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Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World

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Postgraduate School, offers a critical reappraisal of the 1975-76 Soviet-Cuban involvement in Angola in support of the late Agostino Neto's MPLA forces. Finally, Professor James Leutze of the UNC history faculty addresses the pressing requirement for a new NATO strategy, including a full reevaluation of tactical nuclear weapons policies, in the face of the huge, modern and offensively oriented Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces now confronting the Atlantic Alliance. If the editor sought to capture a fuller essence of dependence as a key trait of communist regimes on military power, however, he also might have included other essays on at least the current PRC military modernization program and the regional role of the SRV armed forces in Southeast Asia to achieve a wider frame of reference for his basic thematic premise.

The remaining two sections cover various communist regimes' economic development and human welfare programs and adequately maintain the volume's perception of the uneven development of this pair of key national power factors *vis à vis* military strength in most communist regimes. It is possible that several of the contributions may be somewhat specialized for many readers. Moreover, the choice of topical essays may be an overly diversified way to familiarize readers fully with the basic scope and dynamics of contemporary communist states' economic and social development programs. Notable exceptions are editor Rosefielde's co-authored essay (with Henry Latané) contrasting socioeconomic models in the U.S.S.R. and the PRC, and the treatment of contemporary human rights efforts in the Soviet Union in the context of Soviet-American relations by Dimitri Simes and Aileen Masterson of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies.

It is possible to fully endorse Professor Rosefielde's concluding remarks that the volume furnishes "a better

understanding of why communist military ascendancy is a landmark event" in light of communism's manifest failure to achieve a humane, prosperous society anywhere it has ruled. While its contributions provide as many questions as answers, the volume makes an excellent case for both systemic military success and economic/social inadequacies among the world's communist regimes. For that reason it has much to offer, particularly in the military area, for observers of both the Soviet scene and international communism as a major movement.

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Snow, Donald M. *Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World*. University: University of Alabama Press, 1981. 242pp.

Available at a time in which the Reagan administration is wrestling with questions of using and controlling force, Snow's study of nuclear strategy is both timely and relevant. Discussions of such new strategic systems as the MX missile system, a new manned bomber, the *Trident* program, and cruise missiles are, or should be, directly dependent on the nuclear strategy of the United States. In this respect, Snow's study contributes to the current discussions of American strategic policy.

Snow begins his study with the premise that deterrence is the primary value of military forces, for "the modern world is one in which general war is truly to be feared and in which its prevention is arguably not only the first but the only true military objective." He then presents an overview of concept-organizing devices that have been used in the analysis of nuclear strategy such as game-theoretical devices (prisoner's dilemma and MINIMAX) and action-reaction phenomena. He concludes that strategic nuclear studies do not have an adequate conceptual framework and that the field has been dominated by

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conservative bias. Having developed the need, he offers his own idea for the development of strategic doctrine. It consists of three factors: internal or domestic factors; external factors which, in the postwar years, has largely been the dyadic nuclear relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union; and technology, which he believes has played an important, and in many cases independent, role in the formulation of strategic nuclear doctrine.

Having set forth the various frameworks for analyzing strategic doctrine, Snow applies them to the concepts, stability and limitations of deterrence. This is followed with overviews of American and Soviet nuclear doctrines and capabilities. Snow next analyzes the arms-control process and concludes his study with a discussion of what he sees as the three most difficult and critical challenges of the future: (1) stemming or coping with the qualitative arms race; (2) the evolving Soviet challenge to the United States; and (3) the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation.

While Snow's work is an excellent introduction to the formulation of nuclear strategic policy, especially for the novice, there are some weaknesses. Snow's analysis of strategic nuclear policy starts with what is, not what is desired. Any policy formulation, whether it be foreign policy or nuclear strategic policy, should first start with a definition of objectives, of what it is one wants to achieve. Instead, Snow focuses on the American-Soviet dyad and couples it with technology to formulate a strategic policy. This approach ignores the fact that it may not lead to the desired objective and that manipulation of other factors outside the U.S.-Soviet dyad may be useful. For instance, it may be more effective to redirect technological development, or to alter the international situation as Nixon did with the "China card," in order to reach a desired objective. Additionally, Snow's analysis,

which provides an excellent comparison of the deterrence-only and deterrence-plus schools of thought, does not consider the denial alternative, that is that the United States should develop and build what it thinks it needs to fight a nuclear or conventional war. While all agree that prevention of nuclear war is the primary aim of strategic policy, how this can best be accomplished is a question Snow avoids.

The last significant weakness with this study is Snow's use of dated capability and force structure data. A substantial portion of the comparative data on United States-Soviet Union military balance is from 1975-1976. Much has changed since then, especially Soviet capabilities, which detracts from the credibility of some of the arguments.

Notwithstanding these shortcomings, Snow's study presents a timely and comprehensive look at the development of U.S. nuclear strategy and should provide an excellent foundation for the current discussion about American strategic policy.

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Still, William N. Jr. *American Sea Power in the Old World: The United States Navy in European and Near Eastern Waters, 1865-1917*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 291pp.

In the latter half of the 19th century, the U.S. Navy was little noticed in Europe, yet the history of its activities there and in the Mediterranean is an important aspect of American naval history.

William Still's study is a chronological narrative of naval operations. The book is well written and spiced with entertaining anecdotes and carefully selected quotations. The personalities of important figures are well portrayed and add much to the story. For the early years in particular, the