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PROFESSIONAL READING

“ . . . though the book seems to promise more than it delivers, it is an excellent reference work, topnotch for selected reading, and the only reasonable historical source . . . for a line officer thrust into destroyer modification, procurement or design.”

by
Vice Admiral Thomas R. Weschler, US Navy (Retired)*

Friedman, Norman. *U.S. Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982. 489pp. \$46.95

This handsomely jacketed, but soberly covered, large book presents a complete history of the design and detailed characteristics of every destroyer type in the US Navy (covering a period of over 80 years), but it does so in too many instances with a labored pedagogic style. This is in contrast to a few chapters, less cluttered with such detail, that are alive with the interplay between design discussion, final characteristics and wartime or Fleet achievements. The author, in his acknowledgement, indicates that a suggestion for a book showing the linkage between national strategy, naval doctrine, and ship design was the genesis of this work. It is disappointing not to have that intriguing suggestion fulfilled more adequately.

The book is distinguished by the fine black and white pictures and line drawings of all the destroyer types discussed. They are presented appropriately supporting the text, and help to enliven the book and provide a pictorial continuity.

As a former program manager of the *Spruance* and *Virginia* classes, I can attest to the great value of this book to anyone moving new into the area of

*Admiral Weschler was the DX/DXG Program Coordinator and a Director of OP36 (Ship Characteristics Board).

ship design, development and procurement. The changes in priorities, guidelines, procedures and goals, and the hundreds of possible designs that are studied, are phenomena well recognized in this presentation. It is a history well worth skimming. Chapter 8 (Destroyer Warfare, 1941-45), Chapter 12 (Postwar ASW Escort), Chapter 14 (Nuclear Destroyers and Frigates), Chapter 15 (The New Escorts), and Chapter 16 (The Future) are deserving of close reading. Chapter 8, which reviews the marvelous achievements of destroyermen and their ships in World War II, is a real tour de force.

Though the author makes some effort to equate new characteristics to changed national strategy or naval mission, this is so lightly interwoven as to pass almost unnoticed. In the welter of presentation of every change in characteristic or installation between one *Fletcher*-class DD and another, or one World War II DE and another, one loses any sense of why, and even of interest! Thinning out the detail (to be presented in a chart or table if necessary for completeness) would have aided the comprehension and enhanced the readability. In the recommended chapters, the author strikes a better balance between strategic guidance or mission, design considerations and ultimate choices.

The work is incomplete in two ways. Frequently the United States has not been in the forefront of ship design or outfitting. Thus a generalized reference to what was going on in the other destroyer navies of the world, any why, might have been illuminating in showing the wisdom or error of the selections made for US destroyer types. The slow inclusion of surface-to-surface missile capability, gas turbines, and helos in destroyers are cases in point. The other partial omission is in the discussion and presentation of the significant changes in the technical milieu from which the destroyer capabilities spring. The tremendous change in sonar capability from the hydrophones of World War I to the long-range active and passive capability of today, with its consequent impact on tactics and numbers, is not articulated in any single section of the book. Nor is the long spread in time from the introduction of the first SQS-26 sonar to the actual ability of integrated fleet units to use it (about 15 years) well noted.

The increase in electrical power needs by a factor of over 20 to 1 from World War II to today is not highlighted clearly, though it deserves a diagram to show the fantastic growth. Reduction in manning is referred to; but such key facts as that the new light 5"/54 mount is unmanned, or that the gas turbine plant brought an overall engineering force reduction of better than two to one, are not stated. The development of Prairie/Masker, skewed blade propellers, self-ballasting, and standard distillate fuel go unheralded. The changes in shock and blast resistance may have been clouded by security, but they are significant in their current levels. No mention is made of low silhouette, minimum radar signature and infra-red

signature suppression, except with respect to DDG-51 and some pre-WWII designs, though these have been continual considerations.

It would have been good for the general reader to have been reminded that ship procurement is but one aspect of ship cost. The costs of operations and maintenance and those of manning equal or exceed those of procurement. Thus every ship is bought three times or more. This provides another perspective on such features as ease of maintenance, equipment reliability, manning, and full economy. In this regard, the author notes that the low efficiency of gas turbines was a consideration in earlier ship design. The great improvement in the FT4 and particularly in the LM2500 (*Spruance*, *Perry*, and *Ticonderoga* classes) is not noted, though this was one of the major factors in their selection, once distillate fuel became standard in the Navy.

Overall, though the book seems to promise more than it delivers, it is an excellent reference work, topnotch for selected reading, and the only reasonable historical source or indoctrination medium for a line officer thrust into destroyer modification, procurement or design.

Bartell, Joyce J., ed. *The Yankee Mariner and Seapower: America's Challenge of Ocean Space*. Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1982. 299pp. \$20.00

Was there ever a Yankee Mariner? If so, is he still with us? And what are his prospects for the future? These questions are the focus of this guide to the United States as a sea-faring nation. The book is about American sea power, as defined in the foreword by Dr. Don Walsh, of *Trieste* fame, as "the sum total of all uses made of the oceans: their living and non-living resources, the energy wrested from them, their use as avenues of transport, their value and potential for recreation, as well as the vital role they play in national defense." Walsh's is a theme much in vogue these days, sounded perhaps most forcefully by Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov in his book, *The Sea Power of the State*, and highlighted by the perhaps concluded negotiations at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.

efforts, has several objectives. First, it seeks to provide a history of the American experience with the sea. Second, it intends a tour d'horizon as to the total impact American sea power has had in the past and should have in the future. And, finally, it attempts to offer an understanding of the importance of the oceans for the future of the United States. The editor and authors make a valiant attempt, but fall short of covering these fields as completely as they desired.

This result is predestined by the nature of the book itself. It is a collection of papers presented at a conference held at the University of Southern California in March 1981, sponsored by the Center for the Study of the American Experience, the Annenberg School of Communications. Some of the monographs trace the development of the United States as a sea power from the historical point of view, while others describe specific ocean uses and the US prospects for future developments in those areas. The denouement is

an uneven collection of "voices," some attempting an unbiased, objective analysis, others, unabashedly protagonistic of a special ocean interest.

Certain chapters are noteworthy for what they could have been. For example, Ann Hollick's "Politics in American Uses of the Sea, 1970-1980," attempts too much in too short a space. She provides a nice overview of complex, sometimes byzantine, domestic and international processes, but let me urge you to turn to her book, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea* (Princeton, 1981) for a truly masterful and comprehensive analysis of American oceans politics.

Similarly, Mike McGwire's piece on "The Superpowers at Sea: Two Studies in Sea Power," is actually "One Study in Sea Power"—an analysis of the post-World War II Soviet naval buildup and the use of the sea in Soviet foreign policy. Out of 23 pages, he devotes only four, perhaps five, pages to the United States (relying on the preceding paper by John B. Hattendorf, "Some Concepts in American Naval Strategic Thought, 1940-1970," and the subsequent one by Richard T. Ackley, "National Defense at Sea: The United States Navy," to provide more detail), despite his original intentions. And, again, one should turn to his other, recent writings, e.g., "The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower" (*USNI Proceedings, Naval Review Issue*, May 1980), for a more detailed and complete study of the topic he emphasizes here.

Yet these shortcomings are not the responsibilities of the authors; blame should be directed at the framework for the book—a conference of specialists. It invites fragmentary, disjointed scholarship, while the scope of the conference—the "sum total" of the American experience with the sea—is unachievable

except superficially. The conference, chaired by Dr. Walsh, a retired Navy Captain who now is Director of the Institute for Marine and Coastal Studies, brought together 14 experts from diverse areas of marine affairs, each with his or her own special interest in America's uses of the seas: fisheries and living resources, ocean mining, gas and oil from the sea, renewable ocean energy technologies, the merchant marine, seaports and trade flows, international oceans politics, and naval power. Taken together, their contributions provide an elegant analogy of what Dr. Walsh describes as the fiction of a unified national ocean policy for the use of the oceans. Those who wrote the papers themselves speak of a disunity of interests, and of competition and conflict among distinct goals.

Nevertheless, the editor must be praised for achieving a sense of oneness which is apparent in even a first reading. She seems to have devoted a great deal of effort to making the book flow easily from one chapter to another, to providing allusions in one contributor's paper to conclusions in another's, and generally to making the book hang together well. It therefore avoids completely the fate of so many similar undertakings, the appearance (and reality) of being slapped together, hurriedly, to meet some arbitrary deadline, without a thought of unification. In this strength alone I can recommend the book to the general reader interested in marine affairs. However, because of the superficial treatment of certain topics, those knowledgeable of the oceans or America's maritime roles will likely find too little in it.

This being said, Dr. Walsh ties it all together in the concluding chapter, "The Yankee Mariner in the Next Two Decades," and thereby deals with the three objectives posed at the beginning.

He suggests a way to eliminate the fiction of a national US policy for the oceans, arguing that to have sea power we must have marine science, marine technology and ocean engineering, economic viability, and public policy and ocean politics—the last being the harmonious accommodation of diverse interests for the greater public good.

The first three are largely achievable in the present public context. The fourth, however, remains elusive and, unless this country achieves it on a unified, national level, we will find effective uses of the sea impossible. Rather, the United States will continue in what Walsh views as its decline as a first-rate sea power.

Dr. Walsh calls for us to begin planning the development of a national ocean policy framework and an executive mechanism—a Cabinet-level Department of the Oceans, perhaps?—to ensure that present policy decisions are carried out swiftly by the responsible agencies of government and that inter-agency conflicts are resolved quickly and fairly.

Given the fragmented nature of US decision making for the oceans; the separations of that policy-making process at the local, state, national, and international levels of government; and the diverse forms in which ocean interests are manifested; it is a gargantuan task. Nevertheless, as a long-time student of US and international marine policies, this reviewer concurs with the goal. Reaching it will be an interesting, but certainly tortuous, process.

