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# The Future of East-West Relations: Some Policy Perspectives

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by

Johan Jørgen Holst

**E**ast-West relations have been the centerpiece of international relations in the postwar era, and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. However, the nature of East-West relations has changed and is likely to continue to change in the years ahead. In this essay I will attempt to explore the future course of East-West relations from a policy perspective. My approach is deliberately eclectic and exploratory, and I will raise more questions than I will attempt to answer. My focus is on conceptualization and patterns of relationship, rather than on detailed analysis of specific issue areas.

## Soviet-American Competition: The Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence

The United States and the Soviet Union have been the major contending powers in the international system which emerged after the second world war. They define the broad parameters of the central balance of deterrence. They are preeminent in the capacity to inflict physical destruction. However, the power of nuclear weapons has defied conversion into political influence in most of the dimensions of international politics. Nuclear weapons have become the hobbled weapons of our time, arms whose utility is largely confined to mutual negation. Can nuclear deterrence last through the century? No one knows, but it is very hard to conceive of a credible scenario for general nuclear war. The probability of nuclear war is not susceptible to calculation, the intermittent rise of prophets of doom notwithstanding. But nuclear war could come about as a result of processes which are beyond deterrence; miscalculation, accident, and the snowballing effect of a local conflict.

The very magnitude of the stakes and forces involved inevitably causes the management of nuclear deterrence to constitute the core of US-Soviet relations. They have a shared interest in perpetuating and solidifying the nuclear negation, or the reciprocal denial of meaningful advantage. Nevertheless, both parties seem to fear attempts by the adversary to break out of the stalemate and chase the chimera of significant superiority. The balance of deterrence is neither static nor stable in perceptual terms. But the limits of nuclear deterrence have emerged more clearly over time. Concerns about brinkmanship and extortion in crisis persist, but they seem marginal compared to the central preoccupation with the stabilization of nuclear deterrence.

Deterrence is, it should be recalled, a psychological phenomenon. It is not susceptible to precise calculation. Any quantified expressions of how much is enough

for deterrence are at best tools for analysis in planning force postures. They typically are derived from analysis of the marginal effectiveness of additional forces in destroying a certain type of targets. They are tools for budget management rather than expressions of what it takes to deter an adversary. Deterrence must inevitably be analyzed as a question about who is to persuade whom not to do what in what set of circumstances. The question of who-whom (or *kto-kovo* as the Russians view it) is clear in the Soviet or American calculus. However, when we pose the what-question, we inevitably raise the issues which have been at the roots of all the big debates we have had about strategic policy in the nuclear age: the limits of extended deterrence, the propensity for risk-taking, and the confidence in controlling escalation. No conclusive answers exist.

Technology will alter calculations about the relative effectiveness of weapon systems and the definition of potential options for deployment or employment of weapons. But the political calculus seems intractable. The dilemmas are awesome and inescapable. It is very hard to imagine any American or Soviet leader being persuaded that a nuclear war could be won with "acceptable" damage. Political leaders know from experience and by instinct that something always goes wrong. But precisely because things may go wrong, they cannot commit the future of their nations to an unqualified presumption against the breakdown of deterrence. In the event of war, political leaders need options for rapid termination of the conflict. Such alternatives must be created through force planning. However, the question of how much insurance should be taken out against the breakdown of deterrence is enormously complicated. The difference between residual insurance and the acquisition of warfighting options is never clear-cut. Perceptions will differ, and even prudence may generate anxiety in the context of sharp competition.

East-West relations will continue to be shaped by the irreducible dilemmas of nuclear deterrence. However, as the stalemate in the competition for security and advantage persists the management of the nuclear arsenals may assume an increasingly ritualistic quality. Their direct relevance to the processes of international relations is likely to diminish. Such developments may not be immediately conducive to international order and restraint in the pursuit of national interest and ideological conceptions. Nuclear deterrence could wither away at the margins, and its extension to contingencies other than confrontation between the major nuclear weapon states become increasingly tenuous. The very incredibility of nuclear war could stimulate international behavior which is insufficiently constrained by the fear of nuclear ignition. Political miscalculation is a greater danger than technical accident. It is not unlikely that the limits of nuclear deterrence rather than an intensification of the nuclear arms race will define the issue in the debates on strategy in the remaining decades of this century.

