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The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush

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Europe are seen as a move by Moscow to discourage Western ties with China.

In the final section, Drew Middleton of *The New York Times* reviews recent American attempts to "play the China card" and respond to the invasion of Afghanistan. He does not foresee a return to US-USSR détente. Colonel William V. Kennedy, US Army Reserve, a civilian strategic research analyst, suggests that the US should shift from a Nato-first strategy to one centered on the Far East. He outlines a series of force readjustments which could be undertaken within existing budget constraints.

Edward N. Luttwak, affiliated with the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, analyzes the problems facing the Politburo and concludes that the time may be ripe for the Soviets to exercise the military option against China. He states that China is probably not destroyable but it is divisible. Finally, Jonathan Pollack, a Rand Corporation analyst sums up the main thrust of the book by reminding the reader that both the Soviets and the Chinese may find it beneficial to have a cooperative future. He suggests that the West prepare for all, including this possibility.

The essays are generally well written, footnoted, and concise. Some improvements in organization could be used and the larger implications of Colonel Kennedy's paper should have been addressed by the editors. The book is indexed.

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Gann, Lewis H. and Henriksen, Thomas H. *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush*. New York: Praeger, 1981. 154pp. \$19.95.

Although a great deal is written about

the military stature and policies of the superpowers, at the present time little public attention is focused on the pursuit of guerrilla warfare. The authors, both historians at the Hoover Institution, have served in the British and American armed forces. Guerrilla warfare has its theoreticians, practitioners, and apologists, and yet, particularly in a Third World setting, it is difficult to study from the perspective of either a social scientist or a military affairs expert. Nevertheless, it is the sort of conflict social scientists and their counterparts in the armed forces should study with care (as they once did, particularly in the Kennedy era) lest they unwittingly prepare themselves for yesterday's wars.

A gifted writer, Dr. Gann is a student of Rhodesian (or Zimbabwean) history who is closely identified with the Eurocentric approach to African history. Besides his African histories, he wrote a broadly comparative study, *Guerrillas in History*. His co-author, Dr. Henriksen, has also written both on African history and guerrilla war. Dr. Henriksen's writings are characterized by an obvious familiarity with infantry tactics and considerable sophistication in Marxist-Leninist theory and practice. The two thus make an excellent pair of authors for a volume on insurgency and counter-insurgency in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe from 1964 until 1980, when the nation achieved internationally recognized independence under African majority rule.

A useful point of departure is the author's designation of the white Rhodesians as the "white electorate in arms" and the African insurgents as "labor migrants in arms" and they point out that the former were unable to coopt the bourgeois components of the African population because of the institutionalized, pervasive pattern of racism that undermined the self-esteem of these

successful Africans. The insurgents, in turn, had their own political and military organizations, which were attentive to the relative support each received from different parts of the African population of Zimbabwe. The Shona peoples tended to back one organization, while the Ndebele seemed to flock to the other. The most important war lesson that the authors underscore is that the fight for African majority rule did not dissolve ethnic consciousness and feelings of ethnic distinctiveness. Ethnicity among Africans, in short, was not a casualty of the war.

The authors draw attention to the fact that the insurgents, unlike their compatriots in other campaigns, were never able to administer large liberated zones as a government in place and thus gain both experience and legitimacy.

The authors' analysis of the war in Rhodesia is topical, rather than chronological, which enables them to provide ample thematic coverage. They discuss briefly the weapons, as well as the tactics, of the guerrilla forces, while evaluating both the assets and liabilities of the counterinsurgents. The white Rhodesians, they aver, were a closely knit group who functioned as an "old boy network," which curbed infiltration of their ranks by the insurgents and warded off the threat of a military *coup*. In addition, the whites were able to orchestrate a combined police, armed forces, and civil service counterinsurgency strategy on the basis of their collegiality. Their principal shortcoming, though, was their inability to win the minds and hearts of their fellow whites in the Atlantic community owing, in part, to the absence of a vigorous white Rhodesian intelligentsia. Yet, the authors point out that the Rhodesians were not defeated in battle and they caution that the experience in Zimbabwe

will not necessarily carry over into South Africa.

The Struggle for Zimbabwe should be required reading for all who wish to understand the civil-military mix in long and extensive guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations. The authors provide an excellent blend of analysis and narrative on the politics, strategy, and tactics of the war. The book contains four maps, 138 endnotes, a bibliography, and a solid index. Two appendices show the net immigration flows in Rhodesia and the various constitutional arrangements for representation in the national legislature. The book is superbly crafted, written with care and precision, and contains a remarkably compact comparative background on guerrilla warfare in other parts of Africa, the background being introduced at appropriate intervals in the text to highlight the Rhodesian experience.

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Goulden, Joseph C. *Korea the Untold Story of the War*. New York: Times Books, 1982. 690pp. \$22.50

Vietnam was America's second post-1945 limited war. Like Vietnam the Korean conflict had poorly defined political objectives, lacked a clear-cut military strategy, grew increasingly unpopular with the public, and ended only after agonizing and complex peace talks. Yet, in retrospect the Korean war looks more like a victory than it did at the time. ROK and UN forces (primarily American) did halt the enemy on the battlefield, and a South Korean regime continues to exist, but while the war was in progress, few would have made such sanguine judgments. Democracies often find it difficult to wage limited wars, and it is useful to examine the first as well as the second case.