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Defense Manpower Planning, Issues for the 1980's

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Merchant Ships. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1981. 269pp. \$29.95

This is an updated version of a work originally published in German in 1977. The main portion consists of the names, brief descriptions, and sketches to scale of the merchant ships of the Soviet Union, the other Warsaw Pact countries, and Cuba. The sketches are reminiscent in their detail of those found in *Weyer's Warships of the World*, though they are larger. There is also an alphabetical list, by country, of all the ships, with the most important data given for each ship.

The authors start with a short historical sketch of the maritime history and activity of each member nation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), interspersed with a generous number of black and white photographs. These sections are interesting and informative, particularly that on the Soviet Merchant Marine. Next comes a short section on the training of Soviet bloc seafarers and embracing—more or less—all eight nations. This is followed by the profile line drawings, and vital statistics of the major ships of each of the eight nations. The authors provide a guide to the abbreviations and data at the beginning of this section; had they arranged it alphabetically and had the publisher printed it on a fold-out page at the end of the section it would have proven more practical. Next comes the alphabetical listing of the merchant ships of each nation, again with vital statistics and a cross-reference to the appropriate line drawing.

Curiously, in their preface the authors claim there are 40,000 merchant ships of over 1,000 gross registered tons in the world. In contrast, the US Maritime Administration sets the figure at just under 25,000 such ships.

Soviet Bloc Merchant Ships should be a handy reference, and a companion work

to this one on the Nato nations would be a worthwhile undertaking, but there is probably not enough detail to be of great value to the shipping professional for whom *Lloyd's Register* must be a companion reader.

Finally, the point should be lost on neither the casual reader—nor the shipping professional—that while the number of ships in the Soviet (and COMECON) merchant fleet has grown steadily during the past 10-15 years, the numbers under US flag, as well as most of our Nato allies, have dwindled.

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Taylor, William J., Olson, Eric T., and Schrader, Richard A., eds. *Defense Manpower Planning, Issues for the 1980's*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1981. 278pp. \$29.50 paper \$10.95

Defense Manpower Planning is a collection of 17 essays, some new and some previously published, by a number of well-known manpower analysts and policymakers representing a broad range of disciplines. Several of the papers served as background for the 1980 US Military Academy Senior Conference on Defense Manpower Management. Following two introductory papers, the essays are grouped into three parts: five in a section entitled "Active Duty Forces"; four in "Reserve Forces"; and six in a section called "Alternatives." Those in the last section address alternative solutions to problems described in the first two sections. The book also contains one-page introductions to each of the major sections, a short concluding paper, a glossary, and a short index. A bibliography would have been a useful addition.

One of the best essays is the introductory "Outline of Manpower Issues and

Debate," by the editors, which provides an excellent perspective on the broad range of issues. The strongest group of papers is in the "Active Duty Forces" section. Robert K. Griffith's interesting opening essay traces the history of manpower procurement. He notes that, contrary to much present-day opinion, a peacetime volunteer force is not an unprecedented experiment, but is in fact the norm in American history, and he doubts that society will tolerate a return to the draft in the absence of "clear and present danger."

Next, William J. Gregor seeks to clarify the debate on the role of women by suggesting that the opposing camps are distinguished by the organizational model they view as applying to the armed forces. Advocates of a wider role tend to adopt an instrumental model, which is individual and task oriented. In this view, women's role is limited only by their inability to perform required tasks. The alternative model, dubbed the normative model, is collective and process oriented. In this perspective, the effectiveness of a unit may be marred by the presence of women, even if they are as capable as the men of performing military tasks. This framework for viewing the debate is a useful insight, although unfortunately Gregor makes no pretense to scholarly detachment. He comes down strongly on the normative side.

The third essay is Melvin Laird's useful "People, Not Hardware," a reprint of an American Enterprise Institute publication which has received fairly wide circulation. It needs no comment here. Next is a short piece by Bruce E. Arlinghaus suggesting that the problem with the all-volunteer force is not poor quality soldiers, but weapons which are too sophisticated to be operated by good quality soldiers.

Finally, one of the best essays in the collection, Richard V.L. Cooper's "AVF vs. Draft: Where Do We Go From Here?," rounds out the section. One can learn more from this paper regarding alternatives to present manpower procurement than from all the essays together in Part III of the book. Cooper evaluates various forms of universal, selective, and volunteer service using four criteria: national security; efficiency and cost; equity; and other economic and social policy considerations.

Part II, "Reserve Forces," also opens with a paper taking a historical approach. Robert L. Goldich traces the US reserve tradition to its roots in medieval England. In his view, proposals to improve the efficiency of the reserves "founder on the rocks of American military tradition." Thus, without a clear and on-going threat significant changes in the reserve system are unlikely to occur. Next, William J. Taylor describes a field survey of reservists taken to assess the importance of various incentives for joining and remaining in the selected Army reserve. He finds that pay considerations do not appear to motivate reservists as much as do training and skill acquisition, and group and individual recognition. This conclusion is consistent with survey results in the private labor market. There, too, survey respondents rarely suggest that pay is the key motivating element. Whether in fact labor supply is more responsive to pay than to other factors is, of course, a different empirical question.

In the third essay, Kenneth J. Coffey claims that the United States is not seriously committed to an effective reserve system, and he suggests use of a cadre manning policy for most units. Finally, John R. Brinkerhoff asserts that the reserves are in fact in good condition, and that in any case, the only feasible

route for improving them is by building up through volunteerism.

