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*Events in Afghanistan at the turn of the year gave considerable evidence to the existence of an "external function" of Soviet Armed Forces. This article was completed just prior to the coup in and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Printing schedules have prevented the author from making other than an acknowledgment of that event.*

## THE "EXTERNAL FUNCTION" OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES

by

Avigdor Haselkorn

Over the past several years Western concern over Soviet external military activities, primarily in Third World countries, has grown dramatically. For example, U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown observed recently that there were various explanations for the "undeniable growth" of Moscow's military power. Some see it as a product of bureaucratic inertia, some as part of a deliberate plan "to work the Soviet will on the international community, and others as a tool for supporting political goals. Events in Angola and the Horn of Africa in this [last named] view could well be prototypes for more ambitious projections of Soviet power in the future."<sup>1</sup>

Interestingly enough, former NATO Commander Gen. Alexander Haig also stated:

As long as we maintain a viable deterrent in Europe, conflict is more likely to arise on the periphery, as the Soviet Union ex-

ploits targets of opportunity . . . . Our essential role in Europe is political and psychological, which gives the Western allies a measure of confidence and enhances their ability to work together as we attempt to deal with the peripheral crises that are bound to come.<sup>2</sup>

This article is designed to highlight three related aspects of the U.S.S.R.'s increased military involvement abroad: the changes in the doctrine regarding the role of the Soviet Armed Forces. Second, improvements in Soviet capability to project power into distant trouble spots, and third, recent operational tests of this growing capability which, in conjunction with doctrinal principles, may indicate Soviet intentions and future areas of operations.

**Soviet Doctrine.** The modification in Soviet military doctrine to include an "external function" for the Soviet

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Armed Forces apparently occurred in the early 1970s. In fact, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had hinted at this change during a July 1969 session of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet while stating that "our country's influence on world affairs increases year by year and, one might say, day by day." He added that the Soviet Union "cannot react passively even toward events that might be territorially remote but which affect our security and also the security of our friends."<sup>3</sup>

Further, a high-ranking Soviet naval officer asserted in 1970 that the "peoples of many Mediterranean countries which conquered their independence and have entered on the road to non-capitalist development, regard our fleets in the Mediterranean even as their protector and friend."<sup>4</sup> The Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, Adm. Sergei Gorshkov, wrote:

The entrance of our military craft into the wide ocean ranges and their constant presence in those areas where the interests of the defense of the Motherland, the entire socialist commonwealth requires this, have become usual for our fleet. And this serves as a serious warning, a constant reminder of the inevitable and inescapable retribution to any aggressor who would dare to encroach on the achievements of socialism.<sup>5</sup>

According to the Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces, General of the Army A.A. Yepishev:

In the present era, which is characterized by a strengthening of the position of socialism and by sharp antagonism between the two social systems, a deepening of the external function of the Soviet Armed Forces has logically taken place. . . . It must be seen that socialism's military might objectively assist the successful

development of the revolutionary, liberation movements and that it hinders the exportation of imperialist counterrevolution. In this lies one of the most important manifestations of the external function of the armed forces of the socialist state.<sup>6</sup>

In 1972 Col. V.M. Kulish, a well-known Soviet military commentator, edited a book in which it was stated:

In connection with the task of preventing local wars and also in those cases wherein military support must be furnished to those nations fighting for their freedom and independence against the forces of internal reaction and imperialist intervention, the Soviet Union may require mobile and well-trained and well-equipped armed forces. In some situations the very knowledge of a Soviet military presence in an area in which a conflict situation is developing may serve to restrain the imperialists and local reactions.<sup>7</sup>

At the same time other Soviet military observers endeavored to utilize the new function to urge further military outlays. "The intensification and expansion of the *international* task of the Soviet Armed Forces also objectively conditions the need for their further strengthening. The situation requires increasing attention to questions of Soviet military construction."<sup>8</sup>

