional action to increase the Carter shipbuilding budget, and the Armed Services Committees have done just as Brookings predicted.

A third major difference between the Ford and Carter defense programs is in strategic nuclear forces. The Carter budget projections amount to about 20 percent less than those of Ford over FY 1978-1983. In FY 1978 Carter decided to halt production of the B-1 strategic bomber and to slow down the M-X ICBM. To Korb these decisions mean that the U.S. strategic triad of bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs will be in trouble by the mid-1980s, given the growth of Soviet strategic systems. The United States needs new strategic systems if it is to maintain the "essential equivalence" with the Soviet Union that has been part of U.S. defense goals. Although the Carter Administration has

avored the cruise missile over the B-1 penetrating bomber, Korb makes a forceful argument for reversing the B-1 production decision.

In its extensive discussion of the strategic balance, Brookings seems to be more optimistic than Korb. It sees the Minuteman ICBMs as less vulnerable to a successful Soviet attack than the numbers and characteristics of the Soviet ICBM force might suggest, possibilities for extending the operational life of Poseidon fleet ballistic missile submarines, and the U.S. force of penetrating bombers and cruise missiles being effective into the mid-1980s even without the B-1. However, Brookings observes that it will be necessary to make a decision relatively soon on the M-X and Trident II SLBM if one or both are to be available by the end of the 1980s. High cost will probably preclude going with both systems. The United States may be forced to choose between the relative invulnerability of nuclear deterrent in the SLBM and the advantage of protective redundancy by maintaining a triad of strategic nuclear systems. Unfortunately, Brookings does not see a SALT-II treaty as solving the triad problem or giving much relief in the defense budget, even if such a treaty can be concluded and ratified by the Senate, as now seems doubtful.

The Brookings volume also looks at the butter as well as the guns in the FY 1979 budget. Chapter-long treatments are given to domestic expenditure programs in agriculture, education, urban policy, employment and income security as well as to tax policy. It will be difficult for Carter to attain his goals of reducing federal spending to 21 percent of GNP, eliminating the budget deficit, and cutting unemployment to less than 5 percent. The economic and social environment will put the federal budget under strong pressures, not a good climate for higher defense spending.

The Brookings book and the Korb monograph provide a high level of

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information and analysis presented in readable prose. This reviewer hopes that military professionals will read both works to see the arguments that can be made for different defense budgets and why it is so hard to answer that simple question, "How much is enough?"

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Lefever, Ernest W. ed. *Morality and Foreign Policy*. Washington: Georgetown University Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1977. 76pp.

Few speeches made today could bear the detailed scrutiny that President Carter's Notre Dame commencement speech is subjected to in this first edition of a monograph series of Georgetown University's Ethics and Public Policy Center. The editor, Ernest Lefever, offered Carter's first comprehensive expression of the future course of U.S. foreign policy to 15 "observers" of American politics for their comment, and 9 of the responses are included in this small reader. Three other pieces on the broad subject of ethics and foreign policy add to the concise commentary of the body in a somewhat tangential sense. Although among the essayists one finds such respected and familiar names as Robert L. Bartley, C.B. Marshall, Daniel P. Moynihan, and Eugene Rostow, I found none of the essays particularly remarkable in either analytical value or perspective.

Some took Carter to task for the time and place of his sententious pronouncements; others argue that his prescription for a "foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power and influence which we have for humane purposes" is nothing new in American politics; some question his assessment of a unifying threat of conflict with the Soviet Union which "has become less intensive even though the competition has become more extensive"; some do

not agree that "we can no longer separate the traditional issues of war and peace from the new global questions of justice, equity, and human rights"; others feel that his "five cardinal premises" are limited and narrow in their scope and that they promote a selective morality, a double standard; finally, some conclude that our national ethnocentrism questions the universal application of human rights abroad.

Yet the strength of this symposium lies not in the breadth of criticism or support. Beneath the semantics, the nitpicks of historical analysis, and the dilemma between human rights and *realpolitik*, most of these commentators share some common concerns: that morality or ethics should be an important consideration in the formulation of our foreign policy; that it must be balanced with security interests and cannot be the sole policy determinant; that Mr. Carter's speech will not become the oft-quoted Gettysburg Address of 1977.

Despite the diversity of view, the interest of these writers in morality is instructive and useful: each seemed to be consistent in the view that there is such a thing as national will or ethical foundation which can be articulated; the debate was generated by the President's conception of its method of translation or strength of application. The essays provide a balanced view of Carter's stance, and curiously, a guarded consensus which was totally unexpected. Henry Kissinger's "Morality and Power" sums up that consensus view: "morality without security is ineffectual; security without morality is empty. To establish the relationship and proportion between these goals is perhaps the most profound challenge before our government and our nation."

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