SCOTT C. TRUVER
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Pearce, Frank. *Last Call for HMS Edinburgh*. New York: Atheneum, 1982. 199pp. \$14.95

"It's going to be a bad trip, sir, this is Russian gold dripping with blood." This

somewhat melodramatic statement, attributed to a crewman of HMS *Edinburgh*, a modified *Southampton* class cruiser assigned to the Arctic convoys, holds promise of intrigue, adventure and suspense. However, the anticipation generated by such a quotation is not completely fulfilled in this occasionally disorganized account of convoy action in the Arctic. Perhaps it is fitting, for combat conditions on the Murmansk run, although heroic in the ultimate sense of this overused word, were hardly pleasant or intriguing. Drudgery, boredom, fear, intense physical discomfort and a sense of hopelessness are the stark realities which faced Allied and German seamen and which are vividly described by the author. After a slow, somewhat laborious beginning Pearce adequately depicts the conditions which obstructed allied efforts to push convoys through to the beleaguered Soviets.

The author's personal connection with the story was as a crewmember in HMS *Trinidad*, which was lost in the series of engagements described in the book. That action is emphasized to such an extent that it would seem that Pearce might more appropriately have entitled his work *Last Call for HMS Trinidad*. Despite his disclaimer in the epilogue that this work was completed before the location of the *Edinburgh* wreck in 1981, it appears that the book was rushed to print to capitalize on the popular interest created by the recovery of a portion of the gold lost with *Edinburgh* when she went down to U-boat and surface attack.

Nevertheless, Pearce generates considerable interest through his description of the ordeal and conditions facing convoy survivors as they awaited transportation home from the Murmansk area. Pearce suggests that the often presented argument that Russian treatment of these survivors was an insidious Soviet plot to

make life miserable for their more fortunate allies is inaccurate. With Leningrad starving and Russian backs against the wall of a long front, as much as possible was done to share the meager resources available. Yet the incredible bureaucracy which hampered these efforts is adequately and objectively portrayed.

The description of the cruiser actions involving *Edinburgh* and *Trinidad* and their effort to fight off submarines, air and surface attacks in the perpetual Arctic daylight is well done and fully involves the reader. The heroics attributed to the British skippers and individuals of their commands, the mishandling of German destroyers, the threat of the *Tirpitz*, the *Niger* tragedy and many other incidents all combine to overcome some shortcomings and make this a book to be recommended.

NOEL A. DAIGLE

Lieutenant Commander, US Navy
US Naval Academy

Boutilier, James A., ed. *RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982. 451pp. \$28

MacPherson, Ken and Burgess, John. *The Ships of Canada's Naval Forces, 1910-1981*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1981. 240pp. \$42.95

On 6 October 1973, at a conference on the North Atlantic Strategic Pivot, Commander R.T.E. Bowler, Jr. of the US Naval Institute, spoke on the one-hundredth anniversary of his organization. Bowler's remarks deserve mention here because they are part of a process which led to the publication of these volumes, one of them by the Naval Institute. These books are directly, or

indirectly, the results of four conferences attended by scholars of North American oceanic history.

These conferences have minor historical significance. Two were held at the University of Maine in Orono in 1971 and 1973. Bowler spoke at the latter. One conference convened at the University of Western Ontario in 1972. Each of these gatherings produced a volume containing the addresses delivered at the conferences. Several things came out of the meetings and publications. The first was excellent hospitality and outstanding scholarship by the Canadians. Outstanding is used in the sense it is used on an officer's fitness report. The second product of these activities was a realization by the Americans that there are outstanding naval scholars and scholarship in Canada. Then, the North American Society for Oceanic History was born as a direct result of these conferences.

Primarily a Canadian-American organization "NASOH" has global membership. Many of NASOH's members attended the fourth conference at Royal Roads Military College in Vancouver, British Columbia during 1980. That conference produced the material which Boutilier has ably edited in *RCN in Retrospect*. Barry M. Gough, Barry D. Hunt and Commander W.A.B. Douglas contributed to *RCN in Retrospect*, spoke at most of the conferences, and have helped make the last dozen years a luminous era in Canadian naval thought.

Two amateur historians have helped nurture this thought and produced the second book reviewed here. They are Ken MacPherson and John Burgess. MacPherson wrote *Canada's Fighting Ships* and is an associate editor of *Warship International*. In their *Ships of Canada's Naval Forces, 1910-1981*, they have given us a coffee-table tome whose data and

appendixes make it worth every cent of its \$42.95 price.

By utilizing eight appendixes, MacPherson and Burgess cram their book with data concerning the ships, the convoy operations of World War II and the generally tough jobs the Canadian maritime forces have undertaken during their existence. The appendixes are the fourth part of the book. The other three treat the periods 1910-1939; 1939-1945 and 1945-1981. Each of these parts has a historically focused introduction which outlines Canada's naval experience.

There is no comprehensive history of Canada's oceanic forces. The ships' biographies in this book help fill the void. Perhaps by reading each of these biographies the informed layman and thoughtful officer can come to realize the important role the Royal Canadian Navy played in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Canadian-American collegiality is demonstrated by W. G. B. Lund's chapter on the Battle of the Atlantic in *RCN in Retrospect*. That chapter was reprinted from the *Naval War College Review* and is one of five concerning the convoy war. *RCN in Retrospect* approaches comprehensiveness for the period it treats, explains the relationship of the Royal Navy to the Royal Canadian Navy and addresses some difficult issues. Among these are the Canadian's "junior partner" roles in Korea, Nato and Norad, mutiny, Arctic patrol and exploration, an unusual naval aviation policy, the naval reserve and, importantly, the unification of Canada's armed forces. J. H. W. Knox contributed two chapters to the work on Canadian naval engineering. A series of essays by officers, politicians, and historians, the book is academically uneven, generally accurate, and both good reading and thoughtful.

LAWRENCE CARROLL ALLIN
The University of Maine

Roberts, John, ed. *Warship*, v. 5.
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1982. 288pp. \$23.95

This is a hardcover, bound volume that includes the four 1981 issues of the quarterly journal *Warship*. It is the fifth in the annual series to be published. Though the bound volume appears about a year after the four individual magazines, it has several advantages: it is \$8 cheaper than a regular (US) subscription to the magazine; it is bound, rather than softcover; and it is distributed in this country by the US Naval Institute, making it easily obtainable by American readers. A cooperative marketing agreement between Conway Maritime Press in London and the US Naval Institute in Annapolis has contributed significantly to the transatlantic traffic in good naval books.

Warship first appeared in 1977, and Robert Gardiner has been managing editor since the beginning. The title of editor has been held first by Antony Preston and since 1978 by John Roberts.

The technical side of naval history has never commanded a large readership, particularly in contrast with subjects such as aircraft design history. Those periodicals on this subject that have appeared from time to time have printed only a few thousand copies of each issue, and some—such as *The Belgian Shiplover* (1949-1975), mixing naval and merchant ship history—never went to more than about 500 persons.

What amounts to a revolution in publishing in naval technical history commenced about 1960, heralded at one cost extreme by Oscar Parkes' *British Battleships 1860-1950* and at the other by H. M. Le Fleming's inexpensive little paperback series *Warships of World War I*. This new literature emphasizes such features as comprehensive lists of the ships of a certain navy; accurate and

detailed ships' characteristics; and design histories of a given ship type (e.g., cruiser, destroyer, etc.). Previously this sort of thing was very rare, and one could only resort to *Jane's*, Fahey, or a few other items, much of which were not based on access to official technical papers and plans. Today the quarterly journals *Warship International* (founded in 1964 and now published in Toledo, Ohio) and *Warship* are the principal periodicals on naval technical history, providing detailed coverage from reliable sources.

Warship contains about eight or nine articles in each quarterly issue, though in fact several are installments of multipart series. With only 72 pages per issue, coverage thus is brief on some items. Authors provide little direct citation of their sources, thus limiting the reference value of their work to future researchers. The reproduction of photographs and plans is constrained by the small size of the magazine (about 7½" x 9½") with no "foldout" sheets for large plans. There are very few book reviews and little comment or discussion from readers.

The emphasis is on ships of the steam-power era, from about the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries. Articles on sailing warships do appear, but only one is included in the volume under review. Similarly, coverage of current events is slim. Of the 34 items in volume 5 that might be called articles, only about four bear wholly on current topics. A few more cover the late 1940s and 1950s, contributing to an understanding of present systems, but the theme of most articles is purely historical. Coverage is well balanced among the late 19th century, First World War, and Second World War periods.

The contents of this volume dwell heavily on British ships. By my count, some 21 of the aforementioned 34 features deal with the British Navy. Five

deal with German topics, five with the US Navy, with one each for Austria-Hungary, France, and Japan. Though any one year of such a quarterly journal cannot be fully representative (there have been good articles in other years on ships of Italy and Poland, for example), this enumeration indicates the strength of this volume on British subjects. The articles on British topics range from good to excellent, most reflecting careful scrutiny of archival records and considerable research.

Mr. David K. Brown, a senior member of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, is a frequent contributor to *Warship*, and has three fine works in volume 5. The most notable of these is the first part of a series entitled "Attack and Defence," recounting the history since the days of sail of full-scale British weapons trials against ship targets. There is great value in retrospective study of the success of peacetime experiment in testing new weapons: Did the tests provide useful data on likely combat conditions? Could such tests provide data of this kind? Was the proper use made of the data obtained? The US Navy's now well-known—but only partly researched—saga of gross torpedo defects during World War II highlights the value of thorough technical histories of the test and evaluation process.

John Roberts has a fascinating two-part article on the design of the stillborn *Lion*-class battleships of 1937-1946, which provides new information beyond that given in his 1976 book.

Probably most valuable to readers interested in modern-day naval matters is a two-part article by Alastair Mitchell on British naval radar of 1945-1980, following up on coverage of the earlier period that appeared in volume 4.

Most of the coverage of the US Navy comes from Norman Friedman of the

Hudson Institute, New York, whose many recent publications rapidly are giving him an unrivalled reputation as a civilian expert on historical ship design and construction. Friedman writes on the *Chester*-class treaty cruisers of the 1920s; the command ship designs of the 1950s and 1960s; and the SCB-27 *Essex*-class modification program in this volume of *Warship*. These articles all reflect research in US Navy files, including material still in Navy custody as well as items that have survived to be transferred to National Archives hands. Accordingly, this work offers unique glimpses of the interaction between US Navy force planning and ship design.

Though it appears that there are few people seriously "interested in warships" to the point of wanting to know their technical history, the importance of the warship in history indicates that this number ought to be greater. But for those who are, or might be interested, *Warship*, volume 5, will be indispensable.

CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Tompkins, Tom. *Yokosuka, Base of an Empire*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1981. 152pp. \$12.95

Education at the time of my youth, sixty years ago, involved delving deeply into Greek, Roman, English and American history, while wholly avoiding Oriental. Scholarly involvement in that area was confined to appeals for missionary nickels in the Sunday school collection plate. Perhaps it was this abysmal lack of knowledge of the background, character, mores and capabilities of those Orientals which has allowed an earlier generation to lead us into a series of costly Far Eastern wars with concomitant shifts of world power balance not to our advantage. A check of

the current local school curriculum suggests that conditions in the foregoing deficiency have not greatly improved.

It is thus with sincerity and urgency that I recommend to any US naval officer, not to say diplomat, this very objective and succinct refresher (and no doubt for many the first adventure) in Japanese historical background in general and its pivotal maritime power point, Yokosuka, in particular.

Yokosuka devotes half its text to the rise of Japan from its misty, half mythical beginnings—origins of its peoples unestablished—through the remote, early connections with already ancient China, from which Japan's earlier culture stemmed during the sixth and seventh centuries when Europe was in the Dark Ages and Arabs were overrunning the south Mediterranean littoral. From then until the 15th century, civil wars racked Japan. Buddhism was imported from China, blending with the original Shinto faith to form an easy partnership. It was during this period that the warlike samurai class evolved, a way of life which developed the spirit of Bushido—total dedication to principles of conduct that were reflected as late as World War II in the behavior of the Japanese military.

A second great influx of foreign influence followed the arrival in the 16th century of a Portuguese ship, introducing guns and Christianity. Both these manifestations of civilization flourished in a culture that has consistently demonstrated an ability to exploit foreign innovations or improve on them quickly. In 30 years, homemade guns were in wide use on Japanese battlefields. Then sublime Christian peace descended. European culture was welcomed, while Japanese travelled widely abroad. But finally, feuding Jesuits, Dominicans, and Franciscans brought doubts to Japan's

rulers as to what was the straightest road to Heaven, so that by the end of the 16th century, most vestiges of Christianity had been bloodily wiped out.

Following seizure of temporal power from the emperor by the shogunate in 1603, the closed-door policy was established. By 1663 oceangoing ships were prohibited from sailing from Japanese ports. It was not until 1841 that the closed door began to crack a little with the arrival of a Dutch mission, a connection which soon was to furnish contemporarily modern arms from Holland. Commodore Matthew C. Perry, USN, and his black ships brought the partially opened door crashing down in 1853, beginning Japan's frantic scramble to "catch up."

By 1864, Japan's new oceangoing "fleet," built in a short decade through purchase abroad, desperately required repairs and overhaul, so the French were called in to build a dockyard at Yokosuka, a well-protected cove which as a small fishing village had been recorded as existing a thousand years earlier. With French expertise and Japanese dedication, the first two ships were launched just 17 months after the yard's groundbreaking.

Concurrently with the establishment of Yokosuka's dockyard, its building ways and drydocks, the ancient Japanese system of government was about to be overturned, with the emperor restored as actual ruler, his capital transferred from Kyoto to Edo, newly renamed Tokyo. This, the Meiji Restoration, is the beginning of Japan's lightning rise to the military and industrial power it attained in its road to World War II.

Reflecting intense effort, Yokosuka expanded enormously over the years, playing a very large part in the enhancement of Japan's sea power. A naval air station was established at nearby

Oppama in 1912, whence a seaplane carrier was deployed in 1913 fleet maneuvers. The same carrier with her four seaplanes was employed against German-held Tsingtao in 1914. Also at Yokosuka was built the world's first true aircraft carrier, designed and constructed as such: HIJMS *Hosho*, 7,470 tons, 21 planes, 25 knots, completed in 1922. (The USS *Ranger*, our first carrier designed as such, was completed in 1934.)

A succession of drydocks was built, culminating in the monster No. 6 in 1940: 1,075 ft. long, 165 ft. wide, capable of holding an 85,000-ton ship. It was here, with the most extraordinary secrecy precautions, that the incomplete 60,000-ton superbattleship *Shinano* was converted to a 68,000-ton aircraft carrier. Unfortunately for the *Shinano*, she was sunk on her maiden voyage by the USS *Archerfish*.

Yokosuka describes in detail the operations of the great Yokosuka complex in World War II. For reasons unexplained, it was left largely alone by US bombers until the very last. Even then it suffered only superficial damage, its wretched condition on Allied takeover largely due to wartime shortages and neglect, plus some minor sabotage.

Particularly interesting and useful is the author's assessment of Japanese characteristics and of the immediate postwar easing of tensions and suspicions between the so recent enemies. It adds up to the conclusion that understanding between peoples of widely disparate backgrounds can be accomplished, even though difficulties and major accommodations are entailed in the process.

Yokosuka also covers the tremendous difficulties encountered by the occupying forces: shortages of food, building material for the enormous numbers of homeless, and the establishment of the complex Allied command structure

ashore, including the customs and habits of the Americans forced to bend with the wind in bringing about the mutual colossal shift of attitudes.

Comprehensive tables of statistics on employees, production and growth over the years complement but in no way overpower the text. Numerous full-page illustrations and many smaller ones illuminate the whole story.

The enormous aid Yokosuka offered during the Korean War is covered in depth. Eighty destroyers, 16 carriers, eight heavy cruisers and four battleships were supported. More than 40 minesweepers with Japanese crews, largely ex-Imperial Navy, swept Korean waters, the ships armed for defense.

There are few American naval officers today who have not seen or will not see this great Yokosuka base some time in their career. It behooves them all to understand what is behind it. I served three years as its commander, and am still awed by its power and potential.

KEMP TOLLEY
Rear Admiral, US Navy (Ret.)

Wilson, Sloan. *Pacific Interlude*. New York: Arbor House, 1982. 317pp. \$14.95

Sloan Wilson's *Pacific Interlude* joins several other recent World War II novels in capturing some of the dramatic intensity of parts of the war that fall outside the journalistic mainstream. It is a colorful and somewhat nostalgic reminiscence of the tankermen—a small group of ordinary sailors whose singularly unglamorous and volatile role in the war both afloat and ashore was never the stuff of headlines. Ferrying aviation gasoline from large tankers offshore to makeshift island airfields in the Pacific was dull, important, and deadly business.

Sly Grant, a seasoned yet idealistic Coast Guard lieutenant fresh from the

Greenland patrols, assumes command of an Army oil barge, formally designated the Y-18, laid-up in Brisbane for repairs. He quickly discovers that the damage the ship sustained from a Kamikaze attack was not limited to the rusting and unseaworthy hull. The crew was totally demoralized, suffering from emotional shock, and without leadership. Grant is soon waging his own war on both fronts: to repair and ready the ship for sea, and to lead what has become an erratic and incredibly eccentric crew. Neither is easy.

Bureaucratic red tape (the Army's, Australia's, and the war's) bogs down essential repairs and the unmanageable crew fails to respond to either carrot or stick. With orders to take a cargo of aviation fuel from a tanker in Brisbane to New Guinea and await further instructions, the Y-18 is finally underway. On assignment, Grant quickly learns his trade and, though initially shocked at the laid-back attitude of the other tanker skippers, comes to know that he and his crew continually operate but one step from death. Grant is deeply affected by the losses but at the same time is drawn to this unassuming command by the excitement of the war and a growing dissatisfaction with the sterility of his prewar drawing-room life. Much of the story is told through the lieutenant and the reader sees first-hand how the war matures his outlook.

Tanking is dangerous and at times, the day and night toil and close calls assume a surreal quality. When coupled to isolated and fleeting moments of the natural tranquility of the Pacific, the ship's existence becomes an uneasy "interlude" in the crew's lives. Wilson's story is a personal one and his prose boasts the confidence and sensitivity of someone who was there to experience the peculiar anger, tempo-

ral joy, and constant frustration of wartime at sea. This well-crafted story adds depth and color to the Pacific Campaign from a unique and wholly entertaining perspective.

J. P. MORSE
Lieutenant Commander, US Navy
USS *SPRUANCE* (DD 963)

Noel, John V., Jr. *Division Officer's Guide*.
8th ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1982. 266pp. \$10.95

For thirty years Captain Noel's *Division Officer's Guide* has served as the basic reference for the uninitiated junior officer. It allows a young man without leadership experience to review quickly the basic precepts of management as they apply to the specific situation of the division officer. From this strong base he can develop his own personal style of leadership to operate within those management principles.

The *Guide*, however, is more than the basic principles of management and good sound advice, for it addresses the responsibilities unique to the sea services. The author's closing admonition to the young officer asserts the importance of this:

"Never forget that you and your sailors have one primary mission: to prepare for and to conduct wartime operations. All duties and activities should lead by some means to this end."

The *Guide* is divided, conceptually, into two parts which are intricately interwoven both in their presentation and application. The first part is relatively unchanging in its nature and can best be described as "dealing with people." In each of the seven revisions of his basic text the author has found a contemporary way to articulate his message. New problems of leadership and management have been treated in turn as the Navy has had to face new

issues. The Eighth Edition, for example, has been reworded and where necessary rethought to include the fact that women have assumed a much greater role and responsibility than they once had as a result of their greater numbers and opportunities in the Navy.

The second part of the *Guide* is intended to assist the division officer in fulfilling his administrative responsibilities. These sections have always been updated to reflect new priorities, procedures, and references.

It is in this section of the *Guide* that the Eighth Edition's contributors have failed Captain Noel and, more importantly, the junior officers who will use the Eighth Edition. In the years since the Seventh Edition was published the Navy has undergone two significant changes regarding the training of enlisted personnel which have not been touched on by the Eighth Edition.

The first of these is the expansion and institutionalization of the Personnel Qualifications Standards system (PQS). The coverage of the system is essentially unchanged in this latest update even though the system has become the mainstay of the divisional training program and the advancement system. Given the importance of a strong PQS program to safety, readiness, and personnel advancement, the thumbnail sketch of its administration is inadequate for the new division officer's needs. There is not enough priority placed upon its role.

More and more an individual's advancement opportunity and eligibility is being tied to his PQS progress. Line items from PQS are showing up as questions on advancement exams. Successful completion of specific PQS standards is becoming a prerequisite for eligibility for advancement; and at the command level it is frequently tied to privileges.

