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
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PROFESSIONAL READING

REVIEW ARTICLE

DWIGHT DAVID EISENHOWER, 1945-1948*

by

Michael Geyer†

Volumes VI-IX of *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, covering the period between May 1945 and February 1948, begin with the triumphal conclusion of the war in Europe under the leadership of a vital and forceful commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces. They end with a tired, exhausted, and frustrated Chief of Staff of the Army ("I am getting close to the fed up stage,") stepping down and gladly handing over the office to Gen. Omar Bradley, his handpicked successor. At that point, February 1948, Eisenhower was president-elect of Columbia University, and the White House was clearly within reach. The contradiction between a growing public cult around Eisenhower as a war hero and the inability to achieve what he thought necessary from a professional military point of view characterizes the Eisenhower story of these years. The difficult transition from war to peace and the equally difficult transformation

of an outstanding military person into a public one—Eisenhower never quite managed to conceive of himself as a politician—form the inner logic of the 2,258 pages of carefully edited documents.

It could be a very dramatic story both in terms of the personal development of Eisenhower and in terms of the political and military changes during these years. Yet Eisenhower's personality and the very care of the editors to present the man and his office from all possible angles make it difficult for the professional historian and the general reader alike to form a coherent picture of those years. Clearly these papers were meant to present a repository of the general's writings rather than a self-contained and necessarily more selective documentation of his life and letters. They show more impressively the vast terrain a military leader such as Eisenhower had to cover than the person himself. But one should not be too critical of the editors in this regard. Eisenhower himself reinforced this tendency.

First and foremost, Eisenhower was not a writer, but a superb and effective organizer. His memoranda, statements, and even his personal letters are mostly very short and to the point, stripped of

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all but the most necessary contextual information.¹ Spontaneity is absent, "think-pieces" are rare. Moreover, rational and professional to the bone, Eisenhower's personality tends to vanish completely behind his function. The very outstanding qualities of a military commander—implementing directions from above with diligence and controlling and enforcing their execution rigorously—make a study of the person a very demanding task.

Secondly, there is the intriguing paradox of the increasingly legendary hero who himself was anything but that. Eisenhower would have been the last to downplay his achievements and certainly did not mind public flattery. However, he always considered himself the head of a team of professionals—a recurrent theme throughout his life—rather than a heroic individual. He expressed this sentiment in a deeply felt solidarity with Field Marshal Montgomery and Marshal Zhukov, in his commitment to his fellow officers and his touching care for the common soldiers,² which brought him so much respect and admiration. Corporate ethic and professional responsibility were deeply ingrained in his character and in his work. This spirit permeated his staff work as well, and Eisenhower believed it was the only way to cope with the challenge of modern war: "War has become so comprehensive and complicated that teamwork seems to me the essence of all success." Throughout the four volumes we see Eisenhower's personal style most clearly in this matter.

Yet, before we jump to a managerial picture of the person and his office we should keep the complimentary images in mind. On the one hand, Eisenhower did not simply preside over or run his team from above. Rather his interest in details and the very specificity of his judgments indicate that he controlled his staff very tightly. The amazing coherence of staff work done under him

reflects his omnipresence as head of the team. On the other hand, too modern a vocabulary might be misleading. Eisenhower was not and did not conceive of himself as an "operator." He was very adamant and consistent in fusing the very managerial aspect of his work with traditional American virtues. His "teamwork" was not railored according to the latest fashion of organizational sociology, but rather according to the patriarchal principles of a midwestern family and the values of good neighborhood. "We must have faith in each other.... I will insist on having a happy family. I believe that no successful staff can have any personal enmities existing in it. So I want to see a big crowd of friends around here." Moral values—"integrity and fairness"—and common sense laced with technical knowledge were the underpinnings of professional staff work. Eisenhower systematically fused these moral and ideological qualities with professional competence. The links between common American values, professional ethic, and organizational efficiency were unbroken.