The United States and the Soviet Union will remain the major rivals for power and influence in the international system. However, the contraction of nuclear deterrence which seems likely to occur will stimulate further the process of international depolarization which grew during the 1970s. Soviet and American preeminence is not as pronounced in other areas as in the field of nuclear weapons. The political models they present in no way exhaust the range of choice and preference. Power, strength, authority, and influence are not synonymous concepts and they are likely to become further disconnected as international society exhibits

more pluralistic features in several dimensions. In the Western alliance divisions of labor and the orchestration of military cooperation, economic competition and political consultation will require novel approaches. Current mechanisms are in part outmoded and small adjustments are likely to prove inadequate.

### The Role of Arms Control and Arms Reduction

In the light of such changes in the context of East-West relations arms control seems likely to experience a renaissance rather than being thrown into the dustbin of history. However, for that to happen the approach to arms control must change. The very concept of arms control has to be reexamined. It is doubtful that arms control in the broad sense in which it was launched on the threshold of the 1960s is an appropriate subject for international negotiation. Arms control, defined as fine-tuning measures to enhance stability and improve the capacity for command and control over weapons, should largely be left to defense planning and national decision-making. International negotiations should focus on arms reductions and qualitative limitations.

Arms control negotiations have tended to produce a bias in favor of symmetrical limitations. Yet the military postures of the United States and the Soviet Union and the two alliances which they lead are different, reflecting different traditions, geopolitical circumstances, and ideas about possible contingencies and perspectives. Military postures should be based on a deliberate orchestration of means and linkages among them. Negotiations on arms control tend to divide these military relations into sectors based on assessments of negotiability. Tensions arise therefore between negotiation and defense planning. Negotiations may have the perverse effect also of stimulating force-matching buildups in order to obtain equal symmetrical bargains.

Rather than negotiating detailed symmetrical limitations, the two superpowers in future may focus on broader packages of constraint with considerable freedom to mix systems within the packages. Such an approach would seem to require substantial reductions.

The next round of negotiations on the reduction and limitation of strategic nuclear forces should try to shape a more stable balance at substantially reduced levels. Deep cuts of some thirty to fifty percent would amount to a salient reversal of the trends and could serve to reestablish public confidence in the commitment and ability of governments to avoid the trap of an open-ended competition leading to ever expanding arsenals of nuclear weapons. Stability can be achieved by a combination of explicit provisions and implicit incentives. Limitations on the total number of warheads are likely to diminish incentives for the further multiplication of warheads in the MIRV-load of each missile out of concern for the survivability of the delivery vehicles or their ability to survive a first strike. Limitations on the total number of delivery vehicles combined with a freedom to mix are likely to increase incentives to move missiles to sea, particularly as such missiles are acquiring accuracies which permit them to threaten fixed land-based missiles. Sea-based systems do, however, pose particular problems of command and control which require very close examination. Land-mobile missiles create serious problems for verification and accountancy within a negotiated regime of limitation and reduction and should be avoided. It is possible to envisage a Soviet-American strategic balance which is pegged at substantially reduced levels in terms of warheads as well as delivery

systems. The counting rules which were developed in SALT I and SALT II combined with limitations on testing could provide the basis for reasonable verification of compliance. The limitations and reductions of delivery systems would have to encompass cruise missiles and bombers in addition to ballistic missiles. However, the special characteristics of each class of weapon systems would affect the specific parameters of constraint.

Soviet-American negotiations about reduction and limitation of strategic arms will continue throughout the remaining decades of this century. They will be of pivotal importance to the future of their relations. They are in consonance with their shared interests and could produce a basis for the pursuit of common security rather than the unameliorated perpetuation of a system based on mutual threats of assured destruction.