Army Gen. V.G. Kulikov, at the time Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, declared shortly after that the Soviet military's "internal" role had virtually ended, giving way in the present stage of "developed socialism" to a growing "external" role not simply to defend the Soviet Union but also to secure the expanding territories of the socialist bloc.<sup>9</sup> Further, the need expressed by Kulish in 1972 was given an official doctrinal basis in an article by Soviet Defense Minister, the late

Marshal Grechko, which appeared in May 1974:

At the present stage the historic function of the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted merely to their function in defending our motherland and other socialist countries. In its foreign policy activity the Soviet state actively purposefully opposes the export of counter-revolution and the policy of aggression, supports the national-liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialist aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear.<sup>10</sup>

Considerable evidence exists to suggest that the introduction of an external role into the Soviet Armed Forces' panoply of missions went in tandem with increased Soviet political commitments abroad. The expanding network of bilateral friendship treaties, offered or concluded since the late 1960s by Moscow with various Third World countries, has certainly served as one catalyst for this trend.<sup>11</sup> For example, in a September 1979 meeting with visiting Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin "reiterated the Soviet Union's loyalty to its international duty"<sup>12</sup> as set forth in the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty of 1978. This formulation clearly reaffirms the U.S.S.R.'s commitment to aid Vietnam against China. Further, in an article commemorating the U.S.S.R.'s 40th official Navy Day, the Chief of the Navy Main Staff, Adm. G.M. Yegorov wrote: "Our surface ships sail the expanses of the world ocean; where the Soviet Union's security and state interests demand it, *shore-based* and ship-based naval aircraft operate; units of *onshore* missile and artillery troops and marines vigilantly stand guard."<sup>13</sup>

Yegorov's statement could be read as the first Soviet official confirmation regarding the possible existence of Russian foreign military bases, perhaps on a

worldwide scale, but certainly far from the territory of the U.S.S.R. proper. Notably, Soviet friendship treaties with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Mozambique, Angola and Iraq contain clauses implicitly calling on the signatories to grant the Soviet Union military base facilities on their territories.<sup>14</sup>

In a book review in the leading Soviet theoretical journal *Kommunist* (February 1979), Moscow appeared as extending into a new dimension the increasingly emphasized external role of the Soviet military. By putting forward the 1940 Baltic developments as a model for a peaceful takeover, the book was quoted as assigning a decisive albeit "peaceful" role to the Soviet Armed Forces:

Soviet forces did not interfere in the domestic affairs of the Baltic countries, strictly observing the stipulations of the mutual aid pacts concluded between them and the U.S.S.R. Meanwhile, the presence of Soviet troops on Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian territory protected the Baltic from the interference of foreign imperialists. This demoralized the forces of the bourgeoisie and inspired the revolutionary masses to this struggle for the overthrow of the fascist dictatorship.

A similar employment of deterring counterrevolution and protecting "local" revolutionary struggle could be claimed by Moscow for Soviet troops currently stationed in Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia, etc. During Kosygin's recent visit to Aden, PDRY's Premier Ali Nasir Muhammed assailed efforts to separate the U.S.S.R. from the national liberation movement, and praised it as the "mainstay of the peoples' struggle for freedom, economic liberation, and progress."<sup>15</sup> Indeed, various accounts of the events transpired in the PDRY during June 1978, and the role played by Soviet, East

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German, and Cuban contingents deployed there, fit squarely with the Soviet doctrine of the "peaceful" external function of its military.

Recently, another significant change had occurred in regard to the Soviet external function doctrine. A stronger emphasis is being put on the *collective* mode of military operations envisaged in carrying out this new role. During the Angolan crisis an *Izvestiia* editorial on 25 December 1975 stated: "The people of the world know that they can count on the assistance and support of the mighty *socialist community* in every case where it is essential to rebuff the schemes of an aggressor, to avert the danger of war or to come to the defense of the national independence and freedom of a nation that is struggling against imperialism."

