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In the first decade of this century, the Naval War College played a leading role in the newly institutionalized war planning process. One of the first plans, and the first transoceanic plan, was the Orange Special Situation against Japan. The origins and development of War Plan Orange—"a grand strategy for a war of illusions"—are related here.

THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE AND THE ORIGINS OF WAR-PLANNING AGAINST JAPAN

by
Michael Vlahos

Before the foundation of the General Board, U.S. naval war-planning was confined to *ad hoc* work at the Naval War College. Mahan produced the first of these plans, a "Contingency Plan of Operations in Case of War With Great Britain," drawn up in December 1890. The War College, as an organization, evolved its first war plans during the Venezuelan Crisis in 1895.¹ When the General Board was founded in 1900, to "ensure the efficient preparation of the fleet in case of war," the formulation of official "war portfolios" was institutionalized at last.² The fears of American legislators would not allow the creation of a true general staff along the Prussian model. The General Board, therefore, had no command function and operated as a purely advisory body. Nevertheless, under the leadership of Admiral of the Navy George Dewey, its counsel carried great weight.

In war-planning, the General Board could be seen almost as an extension of the Naval War College for there the

tactical and strategic problems were cast, played, analyzed, and codified for transmission to the General Board. The Board—one of whose members was also the president of the Naval War College—modified, approved, and made official the adoption or the updating of a War Portfolio. The intellectual ferment in war-planning was added by the officer-students at the Naval War College.³

In America's debut years as a world power, two basic war strategies were created, one against "Black" (Germany), the other against "Orange" (Japan). War Portfolio No. 1, against Black, grew out of the strategic insecurity occasioned by the Venezuelan Crisis of 1903⁴ and envisaged a German battle fleet strike across the Atlantic. German intentions in this were presumed to be the destruction of the Monroe Doctrine through the seizure of bases in the Caribbean, and spreading German colonial influence throughout Hispanic America. War Portfolio No. 2, against

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Orange, quickly took form during the Japanese-American Crisis of late 1906-1907.⁵ Pacific planning envisioned a Japanese descent upon U.S. possessions in the Far East.

These plans encapsulated opposing facets of the Navy "world view," just as they faced opposing headings of the compass. The Black War Plan grew in some measure out of Dewey's Germanophobia⁶ and represented a traditional American strategic view. Here was the defensive stance, righteously taken against scheming European powers who would violate the Monroe Doctrine: an American battle fleet standing solemn vigil in the Eastern Caribbean.

How different was the Orange Plan. There, the farflung battle fleet of the United States, defending an insular empire and Asiatic interests against the competing interests of a rival system, would do battle along the American oceanic frontier: the rim of empire. As Frederick Merk or Akira Iriye⁷ would tell us, it was the furthestmost frontier of our history, of a manifest destiny that flung us, first across a wild continent, and then over a vast ocean.

The Orange War Plan was America's first transoceanic conflict plan. As it evolved at Newport during the first decade of this century, the "Orange Special Situation" demarcated, in operational metaphor, America's emergence in the world. The evolution of war scenarios at the Naval War College reflected the larger evolution of America's perceived interest in international conditions.

Reluctant Amity, 1897-1905. The first thoughts expressed at the Naval War College on the possibility of war with Japan appeared in June of 1897. A short essay, written by the Board on Defenses at the Naval War College and entitled "War with Spain and Japan," was occasioned by the Hawaiian crisis of that year.⁸ Its author attempted to

sketch a strategy with the very limited means then at the Navy's disposal. In the event of war, the objective of both the United States and Japan was focused on the Hawaiian Islands. Although a Japanese invasion of the west coast was not expected, "it is admitted that the Japanese might coal either at one of the Aleutian islands or might take temporary possession of Puget Sound... for the purpose of coaling."⁹ A tone of casual pessimism permeates the paper. For example, a general fleet action was expected to "take place which would probably settle for the time being the question of supremacy on the islands."¹⁰ "In case hostilities were delayed until 1898 when the Japanese would be in possession of two first-class battleships," the war planner became very grim indeed. Concurrent hostilities with Spain prevented another first-class battleship from being detached from the Atlantic to reinforce *Oregon*. Only the second-class *Maine* could be spared. With the U.S. Pacific Squadron outgunned, and with San Francisco defenseless before the two big, brand new Japanese battleships, "it would be necessary for us to abandon the Sandwich Islands temporarily and with our fleet fall back to the support of San Francisco."¹¹

This was a sorry tale, for it was the Japanese Navy that seized the initiative, spanning the ocean and descending upon the coast of the enemy homeland. This analysis and its assumptions reflected a world view worthy of a minor navy, still imbued with the operational ethos of a coast defense force.

A much more sophisticated summary of this situation, written by the president of the Naval War College, Capt. Caspar F. Goodrich, reached conclusions identical to the roughly sketched plan for a twin-ocean war against Spain *and* Japan.¹² Drawn up in response to a letter from Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt, its

sobering recommendations are in stark contrast to Roosevelt's eagerness to "smash" the Japanese Fleet. According to Goodrich, "the most serious consideration is our marked numerical inferiority." This situation, of course, would have precluded an offensive move into Japanese home waters. Furthermore, "it should not be forgotten that the Japanese enjoy one marked initial advantage over us in recent war experience... while our personnel... have not received their due need of training...."¹³ He responded to Roosevelt's expectation of "destroying the Japanese fleet," saying, "it is well to remember that Nelson said 'Numbers alone annihilate.'" Finally, the president of the War College offered his professional opinion that "the College regrets that facts seem to forbid a rapid, vigorous, aggressive war."¹⁴

This tone of unequivocal pessimism must have done much to dampen Roosevelt's martial ardor over the Hawaiian question. Furthermore, the assumption underscored by Goodrich may well have prompted the "secret and confidential" instructions John D. Long—Secretary of the Navy—sent some 3 weeks later to Admiral Beardslee. His cautionary directions to avoid any escalation of naval tensions in the Pacific reflected a "shallow water" strategic vision within the Navy, a perception at this point of a Navy incapable of Pacific power projection.