Eisenhower's popularity rested on these qualities. The letters to Eisenhower—a few of these are scattered in the footnotes—indicate how much the public and the Army wanted a hero who was tough yet caring, a commanding executive yet close to the people, straightforward and jovial yet efficient at the same time. It would be an important task for historians to analyze exactly why there was this overriding need for a person like that. Cold war rhetoric—and more generally the American way of crisis management—seems to thrive on this peculiar kind of individualism.

While the documentation presents little to answer this very broad question it can help us to understand the more particular set of military problems that finally wore down and transformed Eisenhower. Three areas of concern

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stand out: the perceived decline of national policies in favor of partisan politics in Washington; the dilution of military tasks and the direct social pressure on the military; and the changing international environment and the changing nature of warfare. In each case the role of the military in the framework of national politics had to be renegotiated and in each case this process seems to have led to strong ideological commitment as a policy substitute. That seems to have been the only way to "rationalize" the military's function and role.

As far as the political decisionmaking process in Washington is concerned, Eisenhower entered this arena with very strong views on the strictly nonpolitical role of the Army and of its Chief of Staff. "A military official in this country must be exceedingly careful to avoid even the appearance of interfering in a matter that is not strictly professional in character." Shortly afterward he wrote: "My sole concern is for the Army and the discharge of its important responsibilities to the country. The Army does *not* make political policy—it is an operating agency. Its military head must stay in his proper field or he will destroy the value of the Army's considered professional advice." Even though Eisenhower retained this view throughout his tenure as Chief of Staff, it turned out to be quite difficult to put it into practice.

Though Eisenhower constantly asked for political guidance and was most careful to spell out the limits of his office, he often did not get guidance or got it only belatedly. The initial stages of the transformation to a peacetime army were not, as Eisenhower wanted, initiated according to a comprehensive plan, but piecemeal and according to political expediency—a process that deeply troubled and antagonized the Chief of Staff. Indeed, the severity of the cutbacks bothered him less than the lack of program and plan. He quoted this

lack with inefficiency and waste.³ Unable to achieve what he deemed vital for the functioning of the military machine Eisenhower directed his anger increasingly against what he called "prejudice, lack of understanding, and outright self-seeking," against interest politics in general and Washington politicking in particular. In his mind, the latter stood in direct contrast to the upright, logical, value-free, necessity—and efficiency—oriented working of the military machine. The question, here, is not whether this was the case and whether Eisenhower was justified. The important point is that under duress Eisenhower reinforced the traditional American values of civil-military relations and denied the complexity and necessarily contradictory character of the formation of national policies. He never quite managed to perceive conflicts over policies or the lack of policies as a result of difficult and contradictory processes of reconciling a variety of civilian and military priorities. He dreaded conflicts and never quite understood why they could happen at all. Instead, he idealized the relation between the President as policymaker and his efficiency-oriented subordinates. The American people at large were linked to this realm of executive politics through common beliefs rather than through a system of interest representation.

The renewed demand for a strong Presidential democracy emerged out of the experience of the postwar struggles over policies and priorities. This demand reflected the professional desire for organization and control at almost any price which is one of the main themes in these volumes. Working without such an organizational framework would have meant to jeopardize the very qualities of professional work and would have led—and as a matter of fact did lead—Eisenhower into the dreaded sphere of interest politics. A strong Presidency

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was not simply one that fulfilled all military demands, but one that was able to establish a clear framework for professional activities.

Public opinion proved to be quite as confusing and contradictory as Washington politics. The issues in which the Chief of Staff was involved throughout 1946 show this most clearly. Both in the military occupation and administration of Germany and in the debate over demobilization, the Army caught severe criticism, even though in both cases the position of the Army and of Eisenhower was not so different from public opinion and the press. As far as the military administration of Germany is concerned, the Army was criticized for wanting to maintain and extend military control in peacetime and for implementing the Potsdam rules only in a haphazard and "soft" way. Eisenhower, however, would have wanted nothing more than "to turn over the Governmental job [in Germany] to civilians" because he feared a dilution and subsequent disorientation of military tasks and functions, if only in the public mind. He also tried everything to enforce Potsdam regulation.⁴ However, he wanted to achieve these goals according to administrative and political expediency, according to his own time schedule rather than as a result of public pressure. He grew bitter about what he experienced as lack of trust and sympathy; just as the military was to act efficiently and responsibly, the public was not to interfere in military business.