Further, L.M. Zamiatin, General Director of Tass and a Politburo member, used the particular pattern of Soviet/allied operations displayed during the Angolan crisis to claim that the developing countries recognize Brezhnev's "services in creation of a powerful system of defense on which many national liberation movements rely," because they are aware that the Soviet military "can come to their aid at any time in their struggle for independence and national survival."<sup>16</sup>

It is also known that in October 1975 a new Russian book, *Military Coalitions and Coalition Warfare*, by G.F. Vorontsov, was finally cleared for publication by the Soviets. Interestingly enough, Vorontsov is a Colonel General, and a member of the General Staff who works with military staffs from the Warsaw Pact and Third World countries.<sup>17</sup> A leading Soviet military theoretician Lt. Gen. P. Zhilin wrote in February 1978: "The economic and military might of the *socialist community* fulfills important historical functions. It fetters imperialism, restricts its potential for exporting counterrevolution and insures the security of

world socialism."<sup>18</sup> Further, on the 10th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, *Krasnyia Zvezda* reminded its readers on 11 August 1978 that "support, defense and strengthening of socialist gains... are the common international duty of all socialist countries."

Corresponding statements by member states of the Soviet coalition themselves serve to highlight the significance of this new doctrinal modification. For instance, at a state banquet in honor of Soviet Premier Kosygin, Ethiopia's leader Mengistu Haile Mariam declared:

Revolutionary Ethiopia, as inseparable part of the camp of anti-imperialist and anti-reactionary forces and of the socialist community is aware that its historical duty is to join ranks with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, now struggling to strengthen peace and security throughout the world, and finally eliminate oppression and exploitation, racism, colonialism and neo-colonialism.<sup>19</sup>

As if to show the Soviet allies what this would mean for the U.S.S.R., Mengistu noted how valuable Ethiopia would be in spreading the revolution elsewhere. "When revolutionary Ethiopia... has created a progressive and stable economic base, it will make its internationalist contribution, and become a reliable bulwark for the Asian, African and Latin American countries, fighting oppression and exploitation."<sup>20</sup> The statement coincided with reports about the training of a "revolutionary" paratroop brigade and existence of a large arms depot in Ethiopia.

It thus seems that in its present form the Soviet doctrine envisages a collective mode of external operations carried on both by Soviet forces and the military forces of members of its security system (or "*socialist community*"), to preserve and enlarge worldwide socialist gains. Viewed from this perspective, exclusive

preoccupation with comparative assessments of Soviet vs. U.S. power projection capabilities seems of rather theoretic value. However, there is no denial that the increased pace with which Russia has been expanding and modernizing its power projection capabilities deserves close scrutiny, as it derives from, and complements the strategic concepts described above.

**Capabilities.** A general consensus seems to have emerged that there are eight airborne divisions in the Soviet Armed Forces, the larger figure probably reflecting the continuing reassessment of Soviet military strength, rather than the recent establishment of another division. In addition, there continue to exist special purpose airborne forces of regimental size or less.<sup>21</sup>

Increasing Soviet pressure on adjacent nations to allow the transit or overflight of aircraft should be expected in the future. The number of aircraft in service with the Soviet Military Transport Aviation (*Voyenno-Transportnaya Aviatsiya*—VTA) seems, if anything, too low rather than too high in view of the absence of other adequate means of transport in the interior of the U.S.S.R. and the increasing scale of Soviet activities worldwide. One reason for this could well lie in inadequate command and control facilities and equipment that do not allow the efficient operation of a large fleet of transports. For this reason it is unlikely that the number of aircraft in the service of the VTA will be increased, at least in the near future. However, this deficiency in numbers could be counterbalanced by switching to larger aircraft. The introduction of the IL-76 as the successor to the An-12 (payloads 40 and 20 metric tons respectively) and the likely replacement of the An-22 by the An-40 (payloads 80 and 120 metric tons respectively) certainly indicate a move in this direction.<sup>22</sup>

Former Chairman of the JCS, the late Gen. George S. Brown has

observed: "The growing capability and flexibility of both VTA and Aeroflot have been reflected in changes in Soviet doctrine and practice. The U.S.S.R. is now more willing to employ airlift forces in support of foreign policy objectives, and to take up foreign policy objectives which require airlift to project Soviet presence abroad."<sup>23</sup>

The pattern of naval construction in the Soviet Union suggests that Russian maritime strategy is to expand naval power into the Third World. The new ships are not so much designed for battles with another great power, but instead would have powerful effect in demonstrating and applying Soviet strength in less-developed areas of the world.

