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The All-Volunteer Force and American Society

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events frequently referred to as contributing to the U.S. policy of containment of the U.S.S.R. However, little is discussed of the event except that the Soviet Union set up puppet regimes in Azerbaijan and in the Kurdish area and sought to exert pressure on neighboring Iran to recognize the autonomy of these provinces. Robert Ghobad Irani's book details the history of these Soviet moves and exposes the options that were available to the United States in seeking a peaceful resolution of the crisis to ensure the integrity and independence of Iran.

From the American perspective, and the book is particularly interesting from the point of U.S. interests and diplomacy, the book is timely. Although Irani chronicles events of more than three decades ago, the rationale for U.S. action seems to be just as relevant today. The Teheran Declaration of 6 December 1943 pledged the Allies to "the maintenance of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran." The fact that the Soviets reneged on this promise and helped set up "republics" in Azerbaijan and Mahabad (the Kurdish "republic") was taken by the United States as an unfriendly act that threatened the territorial integrity of Iran.

The questions posed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, General John H. Hilldridge, in September 1946—the place of Iran in the economic or strategic interests of the United States; the role of the Soviet Union in Iran and its consequences for U.S. interests—detailed in the book could well be asked today and should be seriously answered. The answer is unlikely to be very different. There is an important difference though.

The role of the United States in the "dual option" approach to the Azerbaijan crisis (of a resolution through the United Nations and bilateral negotiations between Iran and

the U.S.S.R.) was successful, according to Irani, because the United States was not perceived as having any direct interests of its own. In other words, the difference between 1946 and 1978 is that in the latter the United States is no longer perceived in Iran as it was in 1946, i.e., a disinterested party merely acting "on principle without selfish motives." Today, the United States might not be able to force the Soviets, if the need should arise, to evacuate, or could Washington be of much help to Iranian central authorities in dealing with current autonomy moves in Iran. Soviet moves are a distant memory to Iranians today. U.S. involvement is a more recent phenomenon and therefore more suspect.

This is an interesting and comprehensive account of the events of 1946 in a crucial area. It helps put the region and some of its difficulties into proper perspective. The presence of a map of Iran would, however, have been of considerable help in locating places without constantly having to turn to an atlas!

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Keeley, John B., ed. *The All-Volunteer Force and American Society*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1978, 206pp.

The All-Volunteer Force and American Society is a collection of six original essays treating the gamut of issues relating to the volunteer force—trends in the manpower pool, the role of women, the role of reserves, British experience with the AVF and others. Quality is quite uneven.

The opening essay by William P. Snyder discusses the personnel procurement problems for the 1980s. It is a familiar argument—manpower needs will be constant or increasing; the pool of 17-21 year old males will decline and competition for this declining supply

112 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

will be intense; the armed services will therefore have tremendous recruiting difficulties. Many conclude from this argument that the draft must be reinstated. Snyder rejects this solution as politically infeasible. Instead he lists eight actions such as lowering physical standards, recruiting more women, and restoring veterans' education benefits, which in his view are necessary prerequisites to any return to compulsory service.

There are two elements missing from his argument. First, there is a curious failure to list increased compensation as a way of making up the shortfall. While manpower supply may be so unresponsive to price that it is politically infeasible to procure adequate manpower by paying more, there are political problems with his listed alternatives as well. It is very doubtful that the supply responsiveness is zero—that paying more will not work. In any case, the degree of supply responsiveness is an empirical question. Snyder does not consider it. Second, in projecting constant or growing manpower needs, the author fails to address explicitly the possible future substitution of capital for increasingly scarce labor. In fact weapons system design today is oriented toward laborsaving. Added manpower economies may or may not be possible in the coming decade. This too is an empirical question—a very difficult one. Snyder's conclusion that personnel needs will be constant or growing may well be correct, but his argument is incomplete without consideration of capital substitution.

In the second essay, Charles Moskos, Jr. stresses two related themes: first that the volunteer army is much less representative of the American middle class than was the pre-Vietnam war army; second, that the volunteer army increasingly has become an occupation instead of an institution. The first is an empirical proposition. Moskos presents an impressive collection of statistics in

support of his contention. The second warrants further discussion. Institutional members see their vocation as a calling. They regard themselves apart from the broad society. Monetary compensation is not the most important reward. In contrast, "an occupation is legitimated in terms of the marketplace." To members of an occupation, self-interest has priority over the interests of the employing organization. In the modern military, money has replaced appeals to duty, honor and country as the prime motivator of personnel. One difficulty with the Moskos argument is that the occupational model and the institutional model are not mutually exclusive. Why should not duty, honor and country on the one hand, and compensation on the other both be motivators? Certainly nonmaterial rewards are important to many individuals in nonmilitary vocations. Such statements are often made about teachers, doctors, farmers, chefs, and telephone linemen. A more fundamental difficulty with the Moskos argument is his failure to explain clearly the consequences for the effectiveness of the fighting force of the growing acceptance of the occupational model. He implies, I think, that the AVF is a less effective fighting force than its conscripted counterpart of earlier years, but he never explicitly says this, much less support it with any evidence. This second objection applies to his first theme as well. Assume he is correct that the AVF is less representative of the middle class than was the drafted force. Is this less representative force a less effective fighting force? A less representative military is inferior as a social mixing bowl, but society may be able to achieve desirable mixing of social classes in other ways.