The same issue was at stake in the public quest for quick demobilization, which strained military discipline and the Army's relation to the public to the utmost. As a matter of fact, demobilization was such an important topic in 1945-46 that one can only wonder that it has received so little attention from historical or military writers.⁵ The new Chief of Staff not only faced tremendous public pressure to "bring back daddy,"

but faced strikes, riots and insubordination. The public pressure for demobilization brought to light and heightened the intramilitary tensions between officers and enlisted men. Again, Eisenhower did not want to keep the soldiers away from home. Moreover, he was very disturbed by the tensions at the grassroots level of the Army. But counter to public pressure he insisted—though he did not succeed—on a planned transformation of the wartime Army into a peacetime Army.⁶ He failed to achieve his ideal concept for a peacetime Army based on universal military training (which incidentally included women). However, he was less offended by that—defining the organization of the Army was a political task, hence not in his competence—than by the political and public intrusion into the professional domain. It seemed to him to destroy the rational and well-calculated process of adjustment that was designed for the benefit of the American people and the United States. Just as the military was to stay out of political affairs, the public was not to intervene in professional matters. He was most sympathetic and understanding to the public plea and never indulged in conspirational theories, as if public and military unrest were instigated from the outside. However, as in a good "family" he insisted that in the end "enlightened"—to use some of Eisenhower's own metaphors—and knowledgeable guidance should rule. Only the executive staffed by professionals who would "stick to facts and realities" could provide that.

The immediate postwar years were a phase of retrenchment for the military. The Army was to demobilize and civilian life and business were to be reinstated. It was and it is commonplace to assume that the military tried to maintain its position.⁷ In an extension of this logic one also could come to the conclusion that because the military

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profited considerably from the cold war, it also helped to instigate it. At least as far as Eisenhower is concerned that is a far too mechanistic conclusion. He was certainly disappointed by some of the political decisions that did not achieve what he expected and deemed necessary for the Army. "This job is more irritating and wearing than I had anticipated. We are still in the latter stages of destroying the greatest machine that the United States ever put together and at the same time trying to plan in orderly fashion to meet the needs of the moment as well as the long-range requirements of the future."

However, for Eisenhower this was not simply a matter of an all-out struggle to save the Army or the military; something more fundamental was at stake. Eisenhower feared that if interest politics should prevail (in the process of the necessary transition from war to peace) the whole political machinery would fall into disarray. Hence, his prime motif for action was not the Army's interest as such, but the reestablishment of a national peacetime consensus against the threat of disintegration and chaos. Once that was achieved the Army could flourish as well.

In other words, the problems of the time were not so much particular issues and policies. The very time and space that such issues as the concrete shape of a future army occupied should not sidetrack us. The overriding problem was to achieve a national consensus that would form a framework for politics and their professional implementation. Eisenhower insisted that the military position in the nation could not be renegotiated in a piecemeal fashion, but only on the basis of a coherent and detailed design. "Every man must know why he is assigned to his particular task." That was not just the recipe for harmony within the military, but for the nation at large. The cold war, even though it was not created by this desire

for organization and control, provided exactly that. Hence, we should be very careful not to explain the cold war in terms of single issues and specific interests as the cold war debate does;⁸ rather the discussion so far leads to the conclusion that cold war ideology was so exceedingly successful because it could reunite the dominant groups in the nation and was able to rally the people behind a strong Presidency. The unity of the nation as a prerequisite for an "orderly" decisionmaking process was the main concern, at least for Eisenhower.

