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Soviet Leadership in Transition

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words along the way, the end result is the impression that there is only one type of naval leader. Horsfield fails to see his subject in the broad light that the naval profession is a varied one that calls for a variety of individuals who, through the nature of their individual personalities, are best suited to provide leadership in particular ways and at particular levels that are most suitable to them. Horsfield is not alone in taking this view, but the point was made effectively by Mahan as long ago as 1901 and it still needs to be followed up by modern scholarship.

There is no doubt that leadership involves esoteric concepts and that an abstract understanding of it most surely will include concepts that even great leaders will not have consciously defined. That is no basis to fault a successful and natural leader, but it suggests that the subject is not entirely the province of those who claim the privilege of age, rank and experience. There is no simple formula to successful leadership: it needs thought and insight. John Horsfield has made some sound points that are useful for the historian; there is much more to be done. Rather than call a hiatus to writing on this subject, let us continue to exchange ideas and to follow new signposts as we examine leadership with greater care and with deeper understanding.

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Hough, Jerry F. *Soviet Leadership in Transition*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1980. 175pp.

The men who are on the verge of ascending to the leadership of the Soviet Union differ radically from the present helmsmen of the Kremlin. They represent an entirely different generational group with distinctly different political values, educational backgrounds, and wartime experiences. In *Soviet Leadership in Transition*, Jerry Hough

analyzes these generational differences within key Soviet hierarchies such as the central and provincial political structures, the foreign policy establishment, and perhaps most interesting to many of us, the military.

While making little attempt to predict the rise of individual personalities, Hough does present a well-developed assessment of those factors that will most likely play important roles in the forthcoming succession. His examination of generational profiles should be extremely valuable for anyone interested in the Soviet Union for, as Professor Hough correctly points out, "the Soviet system in large part remains an abstraction to us" and their leaders, the men and women who run the country, "remain a great faceless unknown to us." One is reminded of course of Churchill's famous characterization of the Soviet Union as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." In fact, asserts Hough, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union seems to have a sound understanding of the political system of the other. This of course complicates relations between the two great powers. Hough's analysis, therefore, has important implications for the future of Soviet-American relations and he concludes by suggesting how the United States might try to improve those relations as the Soviet leadership changes.

Highly critical of recent U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union, Professor Hough argues that future U.S. policymakers, if they are to be effective, must think in rational cost-benefit terms with clear ideas of the priority of national interests—in other words, he advocates the carrot and stick approach in dealing with the new leadership. More specifically the United States should offer incentives for the Soviet Union to pursue "a policy of economic reform, liberalization, and reduction of military expenditures without national humiliation." While traditionalists may view

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this as a highly whimsical piece of wishful thinking, Hough points out that the generational change about to occur within the Kremlin is likely to result in a more innovative foreign policy whose architects are likely to be more self-confident and more willing to engage in quiet diplomacy as long as they are treated with dignity as mature, responsible equals in international affairs.

Nicely complementing the author's much larger book, *How the Soviet Union is Governed* (a revision of Merle Fainsod's classic, *How Russia is Ruled*), *Soviet Leadership in Transition* is a well-researched and engrossing study of the Soviet political system.

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Kaplan, Lawrence S. *A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951*. Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, 1980. 251pp.

The Military Assistance Program (officially the Military Defense Assistance Program—MDAP), was approved in the fall of 1949 and contained provisions authorizing the President to extend \$1 billion in military aid to America's allies in Western Europe. This was, in the context of the early cold war, a substantial commitment on the part of the United States, and the Truman administration's proposals generated considerable controversy within the United States and between the United States and its European allies. Moreover, the implementation of the arms aid program played an important role in shaping the structure of the Atlantic Alliance.

However, the Military Assistance Program has the misfortune (from a historiographic point of view) of being sandwiched between more revolutionary or enduring projects such as the European Recovery Program, the

North Atlantic Treaty, and the assignment of American ground forces to NATO. As a result, the Military Assistance Program's influence on the Atlantic Alliance has never been the subject of careful study and analysis. Fortunately, Lawrence Kaplan's *A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951* fills this important gap for students and scholars of the early postwar period. In addition, by detailing the Pentagon's part in the formulation and implementation of the MAP, the author highlights the significant political and diplomatic role played by the fledgling Defense Department in shaping U.S. foreign policy during the early years of the cold war.

The author views the early history of the Military Assistance Program as a troubled one: its purpose was blurred by including aid for the NATO allies in a larger, globally oriented, assistance package; its relationship to other postwar programs was not adequately coordinated; and the preparation of the MDAP was subject to bureaucratic politics, interdepartmental rivalries and heavy congressional criticism. Moreover, because the military aid program was a part of an evolving alliance relationship where the roles of the European and American partners remained unclear, its development was further hampered by transatlantic strains and stresses. The United States, eager to avoid entangling overseas commitments, hoped that arms aid from the United States would spur the Europeans to greater defense efforts, help restore the military balance on the continent, and ultimately reduce the need for a long-term American commitment. On the other hand, the Europeans—beset with the problems of economic recovery, political instability, overseas commitments, the Soviet menace and latent fears of Germany—hoped that U.S. assistance would be a substitute for increased defense spending on their