Japan was mentioned again as a potential foe of the United States in a paper submitted to the Naval War College in the spring of 1900 by Lt. John M. Ellicott. Entitled "Sea Power of Japan," its thesis and tone reflected an attitude toward the Japanese not far removed from the tentative war plans of 1897.¹⁵ Ellicott was full of praise for the Japanese people, who "possess the characteristics of courage, endurance, intelligence and patriotism that have been amply proven in their recent foreign war."¹⁶ To their navy, he

accorded the highest praise, placing their professionalism on a level second only to the navy of Great Britain, and *above* that of the United States. Japan, he conceded, possessed a "fleet equal in fighting capacity to the combined Eastern squadrons of any three Occidental Powers."¹⁷

In contrast, 3 years of U.S. naval expansion had not expanded the scope of naval strategy. Although Ellicott admitted that the United States, through acquisition of advanced bases in the Philippines and Guam, had gained the "strategic advantage," he implied that this was an advantage only "from a geographic point of view."¹⁸ Like the pessimistic planners of 1897, the young lieutenant handed the initiative to the Japanese. Instead of describing a plan of operations against the home islands, he chose a "worst case" approach: "Suppose, however, that Japan felt strong enough to hold in check any force threatening her from the Philippines, and at the same time to assume the offensive against the United States across the Pacific?"¹⁹

The same trying specter of Japanese descent upon Hawaii and Unalaska was then replayed in grim analysis, culminating in the invasion of California via Santa Barbara and San Diego. Unlike the unfought campaigns of 1897, Ellicott's essay had no pretext for war, no *casus belli*, no "scenario." It was more a warning against the consequences of unpreparedness than it was a strategic plan: "We have the resources and have acquired the position; it only remains—but it *still* remains—to use the resources in making the positions strong."²⁰

Ellicott drew a strategic portrait of Japan as a potential enemy of the far future, if ever. His paper provided more important insight in predicting the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and in his confident assertion that Japan would come to blows with Russia or Germany long before the United States. In

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another study, written by Ellicott and submitted to the General Board in April 1900,²¹ he even went so far as to suggest that a Russian battle fleet might threaten the Philippines. War with Russia was a distinct possibility in Ellicott's speculations. In such a *mise-en-scène*, alliance with Japan would be only natural.²²

Russo-American rivalry in China had been intensifying since the Boxer Rebellion over the policy of the Open Door.²³ American naval officers stationed in the Far East developed serious hostilities toward the Russians they encountered in Manchuria and North China. Should it seem surprising, then, that senior officers should begin to suggest that Imperial Russia might actually be America's primary potential enemy? Rear Adm. George C. Remy—commander of U.S. naval forces in Asiatic waters during the siege of the legations in Peking—reported to the General Board on 29 May 1902 and the minutes of his briefing suggested his bias: "In regard to a possible coalition in the East, Rear-Admiral Remy thought that on one side might be arrayed England, Japan, and the United States, and on the other Russia and France...."²⁴

This vision of a triple alliance with Great Britain and Japan against Russia became so alluring to U.S. war planners during 1902 that a *bona fide* plan of operations in the Pacific was actually considered on this basis. During the summer of 1902 students at the Naval War College prepared its "Solution of Problem of 1902" for just such a war as had been envisaged by Remy earlier that spring. The war scenario, set primarily in Korea and Southern Manchuria, was a harbinger of the Great War to come. The allied armies were stalemated in Korea somewhere north of Seoul and a static, entrenched position warfare ensued. At sea the superior combined squadrons of the Triple Alliance bottled-up

the weaker fleet formations of Russia and France in their bases, from Kamranh Bay to Vladivostok.²⁵

Whether the General Board directed the War College to focus on Russia as the "enemy" of its annual problem after hearing the forceful, "on-scene" arguments of Remy is not known. There were discussions in the spring of 1901 between the General Board and Rear Adm. Frederick Rodgers—commanding U.S. naval forces in the Far East—concerning contingency plans in case of war with Russia, presumably over the principle of the Open Door in Manchuria.²⁶ Given the strategic planning that was pursued against Russia at the Naval War College in 1902, it appears that the Russian Empire was seriously considered as a potential enemy of the United States for several years.

Whatever the contemporary significance of the Navy's first flirtation with war-planning against Russia, it marked the fullness of sympathy within the Navy toward the strategic problems then faced by Japan. In the 1902 plan, Japan was very much the senior alliance partner, the key to the war effort: "A noteworthy feature of the conditions favoring the success of the Triple Alliance is found in the presence of the admirably organized Japanese Army." For its part, the Japanese Navy was considered the operational equal of the Royal Navy.²⁷

This is the significance of the Problem of 1902. During the period of Russophobia in the U.S. Navy, the Japanese Navy was viewed as a worthy potential ally of the U.S. Navy. If, as both Ellicott and Remy warned, Japan "would be glad to get into the Philippines," they were quick to add that "Japan likes best of all foreigners the American."²⁸ Here one may sense the overtones of a tradition of Japanese-American friendship continued since Perry.²⁹

These were fading overtones by 1904. The world of the Problem of 1902 was ideal for a navy still rooted in a traditional American outlook. The Navy of 1902 had no real primary antagonists. None of its overseas bases was threatened, and the policy of the Open Door that it was sworn to uphold in China meant the checking of Russia, a move that Japan would be only too happy to make a checkmate. An incipient natural alliance between the three predominant seapowers of the Pacific automatically ruled out the specter of strategic rivalry. With Russia as the inevitable enemy of Great Britain, Japan, and the United States, the Navy could look forward to playing, as in its "problem," a casual supporting role in the coming struggle that Brooks Adams had outlined in 1900: that of "civilization" locked in mortal combat with the barbarian "Slav."³⁰ In terms of contemporary American perceptions of global "space," Russia was on the periphery, comfortably buffered by Great Britain and Japan whose navies would hold center stage in the future war. Such a play, and such a role, fit well into a traditional American world view of its place in international politics. Something of this expectation can be glimpsed in the introduction to the Problem of 1902: "April 15, 1903. Cossacks kill American missionaries in Manchuria. April 20. United States declares war on Russia and France."³¹

America had embraced an insular empire in 1898, stretching from Hawaii to Palawan. As an expanding *enceinte* advanced America's sense of "vital interests" from hemispheric to transoceanic concepts of space, traditional responses still tended to govern the expectant image of American involvement in both international politics and in global war.

The Crisis, 1906-1908. The development of a serious war plan against Germany in the Course of 1903

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at the Naval War College gave the United States its first official potential enemy of the 20th century. From the strategic insecurity prompted by the entrance of German warships into the Caribbean grew a fabulous tale of future Teutonic perfidy. To destroy the Monroe Doctrine, Germany's entire High Seas Fleet would sortie across the Atlantic to annihilate the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and then proceed to seize bases and expand imperial influence throughout Hispanic America.³²

With the creation of what would in 10 years be codified as the Black War Plan, the Navy institutionalized two critical strategic doctrines. To meet the newly discovered, overwhelming threat of the German Navy, the U.S. Navy at long last sought "concentration of the Battle Fleet"—Mahan's hallowed adjuration. Furthermore, it was necessary to concentrate this fleet in the Atlantic.

A Caribbean Fleet concentration—to meet the Kaiser's imperial thrust—meant, however, virtual abandonment of a budding U.S. imperial strategy of its own in the Pacific.

Mahan himself—the embodiment of the principle of fleet concentration—took arms against the solution to fleet distribution urged on the General Board after the Course of 1903:

To remove our fleet—battle fleet—from the Pacific would be a declaration of policy and a confession of weakness. It would mean a reversion to a policy narrowly American, and essentially defensive, which is militarily vicious.