Eisenhower's cold war rhetoric was less directed toward an alleged or real foreign threat. As a matter of fact he was most hesitant in that respect. The main task of the new consensus was to interpret basic and traditional American values in a new light. The social pressure for demobilization had taught him a lesson. Trust and consensus between the executive and the people did not simply exist; they had to be regenerated constantly. Hence, Eisenhower felt an increasing inclination—obvious in many letters throughout 1947—to speak out for these beliefs and values:

I believe fanatically in the American form of democracy—a system that recognizes and protects the right of the individual and that ascribes to the individual a dignity accruing to him because of his creation in the image of the supreme being and which rests upon the conviction that only through a system of free enterprise can this type of democracy be preserved.

At the same time, however, this almost theological individualism and the praise of free enterprise was not unlimited. Rather they had to fit into a very technocratic division of labor in which every sector of society performed its function and knew its place. Only then politics could follow "rational" and

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"enlightened" executive procedures. The appeal to basic values formed the link between society, economy, and the executive. In the latter, harmony and organizational rationality were to dominate:

I should say that the most noticeable thing here at home is the great confusion, doubt and haziness that seems to prevail in all circles, high and low, both in governmental and in private life. I talked to many civilians during my recent trip and find that all of them are puzzled as to what to do about management and labor, about taxes, about investments, about foreign policy and about the strength and character of our Army and Navy. No one seems to have a complete program on which he is ready to stand or fall. Personally, I consider this merely typical of the state of confusion that the world was bound to experience following upon the global war. Nevertheless it does indicate a very definite need for the development by our leaders of a very sane, comprehensive program and one behind which our people as a whole can get together.

Uncertainty characterized international affairs as well. For anyone familiar with the debate on the origins of the cold war, Eisenhower's hesitation to denounce and condemn Soviet aggressiveness is most surprising. Eisenhower seems to have taken a rather special and very thoughtful position in this issue which distinguished him from many of his fellow officers both in Washington and abroad. The editors correctly point to his wartime experience as one of the main reasons for his attitude. An overall view of the evolution of American attitudes towards international security should take cognizance of this fact. However, before we make Eisenhower into a forerunner of peaceful coexistence—a tendency the editors could not resist—

we should have a closer look at Eisenhower's views on the matters of international stability and national security. These views reveal an unresolved and pressing conflict between creating a system of international stability and a framework for world order on the one hand and national security defined in exclusively military terms on the other hand.⁹ This conflict ran right through Eisenhower's own thinking and his own actions and recommendations. The fascinating element in this story is how long Eisenhower could carry on without ever bringing the two sides together.

The Chief of Staff was deeply convinced that in peace the United States could not "preserve order in the sense of the Roman Peace, where one nation, due to its dominant position in the world, rules all the others. Here, I submit, you are going against the very roots of American sentiments," he wrote to a well-known columnist. "I cannot believe that anyone, no matter what his standing, his popularity or his persuasiveness could develop among our people a sufficiently lively fear to lead them into the adoption of such a policy." Eisenhower believed in the rational ability of the commonwealth of nations to reduce "hysteria and anarchy" and to promote international order and understanding. He believed that, because he was trained in the spirit of military subordination to civilians and simply could not conceive of an international order shaped by military force and counterforce rather than by political order. Just as in domestic politics military force was a necessary, yet subordinate instrument. Eisenhower perceived the military as a last resort in foreign policy rather than as an organizing element in international affairs. Hence, it was quite unthinkable for him that the state of military armaments could shape the relations between nations, even if they had radically different world views. Once

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again, he was waiting for the "sane" and "comprehensive" program in foreign affairs to come that would put the military force into its proper place and that would assign it clearly defined tasks. This program, however, was even less forthcoming on the international level than on the domestic one. Confusion and disorientation were gaining ground in an acrimonious debate over the American role in world affairs.