One indication of this trend is the construction of at least two and probably four nuclear-powered, 32,000-ton cruisers at Leningrad's Baltic yards. The arming of the first of these cruisers, *Sovietsky Soyuz*, launched in December 1977, with 7.3-inch guns seems a giveaway indication of the shift in strategy. The usefulness of these guns in action against a modern fleet equipped with missiles would be minimal. However, they are likely to be useful in Third World conflicts and politics.<sup>24</sup>

Another indication of the trend toward building ships for overseas operations was the commissioning of the 40,000-ton *Berezina*, a logistic support ship, the first of its class, and *Ivan Rogov*, an assault landing vessel. During early spring maneuvers in the Mediterranean, *Berezina* demonstrated refueling three ships at once. *Ivan Rogov* is almost three times the size of the Soviet *Alligator*-class LST, displacing 13,000 tons, and capable of speeds in excess of 16 knots. It is fitted with bow doors, a stern gate affixed to what is believed to be a floodable well deck, and a helicopter storage and landing area above the well deck. Ships of the *Ivan Rogov* class, reportedly being built at the rate

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of three to four a year, are capable of carrying three air cushion personnel landing craft. Each of these craft can hold a platoon of troops and can charge into a beach at a speed of more than 45 mph.<sup>2 5</sup>

Although recent reports suggest the Soviet Naval Infantry is being expanded, most estimates put its present strength at 12,000 men. However, the Soviets have been known to provide amphibious training to selected Army units, especially those stationed in the Baltic Sea area.<sup>2 6</sup>

U.S. sources also believe the Soviet Union is currently building its first large-deck nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at a shipyard in the Murmansk area. Sea trials for the third vessel of the Kiev-class aircraft carriers have recently begun. A fourth Kiev-class ship is now under construction in the Black Sea shipyard near Nikolayev. Adm. Thomas B. Hayward, the U.S. CNO, expressed concern about the pace of Soviet advances and ability to project power, considering that the construction of the fourth carrier was begun only 3 years after the first such vessel joined the Soviet Fleet.<sup>2 7</sup> "The Soviets plan to build at least eight of the Kiev-class carriers, but large-deck carriers in the 50,000-ton plus once spurned by the Soviet Navy are becoming a reality."<sup>2 8</sup> Although some Western analysts maintain that Kiev and Minsk were both deployed outside the Mediterranean because these ships would have been too vulnerable there, at least one of the future Kiev-class aircraft carriers, perhaps Kharkov, will certainly be deployed in the Mediterranean and another, Novorossisk, in the Indian Ocean.<sup>2 9</sup> Kharkov is expected to operate a mixture of Yak-36 Forger V/STOL aircraft and Kamov Ka-25 Hormone helicopters. Although the exact role of the Forger is not entirely clear, underwing pylons appear capable of carrying air-to-air, antiship, air-to-ground and even ASW weapons. During

recent exercises in the Mediterranean, Forgers have been spotted taking off from the Kiev, and strafing towed surface targets.