### The Political Order in Europe

The cold war arose in Europe and involved incompatible visions and interests in respect of the nature and management of the postwar order in Europe. The Soviet Union viewed the order in the perspective of a continental power seeking security through a "cordon sanitaire" of client states. Clientship was defined in a broad fashion equating it with social and political regimentation according to the Soviet model. Ideological conceptions and security considerations merged into a policy of extensive social controls buttressed by military power and party organization. Soviet definitions of their security needs still constitute the primary obstacles to a more open cooperative political order in Europe.

The Soviet position in Europe of the 1980s is militarily strong and politically weak. That combination is not conducive to stability. To what extent can military power compensate and substitute for political erosion? Is it possible to envisage changes in the military confrontation which could change Soviet perceptions of the need for political conformity in Eastern Europe? How could Eastern Europe create a viable balance between society and the state without challenging Soviet interests? How can peaceful change be accomplished in Europe without upsetting the overall balance between the United States and the Soviet Union? What constraints must apply for the Soviet Union to become part of a broader political order in Europe which is consistent with the principle of the equality of states? These are the major issues which will structure East-West relations in the 1980s and 1990s.

Issues of arms deployment and arms limitation in Europe cannot be viewed solely in terms of military efficiency or in the context of a Soviet-American balance. They affect the framework of political relations and future options in Europe. The arrival of approximate parity between the United States and the Soviet Union in respect of strategic nuclear forces has altered the framework of political calculations. It was inevitable and any nostalgic attempts to restore American preeminence will be as futile as Soviet attempts to achieve strategic dominance.

The issues have been posed by the reactions to the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 missile and in the follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Madrid. The SS-20 deployment did not from the point of view of the Soviet-American confrontation present a dramatically new challenge. The SS-20 was a "natural" modernization of a force posture which included the SS-3, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. It did, however, present specific problems due to its accuracy,

semimobility, and MIRV-capacity. The most important change was probably its capacity for steady-state instant readiness which, combined with the former characteristics, made it into a potential first-strike weapon against airfields in Western Europe containing Nato's conventional and nuclear-capable airpower, as well as against the fifty or so special munition sites housing Nato's nuclear weapons in Europe.

However, from the point of view of Western Europe the challenge was primarily political. The deployment of a new generation of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces in the context of strategic parity posited the challenge of Soviet hegemonial aspirations in Europe. Such forces could no longer be integrated into an overall "balance of imbalances." The SS-20 missiles constituted a continental threat against the states of Western Europe, particularly the major nonnuclear weapon states like Germany and Italy. It raised the specter of limited nuclear war in Europe and the attendant concerns about decoupling of the American deterrent from the defense of Europe in a major crisis.

The "zero-option" is a logical political response to the challenge. However, from the point of view of military strategy intermediate-range nuclear forces may be viewed as an important adjunct to a posture which is capable of covering deep interdiction targets such as second-echelon forces or lines of communication and supply. It is not clear, however, that nuclear forces are required for such missions. A political challenge has been met with a political counter-challenge. Should negotiations succeed in substantially removing the Soviet continental range nuclear threat against Western Europe, the prospects for political accommodation in Europe would have improved.

In Madrid the western states, with extensive support from the neutral and nonaligned states, chose the discussion about confidence and security building measures in Europe as currency to challenge the proposition that the Soviet Union be accorded the special position of not being included in a system of constraints with respect to the political use of military force. The continent of Europe extends from the Atlantic to the Urals, and constraints on the routine patterns of military activity must apply equally to all states within the continent. Again, the issue is primarily a political one related to the configuration and operation of the political order in Europe. Negotiations about arms in Europe are as much about the future of Europe as about the regulation and reduction of arms.

The Soviet predicament is a complex one. The Soviet Union spans both the European and the Asian continents. Western Europe in the west and China and Japan in the east present challenges in the Soviet perception to the security and influence of the Soviet Union. The military dispositions which are designed to contain the challenges from opposite directions overlap and interact in complex ways. In addition, the Soviet Union sees itself as a superpower at par with the United States. Military capabilities, and, particularly, nuclear weapon capabilities, are tallied in terms of the ability of the two superpowers to strike at each other's territories. Hence arises the concern about forward basing of nuclear weapon systems.