It would be wrong to make the military into one of the main culprits of this process, though the military contributed to the growing disarray. One of the most remarkable and well-known cases in this respect is the debate over control of atomic energy. The same Chief of Staff who promoted international understanding more than most of his colleagues turned out to be one of the toughest hard-liners in this question. His arguments boiled down to the simple recipe that secrecy and national control is better than any international nuclear organization. The United States had to maintain its nuclear monopoly. Even the British were shut out, though Eisenhower had always supported a close alliance between Washington and London.¹⁰ Eisenhower never recognized that there could be a conflict between the guarantee of national security and international order; whatever was necessary and expedient for national security, was good for international order as well. In the case of Eisenhower this kind of thinking was much more important than the perception of a Soviet threat. But in the end only a Soviet threat could reconcile the divergent tendencies of assuring national security and providing for an international order. We would underestimate the importance of the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, if we would assume that such a Soviet threat was merely "invented." But it is important to note

national security issues and the multilateral organization of international affairs, national security considerations won out easily even among the supporters of international understanding.

National security was defined in strictly military terms. Throughout 1945/46 the military, lacking comprehensive guidelines, redefined these security needs in the most astonishing way. Both Army and Navy started from the notion that a future war was going to be a global one. One would imagine that this choice was motivated by an alleged or real Soviet threat—and once again would miss the crucial point. Military contingency planning indeed assumed such a danger, but its true focus—quite typical for military strategies—was the experience of the past war *and*, more prominently, the *de facto* responsibility for occupied areas, "possessions, territories, and trust territories" just as for newly independent clients like the Philippines. The cold war debate tends to forget that in 1945/46 the United States ruled over a global empire stretching from parts of Germany and Austria in Europe to the Asian mainland. Of course, these were considered to be temporary holdings soon to be released into independence, but that did not keep the military from including these global commitments into their strategic plans.

In other words, the initial making of a global strategy was not predicated on an immediate Soviet threat. The military just realized faster than the American public that the United States was no longer a continental island. The Eisenhower papers and similar military sources, scattered throughout the footnotes, indicate unanimously that the Army and Navy never contemplated limiting contingency planning to the American mainland.¹¹ Not only would such a withdrawal—as the military saw it—create a dangerous power vacuum. The military, including Eisenhower⁷

concluded that changing weapons technology—particularly aviation and missile developments—had made the American mainland vulnerable if the United States did not build up its own defense perimeter. This type of argument, which is usually associated with Soviet concepts, comes out most strongly among American military planners as well.

With it went the more ordinary dynamic of geopolitical expansion: Forward bases had to be secured and needed their own defense perimeter. Thus, an airbase in Peru was seen as quite useful in defending the Panama Canal. A crude domino theory was developed—as in the case of Argentina—long before political scientists and civilian strategists made it into a well-formulated doctrine. In all this Eisenhower turns out to be one of the more restrained military leaders, who was less dogmatic in his geopolitical assumptions, more prone towards international understanding, and most hesitant to engage in warmongering. He did, however, embrace the same military security logic as his fellow officers in Washington and overseas.

These global contingency plans preceded the change in the mood of the country that came in early 1947 and was most clearly manifested in the Truman Doctrine. Their implementation was threatened and their dimensions were scaled down by subsequent budgetary and personal cuts that thoroughly alienated General MacArthur in Japan and General Clay in Germany. Eisenhower himself wished for more clarity and political guidance in this situation but his own sense of the limits of his office prevented him from any more pronounced intervention in favor of the Army's worldwide plans. However, in Eisenhower's writings the change in policy was foreshadowed. While abstract geopolitical and technological considerations began to recede in the last months of 1946, a

"Soviet threat" was emphasized increasingly.¹² The Army was ready in March 1947 and began to act immediately though there is no indication in the Eisenhower papers that the Army actually pressed for action. The importance of the Truman Doctrine rested in the fact that it gave shape and direction to general military ideas and concepts. Once again, the existence of a political program was as important to officers like Eisenhower as the actual content of it. In fact, it was not even realized immediately that Truman's policy change would strengthen the military role in foreign affairs inasmuch as the gains in clarity and perspective were matched by continuous cuts in military funding.