Moreover, the recent transfer of the Su-17 Fitter-C aircraft to the SNA indicates a possible air support or attack role for the Navy. The Fitter-C is a variable-geometry wing, Mach 2-plus (clean) aircraft that can carry almost 8,000 pounds of ordnance. Those that German sources have spotted in the Baltic<sup>3 0</sup> may be for the support of Soviet Naval Infantry operations against West Germany and Denmark. Still this is a new role for SNA and one that similarly could be projected for the Forger or follow-on V/STOL aircraft flying from Kiev and her sister ships.<sup>3 1</sup>

It is also known that Soviet development of catapult and arresting gear for use on a large-deck carrier is underway, and speculation is that a modified Mikoyan MIG-27 Flogger D will be employed as a fighter attack aircraft for Soviet carrier operations. Significantly the U.S.S.R.'s 40th official Navy Day on 29 July 1979 brought statements by Moscow's leading admirals on the importance of Soviet naval developments, with the emphasis on naval aviation appearing greater than in past anniversaries. In an interview that day in Pravda, Gorshkov noted that "a characteristic feature of the Navy's postwar development is the creation of such a long-range and highly mobile force as naval aviation which has also become ocean going."

**Operational Tests.** External operational involvement of Soviet forces has been picking up in recent years. Significant cases include:

1. On 26 November 1977, during the Ethiopian-Somali war, the Soviets launched a massive airlift.<sup>3 2</sup> Up to 225 transports, about 15 percent of the VTA, were dispatched simultaneously along several different routes leading to Ethiopia. For 3 weeks, transports were

landed continuously at different bases, often at intervals of 15-20 minutes. The majority of planes in the first phase were An-22s. Apparently some of them had empty holds, but landed beside the loaded aircraft at Addis Ababa. This led to speculation that the operation was part of a Soviet strategic airlift exercise. Assuming substantial prepositioning of stocks, the airlift demonstrated Soviet ability to move at least three divisions into the Middle East and Northeast Africa within 8-10 hours.

At the height of the operation the Russians launched *Cosmos 964*, a military reconnaissance satellite, which may have played a role in the command and control of the operation. In the second week of the airlift, Soviets began drawing, for the first time, on military stockpiles positioned behind the Urals, to the rear of their divisions on the China border. From airfields in Tashkent and Alma Ata, supplies were flown south over Afghanistan and Pakistan by military transports including the IL-76. The Soviet airlift demonstrated an unprecedented flexibility with almost daily shifting of flight routes to minimize the number of transports transiting any given country.

Logistic support operations involved also the airlifting by Soviet MI-6 *Hook* helicopters of 70 tanks (apparently the BMDs), to the north of Jijiga, behind Somali lines for the offensive that took the city. At the same time, the Soviet Navy reportedly was engaged in protecting a Soviet and East European sealift to Ethiopia. In February 1978 a dozen Soviet warships took part in this operation. *Reuters* on 18 January 1978 quoted an EPLF spokesman in Rome as saying two Soviet destroyers joined the battle for the Red Sea port of Massawa the day before, "bombarding our strongholds." However, subsequent reports confirmed the presence of an *Alligator*-class LST to fire on guerrilla positions near Massawa. In the first 6 months of 1978 Russians and East

European ships and transport planes delivered 61,000 tons of arms and ammunition to Ethiopia.

2. Soviet external military functions were again demonstrated during the Sino-Vietnamese war of early 1979. In March that year "informed sources" indicated that Soviet planes and ships had begun a major movement of Vietnamese troops and equipment from southern Vietnam and occupied areas of Cambodia to northern Vietnam. Transport by Soviet ships originated in the ports of Ho Chi Minh City, formerly Saigon, and Kompong Som port in Cambodia, while troop movements by air were said to have originated principally from Ho Chi Minh City's two airports, Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa. The Soviet planes were said to land troops at Hanoi's two airports and the ships were presumed to be heading for Hanoi's port of Haiphong. It was estimated that Soviet transport aircraft had airlifted 5,000 to 10,000 Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, and that about 25 Soviet pilots were involved in the airlift between the southern and the northern parts of Vietnam.<sup>33</sup>