Additionally, the effective functioning of PQS is specifically inspected by Command Inspection teams. On the negative side of the equation, since the program includes watch station qualifications an officer charged with investigating a grounding or a major machinery failure would undoubtedly check the personal PQS records of those on watch at the time of the incident.

The second issue which escaped the attention of the reviewers is the Warfare Specialist program. Based on the breadth of responsibility the division officer has for his men and to his command. The *Guide* should carry a careful examination of the benefits of this program, but it goes completely unmentioned.

The designation of an Enlisted Warfare Specialist accomplishes a great deal more than to recognize the knowledge and increase the prestige of those petty officers who are ambitious enough to attain the qualification. The extensive cross training involved enhances the value of these individuals immensely. This is particularly important in a navy whose increasing sophistication of equipment is depriving sailors of this more holistic view of their jobs, a navy in which "A" school graduates arrive on board as petty officers without an ounce of salt water in their veins. The result of Warfare Specialist qualification is better combat preparedness. As Captain Noel has told us over the years, *that* is the bottom line!

The book's treatment of these two areas need to emphasize their importance to the division officer, for they form integral components of the framework from within which he must act.

The *Division Officer's Guide* continues to contain lots of good common sense presented in a clear, well organized fashion aimed at the beginner. My reading of the *Guide* indicates that it

remains an indispensable reference for the young officer. Its treatment of his specific duties regarding his men provides a tremendous headstart for the individual bent on a Navy career. Its basic lessons about the importance of people in the Navy and the effect of their *leader* on their lives and performance provides a subtle yet clear view of the *values* of naval officers who have gone before him. This insight will serve him and his subordinates well.

JOHN N. PETRIE

Lieutenant Commander, US Navy

Binkin, Martin and Eitelberg, Mark J. *Blacks and the Military*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982. 190pp. \$18.95 paper \$7.95

Blacks and the Military is an excellent book—perhaps the very best of the numerous monographs, several of which were written by Martin Binkin, one of the coauthors here, in the high quality Studies in Defense Policy series produced by The Brookings Institution. In some sense the title is a bit misleading, for the book covers a wide range of issues relating not just to the racial representativeness of the force, but also to the quality and quantity of manpower—issues that lie at the heart of the debate on the viability of the all-volunteer force. Indeed, a major theme of the book is that concerns for fairness to blacks and members of the "underclass" in general on the one hand, and concerns for recruiting and retraining adequate quality manpower in sufficient quantity to achieve national security objectives on the other, are closely entwined. To ignore the policy interactions between these sets of issues runs the risk that "national security decisions will be made at the expense of the social good and social decisions at the expense of national

security, with a good chance that both will suffer."

The approach is expository. The authors provide a comprehensive and insightful overview of the controversies without taking sides. The book is well documented, containing extensive, up-to-date references to both the popular and the professional manpower literature. There are numerous references to government-sponsored research reports. Many footnotes provide capsule summaries of research results. Extensive statistics are presented both in the body of the text and in a 20-page statistical appendix, which is often referred to in the text discussion. Many of the statistics are not available in other published sources. They were provided to the authors by the Defense Manpower Data Center and other agencies.

Blacks and the Military is organized into seven chapters. The first is introductory, focusing on public concern regarding racial representativeness. Chapter 2 traces the historical role of blacks in the military from the Revolutionary War to Vietnam, noting mainly that blacks were excluded from service, or played a minor role, through most of US history. In fact, until Vietnam, blacks had to "fight for the right to fight" and service was viewed by many blacks as an avenue of social and economic opportunity. Only in the Vietnam War did concern surface that blacks were doing a disproportionate share of the fighting.

Chapter 3 contains a recitation of facts relating to blacks in the military in the 1970s—numbers enlisting, aptitude test scores, socioeconomic status, promotion rates, types of military occupations, and many other things. Chapters 4-6 form the analytical part of the book. Chapter 4 focuses on equity issues, discussing the benefits of service, particularly for young blacks, whose civilian labor

market alternatives may be worse than are those of young whites; and the burdens of service in terms of the prospect of casualties in war. There are unit by unit racial statistics that provide insight into possible black casualty rates were war to break out in Europe, Korea, or elsewhere.

Chapter 5 concerns the relationship of racial composition of the force to military effectiveness. Three aspects are discussed: individual capabilities, particularly including discussion of the relationship of entry standards to performance; group performance—whether heavy black representation harms unit cohesiveness, and whether the loyalty of black troops in some military situations is a serious issue; and how foreign perceptions of US military effectiveness may be influenced by the racial composition of the force.

Chapter 6 deals with prospective manpower trends. The declining target pool, of which blacks will make up an increasing part, the declining test scores throughout the population, the rising technological intensity of military occupations, the sluggish economy, youth unemployment programs, and the recruitment standards forced on DoD by congressional mandate are among the topics treated here. The conclusion is that the race question will not go away in the next decade. Blacks will be a larger part of the target manpower pool, and they are likely to view the service as increasingly attractive. Chapter 7 summarizes the issues raised in Chapters 4-6 and calls for research on some key questions for which little evidence exists—for example, on the relationship between racial composition and group performance.

My overall reaction to this book is strongly positive. It provides an overview of the issues, well supported by

statistics and references, which will enlighten the professional, the policy maker, and the interested citizen. It provides entry to the literature which should be of use to members of the research community. I recommend it highly.

J. ERIC FREDLAND
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Ochberg, Frank M. and Soskis, David A., eds. *Victims of Terrorism*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. 202pp. \$18

This volume is a compilation of 10 articles centering on "human responses to human cruelty," hostage taking during a terrorist attack. As pointed out the hostage, who up to this event has probably led a quiet existence, is suddenly thrown into the most stressful of situations where the threat of death is immediate and ever present. The book draws upon scientific and clinical data in an effort to determine what can be done to reduce the victims' suffering. Actual cases are examined to determine the hostage's psychological difficulties as well as the nature of the relationship between the terrorist and the victim.

Both the editors are psychiatrists with extensive experience in the field, serving as consultants to several government agencies to include the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the US Secret Service. Their contribution is valuable in that, while a great deal has been written concerning how nations and security forces should react to combat terrorism, much less has been devoted to aftermath both in physical and human terms.

As the authors point out terrorism is not going away. Ethnic and nationalist terrorism (i.e., the Irish and Palestinian cases) have existed for years and will

probably be with us for a long time. There has been considerable media coverage of the eroding effect of continuing violence on the residents of Beirut and Belfast. For over a year Americans watched their news programs to see how the victims of the Iranian incidents were faring on day 82 . . . 147 . . . 356 . . . 401, etc. In a sense we all suffered and were ourselves held hostage. (At least one television network, apparently overcoming adversity spawned a profitable late night news program.) The point to be made is that terrorism no longer seems a phenomenon occurring in distant lands. It now has the potential to be "up close and personal."

One of the most interesting aspects examined by one of the authors, Thomas Strenz of the FBI, is the so-called Stockholm Syndrome. Originally named for a 131-hour hostage incident at a Swedish bank, the syndrome consists of three stages: positive feelings of the hostages toward their captors; negative feelings of the hostages toward the police; and reciprocation of positive feelings by the captors. The author points out that this is a coping mechanism which has shown itself in several documented cases. "The hostage identifies out of fear rather than out of love. It would appear that the healthy ego evaluates the situation and selects from its arsenal of defenses (the best) mechanism . . . the law abiding citizen is forced into a life-and-death situation and is unprepared for this turn of events The police, who should help, seem equally helpless. The hostage may feel that the police have let him down by allowing this to happen. It all seems so unreal." There have been cases where former hostages actually began defense funds for their captors; took vacation time to attend trials or visit them in prison, or refused to be inter-

viewed by law enforcement officers. As one former victim explained, "I was alive because they let me live . . . After it was over, and we were safe and they were in handcuffs, I walked over to them and said, 'Thank you for giving me my life back.' I know how foolish it sounds, but that is how I felt."

While the title of the book would indicate that the material is relevant to terrorist cases only, the reader will find worthwhile information useful in understanding the effects of hostile captivity on prisoners of war and criminal victims also.

It may seem far-fetched that such fate may wait any one of us, but as J. Bowyer Bell vividly points out in his work, *A Time of Terror*: "After a decade of dismal terror, there can be few left who are still innocent of the new politics of atrocity and the war waged by tiny 'armies' of fanatics bearing strange devices. All now know the long and grotesque litany of massacre: Lod-Munich-Khartoum-Rome-Athens-Vienna. Now millions are familiar with the luminous dreams of the obscure South Moluccans and the strange Japanese Red Army, with the fantasies of the Hanafis and the Symbionese Liberation Army, and with the alphabet of death—PFLP, FLQ, IRA. Carlos-the-Jackal is a media antihero, and Croatia is now found in the headlines instead of in stamp albums. Anyone can be a victim, can ride the wrong airline, take the wrong commuter train or accept the wrong executive position abroad. While opening mail, passing a foreign embassy, standing in an airport boarding line or next to a car, or attending a diplomatic reception, any of us may draw a 'winning' lottery ticket in the terrorist game."

WILLIAM R. FARRELL
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Naval War College

Allen, Peter. *The Yom Kippur War*. New York: Scribner, 1982. 310pp. \$17.95

A fairly lengthy subtitle to this book reads, "The politics, tactics, and individual actions by which Israel repelled the Arab invasions of 1973." The book lives up to its cover description with a vengeance. Pastiche can sometimes leave a reader breathless, but Mr. Allen is a disciplined writer who manages with aplomb to carry a reader from the TAPLINE on the Golan and the brute heroism of Task Force "Zwick" to variously elegant and "civilized" corridors of power around the world. Like Walter Cronkite's "You Are There," there is veracity here that allows the book to succeed as journalism. Unfortunately, as with most journalistic pieces, all audiences cannot be satisfied.

Generally, there is never quite enough detail to satisfy a military reader looking for a discussion of tactics or of operational schemes. In this regard, the paucity of charts and maps is infuriating for a military reader; at least half the battle description is made without recourse to any map. Further, there is insufficient discussion of the political processes, either within Israel or in the international arena, for the book to serve the political-military analyst or political scientist. At best the book serves as a "blow-by-blow" for readers not yet familiar with the Arab-Israeli wars.