The most intriguing aspect in the changes in the military environment, as presented in the Eisenhower papers, consists in the relative unimportance of the *direct* superpower confrontation. In the tradition of the American cold war debate the editors speak of an "open and unremitting conflict" (vol. VII, p. XIX) of the two superpowers by 1947. Developments were more twisted on the Army level in that year. The sense of an immediate and direct danger from the Soviet Union and the insistence on preparations against a large-scale attack did not come from the United States¹³ but from Great Britain, fueling committee-level American considerations for this case. Preparations for countering such an attack were clearly impressed on Washington from Europe and Eisenhower took them up because he was genuinely interested in close cooperation with Great Britain. Army strategists and particularly Eisenhower doubted the readiness of the Soviet Union, at least in the short run. The Army rather emphasized the local character of "subversive" or "ideological" conflicts. Taking up their older plans for a strategic network of forward bases to secure the American mainland, the Army feared that local unrests and

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civil war, "subversion," would undermine indirectly American security and in the worst case would provide future bases for the Soviet Union when that country came to possess the military capability to threaten the United States. In this way, regional and local defense against "subversion" was closely linked to the defense of the American mainland.

This distinction is important in view of the developments that led to the formation of NATO. It seems that in 1947 integrated concepts for "defending the Western World" were quite underdeveloped in the military. The Army leadership adapted its previous contingency plans rather than changing them in favor of a genuine defense of Europe. Western Europe was to be defended as part of the defense perimeter of the American mainland, rather than for its own intrinsic value. This may explain some of the contortions in 1948 when the North Atlantic Pact negotiations got under way and it may also shed some light on the perennial fears in Europe about the military reliability of the United States.¹⁴

Even under the new conditions of "ideological war" Eisenhower did not favor all-out militarization. The political realm had to prevail while the military was essentially a force in being that was to shape international affairs in case of emergency. While he saw such an emergency in Greece and Turkey and hence favored extensive military involvement and criticized haphazard approaches, he also reminded the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "in the long run, the U.S. must depend upon *forehand action in its foreign policy* because of the high price of a continuous series of crises, and because the failure to prevent them will contribute to the continuation of international instability and expansionism." Eisenhower recommended political, economic and "ideological" crisis management rather than a series

of *ad hoc* military actions. In a very thoughtful letter to Bedell Smith he worried that a military stabilization of the world would overcommit American resources and thus actually weaken the United States in international affairs.

This recommendation reveals the essence of Eisenhower's vision of international affairs. Mutual understanding and a more "controlled" civilian organization of the world did not come after all. Nevertheless, foreign policy (not military force) had to shape international affairs even under the conditions of confrontation. The military was to be ready in case these policies failed. Eisenhower, in other words, opted for a strict limitation of the military instrument and of the—by now—global system of military preparedness. Just as in domestic affairs, Eisenhower wanted and demanded clear and definite policies. These policies, however, were not forthcoming. Instead of rational foreign policy directions he received ideological programs that were to be "rationalized" on an administrative level in endless negotiations between and within the various administrations.

This seems to be the cause of the problems in the year 1947. The substitution of "rational" policies through ideological commitments like the "defense of the free world" and the very inability to formulate such policies needs explanation, inasmuch as these ideological programs neither came "naturally" nor were they simply manipulated. Obviously, Eisenhower had embraced the values of democracy, individualism, free enterprise, and the American way of life for a long time and had fought a war to defend them. Nevertheless, only in 1947 did they begin to appear in his letters and memoranda with a striking urgency. Foreign policy and military planning seemingly could only be explained in these terms. They seem to have

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provided the only way out of "doubt, confusion, and haziness."

The Eisenhower papers do not provide us with a readymade answer to this major question, at least as far as international affairs are concerned. But within the military realm itself we can find some of the mechanisms that may explain the shift towards those vague, yet compelling "policies" that characterize the political development after 1947.

Eisenhower accepted the Office of the Chief of Staff mainly with the intent to guide the Army and the armed services through the difficult years of transition. He hoped that he would be able to build a new military structure using the lessons of the past war and showing a keen interest in future military and military-technological developments. In assessing the achievements the editors conclude that Eisenhower faced serious difficulties in this central issue of his tenure as Chief of Staff. The verdict must be much harsher: Eisenhower was defeated stunningly and sometimes in an embarrassing way. After 2 years of hardest work he could point at bits and pieces of his original program that were institutionalized, but his concepts as a whole were either postponed or simply sidetracked in the complicated military-political machinery of Washington.