More recently Vietnamese deserters reported that Soviet pilots have flown many of the transport planes ferrying Vietnamese troops to western Cambodia. One of the defectors said that in July 1979 he saw 50 to 70 Soviet technicians working on aircraft at Siem Reap airport in Cambodia. "In Washington, Pentagon officials said they had been aware for about a year that the Soviets were flying into Cambodia. But the report of Soviet technicians based on the ground in the northwestern Siem Reap area appeared to go beyond previously supposed levels of Soviet involvement in Vietnam's Cambodia campaign."<sup>34</sup>

3. In March 1979 U.S. State Department officials reported the landing of 25 large Soviet helicopters designed to drop Afghan troops into rebel areas. The officials said it was unlikely that



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the Afghan military had the capability to fly the sophisticated Soviet helicopters, indicating that the Soviets will have to fly the Afghan troops to the fighting.<sup>35</sup> Less than 2 months later U.S. intelligence officials indicated the Soviet Union had supplied Afghanistan with 12 MI-24 *Hind* helicopter gunships, and that Soviet pilots "might be flying them."<sup>36</sup>

Simultaneously, reports said "Soviet pilots routinely fly jets and helicopters from the Jalalabad airstrip and were in action in the major airstrike reprisals mounted against rebel-held Herat in March [1979]."<sup>37</sup> The State Department confirmed subsequently that since midsummer, 400 regular Soviet troops have been deployed inside Afghanistan guarding the Bagram airbase, 35 miles north of Kabul. Bagram has been serving as the main arrival point for the Soviet military airlift into Afghanistan.<sup>38</sup> In October, it was estimated that 30 MI-24 gunships were operating in Afghanistan with 20 more in the pipeline. "Most diplomatic observers [in Kabul] think Soviet pilots and gunners were flying some helicopter gunship missions."<sup>39</sup>

A new phase in Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan's civil war apparently began in late November 1979. A "usually reliable source" in Kabul indicated that Soviet MIG jet fighters and helicopter gunships from Soviet bases struck northeastern Afghani villages under rebel control in the strategic Budakhshan Province.<sup>40</sup> Further, small groups of Tajik and Uzbek soldiers, members of the Soviet Army from Central Asian Soviet Republics just north of the Afghan border, were said to have taken an active combat role in a government offensive launched against the town of Gorband, 40 miles northwest of Kabul.<sup>41</sup>

During the first 10 days of December, the situation had changed again. A battalion of between 400-800 fresh Soviet troops were airlifted into Afghanistan. Some of the new troops

were flown to Bagram and some to Kabul airport. Transport planes reportedly were bringing armored personnel carriers and other combat equipment for the troops.<sup>42</sup> Less than a week had passed when the State Department announced that: "Flight activity by Soviet heavy transport aircraft in the vicinity of Bagram airfield indicates that the buildup is continuing" with well over 1,000 troops arrived.<sup>43</sup> On 21 December 1979 the *Washington Star* reported at least three Soviet battalions were in Afghanistan: "Numbering 500 to 800 men each, two of the battalions are paratroopers with armored transport and one is a motorized rifle unit." More Soviet troops were expected, according to the paper.

A massive Soviet airlift began on 25 December, most flights originating west of Moscow from military airfields deep inside Russia at Smolensk, Pochinok, Vitebsk, and Seshcha. Within a period of 72 hours 200 flights of mostly An-22s and An-12s landed in Kabul airport, transporting the remainder of the Soviet airborne division. Members of this crack unit were instrumental in ousting Afghani President Hafizullah Amin on 27 December 1979 and installing instead Barbak Karmal as Prime Minister. Following the Soviet engineered coup, reports indicated involvement of Soviet paratroopers in the street fighting in Kabul.

Two days later, the White House announced the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan: "We now believe there is the equivalent of an airborne division in the Kabul area and that two motorized rifle divisions have moved into Afghanistan across the northern border. This would bring the number of Soviet combat troops in Afghanistan to from 25,000 to 30,000." President Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski said on 30 December that the "numbers (of Soviet invaders) are now larger." He added the Soviets were moving into Afghanistan in two

formations—one was crossing the border from Kushka and moving into the Afghan city of Herat, "it [had] many tanks, including their most modern ones, armored personnel carriers and troops on trucks." The other was moving from Termez on the Soviet side of the border heading for Tashkurghan and Kabul.