The third section of the book is disappointing. It opens with Bernard D. Rostker's review of the history of the 1980 standby draft registration. While the facts are interesting, the paper has little or no analytical content, and one wonders why it was published. The second essay is an exposition of the elementary economics of the volunteer force by Robert C. Kelly. The editors make a curious observation (p. 177) that Kelly claims defense analysts cannot either understand or solve AVF manpower problems using their current models, and that he urges adoption of his alternative model. The curious thing is that Kelly makes no such claim. His model, which is in no way original, in fact represents the dominant DoD view. The paper seems misplaced in the "Alternatives" section.

Two papers support national service. The first, by William R. King, discusses various national service plans briefly and asserts (p. 225) that "all of the various forms of national service have the advantage of enabling the nation to pursue national goals with greater effectiveness." King claims national service would improve the military, and would also address problems of youth unemployment, welfare dependence, and crime; would cause important public service work to be performed, and would improve the general attitude and spirit of American youth. The costs, he says, would be high, but the potential benefits would be "enormous." The interesting questions, of course, concern just how large the costs and benefits would be. King doesn't even make an offhand guess.

The second paper, by Adam Yarmolinsky, advocates a voluntary national service program. Yarmolinsky at least

attempts to answer some practical questions: what exactly, would participants do?; what would they be paid?; what would be the length of service? etc. He estimates the budgetary cost at \$4 billion per year, without spelling out assumptions made in arriving at that number. He ignores the full economic costs, which are likely much greater.

The sociologist Charles Moskos sounds his familiar theme that the personnel system and compensation package must be restructured so that the presently inadequate AVF can be made to work. He calls for a two-track personnel system wherein those on the career track get technical training, while citizen soldiers get little skill training, low pay, short enlistments, and generous GI Bill benefits. Agree with him or not (I do not), one must concede that Moskos thinks creatively about incentives and compensation.

Finally, Keuneth Coffey points out why restoring the draft would solve few problems. He makes one particularly interesting argument: the draft cannot be used to improve the quality and representativeness of the armed forces unless we are willing to reject large numbers of volunteers as unqualified, in order to draft those with more desirable characteristics. He suggests that, while public support for drafting to fill undermanned units would likely exist, public support for a system structured to reject volunteers and draft the reluctant would surely be less.

My overall reaction to the book is positive, with some reservations. As is perhaps inevitable in such a collection, the quality is uneven, and the papers do not necessarily complement one another very well. There are some excellent essays here, worthy of close attention from anyone with a serious interest in defense manpower issues. There are

others which are little more than unsupported assertions, or are otherwise lacking in significant analytical content. There is one glaring omission. Practically every paper in the book is critical of the possible restoration of the draft. Some authors say that the country should not return to the draft; others say that it cannot, because the draft is politically infeasible. There is no paper by an advocate of restoring the draft. But there certainly are respected scholars and policymakers who do advocate just that. As for political feasibility, few would argue that national service, extensively discussed here, is more politically feasible than restoring the draft. Despite my reservations, I would recommend this volume as worthwhile reading to anyone interested in military manpower issues. Even the specialist will find some new insights here.

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Dobson, Christopher and Payne, Ronald.
Counterattack: The West's Battle Against the Terrorists. New York: Facts on File, Inc. 1982. 198pp. \$14.95

This book, according to the publishers, tells the "inside story of the strategies, weapons and leadership that are winning the struggle against international terrorism." It is divided into 11 chapters and delves into the policies of eight nations, Britain, the United States, Israel, West Germany, Holland, France, Italy, and Spain. One section deals with "private enterprise vs. the terrorists." The authors state that terrorism is the employment of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence for the purpose of placing the public or part of the community in fear. In an era where there have been many attempts to come to grips with a definition of terrorism

this is within acceptable bounds. Unfortunately, many examples of terrorism cited throughout the book fail to meet their definitional criteria.

Chapter I, titled, "Terrorism and the World Community" begins with a description of violent acts directed against notable persons. The attempt on President Reagan's life, an Irish Republican Army bombing, the incident of a 17-year-old youth firing blanks at Queen Elizabeth, a bombing directed against Iranian leaders, the shooting of Pope John Paul II, and the assassination of Anwar Sadat are all lumped together.

Two of these six acts, (those directed at President Reagan and Queen Elizabeth) and possibly a third (that targeting Sadat) do not qualify as acts of terrorism. There exists today, a tendency to label all high risk violence as terrorism. However, terrorism in and of itself can not be identified *solely* by reason of (1) the horrifying nature of the act; (2) scale and magnitude of the activity; (3) identity, ideology, and character of the perpetrators; (4) the methods used; or (5) the nature of the immediate, as opposed to the long term, goal or objective.

Accepting the authors' premise of the political end of terrorist acts it is difficult to find such a motive in the violence directed at Reagan and the Queen. Likewise, the political nature of an assassination does not in and of itself qualify the act as terrorism. The authors, by mingling non-political violent activity with true terrorism, provide a disservice to their readers and cloud the true understanding of a very complex phenomenon.

In their effort to market this book the publishers list several "discoveries" to be found in this "vital and fascinating" study. These points while initially stimulating interest are not, in my judgment, terribly relevant. For example, the dust cover tells the reader he will learn "why,