It is not necessary to analyze the details of Eisenhower's program. Most readers of this journal will read this part of the documentation anyway and they will find superbly argued positions advocating a rational and integrated military structure and the return of Universal Military Training. Whatever can be said for and against the various aspects of Eisenhower's programs for a modernized peacetime army within a unified military establishment and for a new unified strategy, they were planned and mapped out in the light of pure professional logic, guided by ruthless efficiency criteria for the whole of the

military establishment and for its various parts. Even though they went far beyond what the public would finally take, they were not at all insensitive to public demands for a scaling down of the armed services. Eisenhower's various strategic proposals—again way beyond what the American public would tolerate and certainly global in nature—were balanced integrating conventional and atomic weapons. They show Eisenhower as a professional and they show him at his best. But for all the clarity of his programs he only got into endless quarrels. His concept of unified theater commands, though one of the more successful exploits, was watered down only to be surpassed by an even more pronounced piecemeal approach for an integrated military organization. Finally, he never gained full approval for a unified war plan. Eisenhower experienced the failure of rational decisionmaking throughout his career.

He never understood why this could happen in his own military domain, why "sane," "enlightened," "comprehensive," and "reasonable" programs—to use some of his favorite adjectives—could fail. Strangely enough, the workings of the power structures in Washington seem to have been completely alien to him. He hoped to crack them by a combination of logical reasoning and friendly business lunches and was almost regularly disappointed despite his readiness for concessions and compromise, which stood in stark contrast to General MacArthur's brisk manners and to the Navy's interest politics. One cannot help but feel relief running through his letters towards the end of his tenure as Chief of Staff.

In a way, though, Eisenhower learned the message better and quicker than most of his military colleagues. He did not lunge even deeper into the political struggle in Washington, but rather moved more and more out of it. If consensus was not to be achieved by bringing the antagonists together and

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by "talking sense," then consensus had to be established above the parties. Boosted by his image as a war hero and supported and influenced by the cold war, Eisenhower moved slowly out of the sphere of bureaucratic interest struggles into the realm of pure representation of American values (see, for example, pp. 1836-38, and p. 2025 where he comments on a "healthy outdoor existence and a need to work . . . in an enlightened rural area" as conducive to success). Where rational decisionmaking failed, only the appeal to common sentiments and values could achieve unity. It was a consensus that left the divisions untouched, yet gave the whole competitive structure of diverse interests a common goal.¹⁵ This seems to be the secret behind the sudden renaissance of value-oriented programs over "rational" policies. Eisenhower had this in mind when he chose the job of president of Columbia University. And he made clear in January 1948 to anybody who could read between the lines that he was perfectly ready to run for President—but only if called by the

people, not if selected by politicking caucuses. Almost intuitively Eisenhower seems to have realized that successful and "rational" planning and decisionmaking were only possible outside the realm of competing interests, backed by the ideological recourse to the people. The transformation from a military professional to a public person was completed.

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower contain information on almost every aspect of military affairs between 1945 and 1948 and on most of the vital political matters of that period. The editors have compiled an excellent index, which makes access to the volumes easy. That should not, however, sidetrack us from the essential questions: Why did the transition from war to peace end in a new, ideological war, and why did a military professional through and through end his military duty under the twin stars of professional disenchantment and growing political success? To retell the story can only be the beginning of a more serious interpretation.

NOTES

1. See, for example, the top secret memorandum of Eisenhower on the "Overall Effect of Atomic Bomb on Warfare and Military Organization," 3 December 1945, p. 575 of text and pp. 575-579 footnotes.

2. One should emphasize that this care was not pure rhetoric. Eisenhower indeed lived up to the ideal of a "citizens army." See his letter on the "blatant discrimination between recreational facilities offered to enlisted men and those offered to officers, particularly those of high rank," p. 351. See also his letter on the right of enlisted men to write "personal letters" to him, pp. 349-350, 1026, 1032.

