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# Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture

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and Pollution (Chapter 4); An International Legal Regime and Organization for the Natural Resources of the Sun and Moon (Chapter 9); and Direct Television Broadcasting (DTB) (Chapter 12). (The author specifically notes the current urgent need for a new treaty outlawing the launching or the stationing in outer space of anti-satellite satellites.)

Professor Christol is no newcomer to the field of the law of outer space. In addition to many articles on the subject, as the onetime incumbent of the Stockton Chair of International Law at the Naval War College he wrote a "Blue Book" entitled *The International Law of Outer Space* (Volume 55, International Law Studies). To see at a glance the extent of the development in this area the reader has but to compare the table of contents of that volume, published in 1966, with that of the present volume, published 16 years later, in 1982.

There can be little question but that Carl Christol's *The Modern International Law of Outer Space* constitutes a landmark in this comparatively young area of international law.

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Blechman, Barry, ed. *Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture: A Report from the Aspen Consortium on Arms Control and Security Issues*. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1982. 308pp. \$14.95

There are several decisions which are about to be taken in the very near future which will affect the course of Soviet-American and European-American relations, and the risks of nuclear war, for many years to come. At the same time the United States itself is in the middle of a period when the defense consensus associated with the election of President

Reagan is cracking up. The issue of the future of the US strategic posture is therefore both vital and open. Barry Blechman's edited volume could not be more timely.

During 1980-82 the Aspen Consortium on Arms Control and Security Issues met on a number of occasions: (i) to reconsider the basic factors that contribute to decisions about US strategic forces, to see whether they "withstand the light of present and prospective international reality"; and (ii) to devise an integrated policy for strategic nuclear forces, comprising not only the weapons programs necessary to maintain "an adequate military and political balance," but also whether, and if so how, arms control negotiations might enhance US security.

This volume is the report of the Consortium's deliberations on these issues. For the most part, the contributors are individuals who were identified with the Carter administration, but who cannot be identified with the unsophisticated image of those years.

Theodore Roosevelt might have described Jimmy Carter as somebody who "meant well feebly": in contrast, the writers of this report mean well sensibly. They eschew simple-minded faith in equating "security" with ever-accumulating stocks of weapons; they avoid caricaturing the adversary and other actors in foreign affairs; they reject the accountant's approach to strategy, which measures the potential military and political effectiveness of programs merely in terms of percentage increases in the defense budget; and they accept the continuing importance of military factors in the kaleidoscope of international politics.

The first ten chapters of the book have been written by individual contributors, and they address particular aspects of the

military, political, and technological context in which decisions about strategic forces must be reached. The standard of the essays is very high, and several are first class. Space forbids any discussion of them, so a reviewer can only whet the reader's appetite: "Perspectives on Strategic Forces" by Barry M. Blechman; "The United States and Nuclear War" by Walter B. Slocombe; "The USSR and Nuclear War" by William G. Hyland; "U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Control of Nuclear Weapons" by Marshall D. Shulman; "Political Implications of the Theatre Nuclear Balance" by Christoph Bertram; "Technological Prospects" by William J. Perry; "The Politics of Arms Control and the Strategic Balance" by Alan Platt; "Should the ABM Treaty Survive?" by Michael Nacht; "Should the United States Continue to Adhere to the SALT II Treaty?" by Michael M. May; and "The Future of Arms Control" by Joseph S. Nye.

One striking feature of this list of authors, and my only—albeit minor—criticism of the book, is that only one non-American contribution was included. In many ways this is understandable and quite normal, but it does constitute a weakness, for the image which most Americans have of themselves these days, in the strategic arena and elsewhere, is often markedly different from that in the minds of outsiders. In this respect, a bigger non-American input might have helped some fine-tuning when it came to thinking about the political context in which US strategic programs will be decided. The volume naturally places the United States at the center of the stage and, perhaps less predictably, sees US policy as a key to the solution of many strategic problems. However, many non-Americans at the moment—including friends of the

United States—see some US policies as an important part of the problem.

