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The Wizard War

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Michael Collins and O.P. Weyland as well as Drs. Forrest Pogue, Eugene Emme and Theodore Ropp are just a few of those who took part.

The symposium began with the keynote address, "The Influence of Air Power Upon Historians," by Noel Parrish. Parrish laid the basis for the remainder of the sessions as he challenged those present with the potential for the study of air power. His strongest point was that biography holds the key to the understanding of air power's development. Without an understanding of the leaders involved in decisionmaking, no true understanding of the course that events took is possible. He pointed out that serious biographies on several Air Force Chiefs of Staff including Arnold, LeMay, Spaatz, Twining and White remain to be done. In summary, he considers that fact as crippling. A second major speech was presented during an evening session by retired Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, an air pioneer himself, entitled "Some Observations on Air Power."

The succeeding sessions covered air power and warfare for not only the United States but also Japan, Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union. The papers were divided among the World War I and interwar years (1903-1941), World War II operations and leadership, the search for maturity in the postwar Air Force (1945-1953), air power and limited warfare (1947-1978) and technology's effect on air warfare throughout the 75-year period.

Editors Hurley and Ehrhart list four major themes that came out of the sessions. (1) The importance of the "human element" in air power. (2) The intricate relationships between technology, doctrine and the actual employment of air power. (3) The unity of the human experience with air power. (4) The study of air power is vital to our national interest and holds the very essence of military history's significance.

The desired quality of this symposium as a watershed in the study of air power history was markedly enhanced by the invitation for each participant to outline the work that remains to be done in his particular area. The lack of good biographical work on air power leaders was joined by the need for studies on the effects of logistics, technology and intelligence, among several. For that delineation of gaps in present scholarship alone, the proceedings are invaluable. The publication of this book is timely and vital in view of the continued evidence of increased interest and appreciation for the importance of military history to the military professional. The study of air power is an integral part of that discipline.

DON RIGHTMYER
Captain, U.S. Air Force

Jones, R.V. *The Wizard War*. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1978. 556pp.

Dr. Reginald Victor Jones describes *The Wizard War* as "a personal memoir in which I hope that general readers may find some entertainment, intelligence officers some working examples of their trade, historians some matters of interest, and scientists some instruction in the value of sticking to basic principles." His hope is realized on all four accounts.

The book, published in Great Britain as *Most Secret War*, is based on declassified World War II reports, transcripts of post-World War II lectures, and personal recollections. It is, then, a personal account of British scientific intelligence activities during World War II. In it Dr. Jones describes his early work in infrared, his heralded success in identifying and countering German guidance beams, the attempts to counter the German air defense radar net, and the intelligence efforts against the V-1, the V-2 and nuclear weapons.

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The revelation of this book is the crucial importance of having a dedicated organization that can integrate information from all sources to ferret out enemy capabilities and intentions. While the breaking of the German "Enigma" code provided important information, the success of Dr. Jones and his compatriots should be attributed to their exhaustive examination of the myriad complex clues not only from intercepted enemy communications, but from electronic emissions, from statements of agents and prisoners, and from exploitation of captured equipment. Guiding the juggling of this information was Jones' predilection for "sticking to basic principles."

The reliance upon multiple sources of supporting evidence and the testing of conclusions against basic principles had an important side benefit. It built the confidence that encouraged Jones to articulate forcefully his findings and recommendations to the highest councils of government. It was Jones who convinced Churchill to employ Window (now called chaff) to blind German radar. His arguments prevailed over the objections of other highly placed advisors who feared that the Germans would quickly develop and employ the countermeasures against allied radars.

Jones' account also addresses the issue of security—preventing disclosure of own capabilities and intentions to the enemy. The Germans' awareness of the need for security, in fact, made the mission of British intelligence a difficult one. Jones laments that his community was unable to identify new weapons systems in the research phase; it was the testing of systems during development and production that provided exploitable clues.

The debate over the use of Window also was an example of security carried to the extreme. Both the British and the Germans were aware of the effects of Window and delayed its employment

fearing the other would develop and employ it with even greater effectiveness. The Germans, on the order of Goering, destroyed all relevant reports and discontinued research and development. The British were "squeamish" but finally employed it in July 1943 after a year of debate. The Germans soon developed countermeasures and began to employ chaff against British radars in January 1944. And so the account goes: weapon, countermeasure, then counter-countermeasure.

In short, *The Wizard War* is a fascinating account of dedicated efforts to counter the new technology of German weapon systems. While reminding the military professional of the need for security, it emphasizes the importance of focusing on the objective and organizing one's efforts towards that end. To stray from that direction is to be misled, to waste energy and talent, and to forfeit the initiative.

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Jordan, Robert S. with Bloome, Michael W. *Political Leadership in NATO. A Study in Multinational Diplomacy.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. 316pp.

This study is an analysis of the political-diplomatic roles of the first four Secretaries General of NATO—General Lord Ismay, Paul-Henri Spaak, Dirk Stikker, and Manlio Brosio. As the author indicates, the focus is on personality rather than structure and events although in the end he concludes that the latter factors decisively shape the performance of the Secretary General. The political conceptions, ambitions, and styles of the men examined might have facilitated or hindered political agreement within the alliance, but it was forces outside the office itself that defined both the agenda of concerns and the substance of political outcomes. Given such an