In brief, the American question, the Monroe principle, though not formally accepted, is as nearly established as is given to international questions to be. The Pacific and Eastern is not in that case, and is the great coming question.³³

Here in perfect encapsulation is the embryo of the Navy's paradigm shift

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from hemispheric containment to global mission. Although a concatenation of crises had not yet produced a threat to U.S. interests in the Far East in the form of an inevitable enemy, the stage of the theater of decision was ready; and "the great coming question" clearly involved the "destiny" of the United States.

However prescient was Mahan's sense of the slow shift of the imperial center of gravity, it is ironic that his principle of fleet concentration was so misapplied, both from strategic and historicist perspectives. By marshaling its battleships in the Atlantic, the General Board chose a defensive stance against an unlikely threat in preference to an expansive employment of the Navy in transpacific diplomacy. Monroe was still stronger than Mahan, and Atlantic iconography of U.S. foreign policy still held sway in naval world view.

Given a battle fleet concentration in the Atlantic, the first question thrust upon the creators of the Black War Plan directly involved, in the absence of an Isthmian Canal, was the conduct of Pacific War strategy. There might not be a strong candidate for a Pacific potential enemy from Vladivostok to Valparaiso. There were always the Germans, however, and the Kaiser might just decide to attack the Philippines, settling for a more limited dismemberment of the new American Empire. As the officers of the Course of 1903 reasoned, "it is doubtful if public sentiment in the U.S. would be excited to the same extent by the loss of the Philippines."³⁴

Thus was erected the barricade that was to haunt Navy war planners to the opening day of the Panama Canal. Once the Naval War College recommended, and once the General Board sealed its decision in Mahanian writ to station the U.S. Battle Fleet in the Atlantic, no one seemed able to conceive a satisfactory means of transferring that mighty flotilla in time of war from one

American ocean to the other. They came to rue the day, these makers of naval strategy, that they ever came to name the German Empire as "Potential Enemy Number One," create a special plan of operations against its fleet, and deposit the entire strength of the United States at sea along an Atlantic front. Just 3 years after the Course of 1903, a major diplomatic crisis between the United States and Japan drew the curtain to Mahan's "great coming question" of the Pacific. The crisis was sparked when the San Francisco School Board, citing "the higher end" of shielding that city's white children from the dangers of "association with pupils of the Mongolian Race," instituted a pupil segregation policy. Japan declared that the United States had thereby broken the equal treatment clause of the Japanese-American Treaty of 1894. As the image in the U.S. Navy of its Japanese counterpart began to metamorphose into that of a potential, and then probable enemy, the Pacific impotence accruing from Atlantic concentration became intolerable. The nightmare of strategic fleet movement was the central conundrum faced by Navy war planners before 1914. As will be revealed in their correspondence and analyses of the situation during the peak period of the Japanese-American crisis, it was a trauma that they did not awake from until 22 February 1909 when The Great White Fleet returned to Hampton Roads.

From October 1906 to July 1907, when the crisis faded after President Roosevelt formally apologized to Japan, war with Japan became for the first time a possibility not confined to the imagination. In every war plan and war game prepared at the Naval War College, the Army War College, and in every deliberation of the Joint Board of the Army Staff and the Navy General Board, the strategic movement of the battle fleet was always the critical factor. Victory or defeat for the United States

in a war with Japan was seen to hinge on the timing of the entrance of the U.S. Battle Fleet into the "theater of decision." Too often in game and in analysis was this timing off.

The summer before the crisis, the students at the Naval War College were wrestling with the problem of war with Japan. As its Problem for that summer, the Conference of 1906 was handed a set of "Questions Relating to the Campaign Between Blue and Orange." Although hardly premeditated to meet the strategic needs raised by the coming crisis, the "Solution of the Problem" formed the basis of what would soon become the U.S. Navy's Orange War Plan.³⁵

Under its terms, hostilities commenced on 1 June 1907. Blue's battle fleet of sixteen ships concentrated at Manila Bay, with another division of four ironclads at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese Fleet is anchored in "Hancock Bay and the O Sima Straits." This was the setup: the outbreak of war placed Blue at its prepared strategic pivot, just 1753 miles from Tokyo Bay, ready to advance on the home islands with a two to one superiority in numbers and two and a half to one preponderance of force. Advancing along the Manila-Pescadores-Chusan axis, the U.S. Battle Fleet would meet and destroy the Japanese Fleet in a decisive action. From advanced bases just off the shores of Japan, American battleships would roam at will, bombarding the rich cities within the Inland Sea.³⁶

One unpardonable assumption reveals the Problem of 1906 to be, though still an authentic prototype, something less than a serious war plan. The battle strength of the U.S. Navy, according to the doctrine of Atlantic concentration, was at anchor in Hampton Roads in January of 1907. Somehow, by the first of June, the entire battle fleet managed to reach Manila Bay *before* the outbreak of hostilities.³⁷

Such luck was admitted by the students

of the Conference of 1906 to be less than unlikely. Blue strategy in the Pacific might be crippled by the need for a transoceanic fleet movement; yet the students at the conference barely explored the possibility that Orange might attack before Blue was prepared. An explanation for this attitude can be found in Question 18 which asked: "What coal and supplies will be necessary for a fleet of 8 battleships... while making passage under war conditions from Guantanamo to Manila via the Panama Canal?" The Conference of 1906 did not concern itself with the time and intricate logistics necessary to send a fleet to Manila via the Suez Canal, or around Cape Horn in order to assemble in San Francisco.³⁸

In the summer of 1906 it was still assumed that no substantial threat to U.S. interests in the Far East lay on the horizon—for at least the next decade. By 1916, the Canal would allow quick-response fleet concentration in either of the American oceans. Unfortunately, the crisis broke in October of 1906. Ironically, just weeks before, the General Board had advised the Roosevelt administration that Germany was the primary threat to the United States, and that the principle of Atlantic concentration had been vindicated.³⁹

In the archives of the Naval War College there lies the last remaining copy of America's first formal war plan against Japan.⁴⁰ Cryptically entitled, "In Case of Strained Relations with Japan," it was drawn up in the late autumn of 1906, probably in early November, by the General Board. In strategic approach and in objective it was identical to the Solution to the Problem—1906 concluded at the Naval War College in early September.⁴¹ The pace and conduct of the war would be brisk and straightforward. The tone was confident:

In short, after the arrival of our battle fleet in the Far East, our

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naval policy during the war with Japan would be:

- 1st. The seizure of a base.
- 2nd. The defeat of the Japanese battle fleet at sea.
- 3rd. The blockade and commercial isolation of Japan and destruction of her commerce.
- 4th. The recapture of such of our colonial possessions as have fallen into the hands of the Japanese.
- 5th. The capture of the Japanese naval port in the Pescadores.
- 6th. The final and complete commercial isolation of Japan.⁴²

In optimistic, businesslike, prose it all seemed so easy and so simple—as though the narrative of war with Japan would resemble a reading of Mahan's principles of naval strategy from an Academy textbook. Spelling out a war strategy demanded all of three pages in the plan.