The final chapter of the book, "An Effective Strategic Posture," consists of the overall recommendations of the Consortium. The verdicts are not unanimous, and a number of dissenting statements are printed, of both a more dovish and more hawkish nature—a feature which serves to underline the balanced character of the chief recommendations themselves. The Consortium's broad approach can be gauged from the following brief summary, though a brief summary cannot do justice to the complex arguments, careful qualifications, and alternative possibilities which are discussed in the long chapter itself.

Early on, the Study Group argues that it is neither militarily nor politically helpful for the United States to articulate the goal of military "superiority." Nevertheless, US forces must be clearly adequate to deter attacks "under any circumstances," prevent the coercion of the United States by the threat of such attacks, and extend this nuclear umbrella to its allies. In this respect it is believed that land-based missiles will continue to be relatively threatened, and so a greater emphasis in the nation's retaliatory posture should be placed on submarines and bombers. In development terms, Stealth technology should be given priority over the B-1B, and cruise missiles over the MX. But the highest priority among all strategic programs should be directed towards increasing the survivability of command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities.

It was thought that ballistic missile defense technologies with greater promise may be within reach in the 1990s, but that the advantage seems likely to remain with the offense for the foreseeable future. While this is so, it is

thought better to avoid those problems that would arise as a result of seeking to alter the ABM Treaty. Arms negotiations will always constitute only one dimension of the broader Soviet-American relationship, but will be bound to be affected by others. "Linkage" is also a problem for arms control negotiations within the Western alliance, where the stakes are now very high.

There is therefore a political imperative for the United States to continue the talks, making progress as circumstances permit; but it is essential to embed the Intermediate Nuclear Force talks, as soon as possible, in the broader context of negotiations about all strategic forces. The problem of the latter, unfortunately, is complicated by the "messy institutional infrastructure" of arms control and the increasingly complicated political setting. As a result, "it is not easy to define a coherent, constructive, and politically sustainable arms control policy."

Even so, it is argued that there is nothing to gain from terminating SALT II. Beyond that the Study Group believes that there might be room for less formal and less public arrangements when it comes to the long-term future of strategic arms control negotiations, while unilateral efforts could be taken in the defense field which would further the basic aims of arms control. General expectations about arms control should be lowered. Its future is not primarily hampered by "a lack of reasonable goals or of potentially effective means of accomplishing them." Basically, arms control is "to a large degree hostage to the state of US-Soviet relations."

Overall, this is a sophisticated contribution to the debate about the future of US strategic forces. It deserves to be read carefully and widely, and one looks forward to a similar venture into the

area of conventional weapons. To at least one set of European eyes, the contributors to this volume represent the acceptable face of present-day American strategic thinking.

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Feld, Werner J. and Wildgen, John K.  
*NATO and the Atlantic Defense: Perceptions and Illusions*. New York: Praeger, 1982. 171pp. \$19.95

What is one to make of a book that confesses in the "Acknowledgements," before one has even seen the table of contents, that "This text was written quickly: . . ."; that begins the last chapter, called "Policy Implications," by raising doubts" . . . with respect to the causality between perceptions, attitudes, behavior and policy actions" after leading us down the garden path from the analysis of perceptions and illusions in the first five chapters to the policy implications of the last chapter; that fills page after page with clearly superfluous charts, graphs and even an entire irrelevant chapter? One wonders why the authors wrote it and why we should read it. Where were the friendly colleagues who help authors through early drafts and the professional editors with their blue pencils?

The authors wrote a good article that was stretched into a bad book. The good article is the last and sixth chapter. It shows flashes of insight into some of the issues separating the United States from its European allies, but it is unfortunate that the best writing and most intelligent commentary concentrated in the last chapter highlight the bad writing, the lack of organization and the questionable methods of the rest of the book. Chapter six relies upon traditional analysis and