Interestingly enough, on 2 January 1980 *Radio Kabul* quoted Karmal as saying he may have to ask assistance from Cuba, Vietnam and the Palestinians if "activities of antistate elements continue and the threat of international intervention lasts."

**Conclusions.** Discussion of these three elements of Soviet strategy indicates:

1. Contemporary Soviet military doctrine clearly assigns an external role to the Soviet Armed Forces. While seeking to retain this mission but minimize potential political costs, a formulation that stresses the collective nature of external military operations has been increasingly evident. Consequently, current doctrine allocates an "internationalist" function to Moscow's Warsaw Pact and Third World allies.

2. Quantitative buildup and qualitative upgrading of Soviet power projection capabilities are increasingly visible and are likely to continue, if not actually accelerate, in the 1980s. The aim is apparently twofold: improvement of Russia's surge factor and development of assets allowing the permanent external deployment of Soviet military forces for use in distant crises areas.

3. In both combat and noncombat roles, recent operational tests of Soviet "collective external function" doctrine and capabilities indicate Moscow continues to place high priority on its periphery—e.g., the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia.

Combined, there is ample evidence to suggest a determined and persistent Soviet intention of establishing its own

global security system, capable of being supported collectively by its member states. The probability of a direct Soviet military intervention in conflicts related to its security system is highest when one of its member states is about to collapse militarily. However, Soviet defensive support interventions may take two alternative forms: 1. Defensive support in a defensive mode—i.e., Soviet forces landing on territories of its own allies (e.g., Iraq), in order to block the advance of an enemy. (The probability of such a Soviet move is particularly high when the enemy (e.g., Israel) proclaims publicly, that its target of advance is a member state's capital.) 2. Defensive support in an offensive mode—i.e., Soviet intervention on the enemy's territory (e.g., Iran, in case of an imminent Iraqi collapse). This could occur when Moscow judges that an offensive intervention would be more effective, relatively easy to launch, and would involve limited risks (e.g., the effectiveness of Soviet forces airlifted into Iraq may be low for quite some time until sufficient forces had been massed; battlefield conditions plus time considerations may then press the Soviets into invading Iran). The prepositioning of military stocks in the member states would increase the effectiveness of defensive interventions in a defensive

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## BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Avigdor Haselkorn is Senior Strategic Analyst with the Analytical Assessment Company and a Scholar at the Center for Advanced Research, Naval War College. He holds a Ph.D. degree in political

science from the University of Chicago and has written widely on strategic issues, focusing mainly on Soviet political and strategic affairs.

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mode, and may indeed be tailored to open up this option for the Soviets, in addition to these stocks obvious logistic support potential.

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20. Mengistu Haile Mariam, speech in Moscow, cited in *Pravda*, 18 November 1978.
21. Graham H. Turbiville, "Airborne Troops," in David R. Jones, ed., *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual*, v. 3, 1979, p. 108.
22. For an elaboration see Peter Bogart, "The Soviet Transport Air Force: Aircraft and Capabilities," *International Defense Review*, June 1979, pp. 945-950. Reports in the summer of 1977 suggested that the Antonov design bureau was working on a new very large turboprop-powered transport, tentatively code-named An-40, in the class of the USAF's Lockheed C-5 *Galaxy*. Overall production of the IL-76 is expected to reach 200 units with the Tashkent production plant still expanding. *Defense/Space Daily*, 30 January 1978, p. 148. Although to date there have been no indications that the IL-76 wide-bodied transport aircraft is intended for anything but *Aeroflot* use, it is credited with the capacity to move 420 soldiers, or at least 250 parachutists, some 2,800 miles.
23. George S. Brown, *U.S. Military Posture for FY 1979* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978), p. 96.
24. *The New York Times*, 10 December 1979.