However, from the point of view of Western Europe the problem of forward based systems is a mutual problem. Soviet dual capable aircraft in forward areas present a strategic threat against Western Europe. The Soviet counting rules derive from a Soviet-American "homeland-to-homeland" criterion. The two perspectives

are politically incompatible. They involve basic issues of political order and management. They are not susceptible to technical solution and compromise in the context of arms control negotiations. From the point of view of Western Europe, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) issue is primarily one of balance of power within Europe. For the Soviet Union the critical relationship is that between intermediate-range nuclear forces and central systems, while the critical relationship in the West European perspective is that between INF and the escalation balance in Europe. Strategic calculations which affect the framework and substance of political relations in Europe cannot be reduced to a bilateral Soviet-American damage assessment with Europe as an incidental zone of destruction.

Some technical issues are very important. The Soviet Union apparently is concerned about attacks by short-flight time Pershing-IIs against their command and control system. That concern may provide incentives to negotiate the threat away. However, their concern about the difference between flight times of three and thirty minutes suggests a commitment to hair trigger response which is worrisome to the West. Stability requires hard and redundant command, control and communication systems. Similarly, the West would be adding to instability by deploying Pershing-IIs in vulnerable configurations which could suggest a commitment to early launch or invite preemption in a crisis.

### Current Tensions and Instabilities

The stability of the political order in Europe is not only a matter of viable and equitable international relations. Internal conflict and strife in European societies over matters pertaining to international relations will determine the viability of particular arrangements. In Eastern Europe the legitimacy of the political system which was imposed by Soviet power in the 1940s has been questioned and challenged. So far the challenges have been suppressed, most recently in Poland. However, social instability in Eastern Europe induces Moscow to maintain powerful military garrisons which in turn create anxiety about Soviet offensive operations against Western Europe.

In Western Europe the legitimacy of a military strategy which relies heavily on the possible use of nuclear weapons is being questioned and challenged by broad popular movements. However, economic circumstances make it unlikely that governments will make available the resources needed to create a credible conventional defense option, particularly as requirements are pushed upward by the modernization of the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. Instabilities in Eastern and Western Europe thus tend to exacerbate the military confrontation which in turn constrains the ability of the state to accommodate the pressures from society for renewal on both sides of the military confrontation. These tangled knots shape the agenda for East-West relations in Europe. Is it possible to envisage social change in Eastern Europe which in its natural course would not end up challenging the very framework of security relations created by Moscow? Arms control is but of slight relevance to the management of peaceful change in Europe. To some extent the objectives of arms control and political change may be in conflict. What is good for crisis stability may not be good for political change. Thus while it is difficult to engineer peaceful change by means of arms control, arms control may hamper peaceful change through a bias in favor of the status quo. Is it possible to purchase

military stability except at the expense of peaceful change? Or, more specifically, is it possible to conclude agreements on arms control without legitimating Soviet repression in Eastern Europe? The answers are in no way obvious.

Nevertheless, attempts will and should be made to explore arms limitation and arms reduction arrangements which could enhance the ability of the security system to absorb peaceful social change. Large forward deployments of conventional armies on both sides may be incompatible with the altered perceptions of security arrangements which such change would seem to demand. Therefore, it may be considered whether substantial reductions in forward areas will not be needed in order to pave the way for a more viable system of international relations in Europe based on a greater degree of structural diversity and pluralistic adaptation in Eastern Europe. Political security may require a different organization of military security. Thus the issue of force reduction is not an issue to be dealt with solely in military terms, it has to be viewed in a broader perspective of political evolution. However, the way in which the reductions are defined must be militarily significant. The present criterion of manpower is a poor indicator of military capability. Hence, a composite criterion defining combat capability and incorporating manpower, equipment, and disposition will have to be developed. Reductions need to be accompanied also by associated measures which allow for verification of compliance and protect against circumvention and buildup outside the area of reductions.