Getting the battle fleet to its Pacific rendezvous filled the next 40.

The problem of moving the battle fleet overshadowed all other considerations. Although the same fleet was to make the same passage just 1 year later, it was a fantastic proposal to consider in case of war. Fourteen battleships, two armored cruisers, fifteen cruisers, four armed liners, six destroyers, and thirteen auxiliaries⁴³—the entire Atlantic Fleet—would steam out of Chesapeake Bay in the direction of the Zafarin Islands off the coast of Morocco. After coaling there for 5 days, the fleet would steer for Port Said via the Mediterranean, pass through the Suez Canal, and drop anchor off Aden. Another 5 days for coaling, and the fleet would make for Mahe in the Seychelles, where the Asiatic Fleet of five cruisers and the Armored Cruiser Squadron of four ships would be waiting. The complete armada, referred to as the Combined Fleet, would then set its course for the Straits of Sunda and another coaling, finally to go forth toward the Macassar Straits and the

Philippines, "to meet the Japanese fleet."⁴⁴

Total estimated elapsed time: 87.64 days. Total coal consumed: 220,994 tons.⁴⁵ Inasmuch as the fleet would be unable to assemble enough colliers to enable a measure of self-sufficiency in fuel, secret agents were to be sent abroad to buy and to arrange for the delivery of some 197,000 tons of coal to be held at the Zafarin Islands, Aden, the Seychelles Islands, and Lampung Bay.⁴⁶ Two big cruisers were to be sent ahead to guard the ends of the Suez Canal "to prevent a Japanese man of war or merchantman from entering."⁴⁷ The entire schedule was thoroughly developed. Even the Suez Canal charges for the fleet had been computed: \$367,484.69 for 67 ships.⁴⁸

In spite of all the components of careful planning, it is hard for the latter-day reader to shake the impression of fantasy. Analogy to the tragic image of Rojestvenskiy and his fated fleet is ineradicable. No matter how successful its 3-month cruise, the fleet and its commander would face the certainty of battle before base. Ostensibly, the General Board accepted this limitation on U.S. strategy. This was their solution to the sure loss of the fleet base before the fleet's arrival:

When Manila had been taken by the Japanese... the Army would... retire and establish themselves in the hills back of Manila, where... they would be able to hold out until the arrival of the fleet.

After our fleet has arrived and Manila is no longer controlled by the guns of the Japanese fleet, the Army could cooperate with the Navy and reoccupy Manila.⁴⁹

Again, the tone was confident, even arrogant. The General Board had complete faith in the superiority of the U.S. Battle Fleet to sweep all before it. O.N.I. had informed the Board that, as

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of 31 October, Japan had no more than five battleships ready for service. Those capital ships of the Imperial Fleet undergoing repair—including five captured Russian ironclads—would, however, bring the total Japanese battleline to eleven ships within several months.⁵⁰ In a war with Japan in 1907, therefore, the United States could count only on a marginal battle fleet superiority of 14:11. Rojstvenskiy, it must be remembered, had had ten battleships to Togo's four. In 1905 the Japanese tactical advantage lay in armored cruisers and torpedo craft.⁵¹ So it was 2 years later.

Decisive battle was the *pièce montée* of U.S. naval strategy in 1906. Ignoring the defensive posture of the Japanese Imperial Fleet in the war against Russia, the General Board saw only the culminating action at Tsushima: as though Trafalgar could have come off without the Channel Fleet's 3-year blockade of Brest. They anticipated the climax of victory without understanding the foundation process of successful sea strategy. They were incapable of imagining a war of attrition, with a stranded battle fleet, against a fortified enemy, defending lines of communication 13,000 miles long. Reliance on the decisive action to achieve "The Objective" was the illusion that straightjacketed U.S. naval strategy to 1941.

To say that the General Board had constructed a grand strategy for a war of illusions would be charitable. There is a single contemporary marginal note appearing in the War College copy of the war plan every time that the seizure of a fleet base is mentioned. It is a single word: "where?"

By January 1907 the diplomatic situation had deteriorated to the point that the General Board felt it necessary to consult with the Army General Staff on "the question of probable movements during war with Japan."⁵² A Joint Committee was organized, composed of

two officers from the Naval War College and three officers of the Army General Staff. Meetings of the committee were held at the Army War College during January and February 1907. Using the basic war plan of the General Board, several preliminary papers were developed on what was then called Orange-Blue Special Situation.

Unlike the blithe assumptions of the General Board's plan, the harsh realities of a war with Japan were faced squarely by the Joint Committee. One paper, entitled "The Possibility of Great Britain Becoming Japan's Ally," concludes, in less than sanguine language, that "it is plain from the wording of the treaty of alliance that Great Britain could find easy justification in taking active sides with Japan if, indeed, she did not feel honor bound to do so."⁵³

A paper on general strategy written 11 days later stated flatly that without Britain's neutrality "the voyage to the Far East cannot be even considered."⁵⁴ The passage of the battle fleet to the Philippines was reaffirmed as the *idée fixe* of American grand strategy; the Atlantic Fleet was still to steam by the shortest route—via Suez—to Manila. Unlike the complacent plans of the General Board, the Joint Committee accepted the possibility of defeat and the certainty of a long war. Japanese naval strength was respected, especially the preponderance in torpedo craft, and a complete collapse of U.S. defenses in the Philippines was expected *before* the arrival of the battle fleet. After examining the "best-case" U.S. strategy, the preliminary conclusions of the Joint Committee, chaired by Cdr. H.S. Knapp, U.S. Navy, made depressing reading:

When the United States Force shall have arrived it will have no home coal mines and only one naval base in those waters. . . . Nor must the possibility of Olangapo's fall, before the arrival of our fleet,

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be lost to sight That possibility is very great Our situation will be well nigh desperate if Olangapo does not succeed in holding out The Japanese should be able to approximate equality in numbers in time by adopting a wearing down policy, avoiding action and conserving their own ships "Command of the Sea" will thus not be established the moment our Atlantic Fleet reaches the Philippines, and it may be months before it does become established.⁵⁵

All of the blithe assumptions of the 1906 General Board plan were interred by this sober prognosis. They envisaged a grim scenario: The Atlantic Fleet would arrive exhausted, without access to coal or major repair facilities;⁵⁶ the fleet whittled down to near parity after audacious Japanese night torpedo attacks;⁵⁷ all naval facilities at Pearl Harbor and on Guam destroyed by a Japanese raiding squadron in the initial days of war;⁵⁸ and a Philippines expeditionary force of two corps that would require 10 months to transport—if, in a successful campaign, the Navy could "neutralize" the enemy battle fleet.⁵⁹

The depressed presentiments of a war with Japan were leavened somewhat in the final memorandum submitted on 18 February 1907. There was a chance for U.S. victory only if Philippines defense efforts could be shifted from Manila Bay and Olangapo to the more inaccessible Subic Bay. If Subic Bay could be held for 3 months, the memo implied, the war might yet be won. "Subic Bay must be defended to the last."⁶⁰ Thus the origin of one of the unhappiest traditions in U.S. strategy. As Mahan wrote in bitter irony on 28 January: "That we should have a stronghold impregnable as Port Arthur . . . *Absit omen!*"⁶¹