One very important exception to the foregoing generality is the discussion of the bridging of the Suez Canal. That operation itself gets ample discussion in General Adan's *On The Banks of Suez*, London: 1980, reviewed by this writer in the March-April 1982 edition of *Naval War College Review*. Mr. Allen, however, goes back before the war to the discussions, planning, and testing of concepts for such an operation in a chapter dedicated to "Bridging the Suez Canal."

In this planning, some additional insights into the internecine strife of the Israeli Southern Command is provided. Further, some information with regard to the various players and their positions on a Sinai strategy, *viz* the Bar Lev Line, is presented in a new light. These several nuggets are gems for Israeli General Officer "watchers."

(If someone wants to publish a book that would be fascinating to write and would be read by professionals of all stripes, no better subject could be found than the command crises in Southern Command—the politics, personal battles, and professional quarrels of about eight or so general officers that made the campaign far more difficult than it had to be.)

There is one thing about this book that bothered me immensely. The author clearly has a thesis; not one that I cannot agree with, but, nevertheless, one that sets a disturbing tone to the book. A virulent anti-Soviet cast, along with an attraction to naked power politics, runs like the major theme of a fugue, providing a constant measuring standard for the behavior of all the players. This is certainly a way to approach the informal structure of a narrative, but it must call into question the breadth of perspective of the writer. One wonders what is left out. This reviewer prefers being asked to make his own judgments rather than being, however deftly, fed so obvious an approach.

The book is well written; it is a good entrance to the Arab-Israeli conflicts. But, there are limitations to the book aforementioned. Check it out of the library and save yourself \$18.00 for *On the Banks of Suez*.

MICHAEL S. LANCASTER
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Christol, Carl Q. *The Modern International Law of Outer Space*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1982. 932pp. \$85

Almost 20 years ago this reviewer participated in a regional meeting of the American Assembly on the subject of outer space at which one of the conclusions reached was that the adoption at that time of a comprehensive body of law on outer space was not desirable, but that, for the most part, such law should be permitted to evolve on a case-by-case basis.

Professor Christol's magisterial volume indicates that the conclusion so reached was a valid one and that evolution has been the method by which the law of outer space has developed and expanded over the past two decades, and is currently continuing to develop and expand. This evolution began with the 1967 Principles Treaty (Chapter 2), and was followed, as the necessity in each case became apparent, by the 1968 Rescue and Return Agreement (Chapter 5), the 1972 Liability for Damages Convention (Chapter 3), the 1975 Registration Convention (Chapter 6), and the 1979 Moon Treaty (Chapter 7).

Professor Christol concludes that the "challenge of space has led to the formation of an international legal regime for space." However, this does not mean that he believes there is now extant a complete, comprehensive regime in this area. Elsewhere he has made it clear that "there is a *maturing* international legal regime respecting the international space environment, e.g., outer space, *per se*, the Moon, and celestial bodies" (emphasis added).

That one can go no further than that is fully demonstrated by some of the titles and contents of the chapters dealing with problems as to which there is, as yet, no specific international legislation: Protection of Space from Contamination

and Pollution (Chapter 4); An International Legal Regime and Organization for the Natural Resources of the Sun and Moon (Chapter 9); and Direct Television Broadcasting (DTB) (Chapter 12). (The author specifically notes the current urgent need for a new treaty outlawing the launching or the stationing in outer space of anti-satellite satellites.)

Professor Christol is no newcomer to the field of the law of outer space. In addition to many articles on the subject, as the onetime incumbent of the Stockton Chair of International Law at the Naval War College he wrote a "Blue Book" entitled *The International Law of Outer Space* (Volume 55, International Law Studies). To see at a glance the extent of the development in this area the reader has but to compare the table of contents of that volume, published in 1966, with that of the present volume, published 16 years later, in 1982.

There can be little question but that Carl Christol's *The Modern International Law of Outer Space* constitutes a landmark in this comparatively young area of international law.

HOWARD S. LEVIE
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Blechman, Barry, ed. *Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture: A Report from the Aspen Consortium on Arms Control and Security Issues*. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1982. 308pp. \$14.95

There are several decisions which are about to be taken in the very near future which will affect the course of Soviet-American and European-American relations, and the risks of nuclear war, for many years to come. At the same time the United States itself is in the middle of a period when the defense consensus associated with the election of President

Reagan is cracking up. The issue of the future of the US strategic posture is therefore both vital and open. Barry Blechman's edited volume could not be more timely.

During 1980-82 the Aspen Consortium on Arms Control and Security Issues met on a number of occasions: (i) to reconsider the basic factors that contribute to decisions about US strategic forces, to see whether they "withstand the light of present and prospective international reality"; and (ii) to devise an integrated policy for strategic nuclear forces, comprising not only the weapons programs necessary to maintain "an adequate military and political balance," but also whether, and if so how, arms control negotiations might enhance US security.

This volume is the report of the Consortium's deliberations on these issues. For the most part, the contributors are individuals who were identified with the Carter administration, but who cannot be identified with the unsophisticated image of those years.

Theodore Roosevelt might have described Jimmy Carter as somebody who "meant well feebly": in contrast, the writers of this report mean well sensibly. They eschew simple-minded faith in equating "security" with ever-accumulating stocks of weapons; they avoid caricaturing the adversary and other actors in foreign affairs; they reject the accountant's approach to strategy, which measures the potential military and political effectiveness of programs merely in terms of percentage increases in the defense budget; and they accept the continuing importance of military factors in the kaleidoscope of international politics.

The first ten chapters of the book have been written by individual contributors, and they address particular aspects of the

military, political, and technological context in which decisions about strategic forces must be reached. The standard of the essays is very high, and several are first class. Space forbids any discussion of them, so a reviewer can only whet the reader's appetite: "Perspectives on Strategic Forces" by Barry M. Blechman; "The United States and Nuclear War" by Walter B. Slocombe; "The USSR and Nuclear War" by William G. Hyland; "U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Control of Nuclear Weapons" by Marshall D. Shulman; "Political Implications of the Theatre Nuclear Balance" by Christoph Bertram; "Technological Prospects" by William J. Perry; "The Politics of Arms Control and the Strategic Balance" by Alan Platt; "Should the ABM Treaty Survive?" by Michael Nacht; "Should the United States Continue to Adhere to the SALT II Treaty?" by Michael M. May; and "The Future of Arms Control" by Joseph S. Nye.

One striking feature of this list of authors, and my only—albeit minor—criticism of the book, is that only one non-American contribution was included. In many ways this is understandable and quite normal, but it does constitute a weakness, for the image which most Americans have of themselves these days, in the strategic arena and elsewhere, is often markedly different from that in the minds of outsiders. In this respect, a bigger non-American input might have helped some fine-tuning when it came to thinking about the political context in which US strategic programs will be decided. The volume naturally places the United States at the center of the stage and, perhaps less predictably, sees US policy as a key to the solution of many strategic problems. However, many non-Americans at the moment—including friends of the

United States—see some US policies as an important part of the problem.

The final chapter of the book, "An Effective Strategic Posture," consists of the overall recommendations of the Consortium. The verdicts are not unanimous, and a number of dissenting statements are printed, of both a more dovish and more hawkish nature—a feature which serves to underline the balanced character of the chief recommendations themselves. The Consortium's broad approach can be gauged from the following brief summary, though a brief summary cannot do justice to the complex arguments, careful qualifications, and alternative possibilities which are discussed in the long chapter itself.

Early on, the Study Group argues that it is neither militarily nor politically helpful for the United States to articulate the goal of military "superiority." Nevertheless, US forces must be clearly adequate to deter attacks "under any circumstances," prevent the coercion of the United States by the threat of such attacks, and extend this nuclear umbrella to its allies. In this respect it is believed that land-based missiles will continue to be relatively threatened, and so a greater emphasis in the nation's retaliatory posture should be placed on submarines and bombers. In development terms, Stealth technology should be given priority over the B-1B, and cruise missiles over the MX. But the highest priority among all strategic programs should be directed towards increasing the survivability of command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities.

It was thought that ballistic missile defense technologies with greater promise may be within reach in the 1990s, but that the advantage seems likely to remain with the offense for the foreseeable future. While this is so, it is

thought better to avoid those problems that would arise as a result of seeking to alter the ABM Treaty. Arms negotiations will always constitute only one dimension of the broader Soviet-American relationship, but will be bound to be affected by others. "Linkage" is also a problem for arms control negotiations within the Western alliance, where the stakes are now very high.

There is therefore a political imperative for the United States to continue the talks, making progress as circumstances permit; but it is essential to embed the Intermediate Nuclear Force talks, as soon as possible, in the broader context of negotiations about all strategic forces. The problem of the latter, unfortunately, is complicated by the "messy institutional infrastructure" of arms control and the increasingly complicated political setting. As a result, "it is not easy to define a coherent, constructive, and politically sustainable arms control policy."

Even so, it is argued that there is nothing to gain from terminating SALT II. Beyond that the Study Group believes that there might be room for less formal and less public arrangements when it comes to the long-term future of strategic arms control negotiations, while unilateral efforts could be taken in the defense field which would further the basic aims of arms control. General expectations about arms control should be lowered. Its future is not primarily hampered by "a lack of reasonable goals or of potentially effective means of accomplishing them." Basically, arms control is "to a large degree hostage to the state of US-Soviet relations."

Overall, this is a sophisticated contribution to the debate about the future of US strategic forces. It deserves to be read carefully and widely, and one looks forward to a similar venture into the

area of conventional weapons. To at least one set of European eyes, the contributors to this volume represent the acceptable face of present-day American strategic thinking.

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Feld, Werner J. and Wildgen, John K.
NATO and the Atlantic Defense: Perceptions and Illusions. New York: Praeger, 1982. 171pp. \$19.95

What is one to make of a book that confesses in the "Acknowledgements," before one has even seen the table of contents, that "This text was written quickly: . . ."; that begins the last chapter, called "Policy Implications," by raising doubts" . . . with respect to the causality between perceptions, attitudes, behavior and policy actions" after leading us down the garden path from the analysis of perceptions and illusions in the first five chapters to the policy implications of the last chapter; that fills page after page with clearly superfluous charts, graphs and even an entire irrelevant chapter? One wonders why the authors wrote it and why we should read it. Where were the friendly colleagues who help authors through early drafts and the professional editors with their blue pencils?

