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International Collaboration in Weapons and Equipment Development and Production by the Nato Allies

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power enjoyed in the two decades after World War Two also contributed to a general frustration and failure of confidence in government. President Carter was elected to make us good; it is unclear whether President Reagan was elected to make us strong or to send Mr. Carter away. It remains to be seen that the desire of the American public to be Numero Uno is matched by the willingness to pay the price. Again, the rush to publication may cause our authors to wear egg on their faces.

There are some really funny lines in the book. Unfortunately they are not intended. Endnote 7 on page 89: "Carl von Clausewitz was a Prussian general who devoted a great deal of his fertile thoughts to the nature of war. See his book *On War*" One expects that persons prepared to read the book being reviewed would recognize the name of the German philosopher of war, but why did our authors assume that the reader wouldn't need some help with "the chi-square-based Cramer's V" which pops up on page 71?

"Eurodoves and Eurohawks" is the cutesy title of Chapter 5 that begins with an explication called "Some Technical Comments." One suspects that the methodological commentary serves the purpose of camouflaging personal opinion while doing a disservice to the English language. The meaning of "certainty" is stretched; the pseudo-scientific "unidirectionally" and "univocal" bang on one's ears; the reckless use of "Finlandization" makes precision difficult.

And so it goes.

Your reviewer is singularly unhappy with this book.

HENRY G. GOLE
Lieutenant Colonel, US Army

Cornell, Alexander H. *International Collaboration in Weapons and Equipment Development and Production by the NATO Allies: Ten Years Later—and Beyond*. Hingham, Mass.: Kluwer Academic Publications, 1981. 233pp. \$54.50

Progress is being made but major problems are yet to be solved. That is the conclusion of author Alex Cornell as he revisits the Nato weapons development world ten years after his initial study of major system acquisitions by the Alliance. Both the review of his 1969 analysis and his current study of weapon and equipment collaboration focus on two basic hypotheses: 1) international weapons co-development and co-production is a viable concept of organization and management, and 2) the common institutions, agreements, structures and managerial techniques can be clearly identified, recorded and analyzed to assist further collaborative efforts.

The testing of these hypotheses is done empirically, reviewing three examples of joint effort studies in 1969 (long-range maritime patrol aircraft, the Hawk missile system and the F-104G aircraft) and comparing them with three current projects: the Nato Airborne Early Warning aircraft, the Roland missile system and the F-16 aircraft. Staying away from the more typical approach of arguing the relative merits of competing weapon systems, the author concentrates on the evolving organizational structures which demonstrate some success in coping with the multitude of complexities that inhibit transnational system acquisition. In particular, he underscores the vital role that the Nato organization plays in attempting to overcome the resistance and wastefulness of national self-interest. Although interoperability and standardization goals are woven throughout the book, they are not considered as ends in themselves but as

measures of more efficient, multiple system procurement.

The commonly believed argument that the allies never collaborate is refuted with an impressive listing of over fifty projects where members of the alliance have jointly developed or acquired hardware for both national and Nato use. The author looks ahead to many other programs and projects now pending and to several major initiatives such as the Future Identification System (IFF), Joint Tactical Information Distribution System and the Global Positioning System which are now underway. He also provides an excellent listing of international organizational structures and managerial processes (such as the Long Term Defense Program) which have had positive impact on multinational collaboration.

Mr. Cornell then provides a forthright analysis of common arguments made for and against international acquisition ventures. Economic nationalism, "necessary" R&D duplication, and lack of multinational institutions are all taken to task; warning that the fate of the future Atlantic Community is contingent on proving "that efficiency, excellence and superiority *can* come from democratic coalitions." He concludes with a broad range of proposed initiatives to reach an achievable framework of Alliance cooperation. Key among these are: 1) permanently established institutional agencies for collaboration; 2) realization of the "two-way street" concept for exchange of national research, development, production, sales and technology; and 3) serious commitment to the efficiencies of interoperability. He leaves the reader with one final question—whether the goal of commonality can be achieved "by a new spirit" in the Alliance or only by a new treaty as Nato begins its fourth decade.

Alex Cornell has written a very upbeat appraisal of progress and future potential for collaborative weapon development in the Alliance. The book is not for the reader of general military subjects, but for the student of weapon procurement it is an excellent updating of the infrequently explored subject of multinational acquisition. Mr. Cornell exposes a somewhat typical American perception of the potential for unification of the Nato political/military attitude into a single mind set for decision making. Individual national interests cannot be subsumed into a single "Alliance interest" nor will nations forfeit their autonomy. Thus collaboration in weapon development must proceed *within* that constraint rather than attempting to eliminate national self-interest. He is right in concluding that development of multinational organizations with unique management techniques is the key factor for success.

Both of Alex Cornell's empirical studies of Nato weapon acquisition occurred during years of relatively good economic conditions. One must wonder how sensitive the degree of international cooperation is to shifts in world economic conditions. Recent resistance to weapon system deployments and heightened competition in arms sales may be harbingers of a turning away from future collaboration among allies. Whether offsets and "two-way street" concepts of acquisition balancing will compensate for economic detriments of foreign military sales is yet to be seen.

With this useful book, Alex Cornell certainly fulfilled his responsibility as a Nato Fellow, 1979-1980.

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