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The Third World War: August 1985

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future, but when it does, it will be constrained less. The emphasis will be on limiting the duration rather than the means. A future Vietnam is more likely to last 7 weeks than 7 years.

The attitude of society also affects the military profession's self-concept and its relations with society. Speaking to this issue. Huntington sets up an interesting model of congruence and interaction. Observers differ on the degree to which that profession presently defines itself as similar or dissimilar from other institutions (congruence) and the degree it interacts with the rest of society. Huntington discerns a recent trend toward low congruence. or dissimilarity, the military profession tending toward "purely military" functions, defining itself narrowly as the institution involved in "the management of violence." Although the evidence is more conflicting, interaction with society seems to be declining but to a lesser degree. In other words it appears to be turning inward, emphasizing its professional military functions. This is not necessarily bad, Huntington asserts; but it is important that the institution not insulate itself from the rest of society. The Military Establishment must be "different from but not distant from the society it serves."

A word should be said about the other articles. In a somewhat overwritten paper, Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and now Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, discusses the relationship between the Military Establishment's objectives and responsibilities and the role of education. He attests its commitment to education and professional development in which the values of civilian society are inculcated. By bringing individuals from the military and civilian communities together, the educational process fosters understanding and appreciation of each other's goals and perspectives. Thus Goodpaster considers the deterioration of relations between the military and academic communities "incompatible with the needs of a healthy democratic society." The two must work in harmony.

While Goodpaster is concerned with educating the military profession in civilian values, Professor Orville Menard focuses on the other side of the coin, educating the civilian sector in civilmilitary relations. He stresses that civilian control requires vigilance. He invokes his own research on the politicalization of the French military institution in the late fifties and early sixties as caution. Like Goodpaster and Huntington, he affirms the necessity of integration rather than alienation from society.

Finally, Air Force LTC Gene A. Sherrill, former bootstrapper at the host university, offers a case study of civil-military relations, the 1974 Ethiopian military coup against Emperor Haile Selassie. The paper is only tangential to the rest of the book. A brief secondary summary of Ethiopian history focusing on conditions which made the Emperor vulnerable to restive military forces, it develops little new. Although interesting, its main reason for publication appears to be filling pages in order that Huntington's article could be published in book form.

Huntington's article should be read by everyone interested in contemporary civil-military relations. It is highly commended to the military professional. The rest of the book could be overlooked with little loss.

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Hackett, John, et al. The Third World War: August 1985. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1978. 368pp. Let it be said straightaway: the West wins the war; not easily, not without losses, and not without certain prior defense preparations and improvements taken between 1978 and 1985 by several governments.

The book is written as popular, narrative history set down "soon after the cessation of hostilities." Readers may argue that none of it will happen but none can deny that any or all of it could happen. In a tour d'horizon the governments, policies, attitudes, armies, navies, and air forces of all the action states are found to be much as today. The changes that are evident are, for the most part, changes that most reasonable men may logically accept, particularly those that bear on the relations of nations. More difficult to accept are those changes of attitude and action resulting from the West's increasing awareness that there was a threat and that certain defense preparations were therefore made.

Readers who are familiar with some of the author's. General Sir John Hackett's. other writings will know of his opinions on the weaknesses of NATO and the insufficiency of support given it by its member states and their peoples. They will recognize this book as another call for awareness and preparation but will be pleased to find no emotional exhortation. The author's device of writing "future history" permits him to relate his recommendations and hopes as actions that have been taken. One hopes they will be taken else the conduct and outcome of the war he writes of will be decidedly different.

That war will not be redescribed here. The land battle was mostly on the Central Front (General Hackett once commanded NORTHAG); there were related (and sometime causative) actions in the Middle East, Africa, and on the Chinese border; the only nuclear feature, other than rattling, was the exchange of the destruction of Birmingham and Minsk; space was not a battleground, save for the disablement and destruction of some communications and surveillance satellites; there was resupply from America. Air and maritime aspects are well covered and naval readers will be particularly interested in the discussion and analysis that permit the authors to state:

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When the outcome of the 1985 war as a whole can be assessed, it may be that the downfall of the U.S.S.R. will be attributed, ironically, to Gorshkov, the greatest Russian admiral of all time, whose forceful and successful advocacy of ever-increasing Soviet seapower led the comrades to disaster—when the seas got too rough the Bear drowned.

An interesting conclusion is that at the end of the war the world's two superpowers were the United States and the Japan-China coprosperity sphere.

The 1978 facts, doctrines, and orders of battle of the book are hardly disputable-the authors' and consultants' (Americans will recognize Generals Davison and dePuv and John Erickson) credentials insure that. The book is an excellent, readable, and thorough survey of the world that is and could easily be. If the historical projections prove inaccurate, they are at least conceivable, and even those readers for whom Oui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum is anathema might agree that the foundations of their faith rest more on hope than reason. The most encouraging bit of the book is that the authors "have been encouraged by signs around us that among the peoples of the West the point that the U.S.S.R. means what it says and knows what it is doing with respect to the capitalist-Communist contest | is beginning to be taken." If General Hackett (no Pollyanna) is encouraged, we all may be.

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Lebra, Joyce C. Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 206pp.

Shiroyama, Saburo. War Criminal: The Life and Death of Hirota Koki. Tokyo, New York and San Francisco: Kodansha International, 1977. 310pp.

Both these books are interesting and well-done historical studies in their own