Next, Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, in the longest and most difficult paper in the book, traces 20th-century British experience with the AVF. The essay opens with an examination of historical data

PROFESSIONAL READING 113

that show that over time an AVF declines in absolute size and as a percentage of available manpower. By itself the statistical record means little. The case that such trends are inevitable is unconvincing without an underlying explanation. More interesting is the author's discussion of AVF costs in the second section of the paper. The budgetary costs of the AVF are higher than comparable costs for a conscripted force. While the author recognizes that economic costs are in fact greater for a conscripted force, he argues that economic rationality is not characteristic of the political process and that budgetary costs are in fact more important in constraining defense effort. The result tends to be a redefinition of the role of the armed forces to fit into the budget constraint. Economic rationality would also lead to substitution of capital for labor in the face of rising relative budgetary costs for labor, but Harries-Jenkins argues that noneconomic considerations also inhibit this process.

Difficulties in designing a pay policy that will attract sufficient entry level personnel and also provide adequate reward to careerists are the subjects of the third section of the essay.

In the final section, the author points out that economic and budgetary costs are not the sole concern. Competing in the labor market forces the military to emphasize extrinsic advantages of the job. Those oriented toward viewing the military as an occupation instead of a profession are increasingly dissatisfied with certain necessary features of military life—family separation, mobility, and uncertainty regarding assignments. Their sense of relative deprivation is augmented by the low level of public recognition of the uniqueness of the occupation.

The Harries-Jenkins essay stands alone in this volume in addressing economic issues together with social and political concerns. The approach is commendable.

The final three essays need less comment. Cecile Landrum provides a useful description of issues relating to the role of women in the military—combat potential, male attitudes, dual careers, pregnancy, and others. No new ground is broken here, but the paper is a good summary of many of the key issues. Next, the editor, writing on the role of reserves, argues that while reserves in theory supply military capability inexpensively, in fact they augment capability very little. The primary reserve mission is European reinforcement but they cannot be activated and deployed quickly enough to make much difference there. Keeley advocates major organizational and mission reform with emphasis on the Individual Ready Reserve, and on the cadre concept. Keeley's proposals are sensible and deserve consideration. Major reforms have been proposed in the past, of course. Politics is usually blamed for the failure to implement them.

In the final essay, an entertaining journalistic piece, Robert Leider vents his frustrations with analysts, "numbers manipulators" and "manpower plumbers" who, with their computers, have assumed all important defense decisionmaking functions. The military, he says, is left to exercise authority over parades and the wearing of the uniform. Meanwhile, "Warfare itself—the ultimate justification of the military on which rests its claim to uniqueness and expertise—no longer belongs exclusively to the uniformed forces." But, of course, it never did.

Leider dismisses the increasing role of women as a victory only for the numbers manipulators. He belittles DOD attempts to accommodate blacks and other minorities. He invokes Moskos on the shift away from professionalism, but carries the argument to an extreme far beyond Moskos, attacking what he calls rampant vocationalism. To Leider the acquisition of technical

114 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

skills should be strictly secondary to being a soldier.

My overall assessment of *The All-Volunteer Force and American Society* is a negative one. Economic factors are given too little consideration by the authors here. In editor Keeley's view, economists and those with business school training have been overrepresented in debates on the AVF. His collection is an attempt to redress the balance. He quotes an economist, Cooper, who calls for a dialogue between economists and other social scientists on the issues. Such a dialogue is clearly important, but the reader will find little contribution to it here. Except for Professor Harries-Jenkins, the authors make very little attempt to point out, with factual evidence as appropriate, the shortcomings of economic analysis of the issues. Economic factors are entirely ignored, or dismissed with statements such as "It is questionable in the extreme whether the market system is the way to motivate an Army. . . ."

Assessing the AVF is ultimately a matter of weighing costs and benefits. It may well be that in the United States the benefits of a volunteer military force are not worth the costs. The issue is certainly still open. Neither the benefits nor the costs are exclusively, or even primarily, economic. Accordingly, non-economists have an important role to play in clarifying and assessing the relative importance of these benefits and costs. The extent to which *The All-Volunteer Force and American Society* provides such clarification is, for this reviewer, disappointing.

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Nagai, Yonosuke and Iriye, Akira, eds.
The Origins of the Cold War in Asia.
New York: Columbia University
Press, 1971. 448pp.

Historiography, as with all things, is
subject to fashion. Today fashion gives

us symposium-history: an aggregate of addresses from a "significant" conference. Beneath the veneer of an imposing title, under the rubric of a "big" idea, these are often no more than a jumble of narrow essays. Such a collection may illuminate another time and provide highlights of both the institutional and the individual dynamics of the past. *Pearl Harbor as History* was such an achievement and its success reveals both the possibilities and pitfalls of symposium-history. By apportioning institutional subjects, Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, its editors, created an encompassing picture of an era.

In editing *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia*, Nagai and Iriye may well have had the model of Borg and Okamoto in mind. There are superficial similarities in scope and in theme but instead of a polished lens through which to view another time, they have given us but a dark lens of layered historical opinions. The 16 essays are so arranged as to cover fashionable historiographical issues but there is no systematic attempt to distill an age. If they had wished to achieve a portrait of a controversial age, success could have come only by breaking it down into its components, ideological, geographical, or institutional.

The self-congratulatory parade of post-Vietnam revisionism is more "significant" as an insight into the manner in which we attempt to explain ourselves than as a telling judgment on our recent ancestors. In his pompous introduction the Englishman, D.C. Watt, is able to pronounce (and, I am sure, with a solemn face): "America's defeat [in Vietnam] came, and came deservedly, because America was fighting on the wrong side and in a way contrary to the ideals of Americanism." With history, we shape our past to exculpate the eternal present. Among the paradigms of defeat, it is easier to accept the judgment of "defeat as just punishment" than it is to endure the humiliation of "defeat as surrender." This may