Two officers at the Naval War College that spring did not accept the strategic tenets of either the General

Board or the Joint Committee. To them, the battle fleet succor of the Philippines via Suez was the outgrowth of a single battle, a short war illusion. Lcdr. W.D. MacDougall's "Study of Special Situation" concluded: "The probability is that the blue fleet, arriving at Manila via Suez . . . would be expended. That would end the war. If we call the time three months, the route via Suez means a short war, totally unsuccessful for Blue."⁶²

Only through a concentration of the entire U.S. Navy on the American west coast, followed by a deliberate and fully supported advance across the Pacific, could victory be achieved against Orange. This concept was further distilled by Cdr. J.H. Oliver who, in a short memorandum to the president of the Naval War College dated 20 April 1907, forecast the basic axis of a future, and a real, Pacific war: "Upon the outbreak of war in our present state of unpreparedness, regard our oversea pacific possessions as temporarily lost, and proceed resolutely to their reconquest . . . through advance across the Pacific upon a broad strategic front."⁶³ Rather than staking the outcome of the war on a single battle—very probably fought on waters and under combat conditions of the enemy's choosing—Oliver developed a deliberate approach to wrest command of the sea from Japan. By concentrating on the objective of battle rather than battle as an end in itself, both Oliver and MacDougall sensed the limitations and imperatives of war with Japan.

To the president of the Naval War College, such strategies were viewed as somehow strangely defeatist.⁶⁴ At the Naval War College one was taught that proper naval strategy led ineluctably to Trafalgar-like decisions. Was not Tsushima a vindication of Mahan's principles and the "Nelson touch"? But then, most of the military and naval staffs of the world before 1914 were imbued with a kind of short-war ethos.

This was an almost universal spirit, and it spurred them on, encouraging with the expectation that inspired staff work and meticulous planning could quickly bring a war to a clean and efficient conclusion. The legend of the Elder Moltke had seized the imagination of an entire generation of officers at the American war colleges.⁶⁵

When it was realized that operational planning involved more than coaling preparation and fleet mobilization, there was a rapid cooling of an ebullient Service spirit. The creation of the Orange Plan was something of a trauma for both Army and Navy. Some part of the depression affecting the military services in 1907 in regard to the prospects of a war against Orange can be recognized in the "Diary and Comments" accompanying the Army War College Course of 1907-1908 Strategic Game. Held 27-30 January 1908, the "Problem Involving War Between Orange and Blue" narrated the course of a humiliating campaign—for Blue. War was declared by Japan on 15 January 1908. Twenty-eight days were required to conclude operations against the Philippines. "Subig falls after destruction of dock, vessels, heavy artillery and coal; all troops prisoners of war."⁶⁶ Guam fell on 19 January. Hawaii was invaded on the 25th and by 6 February Honolulu fell. Two U.S. battleships were scuttled at Pearl. Given this new threat, the Atlantic Fleet was hastily rerouted to San Francisco via the Strait of Magellan. From 25 February to 15 March, Orange proceeded to land three divisions at Monterey and one at Puget Sound. San Francisco fell. Orange landed 2,000 marines in Panama and destroyed the coal stocks and isthmian railroad. Blue battle fleet arrived off Panama 23 March and suffered prompt attrition from Orange destroyer/cruiser attacks. By 5 May, the 110th day of the war, "Orange has three divisions about Admiralty Inlet and three about San Francisco."⁶⁷ A temporary base was

improvised for the Blue battle fleet at Bellingham Bay. Blue was left with 14 battleships to Orange 11, and only 5 armored cruisers to Orange 10. "Orange fleet appears and both fleets prepare for a decisive engagement."⁶⁸ At this point the game, mercifully, terminated.

For such a miserable performance the team representing Blue was only lightly criticized. In his commentary on the game the president of the Army War College faulted only the Blue naval deployment that allowed Orange to bottle up and destroy two Blue battleships in Pearl Harbor. Orange, in 1941 clairvoyance, was heavily scolded for its initial strategic dispersion of forces, "in the accomplishment of her object by attacking simultaneously at two widely separated points.... In this connection it is worth considering what might have happened had ORANGE dispatched her entire force for BLUE's Pacific Coast possessions."⁶⁹

Granted, these are the words of an army general, and a landsman. His naval counterpart, Rear Adm. J.W. Mertell, revealed in a letter to the Army War College president that strategic opinion in Newport could reach neither a base for consensus nor a spirit of optimism. In regard to the response at the Naval War College to the memorandum of Knapp and the Joint Committee, he wrote:

During the discussion here, no marked unanimity was manifested on any of the salient features of the memorandum, and the final approval thereof by the majority of the staff can only be considered... as a series of compromises... the conclusion on each special feature of the plan being in the nature of a choice of evils... a plan (to which I see grave objections) to abandon entirely our possessions in the Far East... and then proceed to their re-conquest by way of Hawaii and Guam... had its advocates as

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offering the maximum chance of ultimate success....

In view of the above I can only regard the memorandum... as emphasizing the difficulty of the problem, and pointing to the necessity of further study....⁷⁰

In short, the war planning staffs of the two armed services, and especially of the Navy, were bankrupted over Pacific strategy, and forced so to confess. In a war with Japan in 1907 it was expected that the United States would lose the Philippines and, because there were no forces for its defense, possibly Hawaii. A battle fleet could no doubt make the long passage to Manila. There would be no proper base awaiting the armada upon its arrival there. A so-called "advance base" could be set up with materials transported for that purpose.⁷¹ This equipment would include, however, neither drydock nor coal deposit. An expeditionary army to reconquer the Philippines and the tonnage necessary to transport it could not be assembled for at least 6 months. According to the General Board, this force could never transit across the Pacific in the face of Japanese interdiction.⁷² It would be a war of Japanese initiative and U.S. attrition, with lines of communication and supply 13,418 miles long.

In 1907, logistical technologies were not yet capable of creating structures to support navies and expeditionary armies thousands of miles from and independent of permanent base facilities. So-called "advanced base" materials could never have sustained a battle fleet, under constant attack from enemy squadrons themselves possessed of a secure Philippines base. A battle under these conditions might be little better than a replay of 1905, with Admiral Togo again commanding the victorious fleet.

These were the findings of both war colleges, amply tested by wargaming

and by simple logic. Until the completion of the Panama Canal, the principle of Atlantic battle fleet concentration remained the central conundrum in any contemplation of Pacific strategy. This inviolate doctrine was reasserted by the General Board on 25 April 1907:

At the present time no European nation has a single battleship outside of European waters, which fact is considered a cogent reason that our entire battle fleet should be concentrated on the Atlantic coast.

