

1979

Dragon and Eagle

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Recommended Citation

Cole, Bernard D. (1979) "Dragon and Eagle," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 32 : No. 1 , Article 29.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol32/iss1/29>

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1935 general election, however, he began slowly to emerge from his self-imposed political isolation. Yet Churchill was not brought back into office (as First Lord of the Admiralty) until after the outbreak of war in September 1939.

In the years just before the war, Macmillan notes sadly, there were only two giants in the House of Commons, Lloyd George and Churchill, and neither could exert any effective influence upon any party, Liberal, Labour, or Conservative. Lloyd George never saw what was needed, but by the mid-1930s Winston Churchill did. In the light of the missed opportunities and tragic errors of British policy in these years, Macmillan shows us how right Winston Churchill was in calling the Second World War "the unnecessary war."

J. KENNETH McDONALD
George Washington University

Oskenberg, Michel and Oxnam, Robert B. eds. *Dragon and Eagle*. New York: Basic Books, 1978. 384pp.

This collection of 12 essays by prominent American China scholars attempts to explain the basis for future interaction between the two nations by examining the historical background of Sino-American relations. Read individually, the essays are generally informative, if necessarily brief. Together, however, their common schema and subject matter lead to a book which is repetitive and which offers little in the way of fresh ideas.

Oskenberg and Oxnam provide introductions to five of the book's six "parts" (the sixth consists of a single article). The editors have also written three of the essays. The tone is set in the first, introductory, section, where the editors provide the "historical perspective" of Sino-American relations. The components of this interaction—military, economic, political, and cultural—are set forth, to be repeatedly addressed in the following essays.

The section entitled "Mutual Perceptions" contains essays by Warren I. Cohen and Tu Wei-ming. Both articles are well-written, and Cohen makes good use of public opinion polls in discussing American attitudes towards China. The two authors' conclusions are similar and unexceptional: the United States and China have operated and will continue to operate in different cultural and ideological contexts.

The section on "Bilateral Interactions" includes articles by Oskenberg, Lyman P. Van Slyke, Waldo H. Heinrichs, and Stanley B. Lubman. The first of these provides a brief, useful view of the Chinese foreign policymaking apparatus. Van Slyke discusses "Culture, Society, and Technology in Sino-American Relations" but offers no firm, comparative conclusions. Heinrichs attempts to survey the entire history of Sino-American military interactions but is best when discussing the 1950s. He also notes that in 1945 China held only a peripheral position among American foreign interests. Lubman addresses the trade issue and points out the similarity of the present Canton Trade Fair to the 19th-century *co hong* system used by China to control external trade. His attempt to describe China's drive for economic self-sufficiency in the 1950s and 1960s is inconsistent and appears to suffer from poor editing.

The fourth part of *Dragon and Eagle*, "Multilateral Interactions," is the most disappointing section of the book. The reader expects more from the expert Allen S. Whiting than is provided in his "Japan and Sino-American Relations." It would be particularly interesting to know with what reasoning the author concludes that significant Japanese rearmament will not occur. This points up a criticism of the book as a whole: no notes are provided to support the authors' views.

The essay by Steven I. Levine, "The Soviet Factor," is simplistic and subjective. For instance, his view that the

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United States bears the responsibility for the onset of the Korean war is a position which can, to a degree, be argued. However, Levine offers no rationale for this position. His "conclusion"—that China will continue to grow militarily, and that "the United States and the Soviet Union would be wise to recognize this emergent reality"—belabors the obvious.

The articles which form "Interactions Around China's Rim" are by Peter Van Ness, Michael H. Hunt, and Alexander Woodside. The last offers a fine view of the role of Southeast Asia in Sino-American relations, although Woodside's advocacy of formal U.S. relations with Cambodia seems unjustified in view of that country's institution of hysteria as a way of life. Van Ness rehashes Taiwan's role in Sino-American relations without offering any new ideas. Hunt's article should be important, addressing the historic and continuing importance of the northeast, the "cockpit of Asia." However, his efforts suffer from staleness—the 11 authors who precede him address many of the same topics—and end in a conclusion which is difficult to justify. Surely, if the United States withdrew her forces from the area and substituted "some less binding agreement for the current South Korean security treaty," as Hunt urges, it would not allow "Washington [to] gain the time and flexibility it needs in responding to any Korean crisis."

The final part of the book consists of an article by Jerome A. Cohen, "Sino-American Relations and International Law." It is the finest essay in the book. The author provides a straightforward insight into the two countries' perception of law. He concludes that both nations have a cynical view of international regulation and that international law—which he describes as a relative value—cannot by itself function to improve or even regulate Sino-American relations. It is a well-written and perceptible essay.

The articles in *Dragon and Eagle* are based for the most part on solid scholarly ground—although the essays by Levine and Hunt leave something to be desired in this respect. This is not a work for the reader who is already knowledgeable about Sino-American relations. However, it does provide a comprehensive, if unexceptional, introduction to the subject for the uninitiated student.

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Palmer, Dave R. *Summons of the Trumpet*. San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978. 277pp.

Colonel Palmer describes his book as "a broad history—the story of America's military involvement in Vietnam." And that's exactly what it is—a most enjoyable story. No footnotes interrupt the flow of his narrative, making this a highly readable account of 20 frustrating and futile years of military operations.

The book is constrained to an investigation of our military involvement; political, economic, and psychological factors are discussed only as required to provide a backdrop for the military story. However, even though he has explicitly limited his focus, some readers will feel his treatment is still overly condensed. For example, he discusses only six battles/campaigns and even those in very little detail. But this approach serves his purpose well—he communicates the flavor of combat without the usual plethora of tactical specifics that can easily pose a confusing maze for the reader who wasn't there. And he includes these actions as necessary to show the changing faces of the war, not to chronicle specific engagements as more important than others.

Although Palmer neither whitewashes nor condemns, he has his favorites and his "goats." General Westmoreland comes off well; although he is