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On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War

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relating to the conduct of hostilities, the latter being his intended subject. He next offers some rationale for the efficacy of the law of war. He concludes the chapter with a few words to each of three groups, aware that each would approach the book from a different perspective: international lawyers, military professionals, and his fellow historians. That he felt it necessary to offer admonitions to each manifests his appreciation for the complexity of his subject.

Best writes in a controversial style that avoids the normally stilted tones associated with international law, guiding the reader along a path leading through the evolution of modern warfare, the legislative foundations of the law of war, the trials of total war, and the difficulties of the law of war in our modern world of "co-existence." He addresses all aspects of the subject, and is not reticent in identifying those parts that have worked better than others.

If *Humanity in Warfare* falls short at any point, it is in the chapter on the law of war as it relates to aerial bombardment. The subject is complex and has defied codification into agreed rules of law that will assure universal respect. The rules applied in World Wars I and II, Korea and Vietnam were based on interpretation and paraphrasing of two treaties written at the Hague in 1907, or before aerial warfare had left the cradle. New rules drafted in 1977 have not yet been adopted by any military power, small or large, and even without the "fog of war" reveal substantial weaknesses. Yet Best, in his eagerness to condemn Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, wartime leader of the RAF's Bomber Command, and fellow British historian H. Montgomery Hyde, in some measure loses his objectivity as a historian. This is particularly true in his criticism of Harris, whom he appears to wish to try by what he *believes* the law to be today and by standards of modern

bombing capabilities, rather than by the even less clear standards and equally less-accurate capabilities that existed during Harris' tenure 40 years ago. Moreover, he lays all blame at Harris' feet to the neglect of myriad factors beyond Harris' control. He would have done well to heed the admonition of another British historian, Martin Middlebrook (author of books on the aerial raids on Hamburg and Nuremberg), who wisely counseled that "The wartime actions of Bomber Command . . . should not be judged out of the context of the period."

This brief lapse should not detract from an otherwise excellent book, however. Indeed, the book's overall quality and the controversial nature of Professor Best's discussion of the strategic air offensive over Europe during World War II make *Humanity in Warfare* an excellent vehicle for academic discussion within our service schools. That is no easy accomplishment, and the author is to be commended for it.

W. HAYS PARKS

Paterson, Thomas G. *On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War*. New York: Norton, 1979. 173pp.

This is a coherent, condensed, scholarly essay that attempts to describe just how America became involved in that global effort to hold back Communist expansionism, the cold war. The author, a historian at the University of Connecticut who has specialized in the "origins" of the cold war during the years 1945-1950, provides a useful, sweeping historical portrait of the post-World War II American-Soviet bipolar power structure of international politics.

The book contains eight chapters describing the events that generated this new bipolar world, one that arose in response to the devastation of Europe and the resulting collapse of European colonial empires leaving a power

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vacuum in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Other chapters describe the tacit allocation of Soviet and American "Spheres of Interest," the development of strategies to rebuild the economies and governmental institutions of Europe, and the tactics of American leaders who consciously manipulated public opinion in order to marshal support for America's own "expansionist" actions in assuming the role of leader of the Western World.

The chief virtue of this book is that it successfully synthesizes, as the author intended, a voluminous body of research, including archival material as well as conflicting analyses by conventional and "revisionist" historians of the cold war. In his thoroughly documented book (the bibliography runs to 22 pages and is itself a highly useful reference guide). Paterson writes with clarity and lucidity about the rise of the new international system that has confronted members of the American military for the past 30 years.

The thesis of his study gives little comfort to either the radical left or right wing political hucksters. Instead, Paterson demonstrates that the policies pursued by American leaders in the cold war were motivated by both an altruistic concern to defend Western democracy and at the same time a desire to secure economic markets, natural resources, and strategic advantages for American business, government and other interests. Similarly, he concludes that Soviet behavior in the cold war was motivated by both ideological fervor and a legitimate rational concern for security growing out of traditional Russian fear of military invasion.

Though Paterson offers no prescriptions for the future, his final chapter warns that the history of the cold war period has demonstrated a steady erosion of the dominant position of both America and Russia in a rapidly changing world of nationalism, Communist polycentrism, and shifting eco-

nomics power. The implication of his study is clear: history does not remain static.

Karl Marx once wrote that history repeats itself: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce. Like many of Marx's prophecies, this one has been proven false in our time. In an age of nuclear weaponry, a second cold war, unchecked by sophisticated policy, wise historical understanding, and disciplined restraint, could lead to a cold war whose momentum spins out of control. In such a situation the repetition of history would not be farcical. It would be catastrophically tragic for all mankind.

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Rose, Lisle A. *Assault on Eternity: Richard E. Byrd and the Exploration of Antarctica, 1946-47*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980. 292pp.

Assault on Eternity is the story of the U.S. Navy Antarctic Developments Project, more popularly known as *Operation Highjump*. This still is the largest expedition ever sent to Antarctica. *Highjump* was essentially a cold environment training exercise, but it had additional purposes—extending potential U.S. sovereignty over areas discovered by Americans, investigating the problems of establishing air and support bases in Antarctica's harsh climate, testing ships and equipment, and conducting limited scientific observations.

The author, the State Department Polar Affairs Officer, has written an excellent operational history of ship and aircraft operations in Antarctica in the post-World War II period. He discusses the concerns of ship's officers as they take their thin-skinned ships through the pack ice and the concerns of aircraft commanders and crews in long flights over unknown and dangerous territory. His report on the crash of the PBM "George-1" and the ordeal of the