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U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea

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This book is organized in a manner designed to interest the novice as well as the expert Africanist, and the authors have written a lucid, crisp history of South Africa both in terms of population groups and in terms of institutions and policies. The greatest single strength of the book is the spectacular comparative sweep of the exercise which lifts South Africa out of the *sui generis* category it has often been forced into and places it within the context of the 18th, 19th and 20th-century phenomena throughout the globe. It is this comparative skill that reinforces their underlying premise that far too many American academics, especially the Africanists, have been willing to isolate South Africa in their minds and feelings and to judge it by standards not applicable either to other nations (usually those whose diplomats and citizens are vehement critics) or to the same time period in history, with the end result that South Africa is subjected to a double moral standard (see p. 258). Fortunately, a number of Africanists are sufficiently well balanced emotionally and politically to subject all the states of the African continent to the same moral yardstick.

Another attractive feature is that the authors provide a discerning analysis of the assets and liabilities of South Africa's Military Establishment and take a hard, sober look at the various types of threats and insurgencies that the police and defense units will most probably face. Their estimate, on balance, is favorable to the current regime (chapters 6, 7, and 10), and they are equally willing to draw attention to a number of the repugnant features of the apartheid system (see p. 300). They are rather critical of the high degree of state intervention in the South African economy and come out in favor of a stronger free market system in South Africa (pp. 296-297), along with a system of fragmenting power known as consociationalism (generally linked with sharp

linguistic, ethnic and religious cleavages in the population of some of the nations of Western Europe, such as the Netherlands and Switzerland and Austria) as a counter to straight one-man, one-vote African majority rule (pp. 299-300). The tables of the book are excellent and the maps are adequate, but neither the indexing nor the endnotes are detailed enough to recommend the book as a reference work. A second edition, available in paperback at much lower cost and more rigorously footnoted, would certainly be most welcome and would facilitate the serious debate between the liberals and the moderate conservatives that both authors have carefully tried to foster.

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Hollick, Ann L. *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981. 496pp.

During the past decade, Dr. Hollick has emerged as the best-known and most widely published specialist on the formulation of U.S. ocean policy. Her important new book, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea*, is rooted in her many articles describing the bureaucratic in-fighting among such actors as the White House, the Congress, the Departments of State, Defense, Interior, Justice, Commerce and Transportation, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations. Dr. Hollick's book, like her earlier articles, has the great merit of explaining plainly and intelligently what went on in the tangle of Washington politics to result in those ocean policies with which Washington then negotiated in international politics.

Dr. Hollick's book, however, goes well beyond her articles in at least two ways. First, the book is much more

comprehensive. It weaves together many of the bits known about the ocean policy process and fills in many gaps. The book's story begins in 1935 with the Roosevelt administration's adoption of antismuggling legislation, goes on to show how the Truman Proclamations of 1945 were based on a decade of Roosevelt ocean policies, pulls together the threads of policy concerning fisheries and the continental shelf under Truman and Eisenhower, pauses to look at greater length at the First and Second Law of the Sea Conferences in 1958 and 1960, describes the "interregnum" between international conferences in the sixties, and then concentrates on U.S. ocean policies and the Third Law of the Sea Conference in the seventies. The account finishes effectively with the Ninth Session of the Conference in the summer of 1980 where the Carter administration is attempting to wrap up some of the problems faced earlier by the Nixon and Ford administrations. With respect to the historical account of U.S. ocean policies between 1935 and 1980, Dr. Hollick's book stands alone. It will quickly become the "standard text" for this period.

The book's other great contribution is its generalities concerning U.S. ocean policy which form the core of the opening and concluding chapters. Dr. Hollick's conclusions are persuasive, built as they are on a solid evidential and analytical foundation. Furthermore, they apparently do a good job in helping one comprehend recent events such as the decision of the Reagan administration to pull back, at least temporarily, from the Law of the Sea Conference. That decision seems intertwined with the picture Dr. Hollick paints of a United States torn between a general preference for the order that only a widespread multilateral solution to ocean problems can provide and a specific preference for certain solutions, e.g., respecting ocean mining, that might be better advanced by unilateral action

taken outside of a conference dominated by developing countries. One important question is what if anything is lost by abandoning the multilateral option.

I am less sanguine than many about the capacity, legal and political, of the West to maintain or develop customary international law without the East or the South. Some feel that U.S. interests, e.g., the Navy and merchant shipping, that stand to "gain" from the contemplated Law of the Sea Treaty will not "lose" if no Treaty is adopted since customary international law already gives them what they need. A reading of Dr. Hollick's excellent book will, I think, dispel some of that optimism. Countries, including the United States, have been very busy outmoding customary international law of the sea in the past 45 years.

M.W. JANIS

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Huisken, Ronald. *The Origin of the Strategic Cruise Missile*. N.Y.: Praeger, 1981. 202pp.

The Origin of the Strategic Cruise Missile is the most recent addition to a large family of case studies of major U.S. weapons programs. The author examines the technological, military, and doctrinal context in which America's current generation of ALCMs and SLCMs evolved. Particularly strong emphasis is given to the problems of bomber penetration to Soviet targets, *Minuteman* ICBM vulnerability, and the movement of U.S. declaratory policy towards nuclear counterforce, and the ways each of these moved the United States closer to cruise missile procurement. In the end, the author rejects the commonly heard view that cruise missiles were developed as SALT bargaining chips and concludes that the primary impetus for a strategic cruise missile program was the desire to demonstrate to the Soviets U.S. willingness to