### The Nuclear Posture in Europe: Towards Restructuring

The rationale for Nato's deployment of theater nuclear weapons in Europe has changed over time. They were supposed to compensate for Warsaw Pact preponderance in conventional forces. Later on they were thought of as links in a chain of deterrence coupling the defense of Europe to the American "strategic" deterrent. Subsequently, as the Russians deployed matching capabilities, theater nuclear weapons were thought of as a deterrent to first use of nuclear weapons by the Warsaw Pact. The pattern of deployment has been determined by the concept of forward defense and the lack of strategic depth for defensive operations.

Nato has developed a doctrine for initial demonstrative use of nuclear weapons. However, a consistent doctrine for follow-on use has never been adopted. Nato doctrine does not prescribe early use but neither does it proscribe it. The actual options will be defined by the existing military situations. It seems likely that any military situation which implies early first use would create tensions and fissures in the alliance in crisis. Therefore, it would seem desirable to reconsider the defense arrangements in Western Europe with a view to reducing Nato's reliance on nuclear weapons in general, and pressures for early use in particular. It does not seem likely that only declaratory measures concerning no-first use would change the situation *per se*. The military situation has to be changed in order to affect the real options and calculations in a crisis. Reducing pressures for early use would seem the most viable route. The option of first use will be there as long as nuclear weapons exist.

The implicit option presumably will prevent any party from pushing his opponent to the wall in a major conventional attack. Europe can never be made safe for conventional war, and it should not be. The destructiveness of modern conventional war in densely populated areas would be unprecedented. The nuclear shadow would be hanging over any conflict in Europe. The operational problem is one of reducing



the built-in pressures for early use. Such pressures should be reduced reciprocally by East-West agreement in order to remove the presumption of inevitable escalation.

Nato will need to fashion more credible and viable defense arrangements and strategy in order to implement a doctrine of flexible response. The restructuring of Soviet forces which took place in the 1970s poses new requirements. Nato seems to be overly focused on a linear defense aimed at preventing a breakthrough by means of battles of attrition. Instead, emphasis should be placed on a capacity to isolate attacking first echelons from the reinforcement echelons in order to disrupt the momentum of an attack and reshape the battlefield. Improved conventional munitions; enhanced systems for command, control, communications and information; as well as more reliable target acquisition capabilities could provide options for a credible conventional defense within roughly the established levels of financial commitments.

Nato's present arrangements seem ill-suited to implement a flexible response strategy with an emphasis on conventional defense. There is a certain contradiction between flexible response and forward defense, especially as the commitment to forward defense is buttressed with a large number of short-range battlefield nuclear weapons. Thereby the contradictions compound themselves within the political commitment to maintain rigid control over the release and employment of nuclear weapons.

It is easier to use battlefield nuclear weapons early than late due to the confusion on the battlefield when attacking and defending forces interlock. Command and control inevitably become a central and largely insoluble problem. The present situation contains built-in pressures for rapid nuclear reaction with imperfect knowledge of the situation against a very complex and rapidly changing target set. It may also generate disturbing incentives for Warsaw Pact preemption. A major withdrawal and reduction of battlefield nuclear weapons, combined with mutual abstention from concentrating conventional forces, particularly armored forces, in the forward areas could result in a situation consistent with a mutual no early use of nuclear weapons regime. In any event, Nato should restructure her defense so as to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons and remove the pressures for their early use. There is need for a new integrated perspective aiming at mutual reductions by the thousands in the number of nuclear weapons in Europe.

A negotiated agreement should include preferential reductions of battlefield nuclear weapons, nuclear air defense weapons, and alert practices which imply pressures for preemption and early use. The residual nuclear forces should satisfy stringent S<sup>3</sup> (safety, security, and survivability) requirements. Agreements on rough parity in conventional combat forces could facilitate a process of extensive and structured denuclearization of the defense arrangements in Europe.

