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The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, 1933-1947

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Atlantic is included, none of his other books and articles. Michael Lewis' work is listed, but not Daniel Baugh's excellent work on naval administration. There is an article by Frederic Lane listed, but not his more important book on Venetian shipping. Moreover, no published documents are listed and few books and theses deal with continental naval history.

One could point to similar anomalies in every section of the bibliography. At the far end of the volume in the section on "Sea Power for the 1980's" one finds the most curious agglomeration. Evelyn Berckman's *Creators and Destroyers of the English Navy* is included without annotation, although it contains not a word that refers to any event after the year 1685. Gerald Graham's superb lectures on *The Politics of Naval Supremacy* are included, but they are an analysis of the 19th century.

In short, one must commend the publisher for sponsoring a good idea, but the quality of the scholarship in this bibliography is so deeply flawed that it cannot be recommended for use, except with the greatest caution. A university interested in building a collection in naval history would be better advised to use an updated version of the 800-item bibliography that the Naval History Division published nearly 10 years ago. The research scholar should continue to use his Neeser, Albion, Hardin Craig, Charles Schultz and Myron J. Smith.

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De Santis, Hugh *The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, 1933-1947*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. 270pp.

Hugh De Santis is a research analyst for regional political and security affairs of Western Europe in the State Department. This, his first book, is a recipient of the 1980 Stuart L. Bernath Award,

given annually by the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations in recognition of distinguished new scholarship in the field.

The work describes the professional world of 30 American Foreign Service officers in the years 1933-1947. De Santis has relied extensively upon both private papers of these diplomats and personal interviews to reconstruct the psychological, intellectual, and social dimensions of the milieu in which American Foreign Service officers worked. Almost incidentally, from this perspective, he has written about the Soviet Union and the cold war, two factors that only in retrospect came to dominate the lives of American diplomats in the mid-1940s. The approach he has taken, De Santis argues persuasively, is more likely to produce a better understanding of the environment in which policy decisions evolve; thus it is more conducive to an explanation of why American-Soviet relations took the course they did in the crucial years 1944-1947.

Most of the 30 individuals who are the focus of this study served either in Moscow or in European capitals in which Soviet policy and the activities of the Red army became a major and immediate concern as World War Two drew to a close. Some, like Charles E. Bohlen and George F. Kennan, were trained Soviet experts; most were not. The one characteristic they share in common was training as professional Foreign Service officers prior to 1939. What De Santis' research has shown is that, as Americans, these men tended to evaluate international events in highly moral and legalistic terms, discounting the European model of *realpolitik* as an outmoded, discredited method of diplomacy. As members of the Foreign Service, they were socialized into what was then still an exclusive organization generally restricted to white Anglo-Saxon protestant gentlemen. Despite the Rogers Act, passed in 1924 to

democratize the Foreign Service, the State Department retained its club-like atmosphere. Foreign Service personnel all knew each other. Set physically apart from American society by their service abroad, professional diplomats developed their own value system. Individuals who failed to conform not only risked being ostracized socially, but also jeopardized their careers. Finally, as members of the foreign policy bureaucracy, Foreign Service officers generally accepted the role defined for them by statute and custom—they were the conduits of American policy to foreign capitals and reporters of events from abroad. Most decidedly their responsibilities did not include being movers and shapers of policy.

These characteristics of the Foreign Service are of great significance for the role in which American diplomats found themselves cast at the war's end. Throughout World War Two, the State Department remained on the periphery of Allied policymaking. While individual diplomats occasionally acquired personal influence with Roosevelt, by and large he and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ran the war without the State Department. Socially, psychologically, and bureaucratically conditioned to be diplomatic spear-carriers, most Foreign Service officers in the field embraced the image of the Soviets as partisans of the ideals expressed in the Atlantic Charter. Thus they suppressed, or conveniently forgot, their private reservations concerning the Soviet system and Russia's international conduct in the decades prior to the war. As long as the focus of policy remained on Allied military victory, Foreign Service officers had little difficulty in adjusting or rationalizing discrepancies between Washington's official attitude toward cooperation with the Soviets and actual Soviet behavior. When the focus shifted to structuring the postwar world, the dissonance between the policy of cooperation and Soviet military and political depreda-

tions became impossible to ignore.