Japan only being under consideration, it would be better to have the battle fleet in the Philippines... but as we must also be prepared for possible trouble with European nations in defense of the Monroe Doctrine, it would be unwise to put all our battle fleet in the Pacific waters.⁷³

In spite of all warnings and prognostications from Newport, Dewey and the Board, possessed by an entrenched Germanophobia extending back in time to the fleet admiral's confrontation with Diederichs in 1898,⁷⁴ kept their strategic lens fixed on the *Hochseeflotte*. When the strength of the battle fleet reached 30—a "Two-Ocean Standard"—they conceded that the capital ships "may be assigned to the Atlantic and Pacific coasts in the proportion deemed most expedient, even though the Panama Canal is not yet finished."⁷⁵

For 40 years an enduring part of Navy mythology, the concept of the "Two-Ocean Navy" had its official nativity in this memorandum. As a measurable reality, the standard was not achieved—in peacetime—until 1945. By that time the aircraft carrier had replaced the dreadnought as capital ship. America's classic battle fleet never, in fact, attained a 30-ship standard in modern frontline units. Fleet concentration was, therefore, the strategic watchword until

F.D.R. split the fleet in 1941. In 1907, its concentration in the Atlantic was viewed by some officers as unsound.

Dewey's trusted ex-aide, and a member of the General Board, Capt. Nathan Sargent represented a large faction of officers who saw in Atlantic concentration the strategic root of U.S. defeat in a Pacific war. Sargent delivered a strongly argued memorandum to the assembled Board on 15 June 1907. He began by portraying in stark terms the dangerous assumptions behind the current Suez-Subic strategy of citadel relief. To the Board's excuse in the form of a Two-Ocean Standard of 30 capital ships, Sargent replied that such a standard had already in fact been reached: "The theory of concentration on our Atlantic Coast was a necessary one so long as our number of capital ships was limited, but is it advisable to hold this theory when we may be said to possess 22 battleships and 10 armored cruisers?"⁷⁶

In the event of hostilities with Japan, Sargent continued, the dividends of fleet division would be enormous. Japan would be constrained from dividing her Fleet in support of simultaneous attacks on the Philippines and Hawaii. If the Philippines were ignored, and Hawaii or the west coast substituted as the objectives of Japanese strategy, the U.S. Pacific battle squadron could easily proceed south "to establish a rendezvous where the Atlantic Fleet, after passing *unmolested* through the Strait of Magellan, could unite with the Pacific force." (Italics mine)⁷⁷ For the Strait route, as Sargent underscored again and again, would be a safe and sure passage. To expose an unsupported fleet to the "latent animosity and jealousy of European nations" on route to Suez, where the canal might be blocked to a war fleet by a treaty-bound Britain, is implied madness. This caveat was in prudent contrast to the Mediterranean-cruise atmosphere of the General Board's 1906 war plan. As Rojestven-

skiy discovered, there is nothing more demoralizing to a combat fleet than a parade in full public view, jeered by journalists and harassed by "neutral" squadrons.

There was a diplomatic objective to Sargent's petition. With the battle fleet concentrated in the Atlantic, Japan, in the event of war, would have 3 uninterrupted months to seize and fortify its objectives across the Pacific. Would the combined Imperial Staff consider the gamble of war with a major part of the U.S. Fleet in San Francisco? A fleet, Sargent suggested, possessed a peacetime deterrent potential quite the equal of its war-fighting capacity. In this context, he concluded, "the concentration of the whole at a distance of 11,000 miles from a threatened point may not be a logical application of strategic principles."⁷⁸

There was a sense of urgency in his imagery, almost a premonition of war. Sargent's fear of Orange was reflected in his image of the Japanese people as a dangerous warrior race, "...a bellicose people whose heads are already turned by successful war waged against an implacable enemy, and whose feelings are being worked upon by adroit politicians with subtle arguments on questions of race antipathy and alleged details of persecution of their compatriots."⁷⁹ After all, almost the entire Russian Battle Fleet—22 armored ships—had been destroyed or captured by the Japanese Imperial Fleet in 1904-1905. In decrying the prospect of a voyage to be made halfway around the world before the prospect of battle, Sargent could not better insinuate the image of a U.S. Battle Fleet following the wake of Rojestvenskiy.

Sargent's recommendations were rejected. Four years later Mahan, having read the Naval War College's *Strategic War Plan of 1911*, *Blue-Orange*, wrote a critique to the president, Capt. Raymond P. Rodgers. In his commentary the architect of seapower strongly

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questioned the southern approach to the Philippines via Suez. Mahan preferred a northern route to establish a formal base at Kiska, involving a battle fleet passage through the Strait of Magellan to Bremerton. Mahan's striking strategic suggestion involved outflanking the Japanese position in Hawaii by striking first at Guam from Kiska, and then on both the Philippines and the Japanese home islands along a double axis.⁸⁰

The War College response to Mahan's critique reprimanded the mentor. Not only was the southern approach shorter—and, "other things being equal, the shortest route is the best"—it was even said to be safer. By 1911 the haunting scenario of the Army War College Strategic Game of 1908 had been institutionalized in the war expectations of both war colleges. In Mahan's second—and very defensively toned—reply to Rodgers and the Naval War College Strategic War Plan he is appalled by the bleakness of the scenario: "...I do not believe it practicable for Orange to occupy *all* possible bases (in the Pacific)..."⁸¹ Mahan wanted to attack Japan by the most direct route and attack them where they are strongest. Steeped in Nelson, Mahan refused to accept the hesitant and globally circuitous approach of the War College, attempting in plan to make a lodgment in the Philippines when the *Kaigun* was denounced in Alaska and Hawaii. He quoted profusely from the anecdotes of naval history and, almost as though it might be in vain, he urged, "*de l'audace, de l'audace, et encore de l'audace.*"⁸²

One of the most reassuring consequences of the cruise of the Great White Fleet was the awareness instilled in the Navy that its capital ships could make long ocean passages without major mishap.⁸³ There was no question in the minds of Blue-Orange planners that the Atlantic Fleet could proceed to Manila/Subic via Suez inside of 3

months. From year to year, it was also a battle fleet gaining in relative strength. In early 1907 the American-Japanese battleship ratio was 10:7.1. In 1909, the "battle value" was calculated at 10:6.4.⁸⁴ By 1912, this battle ratio was somewhere on the order of 10:4.6.⁸⁵ Blue-Orange campaign planners should by this time have developed every expectation of success for Blue.

In fact, Dewey wrote to Secretary of the Navy Truman Newberry on 24 February 1909 urging a division of the fleet between Atlantic and Pacific—as soon as the 30-battleship standard was attained in 1910 or 1911. In belated support of Sargent's recommendations, the General Board stipulated only "That if a Pacific Fleet be formed, it shall always be more powerful than that of any probable enemy in the Pacific."⁸⁶ Several months later it became obvious that German battleship building programs would leave the U.S. Navy in third place among naval powers by 1912. Dewey's Teutonic fixation would allow no diversion from this renewed German menace, even though the combined fleets of the Entente offered protective buffer. Though Tirpitz' fleet could never escape the North Sea, the number of his growing dreadnought squadrons hypnotized the General Board.⁸⁷ Not until the end of the Great War would a Pacific shift of the battle fleet occur. In spite of an inferior order of battle, the Imperial fleet of Japan was, until 1919, given a free run of the Pacific.

