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### American Diplomacy: An Analysis of the Azerbaijan Crisis, 1945-1946

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iniquities of Tsarism, the atrocities of anti-Semitism and the ignorance and drunkenness" of Russian peasants. Of equal interest are the twists and turns of the last days of the Tsar, captured with precision and clarity and revealing that even a man of absolute power must yield if he does not hold the confidence of his government.

This wartime look behind the scenes at the workaday world of diplomats confirms that they perform necessary and difficult tasks that have not been outdated by technological advances in communication nor the realpolitik rhetoric of the nuclear age. Grayson concludes that U.S.-Russian relations never got further than "cool correctness" and that the nations were separated by a "wall of mistrust and ignorance." In my view, that 1914 wall remains largely intact today.

J. P. MORSE

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Hoyt, Edwin P. *U-Boats Offshore*. New York: Stein and Day, 1978. 278pp.

More than a third of a century after the end of World War II, a spate of books about various aspects of that war is appearing on the market: books such as Ronald Lewin's *Ultra Goes to War*, Joseph E. Persico's *Piercing the Reich*, and Edwin P. Hoyt's *U-Boats Offshore*.

The author of this book provides a fascinating account of the activities—and successes—of German submarines off the eastern coast of North America in the early part of the war. According to Hoyt, the American Military Establishment was neither trained nor equipped for antisubmarine warfare in the months following Pearl Harbor, and nearly lost the war for the Allies in the early months of 1942: in the first 6 months after American entry into the war, German U-boats sank nearly 600 ships, most of them in American waters defended by U.S. Forces, while losing

only 6 submarines in the western Atlantic.

These data are consistent with Hoyt's thesis of American "unpreparedness and incompetence in dealing with U-boats." It is, however, only fair to ask whether Great Britain fared any better in the eastern part of the Atlantic. If the Germans threw the bulk of their submarines at the U.S. east coast rather than deploying it elsewhere, it is not surprising that they met with substantial success. Since all of western Europe, including Great Britain, had been losing to Germany during the same period, one could equally well argue that America's European Allies were equally unprepared and incompetent.

The book is a dramatic, suspenseful, action-packed account of war in the Atlantic as it involved the United States. Hoyt's portrayals of sinkings and his lifeboat and raft stories are both poignant and shocking. There are heroes on both sides, with few villains. Even the Germans are pictured as brave men doing their duty: if some German captains abused the laws of war, they were not alone, as in the case of their U-85, the crew of which presumably was massacred by an American destroyer.

Hoyt ends on a note of triumph: the weight of Allied skill and of American industrial power turned the tide of battle, changing the entire course of World War II.

A great deal of research went into *U-Boats Offshore*, but the resulting text is literary entertainment, not a book valuable to military strategists or tacticians.

STEVEN E. CADY

Captain, U.S. Air Force

Irani, Robert G., *American Diplomacy: An Analysis of the Azerbaijan Crisis, 1945-1946*. Hyattsville, Md: Institute of Middle Eastern and North American Affairs, 1978. 94pp.

The "Azerbaijan Crisis," as it is known in the West, is one of those

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events frequently referred to as contributing to the U.S. policy of containment of the U.S.S.R. However, little is discussed of the event except that the Soviet Union set up puppet regimes in Azerbaijan and in the Kurdish area and sought to exert pressure on neighboring Iran to recognize the autonomy of these provinces. Robert Ghobad Irani's book details the history of these Soviet moves and exposes the options that were available to the United States in seeking a peaceful resolution of the crisis to ensure the integrity and independence of Iran.

From the American perspective, and the book is particularly interesting from the point of U.S. interests and diplomacy, the book is timely. Although Irani chronicles events of more than three decades ago, the rationale for U.S. action seems to be just as relevant today. The Teheran Declaration of 6 December 1943 pledged the Allies to "the maintenance of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran." The fact that the Soviets reneged on this promise and helped set up "republics" in Azerbaijan and Mahabad (the Kurdish "republic") was taken by the United States as an unfriendly act that threatened the territorial integrity of Iran.

The questions posed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, General John H. Hilldring, in September 1946—the place of Iran in the economic or strategic interests of the United States; the role of the Soviet Union in Iran and its consequences for U.S. interests—detailed in the book could well be asked today and should be seriously answered. The answer is unlikely to be very different. There is an important difference though.

The role of the United States in the "dual option" approach to the Azerbaijan crisis (of a resolution through the United Nations and bilateral negotiations between Iran and

the U.S.S.R.) was successful, according to Irani, because the United States was not perceived as having any direct interests of its own. In other words, the difference between 1946 and 1978 is that in the latter the United States is no longer perceived in Iran as it was in 1946, i.e., a disinterested party merely acting "on principle without selfish motives." Today, the United States might not be able to force the Soviets, if the need should arise, to evacuate, or could Washington be of much help to Iranian central authorities in dealing with current autonomy moves in Iran. Soviet moves are a distant memory to Iranians today. U.S. involvement is a more recent phenomenon and therefore more suspect.

This is an interesting and comprehensive account of the events of 1946 in a crucial area. It helps put the region and some of its difficulties into proper perspective. The presence of a map of Iran would, however, have been of considerable help in locating places without constantly having to turn to an atlas!

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Keeley, John B., ed. *The All-Volunteer Force and American Society*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1978, 206pp.

*The All-Volunteer Force and American Society* is a collection of six original essays treating the gamut of issues relating to the volunteer force—trends in the manpower pool, the role of women, the role of reserves, British experience with the AVF and others. Quality is quite uneven.

The opening essay by William P. Snyder discusses the personnel procurement problems for the 1980s. It is a familiar argument—manpower needs will be constant or increasing; the pool of 17-21 year old males will decline and competition for this declining supply