Because of who they were, American Foreign Service officers originally accepted the image of postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union along Atlantic Charter lines from a mixture of motives: from genuine hope and expectation; from a sense of duty; and because their careers depended on it. Thus throughout the war most Foreign Service officers were wholehearted practitioners of the "diplomacy of silence." Maynard Barnes, Ambassador to Bulgaria, coined the phrase in June 1945. With it he meant to shame the Department and his colleagues in the field into speaking out against Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe.

As De Santis shows in a series of telling vignettes, Barnes and his colleagues were ill-equipped to assume an authoritative voice in policy formulation. Nor were their superiors in Washington any more capable of the combination of insight and analysis that were the prerequisites of a policy to deal realistically with the incipient clash of American ideals and Soviet policies. Ultimately, De Santis concludes, the diplomacy of silence signified the intellectual vacuum created within the American Government when ideals and expectations, held too long without re-examination, were overtaken by events.

It was this vacuum that George F. Kennan, a brilliant but idiosyncratic Foreign Service officer, filled with his "Long Telegram" from Moscow in early 1946. Kennan had never shared his colleagues' views of foreign relations, nor had he accepted the official wartime image of the Soviet Union. This made him unique in being able to rethink past policy and formulate a new direction for American diplomacy, one which, given his expertise in Soviet policy and Russian history, fully accounted for the nature of Soviet behavior.

De Santis' treatment of Kennan is one of the best accounts in print of the influences that shaped the thinking of

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this key individual in American cold war diplomacy. As De Santis portrays him, Kennan is a kind of tragic hero—a prophet without honor prior to 1946, afterwards hailed as the intellectual savior of American foreign policy. Ironically, Kennan now says that even as he achieved personal recognition, he saw his concept of containment of Soviet power misappropriated and misapplied. As De Santis has told the story, such a fate was virtually inevitable.

MICHAEL K. DOYLE

- Ireland, Timothy P. *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981. 245pp.

The foundation of post-World War II American foreign policy was constructed between the end of World War II and the start of the Korean War. During that short span, the United States adopted the containment policy and devised instruments to put it into effect: economic assistance in the form of the Truman Doctrine and the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) and a military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty, with the countries of Western Europe. These policy initiatives both marked a radical change in the nature of American foreign policy and created a policy framework that has endured for over three decades.

The intensity and durability of the cold war have skewed our perspectives on the motives of American policy-makers in the years following World War II. This is particularly the case with NATO, conventionally viewed as an American and European response to the Soviet military threat to Western Europe. Timothy Ireland's thoughtful work, *Creating the Entangling Alliance*, reminds us that there were other reasons for forming NATO and for the direction that that organization has taken. Soviet-American tensions were,

of course, an important consideration in the American view. For our European partners, however, the French in particular, the problem was the threat posed by an economically strong and possibly unified Germany. The dilemma facing American officials, therefore, was "to restore the power of Western Germany in order to create a new balance of power in Europe without also creating an imbalance of power in Western Europe." Initially, American officials saw a European coalition as a means of balancing Soviet power and thereby limiting American involvement in European affairs. With the decision of the Truman administration in 1950 to form an integrated military headquarters and to station American troops in Western Europe, American policy had moved full circle. The United States had become permanently "entangled" in European politics.

In tracing developments leading to the formation of NATO, Ireland gives roughly equal attention to the two main dimensions of the policy process: (1) the discussions between the Department of State and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee over the general nature of American involvement in Europe; and (2) the negotiations between the United States and the major countries of Western Europe. The result is an excellent case study, which illustrates the complexity and potential of patient diplomacy, and a forceful reminder that issues other than the Soviet threat were—and still are—important in NATO organization and policy.

The book has two shortcomings. First, President Truman's role in the policy process is not examined. Truman is mentioned frequently, but only as a background figure. It is difficult to believe that the President played such an insignificant part in a policy issue of this importance. (Ireland did not examine Truman's papers or cite his *Memoirs*.) Second, the analysis would