The authors wrote a good article that was stretched into a bad book. The good article is the last and sixth chapter. It shows flashes of insight into some of the issues separating the United States from its European allies, but it is unfortunate that the best writing and most intelligent commentary concentrated in the last chapter highlight the bad writing, the lack of organization and the questionable methods of the rest of the book. Chapter six relies upon traditional analysis and

good prose to suggest that cultural continuity and a real feeling for the way Europeans see things continue to have great value for those of us concerned with Nato. The first five chapters of the book are a virtual parody of the scientific method producing an edifice whose superstructure is made of jello.

The book has defects. Shall I count the ways?

The first chapter announces that: "Through an analysis and evaluation of relevant public opinion data and by content analysis of selected newspapers in the United States, this book will attempt to shed light on this vast and sometimes contradictory array of perceptions, misconceptions, and illusions that have arisen in connection with Nato and the Atlantic defense"; but it fails in the attempt by placing clouds between the light source and the reader and by doing badly what Karl W. Deutsch does so well. Gobs of information are not evidence; collections of notions are not chapters; the concluding essay, quite a nice one, does not spring from what is not evidence. Further, by rushing to publication in 1982, for reasons unknown to readers, our authors fall into a trap of their own making in the first chapter and throughout the book: they project the early successes of the Reagan administration well into the 1980s, a gamble lost about the time the book went to press as the US Congress and the American people discovered that there were costs associated with administration programs and resistance began to set in.

Chapter 2 is called "The Public Image of NATO in the United States." One is never told why the authors chose seven particular newspapers for analysis rather than some other newspapers or some other number of them. Why did they use, for example, *The Houston Post* and *New Orleans Times-Picayune* and not the

St. Louis Post Dispatch, the *Wall Street Journal*, *The Christian Science Monitor* or *The Washington Post*? The three major newsmagazines are analyzed but only one of the three national television networks. Why? When our authors portray the tables derived from questionable samples, one wonders how representative of the United States four newspapers (*The New York Times*, *Chicago Tribune*, *New Orleans Times-Picayune*, and *Los Angeles Times*) might be. The most trusting soul begins to wonder early on if the deck is being stacked or if our authors know what they are about. Extensive use of the *New Orleans Times-Picayune* throughout the book may be a noble effort to bind town and gown (the authors teach at the University of New Orleans), but it doesn't charm a stranger to the delights of Bourbon Street.

The irrelevant Chapter 3 is as bland as kissing one's sister and as useful as a sixth toe. One reads twenty pages to discover: obscure Nato-produced films are difficult to distribute because no one wants to show them; when shown to a captive audience (the authors' classes) they have a marginal positive effect; how to fill a book with figures and graphs that advance neither human understanding nor the book's progress.

In Chapter 4 we learn that the American public sees Nato and defense as synonymous and is prepared to spend for defense for the first time since the Vietnam debacle for long-term ("Soviet expansionism") and short-term (Soviet installation of SS-20 missiles in Europe) reasons. The authors fail to point out that American aversion to defense spending wasn't caused exclusively by the unhappy US experience in Vietnam nor by disillusionment with détente. Watergate, Agnew's resignation, the oil crisis, ABSCAM, and memories of the loss of unmatched US military and economic

power enjoyed in the two decades after World War Two also contributed to a general frustration and failure of confidence in government. President Carter was elected to make us good; it is unclear whether President Reagan was elected to make us strong or to send Mr. Carter away. It remains to be seen that the desire of the American public to be Numero Uno is matched by the willingness to pay the price. Again, the rush to publication may cause our authors to wear egg on their faces.

There are some really funny lines in the book. Unfortunately they are not intended. Endnote 7 on page 89: "Carl von Clausewitz was a Prussian general who devoted a great deal of his fertile thoughts to the nature of war. See his book *On War*" One expects that persons prepared to read the book being reviewed would recognize the name of the German philosopher of war, but why did our authors assume that the reader wouldn't need some help with "the chi-square-based Cramer's V" which pops up on page 71?

"Eurodoves and Eurohawks" is the cutesy title of Chapter 5 that begins with an explication called "Some Technical Comments." One suspects that the methodological commentary serves the purpose of camouflaging personal opinion while doing a disservice to the English language. The meaning of "certainty" is stretched; the pseudo-scientific "unidirectionally" and "univocal" bang on one's ears; the reckless use of "Finlandization" makes precision difficult.

And so it goes.

Your reviewer is singularly unhappy with this book.

HENRY G. GOLE
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Cornell, Alexander H. *International Collaboration in Weapons and Equipment Development and Production by the NATO Allies: Ten Years Later—and Beyond*. Hingham, Mass.: Kluwer Academic Publications, 1981. 233pp. \$54.50

Progress is being made but major problems are yet to be solved. That is the conclusion of author Alex Cornell as he revisits the Nato weapons development world ten years after his initial study of major system acquisitions by the Alliance. Both the review of his 1969 analysis and his current study of weapon and equipment collaboration focus on two basic hypotheses: 1) international weapons co-development and co-production is a viable concept of organization and management, and 2) the common institutions, agreements, structures and managerial techniques can be clearly identified, recorded and analyzed to assist further collaborative efforts.

The testing of these hypotheses is done empirically, reviewing three examples of joint effort studies in 1969 (long-range maritime patrol aircraft, the Hawk missile system and the F-104G aircraft) and comparing them with three current projects: the Nato Airborne Early Warning aircraft, the Roland missile system and the F-16 aircraft. Staying away from the more typical approach of arguing the relative merits of competing weapon systems, the author concentrates on the evolving organizational structures which demonstrate some success in coping with the multitude of complexities that inhibit transnational system acquisition. In particular, he underscores the vital role that the Nato organization plays in attempting to overcome the resistance and wastefulness of national self-interest. Although interoperability and standardization goals are woven throughout the book, they are not considered as ends in themselves but as

measures of more efficient, multiple system procurement.

The commonly believed argument that the allies never collaborate is refuted with an impressive listing of over fifty projects where members of the alliance have jointly developed or acquired hardware for both national and Nato use. The author looks ahead to many other programs and projects now pending and to several major initiatives such as the Future Identification System (IFF), Joint Tactical Information Distribution System and the Global Positioning System which are now underway. He also provides an excellent listing of international organizational structures and managerial processes (such as the Long Term Defense Program) which have had positive impact on multinational collaboration.

Mr. Cornell then provides a forthright analysis of common arguments made for and against international acquisition ventures. Economic nationalism, "necessary" R&D duplication, and lack of multinational institutions are all taken to task; warning that the fate of the future Atlantic Community is contingent on proving "that efficiency, excellence and superiority *can* come from democratic coalitions." He concludes with a broad range of proposed initiatives to reach an achievable framework of Alliance cooperation. Key among these are: 1) permanently established institutional agencies for collaboration; 2) realization of the "two-way street" concept for exchange of national research, development, production, sales and technology; and 3) serious commitment to the efficiencies of interoperability. He leaves the reader with one final question—whether the goal of commonality can be achieved "by a new spirit" in the Alliance or only by a new treaty as Nato begins its fourth decade.

Alex Cornell has written a very upbeat appraisal of progress and future potential for collaborative weapon development in the Alliance. The book is not for the reader of general military subjects, but for the student of weapon procurement it is an excellent updating of the infrequently explored subject of multinational acquisition. Mr. Cornell exposes a somewhat typical American perception of the potential for unification of the Nato political/military attitude into a single mind set for decision making. Individual national interests cannot be subsumed into a single "Alliance interest" nor will nations forfeit their autonomy. Thus collaboration in weapon development must proceed *within* that constraint rather than attempting to eliminate national self-interest. He is right in concluding that development of multinational organizations with unique management techniques is the key factor for success.

Both of Alex Cornell's empirical studies of Nato weapon acquisition occurred during years of relatively good economic conditions. One must wonder how sensitive the degree of international cooperation is to shifts in world economic conditions. Recent resistance to weapon system deployments and heightened competition in arms sales may be harbingers of a turning away from future collaboration among allies. Whether offsets and "two-way street" concepts of acquisition balancing will compensate for economic detriments of foreign military sales is yet to be seen.

With this useful book, Alex Cornell certainly fulfilled his responsibility as a Nato Fellow, 1979-1980.

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Cooling, Franklin, ed. *War, Business, and World Military-Industrial Complexes*. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1981. 217pp. \$19.50

This work is designed to accompany an earlier volume edited by Cooling, the assistant director for historical services at the US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks. Where the previous study examined the US "military-industrial complex" in historical perspective, this book provides a transnational, historical view. However, the study's global reach falls short of all the nations or time periods which might have shed light on the phenomenon. Cooling found "a dearth of scholars willing and able to write" about this subject in their own countries. (Either there is less interest in the topic outside of the United States or such research has political risks.) As a result, military-industrial relations in Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Brazil were addressed by American scholars. The essays on Canada, Australia, and Sweden were prepared by resident nationals, while the situation in South Africa was examined by an observer from Salisbury, Zimbabwe.

Cooling provides brief summaries of each of the national essays but no general synthesis other than observing that small nations generally seek armaments independence. Interestingly, his conclusion that the superpowers have usually been able to thwart the smaller nations' achievement of armaments independence and other statements about the power of the multinational arms firms are not well supported by the essays in this volume.

The various authors differ in their analyses, perhaps because the editor's guidance is unclear beyond indicating a need to know more about non-American interactions. Few of these historians

chose to test whether their countries have been subject to the "unwarranted influence" and "the potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power" which President Eisenhower feared could result from the symbiotic relationship between industry and the armed forces.

Edward Homze does address this issue in his paper on Germany. He concludes that Germany has seen more of a loose alliance of interests than a close-knit conspiracy. Before World War II rearmament benefited parts of German industry, but the Nazis dominated both the military and industry. The real risk from the Germans was their ultranationalism which pervaded most, if not all, sectors of society. The German model was dangerous as a tool for a society with such a philosophy. The change in values in the Federal Republic of Germany has witnessed a less threatening collection of interests than in the past.

