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Brezhnev: Soviet Politician

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have been easier to follow had a copy of the North Atlantic Treaty (or at least the controversial articles, #3, #5, and #9) been included as an appendix. These deficiencies notwithstanding, *Creating the Entangling Alliance* is a useful and constructive book on the formation of the key security organization of the post-World War II period.

WILLIAM P. SNYDER
Texas A&M University

Keeton, George W. and Schwarzenberger, Georg, eds. *The Year Book of World Affairs, 1981*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981. 288pp.

The purpose of this series of year-books is *not* to comment on the important events of the past year as such. Its "specific object," noted on page 1, is to "make possible analyses in a wider perspective and on the basis of more mature reflection than may be possible in a quarterly or monthly journal." If this caveat is not kept in mind one will be very surprised at this volume's contents. There is, for example, no article directly on the Middle East—and 1980 was an event-packed year for that area. Some of the articles could easily have been printed 2 to 5 years ago (and perhaps 2 or 5 years from now). For example, Kenneth W. Thompson's "Functionalism and Foundations in the United States," is in this category.

But the articles on the whole meet the standard set. Some of the 19 are of better quality than others. They range over a great variety of topics whose center of gravity is obviously the taste and preference of the two editors. The whole collection tends to focus somewhat outside the general politicomilitary framework. They include very specific titles such as "New Zealand and the European Community" and "External Indebtness of Less Developed Countries," to very general essays such as "Catasrophe Theory and International Relations." Among the more

interesting to this reviewer were Colin Legum's "Foreign Intervention in Africa(II)," Miguel Wionczek's external indebtness essay already mentioned (which is filled with well-selected data), C.P. Fitzgerald's "China's View of the World" (which is an excellent "philosophical" look at China), and Alfred P. Rubin's "The Panama Canal Treaties: Locks on the Barn Doors" (which exposes neatly the structural and technical defects in the Canal treaties). Each one of these is first-rate and a reader of this book with limited time could begin there and go on as time permits.

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN
Naval War College

Murphy, Paul J. *Brezhnev: Soviet Politician*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1981. 363pp.

More than just another biography of another Soviet political leader, *Brezhnev: Soviet Politician* is an extremely timely study that examines Brezhnev's rise to power in one of the world's most complex and still largely closed political systems. In particular, while Brezhnev's career is in itself interesting, the book is most valuable for the insight it provides into the question of leadership succession in the Kremlin. Murphy takes the position that "conflict" is the principal element of Soviet politics resulting in a continuous process of rivalry, struggle and intrigue. Brezhnev, he contends, is an exemplary example of this process who possesses "the right mixture of tenacious energy, drive, cunning, discipline, ruthlessness, concealment . . . [and] above all . . . ambition."

Acknowledging that political biography, and in particular Soviet political biography, must contain conclusions often based on fragmentary and imprecise evidence, the author does indeed frequently rely on personal opinion and judgment to develop his study. He clearly identifies his own speculation,

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however, and while other analysts might not agree with all of them, they do not detract from the overall value of the book.

Of special interest is the author's excellent treatment of Nikita Khrushchev's consolidation of power after the death of Stalin, Khrushchev's successful bid to forestall an intricate Kremlin plot to overthrow him in 1957, and, finally, his eventual demise as a result of still another episode of Kremlin intrigue. Naturally Brezhnev's role in all of these events is the focus here, and Murphy clearly shatters the view widely held in the West that Brezhnev was not regarded as a serious contender for Kremlin leadership. Then, of course, the relentless manner in which he marshaled his own political forces until all semblance of collective leadership gave way to the eventual emergence of still another *vozhhd* or supreme, incontestable and infallible leader, is a veritable case study in the dynamics of Soviet politics.

Appearing at a time when Brezhnev's advanced age and poor health are catching up with him, Murphy's book sheds much needed light on the impending succession struggle certain to beset the Kremlin in the not too distant future. In fact, the struggle has in all probability already begun.

DALLACE L. MEEHAN
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Overy, R.J. *The Air War 1939-1945*.
London: Europa Publications Ltd.,
1980. 263pp.

This is an outstanding book on a subject in which past controversy has often generated more heat than light. Dr. Overy's study of the relationship between air and sea warfare, and air and land warfare, leads him to conclude that, prior to the dropping of the A-bomb in August 1945, airpower was a necessary, but not sufficient, means to victory, and that air forces were complementary to

navies and armies, rather than autonomous of them. He offers an analysis not only of the strategic but also of the economic, scientific and technical aspects of the air war. Navy men may feel that more might have been said about the naval side, but they will find much to interest them. The conclusion that strategic bombing alone, using high explosives, was insufficient to secure victory is itself significant from the point of view of assessing the role of navies. The most effective target for strategic bombing was the enemy's economy, but here airpower was being used in combination with naval blockade.

As for naval use of airpower, the author, a Briton, points out that whereas the Royal Navy maintained even in 1939 that aircraft from carriers could only slow down large ships leaving them to be sunk by other ships rather than aircraft, the use of aircraft carriers to attack the enemy fleet had been fully accepted by the U.S. Navy. This victory for the advocates of airpower was timely, in view of Japanese enthusiasm for aircraft carriers and the nature of the Pacific War in 1941-45. No less fortunate for the Allies was the *Luftwaffe's* failure to give adequate support to the *Kriegsmarine* in the Battle of the Atlantic. Admiral Raeder pointed out that aircraft were needed not only to attack shipping but also to guide submarines to vulnerable targets, but, despite initial success by Focke-Wulf *Kondor* long-range aircraft, Goering refused to divert more aircraft to the war at sea, largely because he did not wish to relinquish operational control over *Luftwaffe* units.

Certainly, from mid-June 1941 the *Luftwaffe* was busy elsewhere with what for Germany was the major effort of the war—the invasion of Russia. Although Overy's main focus is on the Anglo-Saxon countries—inevitably perhaps in view of the availability of sources—he has some interesting things to say about