The fact that the institutions responsible for war planning maintained such a dismal strategic scenario, yielding every conceivable advantage to Orange, expecting every enemy initiative to be met with instant success, and at the same time refusing to adopt a more direct or offensive axis of campaign, suggests a sea change in Navy thinking after the crisis of 1906-1908. In assuming, after the outbreak of war, a Japanese romp from Manila to

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Monterey, the war planning course at Newport was, at first, merely following the tradition of worst-case modeling. When the General Board refused to alter fleet disposition in 1907, they effectively froze the strategic picture. Magellan or Suez, the initiative was handed to Orange. In this context, the initial assumption that Japan would take maximum advantage of temporary U.S. infirmity and adopt a "go for broke" grand strategy became unquestioned postulation.

As Cdr. J.H. Oliver concluded, in a lecture entitled "Our Situation in the Pacific Ocean," delivered at the Naval War College on 3 June 1910, the omens were not in America's favor:

If ever we come to blows with Japan, it seems clear that odds will not be even unless it shall be practicable for us to invade the Inland Sea of Japan as easy as it is for Japan to invade the Inland Sea of the Philippines.⁸⁸

War planning against Japan, from 1906-1914, reflected, for the first time, some of the enduring strategic problems associated with the trans-oceanic projection of power. In that heady era, the early Orange Plan represented some of the inner components of that displacement:

- As an example of war plan evolution mirroring a concomitant scale of perceived interests on a larger, national scale. As the United States began to define formally its political and economic stake in the Western Pacific, and in the destiny of China, the Orange Plan spelled out the concretized boundary—the security perimeter—of the new American sphere.

- As an example of second-priority contingency planning. Early plans against Orange reflected the enduring problems in America's first "one-and-one-half war" strategy. Black was formalized as the primary enemy, and Black priority kept the battle fleet in the Atlantic. The Armored Cruiser

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Squadron was hardly enough to contain Togo's ironclads, and Pacific reinforcement hinged on the first American "swing strategy."

- As an example of war plans' objective needs outdistancing both technology's "state of the art," and a naval order of battle limited by congressional budget constraints. The "art of the possible" in Pacific strategy walked a fine line between offensive instincts and policies, and defensive realities.

Finally, the first Orange Plan represented a prescient statement of future war. As drawn by Oliver in his letter of 1907,⁸⁹ and then by his special contribution to the War College plan drawn up under Rodgers' oversight in 1911, the Pacific campaign drew a Cassandra forecast, three decades before:

- The fleet would sortie from Hawaii, and anchor at the end of the line: Okinawa.

- The axis of advance would cut the Central Pacific, and incur the island-hopping seizure of the Marshalls and Carolines.

- Manila would be recaptured.

- The fleet would hike out with its own, mobile, advanced base.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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— Japan would be brought to its knees through blockade: economic strangulation.⁹⁰

There would be no short war; there was no certainty even of a climatic, setpiece sea battle: a Trafalgar-like decision. Drawn on a canvas of early Dreadnought technology, *sans* radar, *sans* Zero, *sans* B-29; it was a remarkable picture of "the shape of things to come." Rodgers even suggested, in clairvoyance of Nimitz, "that BLUE forces should be employed

in the capture of the Lu Chu Islands (Okinawa), and the reduction of the Pescadores (Formosa) then to begin extensive land operations for the recapture of Luzon."⁹¹

The strategic realities of empire were speeding the Navy's coming of age. Mahan might still cry "*et encore de l'audace*," but his pupils were already outdistancing him, and the prevailing spirit of the age. Even before 1914 the Navy was beginning to discard the illusion and the fashion of the short war.

NOTES

1. Mahan's war plan has been included in Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire, eds., *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975), v. III, pp. 559-577. The first contingency plans drawn up by the Naval War College can be found in the Naval War College Naval Historical Collection, Record Group 8, *UD* "Plans for the Defense of the Atlantic Coast," 1895. These are strictly defensive arrangements, posited upon the descent of a "superior force from Halifax."

2. Papers of the General Board of the U.S. Navy, in Seager and Maguire, eds., v. I, Dewey to Crowninshield, 11-16 April 1900.

3. For an idea of the day-to-day working relationship between the General Board and the Naval War College, see General Board Proceedings, 30 December 1903; 26 September 1906; 18-19 June 1906; also, Naval War College Archives, *JNOP*, Wainwright to Menell, 2 March 1907.

4. The best discussion of the effect on the Navy of the Venezuelan Crisis is in Seward W. Livermore, "Theodore Roosevelt, the American Navy, and Venezuelan Crisis of 1903," *American Historical Review*, April 1946, pp. 452-471. For the effect of the crisis on Dewey, see General Board, File 425, Memorandum of George Dewey, 24 June 1904.

5. There was a War Portfolio No. 2 in existence before 1906 although it was concerned primarily with the seizure of a potential base off the China coast, or a recurrent contingency of U.S. armed intervention in China, quite possibly in opposition to Russian interests in Manchuria.

6. The origins of Dewey's emotional obsession with the Teutonic threat is nicely explored in Thomas A. Bailey, "Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay," *American Historical Review*, October 1939, pp. 59-81.

7. Akira Iriye, *Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967); Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation* (New York: Random House, 1963).

8. Board on Defenses, "War with Spain and Japan," Record Group 8, *UNOPB*, Naval War College Historical Collection.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

12. "Strategic Features of the Pacific," Record Group 8, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection, 23 June 1897.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

* 14. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

15. John M. Ellicott, "Sea Power of Japan," Record Group 8, *JN*, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection, 1900.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-23.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