Jacob Kipp's analysis of the relationship between the Russian Navy and private enterprise in the nineteenth century is an interesting example of military-industrial relations in an underdeveloped nation. When the state-owned, quasi-feudal complex of arsenals and shipyards proved incapable of meeting the need for modern ships during the Crimean War, naval reformers turned to private industry. Drawing on foreign designs, prototypes, and in some cases, materials, newly established private yards brought the Russian Navy into the age of steam and iron. The extensive shipbuilding program not only built a modern Russian Navy, but also fostered the iron and engineering industries. Unfortunately government financial problems prevented the navy from maintaining a significant continuous flow of orders through the 1860s, and many of the new

private firms went out of business or were acquired by the state. This experience has some lessons for contemporary naval ship procurement.

Although different in many ways, the relationship in Great Britain and France illustrates the value of cooperation between the military and industry. Both nations normally used government armaments facilities, but turned to industry during World Wars I and II in order to meet the greatly expanded demands for arms and to accommodate the new automotive and aviation technologies. Many innovations in weapons systems resulted from this private-public collaboration. These nations have also used export sales to sustain a larger production base than domestic peacetime orders could support and to reduce the unit cost of production through greater volume.

Canada, Australia, and Sweden relied on the larger industrial states as their primary source of arms, but were forced during World War II to develop their own hardware as their traditional suppliers could no longer service them. Although these states have tried to sustain themselves in the postwar period, they have found it increasingly difficult to do so. The defense establishments are too small to support the research and development needed for advanced military technology. The inability to achieve volume rates of production has run up unit costs. Although Canada and Australia maintain some domestic arms output, they are heavily dependent on foreign designs and procurement. Sweden has been more successful in maintaining a high technology military aircraft industry, but by the 1970s it was increasingly importing materials and turning much of its defense production base to civilian goods.

South Africa and Brazil are new economies which have expanded extensively

since World War II. South Africa was forced to do so when its racial policies resulted in a United Nations embargo on arms exports to it. Its success in developing and maintaining military strength is largely due to internal cohesion. But many Western nations have helped South Africa to develop its nuclear and conventional arms industry, and their trade with South Africa enables it to sustain its indigenous production.

Brazil is a success story in its transition from a national dependent on foreign arms imports to one in a position of national self-sufficiency and a coming arms exporter. Brazilian weapons may be tough competitors for the products of industrialized states because they are likely to be better suited to the technological capabilities of developing nations.

Although the essays in this book do not establish any general thesis they provide some illuminating examples of the variety of ways in which the military and industry interact.

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The Arms Race and Arms Control.

Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1982. 242pp. \$8.95

Over recent years, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has acquired the reputation of being an effective, articulate advocate for international arms control. Relying heavily on data published in Western sources, SIPRI's staff have consistently published high quality technical and political analyses of major arms control and international security issues.

The Arms Race and Arms Control attempts to follow in the footsteps of earlier SIPRI works such as *The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare* or *Nuclear*

Proliferation, but it fails to make a substantial new contribution to the literature and theory of arms control where other works have succeeded. There are two significant factors which differentiate this rather unsuccessful attempt by SIPRI from its more important cousins.

First the breadth of material covered in this book is wide, yet the depth is often shallow. Essays in *The Arms Race and Arms Control* span the following topics: world military expenditures, arms transfers, strategic nuclear weapons, military use of space, enhanced radiation weapons, nuclear explosions, intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Nordic Nuclear Free Zone Proposal, "inhuman weapons," United Nations arms control and disarmament activities, and arms control agreements in force. While this list of arms control activity is expansive, the treatment of each subject varies in detail and sensitivity to argumentation, data, and analysis.

Some essays such as "The CSCE and the European Disarmament Conference," "Nordic Initiatives for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Europe," and "The Prohibition of Inhumane Weapons: New Small Arms Ammunition," are particularly worthwhile because they address issues usually overlooked by other Western and particularly American analysts. The essay on "The Trade in Major Conventional Weapons" is also valuable because it serves as a scholarly international source to confirm the American judgment that the Soviet Union has become the world's largest supplier of military equipment.

Unfortunately, several of the remaining essays do not live up to the standards of argumentation, analysis, and documentation met by those mentioned favorably above. The essay on "The Neutron Bomb," for example, scores

telling points against the development and deployment of enhanced radiation weapons attacking their military utility, only to weaken the argument by concluding with highly polemical statements adding heat but shedding little new light on the problem of defending Europe against large-scale armor assaults from the Warsaw Pact in a cost-effective, humane manner.

Second, *The Arms Race and Arms Control* is less useful than other SIPRI publications because of its hybrid character. It is neither a highly detailed study comparable to the earlier mentioned study, *The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare* nor a complete SIPRI *Yearbook on Armaments and Disarmament*. Advertised as an extract of the 1982 *Yearbook*, *The Arms Race and Arms Control* seems doomed to failure. It lacks the rich supporting data accompanying the essays normally found in the *Yearbook* and includes in at least one instance discussion that is irrelevant to the stated purpose of the book—providing a broad, factual overview.

SIPRI will continue to publish both its *Yearbook on Armaments and Disarmament* and specialized, detailed studies. I believe both publishing efforts are worthwhile. The improved editorial balance evidenced in *The Arms Race and Arms Control* is welcome, but professionals in the field of international security would be well advised to spend the marginal difference for SIPRI's *Yearbook of Armaments and Disarmament, 1982* and forgo *The Arms Race and Arms Control*.

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Kegley, Charles W., Jr. and McGowan, Pat, eds. *Foreign Policy USA/USSR*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982. 320pp. \$25 paper \$12.50

While there is an abundance of literature in the field of political affairs

that deals with the foreign policy of either the United States or the Soviet Union, there is relatively little that deals with the foreign policies of both superpowers. In particular there seem to be very few studies that compare those policies in any kind of a systematic manner. *Foreign Policy USA/USSR* is an attempt by the editors to correct that imbalance by providing a systematic comparative study of the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union. As one who teaches a graduate course in comparative US and Soviet foreign policy, I welcomed this approach and rejoiced at the prospects of a study that might serve as a single-volume text for the course.

Unfortunately, this book falls short of the mark and is far too limited in both breadth and depth. With few exceptions, the articles and essays that make up the book concentrate more on the methodology of analysis and too little on its substance. Much of that methodology is of the behavioral scientific or statistical analytical variety, forcing those of us who cling to the traditionalist school of political interpretation into mild cases of migraine as we sort through "central tendencies" and "deviations from central tendency" in order to learn that in the United States there is a relationship between presidential party and defense spending, and that in the Soviet Union there is a relationship between aggregate economic performance and defense spending. Indeed!

For those, however, who prefer a quantifiable framework for political analysis and are properly attuned to the value of computer simulations and complex model building, this book does provide some interesting theoretical bases for comparing certain aspects of US and Soviet foreign policies. But those aspects are rather limited in scope and

while the book is divided into three parts which on the surface seem to be sufficiently comprehensive (Relationships Between the Superpowers, Ideological Orientation and Policy Consequences, and Responses to Common Problems), the individual chapters that make up those parts remain too narrowly focused. One refreshing exception is an excellent chapter titled "Perceiving the Other's Intentions," which categorizes the major schools of analyses in *both* the United States and the Soviet Union in terms of how those analysts perceive the global intentions of the other superpower.

The twelve "chapters" aren't really chapters at all, but rather individually prepared articles or studies (all by different authors) that do not necessarily relate to one another except in the sense that they were selected by the editors for inclusion in one or another of the three main parts of the book, and tied together in the introduction which is an overview of each of the articles. In fact, it is in this introduction that the editors make a valuable contribution to the book. Many readers will find the introduction the most rewarding section of all.

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Dziak, John. *Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: The Interaction of Theory and Practice*. New York: Crane, Russak, 1981. 72pp. \$5.95

Vernon, Graham D., ed. *Soviet Perceptions of War and Peace*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1981. 185pp. \$6.00

Several years ago the US Navy virtually abandoned its research on strategic thinking, leaving the field to academics. Nowhere is this more the

case than in the study of Soviet naval strategy. This has led to the ascendancy of an academic view which deemphasizes the importance of examining Soviet strategic postulations, substituting an analytical strategy which involves application of statistical and behavioral formulae to analysis of Soviet naval strategy and operations. Naval intelligence, which questions this approach, has stressed the concrete—construction and operations—in achieving an understanding of Soviet strategic postulations actually formulated several years before. As a result, our understanding of Soviet strategic concepts is usually several years behind the times.

This situation is not as bleak as it may seem; because much has been done in both government and academia in analyzing Soviet military strategy. Since Soviet naval strategy is a subset of its overall posture, an accurate analysis of Soviet strategy is an indispensable prerequisite for understanding their naval strategy. Nowhere else are these efforts integrated more succinctly or cogently than in two recent works: *Soviet Perceptions of Military Power* by John Dziak and *Soviet Perceptions of War and Peace*, edited by Graham Vernon.

In *Soviet Perceptions of Military Power*, Dziak integrates several major analyses of Soviet strategic writings with the research on long-range Soviet strategy under the sponsorship of Professor Joseph Schiebel of Georgetown University in the 1970s. In doing so, Dziak makes a unique and valuable contribution. However, he uses these postulations and relies on extensive Soviet sources to progress far beyond other analysts, giving us new insight into Soviet perceptions.

Dziak begins by noting that many of the liberalizing trends in Russia were reversed by the Revolution of 1917, and

that a much older Asiatic system was restored. He demonstrates the basic continuity of this system since 1917 and shows that fundamental harmony between military and political goals characterizes the current system. He concludes that "the Party, military, security, industrial and selected State elites" are totally integrated. This results in a degree of unity in the Soviet system which is often underestimated in the West.

Dziak offers a detailed discussion of strategic concepts and military organization to prove his case, making several important points in the process. First, Soviet politics both overlies and drives the acquisition of military power. Second, Dziak notes that comprehensive planning is an academic feature of the Soviet system—not only for the economy, but for the military as well. Integrating military and political forces in order to fulfill Party objectives reflects an approach that engineers military doctrine into operational reality. Thus, action flows from plan. The "buildup" of the 1970s and 1980s results from this approach, rather than being some kind of presumably reflexive response to US provocation. Finally, Dziak refutes the myth that the Party and the military are institutions in conflict and demonstrates convincingly that the Soviet system is not one of diffuse, contending power centers.

In demonstrating the validity of the above points, Dziak provides us with one of the most concise, cogent introductions, available on the subject of the Soviet military system and its perceptions. His book ranks among the best in this area; it is mandatory reading for anyone concerned with Soviet military and naval strategy.