3. James I. Hewes, *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963* (Washington: U.S. Army, Center of Military History, 1975); *Eisenhower Papers*, p. 679; "Each day I more fully realize the necessity for Regular Army legislation and long range legal decisions concerning organization, site and composition of the Army."

4. One of the main problems was the issue of denazification; see his letter to Patton, 11 September 1945, pp. 351-352. The best recent summary on this issue is Lutz Niethammer, *Entnazifizierung in Bayern. Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter Amerikanischer Besatzung* (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1972).

5. Bert M. Sharp, "'Bring the Boys Home.' Demobilization of the United States Armed Forces After World War II," Unpublished Ph.D. Paper, Michigan State University, East Lansing, 1976.

6. See Eisenhower's memo on "Policies for training of troops awaiting discharge," pp. 670-672; and his letter to the President, pp. 814-815.

7. Clyde E. Jacobs and John F. Gallagher, *The Selective Service Act: A Case Study of the Governmental Process* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1968).

8. See the excellent review of Charles S. Maier, "Revisionism and the Interpretation of Cold War Origins" in Charles S. Maier, ed., *The Origins of the Cold War and Contemporary Europe* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1978), pp. 4-34.

9. Compare Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977).

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10. See pp. 1092-1094; 1125-1128; "The existence of the atomic bomb in our hands is a deterrent in fact, to aggression in the world. We cannot at this time limit our capability to produce or use this weapon," p. 1127; pp. 1125-1127; Barton B. Bernstein, "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1924, 1946," *Journal of American History*, March 1974, pp. 1003-1044; Margaret Gowing, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974). Finally, see p. 1856: "This statement [J.C.S. 1764] is probably correct in the sense that it is distrust of the Soviets which has, by its impact on American public opinion and Congress, formed the resolve of the United States to insist upon adequate controls and safeguards in the control of atomic energy. However, even without regard to the present Soviet posture, it does not appear to me that the United States could, in the interest of its own security, agree to share its atomic resources and knowledge internationally without adequate controls and safeguards. A statement capable of interpretation to the contrary might prove unfortunate.

11. In addition to the numerous documents in the Eisenhower papers, see Michael S. Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense 1941-45* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).

12. See pp. 2020-2022 and pp. 2084-2086. However, Eisenhower maintained a clear head to the very end:

Although we must never lose sight of the constant threat implicit in Soviet political, economic and military aggression, we must remember also that Russia has a healthy respect for the power this nation can generate. Unless they had such a respect they would go right ahead and do as they please in Europe and wouldn't spend their time in piling hysterical charge upon hysterical charge and, in general, showing their own doubts and fears by lying when they know that we know they are lying. p. 2085.

13. A first and most interesting discussion of the possibility of a Soviet threat is in a top secret memorandum to Patterson, 29 March 1946, pp. 962-964.

14. Ernest H. van der Beugel, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership: European Integration as a Concern of American Foreign Policy* (Amsterdam, N.Y.: Elsevier, 1966).

15. For a similar argument see Herbert Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power; An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974).

BOOK REVIEWS

Chester, Edward W. *The United States and Six Atlantic Outposts: The Military and Economic Considerations*. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1980. 260pp.

In this book the author sets out to assess the military and economic relations that the United States has had with the Bahamas, Jamaica, Bermuda, Iceland, Greenland, and the Azores. With a separate chapter on each of these islands, the author traces the history of U.S. relations with each of them from the 18th century through the present.

One of the weaknesses of the book is that while much attention is focused on the history of American relations with each of these islands, little attempt is made to assess their importance to American foreign policy as a whole.

Further, while their bilateral relations with the United States are looked at closely, the author neglected the present domestic political situations in these islands and how they have affected relations with the United States. In particular, no mention was made of Communist participation in Iceland's government nor of how this has affected Iceland's role in NATO.

While the author appears to conclude that each of these islands is important to the United States militarily, he, unfortunately, does not explain why. Are they important because they might provide bases for U.S. forces? If so, for what missions would bases on these islands be important? Or are these islands militarily important not so much for what they contribute to