Nuclear deemphasis seems needed in order to provide both credible defense and mutual deterrence in light of the spectrum of potential contingencies which might arise and in terms of social acceptability in Western societies. The number of nuclear weapons in Europe is very large, far in excess of reasonable requirements. They (or Nato's anyway) are vulnerable, with too many nuclear eggs in a few baskets, a large portion of which need to be emptied early in a conflict if they are not to be overrun or hobbled by the direct contact of opposing forces on the battlefield.

## Diplomacy, Leverage, and Common Interests

Negotiations about arms cannot, of course, proceed in a political vacuum. Shared interests in arms limitation and reduction do not imply or presuppose common international purposes. However, what can be achieved in terms of a broad political stabilization of the political order in Europe depends on assumptions about the nature of the Soviet Union as an international actor in the years ahead. For purposes of analysis we may distinguish between three different models, or working assumptions, about the Soviet Union: (1) A cautious bureaucratized state operating by inertia rather than by bold departures (consolidationist model); (2) A power-conscious state intent on cashing in on changes in the constellation of forces (expansionist model); (3) An accommodating state desirous of ameliorating the strains of competition and struggle (concessionist model).

The models are not mutually exclusive and Soviet behavior may oscillate among different impulses. The very dynamics of power transition is likely to define the pattern of Soviet moves and positions. The power transition within the oligarchy is likely to pass through two phases, first a succession which is dominated by the aging members of the current Politburo, then a second phase of more unpredictable movement as power passes to a new generation of leaders who began their political careers after the war. Their formative experiences are different from those of the present leaders. They know the internal weaknesses of the Soviet system, but at the same time they are conscious of the international power position of the Soviet Union and perhaps are less imbued with a sense of inferiority and vulnerability than the present leaders are.

The role and influence of the military will be particularly important during the transition process. None of the contending oligarchs are likely to challenge the prerogatives and claims of the military for fear of causing the latter to throw their weight against them. Large concessions in negotiations about arms reductions and limitations are unlikely to command enthusiastic military support in Moscow. However, severe economic constraints could entail a more acute political struggle over the allocation of resources and exacerbate the problems of succession.

The low growth which is projected for the economy could have a significant impact on Soviet national security policy. High growth rates in military spending and investment have characterized the Soviet economy up til recently. Low growth of investment and a relatively stagnant economy constitute a novel challenge. The high investments of previous decades have provided a basis for continued growth of military spending. Military expenditures could presumably continue to grow at an annual rate of 4-5 percent, absorbing an increasing share of a stagnant GNP at the expense of consumption and investment. However, choices will have to be made soon. The Soviet leaders have turned to the West for technology and capital in order to compensate for deficiencies in their investments. This may imply Western leverage and Soviet incentives for accommodation but, as we shall see, it is difficult to apply such leverage in support of specific political objectives.

Clearly, the broader policy choices in the Kremlin will be determined also by such factors as expectations concerning the implications of an accelerated arms

competition, evaluation of the "staying power" of Western societies in a prolonged competition, and assessments about the relative fragility of the Soviet imperial position in Eastern Europe.

In absolute terms trade with the West has had a marginal impact on Soviet investment. Capital imports have not exceeded the servicing of debts. Importation from the West is but 1.4-1.5 percent of the Soviet GNP. The share of machinery imports from the West of the total machinery input into the Soviet economy is but 7-8 percent. It has in overall terms very little impact on Soviet economic growth. However, aggregate macroeconomic assessments may conceal the importance of Western trade and technology to particular sectors, sectors which from a long-term perspective may be particularly important to overall growth (i.e., they have high multiplier effects).

Whatever potential leverage trade and credit may seem to hold on paper, it is unlikely to influence Soviet behavior in vital areas. Dependence is always a two-way street and leverage may be applied in both directions. The tendency to resort to economic sanctions as a means of reacting to Soviet transgressions after Afghanistan has probably defined Western policy requirements in terms around which the Western states are least able to coalesce because of the nature of the Western economic system. The whole issue of economic sanctions should be reexamined in the light of experience. The means of reaction should not turn the crises created by Soviet transgressions into internal Western disputes over the burdens of sanctions. Double-standards multiply as national interest modify and mold initial principles (for example, US policy on grain exports and West European policy on the gas pipeline deal). A minimum requirement should be, however, that Western subsidization of the Soviet economy cease. There should be no preferential treatment by the extension of governmental credits below the market level and the consensus interest terms. East European debts are substantial. They amount to some 80 billion dollars, and the servicing of debts tend to eat up export earnings. Hence, economic interdependence is a fact of life also in the East-West context, even if it is difficult to translate such interdependence into focused leverage. The growth of economic intercourse will, however, require a degree of stability in East-West relations which has been absent in recent years.