21. J.M. Ellicott, "The Strategic Features of the Philippine Islands, Hawaii and Guam," Record Group 8, XSTP, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection, 14 June 1900, p. 4.
22. Ellicott, "Seapower of Japan," pp. 17-18.
23. Edward H. Zabriskie, *American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East, 1895-1914* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1946; reprinted, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 65-85.
24. General Board, *Proceedings*, 29 May 1902.
25. "Solution of Problem of 1902," Record Group 12, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection, pp. 14-19.
26. General Board, File 425-2, Rodgers to General Board, 13 May 1901.
27. "Solution of Problem of 1902," p. 7.
28. General Board, *Proceedings*, 29 May 1902.
29. Shunsuke Kamei, "The Sacred Land of Liberty: Images of America in Nineteenth Century Japan," in Akira Iriye, ed., *Mutual Images: Essays in American Japanese Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 5-73.
30. Brooks Adams, *America's Economic Supremacy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 99-100, 104. Homer Lea, at the time of his death in November 1912, was making notes for a third volume in his trilogy to be entitled *The Swarming of the Slav*, where he spoke of "the great awakening of the Slav to his own power," and forecast a final battle between America and Russia. In a popular British perspective, Fred T. Jane warned, "At some future date that great struggle between the British Empire and the Russian, between the Anglo-Saxon and the Slav, that so many phophesy, may yet come off." Fred T. Jane, *The Imperial Russian Navy* (London: Thacker, 1904), p. 451.
31. "Solution of Problem of 1902," p. 1.
32. "Problem: Course of 1903," Record Group 12, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection.
33. A.T. Mahan to Henry C. Taylor, 7 December 1903 in Seager and Maguire, eds., v. III, p. 86.
34. "Problem: Course of 1903," p. 25.
35. "Conference of 1906. Solution of Problem," Record Group 12, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection.
36. *Ibid.*, pt. II, pp. 1-5.
37. *Ibid.*, pt. II, pp. 7-8.
38. *Ibid.*, pt. II, pp. 48-51.
39. General Board, Dewey to Bonaparte, 2 October 1906, in Seager and Maguire, eds.
40. War Plans in the hands of the General Board were constantly in the process of being revised or updated. As a result, the earliest copy of a war plan against Orange held by the U.S. Navy Operational Archives in Washington is dated February 1914. At that time the war plan against Orange assumed a more official, institutionalized character.
41. General Board, "Confidential. In Case of Strained Relations with Japan," Record Group 12, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-21.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-14.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 33, 35.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68. Office of Naval Intelligence, attached "Compilation" of current status of major units of I.J.N., 30 October 1906. The question of Japanese battleship availability revolved around the refit progress of *Mikasa* and five captured Russian capital ships, all then undergoing repair. In the event, these ships entered operational service in 1907 and 1908. There is little doubt, however, that, given the stress of war and a 3-month U.S. Battle Fleet transit, these repairs could have been expedited.
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-75.
52. General Board, *Proceedings*, 29 January 1907. The minutes also noted that, "A copy of the General Board's plan has been sent to the Army War College for such use and suggestions as it may furnish."
53. H.S. Knapp, "Memorandum: War Between the United States and Japan. The Possibility of Great Britain Becoming Japan's Ally," 19 January 1907, Record Group 8, *JNOPP*, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection.
54. H.S. Knapp, "Memorandum," 31 January 1907, Record Group 8, *JNOPP*, p. 5, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 10.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

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58. "Memorandum Regarding Initial Stages of Japanese War," 4 February 1907, Record Group 8, *JNOpp*, pp. 4-5, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection.

59. "Memorandum," 14 February 1907, Record Group 8, *JNOpp*, p. 1, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection; the source for this conclusion was taken from the answer to question 18 of the "Conference of 1906. Solution of Problem," pt. II, pp. 44-48.

60. "Memorandum Prepared for President of Army War College by Joint Committee. Consideration of Special Situation," 18 February 1907, p. 13, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection.

61. A.T. Mahan to the editor of the *New York Sun*, 28 January 1907, in Seager and Maguire, eds., v. III, p. 206.

62. W.D. MacDougall, "Study of Special Situation," 5 April 1907, Record Group 8, *JNOpp*, p. 10, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection.

63. J.H. Oliver, "Memorandum Submitted to the President of the War College," 20 April 1907, Record Group 8, *JNOpp*, p. 1, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection.

64. Merrell to Wotherspoon, 21 April 1907, Record Group 8, *JNOpp*, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection.

65. Bradley Fiske, in his book, *The Navy as a Fighting Machine* (New York: Scribner, 1916) gives the clearest indication of *Generalstab* hero worship in the U.S. military of that era: "Until the advent of Moltke the art of strategy was more in evidence than the science. . . . In the education of war. . . no man was ever proved right more gloriously than Moltke." pp. 156-179.

66. "Army War College. Course of 1907-1908. Problem Involving War Between Orange and Blue." Record Group 8, *JNOpp*, pt. 2, *Diary*, pp. 1-3, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection.

67. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-10.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

69. *Ibid.*, pt. 2, *Comments*, p. 2.

70. Merrell to Wotherspoon, 21 April 1907, Record Group 8, *JNOpp*, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection.

71. "Informal Memorandum Relating to Questions of Fleet Supply, Naval War College Problem, 1908," *Report of the Second Committee*, 19 September 1908, "An advanced base outfit contemplates only the seizure of a port for the use of the fleet to coal or find protection, and would not be considered as useful for the transfer of supplies. . . ." Record Group 12, p. 2, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection.

72. General Board, "Memorandum," 14 February 1907, Record Group 8, *JNOpp*, p. 2, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection.

73. General Board, File 420-1, Dewey to Metcalf, 25 April 1907.

74. Thomas A. Bailey, "Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay," *American Historical Review*, October 1939, pp. 59-81. Also, in his ghosted autobiography, *The Autobiography of George Dewey* (New York: Scribners, 1913), the admiral gives vent to his paranoia over Germany's nefarious plans.

75. General Board, File 420-1, Dewey to Metcalf, 25 April 1907.

76. General Board in Seager and Maguire, eds., v. V, "Memorandum for the General Board (presented by Captain Sargent)," 15 June 1907, para. 4.1.

77. *Ibid.*, para. 4.2.

78. *Ibid.*, para. 7.

79. *Ibid.*, para. 2.

80. A.T. Mahan to Raymond P. Rodgers, 22 February 1911, in Seager and Maguire, eds., v. III, pp. 380-388.

81. A.T. Mahan to Raymond P. Rodgers, 4 March 1911 in Seager and Maguire, eds., v. III, pp. 390-391.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 393.

83. General Board in Seager and Maguire, eds., Dewey to Newberry, 24 February 1909.

84. "Memorandum," 30 January 1907, plus Office of Naval Intelligence update on I.J.N., dated 1 February, Record Group 8, *JNOpp*, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection. For 1909 calculations see L.C. Lucas, "Armored Ships—Blue and Orange—Values—Compiled May 1909," Record Group 8, *JND*.

85. This ratio of comparative strength has been calculated on the basis of information from contemporary issues of Jane's and Brassey's. Japan's poor standing is owing in part to its slow start in dreadnought building. At the end of 1912, Japan had only one dreadnought battleship complete as against eight in the U.S. Navy.

86. General Board in Seager and Maguire, eds., Dewey to Newberry, 24 February 1909, para. 5.

87. General Board, File 420-2, "Memorandum from General Board to SecNav, Building Program, 1913-1917," 5 September 1912.

88. J.H. Oliver, "Our Situation in the Pacific," 3 June 1910, Record Group 8, *XSTP*, p. 8, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection.

89. Oliver, "Memorandum Submitted to the President of the War College."

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90. R.P. Rodgers, "Strategic Plan of Campaign Against Orange," 15 March 1911, Record Group 8, *JNOpp*, 52-57, Naval War College Naval Historical Collection.

91. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

