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Korea, the Untold Story of the War

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successful Africans. The insurgents, in turn, had their own political and military organizations, which were attentive to the relative support each received from different parts of the African population of Zimbabwe. The Shona peoples tended to back one organization, while the Ndebele seemed to flock to the other. The most important war lesson that the authors underscore is that the fight for African majority rule did not dissolve ethnic consciousness and feelings of ethnic distinctiveness. Ethnicity among Africans, in short, was not a casualty of the war.

The authors draw attention to the fact that the insurgents, unlike their compatriots in other campaigns, were never able to administer large liberated zones as a government in place and thus gain both experience and legitimacy.

The authors' analysis of the war in Rhodesia is topical, rather than chronological, which enables them to provide ample thematic coverage. They discuss briefly the weapons, as well as the tactics, of the guerrilla forces, while evaluating both the assets and liabilities of the counterinsurgents. The white Rhodesians, they aver, were a closely knit group who functioned as an "old boy network," which curbed infiltration of their ranks by the insurgents and warded off the threat of a military *coup*. In addition, the whites were able to orchestrate a combined police, armed forces, and civil service counterinsurgency strategy on the basis of their collegiality. Their principal shortcoming, though, was their inability to win the minds and hearts of their fellow whites in the Atlantic community owing, in part, to the absence of a vigorous white Rhodesian intelligentsia. Yet, the authors point out that the Rhodesians were not defeated in battle and they caution that the experience in Zimbabwe

will not necessarily carry over into South Africa.

The Struggle for Zimbabwe should be required reading for all who wish to understand the civil-military mix in long and extensive guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations. The authors provide an excellent blend of analysis and narrative on the politics, strategy, and tactics of the war. The book contains four maps, 138 endnotes, a bibliography, and a solid index. Two appendices show the net immigration flows in Rhodesia and the various constitutional arrangements for representation in the national legislature. The book is superbly crafted, written with care and precision, and contains a remarkably compact comparative background on guerrilla warfare in other parts of Africa, the background being introduced at appropriate intervals in the text to highlight the Rhodesian experience.

RICHARD DALE
Southern Illinois University

Goulden, Joseph C. *Korea the Untold Story of the War*. New York: Times Books, 1982. 690pp. \$22.50

Vietnam was America's second post-1945 limited war. Like Vietnam the Korean conflict had poorly defined political objectives, lacked a clear-cut military strategy, grew increasingly unpopular with the public, and ended only after agonizing and complex peace talks. Yet, in retrospect the Korean war looks more like a victory than it did at the time. ROK and UN forces (primarily American) did halt the enemy on the battlefield, and a South Korean regime continues to exist, but while the war was in progress, few would have made such sanguine judgments. Democracies often find it difficult to wage limited wars, and it is useful to examine the first as well as the second case.

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Joseph C. Goulden has attempted to write a military-political study of the Korean war with mixed success. He has really tried to do too much by including battle studies, diplomacy, and domestic politics in a single volume.

His analysis of military operations is consequently far from complete. For example, he devotes much attention to the Inchon landings and the retreat of the X Corps but virtually ignores the campaigns of 1951. Moreover, he says little about the roles of the Navy and Air Force. At best he provides a general overview of military operations spiced with a few vignettes.

Goulden is much better in describing the political and diplomatic aspects of the war. He gives an excellent detailed description of the Truman-MacArthur controversy. Although extremely hostile to the general, he supplies enough evidence to justify Truman's actions. Goulden also does a good job in discussing the lengthy armistice negotiations. Thus if the military history is weak other aspects are, if not exactly new, competently executed.

STEVEN T. ROSS
Naval War College

Wilson, Dick. *When Tigers Fight: The Story of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945*. New York: Viking Press, 1982. 269pp. \$16.95

When Americans think about the war against Japan they remember the sea, air, and amphibious operations in the Pacific. The British tend to focus on the operations of General Slim's 14th Army in India and Burma. A few people recall Merrill's marauders and some are familiar with General Stilwell's problems in the China-Burma-India theater. During the entire conflict with Japan, however, the majority of the Imperial Army fought in China where it had been

operating since 1937. At the time of Japan's capitulation there were over 1,200,000 Japanese troops in China and Manchuria. Although scholars have written a good deal about China's social and political problems, relatively little has been done on the military operations on China's mainland.

Mr. Dick Wilson has attempted with some success to fill this gap for in a straightforward narrative, he describes the military operations of the Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945. He notes that Chinese resistance was substantial and often effective. The Japanese army could, it is true, usually capture geographic objectives, but it was never able to destroy China's political or military ability to resist.

Mr. Wilson's book has a number of defects. Order of battle information is minimal as is his data on diplomatic activity. The impact of the war on Chinese society is also treated in a sketchy manner. Still, Wilson's book is very useful. It is accurate as far as it goes and it illuminates a major and largely ignored aspect of the Second World War.

STEVEN T. ROSS
Naval War College

Shachtman, Tom. *The Phony War 1939-1940*. New York: Harper & Row, 1982. 289pp. \$16.95

Mr. Shachtman's book contains no original research. The story he tells has been told before, and he adds nothing new. His book is mistitled. It does not deal with the "phony war" but rather with the course of World War II from its outbreak to the fall of France. The book is also marred by several minor factual errors. For example, no matter what Mr. Shachtman says, Yugoslavia did not in 1939 (nor does it today) have a common frontier with the USSR.