The concept of interdependence based on an interlocking web of commercial and societal relations leading to mutual stakes in a peaceful future is still a valid one. It should be recognized, however, that the "superstructure" of economic and cultural ties will atrophy unless the "infrastructure" of military relations be molded so as to reduce fears of surprise attack and deep breakthrough. It seems likely that the Soviet Union will become increasingly dependent on the importation of capital and technology in the next two decades in order to get the economy moving again. The development of Siberia looms particularly high in the Soviet priorities. However, low productivity, reduced capacity of investment, labor shortage, and the absence of a synergistic technological base combine to constrain the options for future growth. A Western strategy of cooperation could structure Soviet incentives for accommodation and restraint. Economic ties may lend themselves more suitably to positive inducement of cooperative behavior than to negative punishment of transgression. A Western code of economic engagement could provide a framework for the structuring of Soviet incentives.

A stable political relationship between East and West will require consensus on certain basic norms of behavior, a code of conduct based on the principles of mutual restraint and respect for the limits imposed by contending interests. Such norms are not rooted in Soviet culture and history. For Moscow they represent to some extent alien concepts of the liberal tradition in the West. They do amount, however, to imperatives for ultimate survival in the nuclear age. Competition and contention will not cease in international society. Harmony is not the normal state of affairs. The Soviet notion of struggle (*bor'ba*) is closer to reality. But it cannot be struggle unbridled or uncontained. Ultimately, states cannot pursue national security in competition for unilateral advantages. They should pursue common security through cooperation for mutual advantages. Such noble visions must always be part of the policy-making perspective, recognizing, of course, that international relations have not progressed that far yet.

The whole notion of progress is complicated when applied to international relations. Tabulations and perspectives differ. Thus the balance sheet of *détente* from the 1970s looks different to Americans than it does to Europeans. The seventies was the decade when the Soviet Union caught up with the American lead in long-range nuclear weaponry and increased the direct threat against the continental United States; it was the decade when the Soviet Union backed up a global policy with military means in Africa as well as Southwest Asia. But for Europeans the decade of *détente* brought the postwar era to an end and created a more open and cooperative order on the continent of Europe. Developments fell far short of hopes and expectations, and they ground to a halt because of the Soviet arms buildup and the accumulated impact of intervention and pressure in Afghanistan and Poland. Nevertheless, there is a feeling that valuable gains were made and that the process should be resumed.

Reduction and limitation of armaments will inevitably constitute a major field of concern in East-West relations. Such negotiations are not beyond politics. They reflect and project political interests and political designs. In this sense they are inextricably linked to the broad texture of international relations. Deliberate efforts to establish links between specific negotiations for the limitation and reduction of armaments and the general international behavior of one's opponent pose vexing problems. Such negotiations require a high degree of continuity and stability. They are not gifts to an adversary or rewards for good behavior, but rather a means of pursuing and capitalizing on shared interests.

The task of diplomacy is often to limit, split, and subdivide conflicts, not to generalize and aggregate them. Elevating the notion of linkage to the level of a general principle for the management of East-West relations is likely to reduce rather than broaden the scope for diplomatic maneuver. It could increase tensions between European and American interests, as Europeans are likely to be reluctant, for example, to make stabilization of the political order in Europe hostage to the policies of the superpowers in relation to conflicts in the Third World.

The future of East-West relations will depend on the management of interdependence, on the structuring of incentives for cooperative behavior, and on mutual restraint in the use of force and pursuit of unilateral advantage.