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The Origin of the Strategic Cruise Missile

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comprehensive. It weaves together many of the bits known about the ocean policy process and fills in many gaps. The book's story begins in 1935 with the Roosevelt administration's adoption of antismuggling legislation, goes on to show how the Truman Proclamations of 1945 were based on a decade of Roosevelt ocean policies, pulls together the threads of policy concerning fisheries and the continental shelf under Truman and Eisenhower, pauses to look at greater length at the First and Second Law of the Sea Conferences in 1958 and 1960, describes the "interregnum" between international conferences in the sixties, and then concentrates on U.S. ocean policies and the Third Law of the Sea Conference in the seventies. The account finishes effectively with the Ninth Session of the Conference in the summer of 1980 where the Carter administration is attempting to wrap up some of the problems faced earlier by the Nixon and Ford administrations. With respect to the historical account of U.S. ocean policies between 1935 and 1980, Dr. Hollick's book stands alone. It will quickly become the "standard text" for this period.

The book's other great contribution is its generalities concerning U.S. ocean policy which form the core of the opening and concluding chapters. Dr. Hollick's conclusions are persuasive, built as they are on a solid evidential and analytical foundation. Furthermore, they apparently do a good job in helping one comprehend recent events such as the decision of the Reagan administration to pull back, at least temporarily, from the Law of the Sea Conference. That decision seems intertwined with the picture Dr. Hollick paints of a United States torn between a general preference for the order that only a widespread multilateral solution to ocean problems can provide and a specific preference for certain solutions, e.g., respecting ocean mining, that might be better advanced by unilateral action

taken outside of a conference dominated by developing countries. One important question is what if anything is lost by abandoning the multilateral option.

I am less sanguine than many about the capacity, legal and political, of the West to maintain or develop customary international law without the East or the South. Some feel that U.S. interests, e.g., the Navy and merchant shipping, that stand to "gain" from the contemplated Law of the Sea Treaty will not "lose" if no Treaty is adopted since customary international law already gives them what they need. A reading of Dr. Hollick's excellent book will, I think, dispel some of that optimism. Countries, including the United States, have been very busy outmoding customary international law of the sea in the past 45 years.

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Huisken, Ronald. *The Origin of the Strategic Cruise Missile*. N.Y.: Praeger, 1981. 202pp.

The Origin of the Strategic Cruise Missile is the most recent addition to a large family of case studies of major U.S. weapons programs. The author examines the technological, military, and doctrinal context in which America's current generation of ALCMs and SLCMs evolved. Particularly strong emphasis is given to the problems of bomber penetration to Soviet targets, *Minuteman* ICBM vulnerability, and the movement of U.S. declaratory policy towards nuclear counterforce, and the ways each of these moved the United States closer to cruise missile procurement. In the end, the author rejects the commonly heard view that cruise missiles were developed as SALT bargaining chips and concludes that the primary impetus for a strategic cruise missile program was the desire to demonstrate to the Soviets U.S. willingness to

106 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

maintain essential equivalence at the strategic level.

Unfortunately the data for this study were all derived from secondary sources. No "insider interviews" which characterize many previous weapons program case studies were used. Consequently, the author's "distance" from the subject of study is apparent, and his analysis is often superficial and impressionistic. Still, *The Origin of the Strategic Cruise Missile* does provide some interesting glimpses of the U.S. cruise missile program.

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Messimer, Dwight R. *No Margin for Error*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1981. 167pp.

In an age when carrier-based aircraft form the backbone of the Navy's offensive and defensive punch, it is interesting to reflect back upon a time when the need for *any* Navy aircraft was seriously questioned. Such was the case in the United States in 1920. In order to demonstrate the versatility of naval aircraft, a flight was planned in which a team of Navy flying-boats would fly from California to Hawaii. In his delightful book *No Margin for Error*, author Dwight Messimer accurately and colorfully depicts the story of this record-breaking flight.

Operating aircraft over water, whether from shore bases or from carriers at sea, has long been known as an undertaking with "no margin for error." Messimer's choice of this phrase as the title of his book is particularly appropriate because this first "trans-Pacific" flight stretched the capabilities of the aircraft to the maximum—and perhaps slightly beyond. It was recognized from the start that a substantial "tail-wind" was a *necessity* to provide the range required to reach Hawaii. In the early planning stages:

The project planners counted on the trade winds to increase the planes' ground speed to around 80 knots. At that speed, the trip would be made in just over twenty-six hours, leaving about a two and one-half hour margin . . . their ability to reach Hawaii in still air was non-existent.

Two different aircraft were chosen for the attempt, the PN-9 manufactured by the naval aircraft factory and the PB-1 built by the fledgling Boeing Company. Neither plane, however, was really up to the challenge of 2,100 miles of open ocean. The question that must be asked is "Why did the U.S. Navy undertake an adventure with such slim odds of success?" The answer to this question is clearly spelled out by Messimer as he paints a vivid picture of the military/political climate of the day. Since 1919, U.S. Army Gen. William "Billy" Mitchell had fought for a consolidated "national air force" which would have been responsible for all military aviation. By 1924, his campaign was well underway and the infant naval aviation arm was clearly on the defensive.

Since 1923, Rear Admiral William E. Moffett, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, had been looking for a way to stave off Mitchell's attack. Admiral Moffett had to convince the public that naval aviation had certain special requirements that could only be met if the aircraft and aircrews were an integral part of the fleet. What the Navy needed was a spectacular aviation accomplishment. In April 1924, following six months of in-house politicking, a plan to make a west coast-Hawaii flight was selected as being suitably spectacular.

Messimer covers the events leading up to the flight and then, with adventure-story excitement, details the crash at sea and subsequent events that have since become one of the great legends of naval aviation.