25. See *Daily Telegraph*, 22 August 1978; *Aerospace Daily*, 17 October 1978, p. 219; *Maritime Defense International*, November 1978, pp. 437-438. The Istanbul paper *Aydinlik* on 6 August 1979 reported the beginning of sea trials in the Black Sea for a new Soviet hydrofoil capable of carrying 70 tanks. "With such a vessel Russia will be able to reach any shore of the Black Sea within a few hours, and make a rapid landing with armor support."

26. *Christian Science Monitor*, 13 November 1978; *The New York Times*, 10 December 1979.

27. *Baltimore Sun*, 25 August 1979.

28. *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 20 August 1979, p. 14. In fact, as this article was completed, U.S. defense officials have confirmed that Russia was building its first large nuclear-powered attack carrier. Reportedly, Admiral Gorshkov recently acknowledged to American diplomats in Moscow that the ship was under construction. It is expected to carry 85 aircraft. "Analysts in Washington said they expected the Soviet Union to build four or five of the large aircraft carriers, and to surround them with other warships to form battle groups, in the American manner, to project Soviet naval power anywhere in the world." *The New York Times*, 17 December 1979.

29. The new aircraft carriers are scheduled for commissioning in 1980 and 1983, respectively.

30. Peter Bogart, "The Air Attack Potential of the Warsaw Pact," *International Defense Review*, April 1976, p. 195.

31. Norman Polmar, "Soviet Naval Aviation," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1978, pp. 67-68.

32. This section is based on a detailed examination of military operations during the Somali-Ethiopian war provided in: Avigdor Haselkorn, "Soviet Power Projection Strategy: The Bilateral vs. the Systemic Approaches," Center for Advanced Research, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., July 1978, pp. 72-92 (mimeo).

33. See *The New York Times*, 16 March 1979; *Washington Post*, 18 March 1979; *Boston Globe*, 25 April 1979. Note *Izvestiia's* claim on 21 March 1979 that "acting in accordance with the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty, our country gave fighting Vietnam all the help which was necessary in the Vietnamese comrades' opinion."

34. *Washington Post*, 18 December 1979; *Time Magazine*, 24 December 1979, p. 35.

35. *Washington Post*, 28 March 1979; State Department spokesman Tom Reston, cited in *Baltimore Sun*, 11 May 1979.

36. *The New York Times*, 4 May 1979; *Washington Post*, 7 August 1979.

37. *Washington Post*, 10 May 1979; *Boston Globe*, 18 September 1979. Typical doctrinal formulations were brought to support these actions. On the occasion of the Supreme Soviet formal ratification session of the friendship treaty with Afghanistan, Soviet leaders portrayed the treaty as opening up a "new state" in relations between the two countries, and Brezhnev noted that "the Soviet people are giving the friendly people in Afghanistan internationalist aid and support." *Izvestiia*, 21 April 1979. Emphasis added.

38. *Jerusalem Post*, 5 September 1979; *Baltimore Sun*, 20 September 1979.

39. *Washington Post*, 9 October 1979; *The New York Times*, 30 October 1979, citing "European intelligence sources"; *Baltimore Sun*, 11 December 1979.

40. *Associated Press*, 6 December 1979.

41. *Baltimore Sun*, 29 November 1979. Other sources discounted the report but said the Borband offensive, and a previous one in Paktia Province, seemed to be under direct Soviet command. *Washington Star*, 30 November 1979. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter also claimed that "Soviet advisors have increased their role in support of the Afghan military, especially in the area of command and control function. There have been recent Afghan Government offensives against the insurgents which indicate an extensive Soviet role in their planning and execution. We are not able to confirm that Soviet military personnel have taken overt combat role against the insurgents." Cited in *Baltimore Sun*, 5 December 1979.

42. *Washington Star*, 13 December 1979.

43. *Ibid.*, 16 December 1979; *Washington Post*, 19 December 1979.