Dziak's book serves as an introduction to Graham Vernon's *Soviet Perceptions of*

War and Peace, a collection of eight articles dealing with the Soviet view of conflict. This book illuminates Soviet perceptions of several relevant political and military issues based on examinations of Soviet sources, and to demonstrate, from the Soviet view, how their military and political policies interrelate.

All of the contributors are established experts on the subject. John Dziak's lead essay focuses on military doctrine. Dziak shows that doctrine is the Party's guide for the military's strategic structure and future direction. Reiterating his view that the Soviet Union is a totally integrated political-military system, Dziak sees doctrine and the resulting force structure as the implementation of the Party's method for pursuing its political objectives.

Dziak's chapter provides a framework for the remainder of the book, which focuses on Soviet perceptions of seven specific issues: the laws of war; the origins of the cold war; war in the nuclear age; Soviet military capabilities; military strategies and forces; peaceful coexistence; and the emergence of multipolarity in international affairs. All of the articles are comprehensive and well written, providing the reader with a good introduction to Soviet perceptions of several major issues.

Two articles are truly noteworthy. The first, by William and Harriet Scott, assesses Soviet perceptions of American military strategy and strength. The Scotts note that Soviet perceptions change in order to continue to accurately reflect US strategy and military strength. The Scotts are the only contributors who explicitly address the Soviet Navy. In discussing the postulations contained in Admiral Gorshkov's *Sea Power of the State*, they emphasize that, although he views US strategy and

forces from a somewhat different perspective than other Soviet leaders, this is merely a difference in emphasis; there are no basic differences between Gorshkov's views and those of other Soviet military leaders. This important observation conflicts with the view commonly held in the US Navy that there is a significant divergence of views between Gorshkov and his counterparts.

Colonel Vernon's excellent article traces the concept of "peaceful coexistence" from its inception and concludes that there is considerable consistency in Soviet policy. He believes that for the USSR, peaceful coexistence is a currently operative but not necessarily permanent concept. Vernon warns that it is essential for the West to maintain the balance of power so that the Soviets do not achieve a "position of strength." The implications of this for the US Navy are obvious.

As both editor and contributor, Vernon has provided us with valuable insight into the Soviet view of several major military and foreign policy issues. A concise, readable, and comprehensive volume, *Soviet Perceptions of War and Peace* is a valuable aid for understanding current Soviet military and naval strategy.

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Miller, Mark E. *Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: The Quest for Superiority*. Washington, D.C.: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1982. 298pp. \$14.95, paper \$9.95

Deciphering Soviet political/military intentions, and matching those intentions to the raw military capabilities that the USSR commands, is a most hazardous undertaking. Compounding the difficulty of access to information is the paucity of analysts who are not only able

to read, understand, and interpret Soviet Russian language military literature, but can present their findings in readable form to the wider Western security community. To be sure, scanning Soviet literature for hints of doctrinal change, or strategic assumptions, will not unlock all the doors to that closed society that is our foremost adversary. Nevertheless, an analysis of the literature that is primarily geared to internal Soviet military audiences reduces the risk that our interpretations of the USSR's intentions, and the mindset of its leadership, will be far off the mark.

Mark E. Miller's *Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: The Quest for Superiority* represents a major contribution to the study of Soviet military literature. Miller's thesis is straightforward: "the fundamental problem confronting the United States in its military competition with the Soviet Union is as much one of contending strategic philosophies as of opposing military assets." Miller argues that Westerners have discounted the importance of strategic doctrine in shaping force development, primarily because the United States in particular has relied more on resources than on strategy to win its wars. He contends that the Soviets, on the other hand, espouse a nuclear warfighting and war winning strategy that is reflected in their writings. He argues that Soviet requirements have remained constant for two decades, while deployed forces have "correlated" to an even greater degree with those requirements. At the same time the weapons acquisition system and the formulation of doctrine have been under firm political control.

Miller guides his readers through a postwar history of Soviet doctrine and force development in order to support his case. He provides a most useful

discussion of the Soviet weapons acquisition process, as well as a trenchant critique of the SALT II Treaty. But he does not entirely succeed in convincing the reader of the validity of his central thesis.

Miller's major problem is that at critical junctures he is forced to rely on speculation, rather than documentation to prove his case. For example, Miller argues that the USSR's overall political/military strategy in the late 1960s sought to delay the resurgence of American power, to acquire the benefits of Western technology, and by means of détente, to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies and ensure the West's neutrality in a Sino-Soviet struggle, thereby thwarting the Nixon Grand Design. Unfortunately, there is a marked absence of evidence to support Miller's arguments.

Similarly, Miller's discussion of Soviet objectives in SALT I argues, without any sources, that limitations on ballistic missile defenses were "uppermost in the minds of the Soviets." His explanation for this critically important assertion is far too tentative, and is laced with the use of the terms "may" and "probably." Again, Miller's argument that the Soviet notion of deterrence has not embraced notions of mutual restraint is essentially an unsupported assertion. Indeed, his statement that the Soviets "have had little use . . . for shoring up deterrence . . . [such] as improving communications," flies in the face of the existence of a Moscow-Washington hot line, and its frequent use, as well as of agreements such as that regarding incidents at sea.

Almost as troublesome is Miller's reliance upon antiquated citations to prove a particular point. For example, Miller cites a general officer's comment

published in January 1968 in support of his arguments that the Soviets view a protracted conventional campaign as improbable. Without doubt, at the time the Soviets did not focus on the possibilities of a protracted conventional war. Many analysts would argue, however, that they do so today. Similarly, Miller argues that the Soviets expect to launch a preemptive nuclear strike, on the basis of a comment by A.A. Sidorenko published some years ago. Brezhnev's no-first-use offer has, of course, overtaken Miller's argument, at least at its face value.

The point of these criticisms is not to devalue Miller's effort. His research is indeed painstaking, even if the book suffers from a variety of minor factual errors and some poor proofreading. Furthermore, Miller's arguments are plausible, and are supportable on the basis of analyses that go beyond his methodology. Most readers will recognize the limitations to Miller's methodology, as the author himself acknowledges. Thus, for the general reader willing to plunge into heavily academic prose, and for the specialist seeking a well-organized discussion of the Soviet military/political psyche, Miller's book, in the genre of the seminal works by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and Amoretta M. Hoerber, is indeed required reading.

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Clawson, Robert W. and Kaplan, Lawrence S., eds. *The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means*. Wilmington, Del.: Scharlarly Resources, 1982. 297pp. \$19.95 paper \$9.95

This collection of conference papers, produced under the auspices of Kent

State University's Center for Nato Studies, goes some distance toward achieving its ambitious goal: to close the "scholarly publication gap" that exists between works on the Warsaw Pact and those dealing with Nato. It could have succeeded with a somewhat shorter volume, however; one that was both more readable and less repetitious.

The Warsaw Pact is organized as an encyclopedia of the Warsaw Pact. Its major sections address "The Principal Political Relationships," "NATO and the Warsaw Pact," "The Forces," "The Weapons," and "Doctrine and Capabilities." The initial section subjects the reader to the same litany of dates and key events three times over, in Andrzej Korbonski's essay pretentiously entitled "The Warsaw Treaty After Twenty-Five Years: An Entangling Alliance or an Empty Shell?," Jorg K. Hoensch's "The Warsaw Pact and the Northern Member States," and Edgar O'Ballance's "The Three Southern Members of the Warsaw Pact."

O'Ballance has produced the most cogent of the three pieces. It is relatively free of unsupported assertions, which particularly plague the Hoensch essay, and provides valuable insights into the neutralist tendencies of the southern tier states. Sloppiness even creeps into O'Ballance's work, however. For example, there was no June 1973 Middle East War. The war in question was fought in June 1967. More troubling is the reference to participation of under-strength Hungarian forces and an "ineffectual" Bulgarian contingent in the crushing of Czechoslovakia. Hoensch asserts that "the Pact command could . . . pride itself on the mainly satisfactory coordination of the five participant forces during the . . . the intervention against a deviant Pact member."

The section on Nato and the Warsaw

Pact includes two essays that in many respects cover the same ground as those of the earlier section. Even more overlaps appear in the following sections on Forces, Weapons and Doctrine.

James T. Reitz's piece on "The Soviet Armed Forces: Perceptions Over Twenty Years," opens the Forces section. It fails to address changes in the nomenclature of the aviation forces that are reported later in the volume, totally ignores command, control and communications, and likewise overlooks support forces. Thomas Cason's article on "The East European Military Forces" is more instructive. It too ignores C³, however, and is uncertain about some of its facts (are there nineteen Soviet divisions in the GDR, or twenty, as Hoensch asserts).

James Carlton's essay on "Soviet and Warsaw Pact Major Battlefield Weapons" generally provides a good overview of its subject matter. It would have been an even better piece had it included a discussion of the Soviet weapons system development process, something that Bill Sweetman incorporates into his excellent study of Warsaw Pact air power.

In marked contrast to Sweetman's essay is that by Louis J. Andolino on "Warsaw Pact Sea Power Assets." Readers of the *Naval War College Review* will note some fundamental oversights, errors, and omissions in Andolino's essay. There is no discussion of Soviet or Pact mine warfare capability. There is an outdated evaluation of the shifting and erratic nature of Soviet shipbuilding

programs that is more appropriate to 1970, the date at which the source for Andolino's assertion was published. There is no reference to the need to maintain SALT I limits when evaluating reasons for the recent slight decline in Soviet SSBNs. There are also minor irritants—Udaloy, for example, is spelled Udalov.

Commander Steve Kime's analysis of Warsaw Pact navies in the section on Doctrine and Capabilities is far more thoughtful, and should have sufficed (perhaps with some expansion) for the editors' purposes. On the other hand, co-editor Robert Clawson's two essays on Pact ground and air forces (the former co-authored with John Binder) stand well on their own in the Doctrine section, though again one wonders why so many facts need to be repeated several times over in the various essays on Pact forces.

Finally there is John Erickson's discussion of "Military Management and Modernization within the Warsaw Pact," which further confirms the author's reputation as one of the leading observers and analysts of current Soviet military developments. The editors could have done well to have highlighted this piece, possibly by having it open the Forces or Weapons section, possibly too, by having eliminated some of the more repetitive and less enlightening portions of this most uneven volume.

DOV S. ZAKHEIM
OUSD (Policy)