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Planning U.S. Security

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Nipponese homeland. Fortunately, the AD (the Skyraider's original designation) was not blooded against the Japanese because the war ended earlier than many expected. One might have expected the AD's career to be over before it started, but its distinguished flying and combat career was just beginning and would span at least four decades.

Author Rosario Rausa is well qualified to tell this saga. His previous book is the biography of the creator of the Able Dog as well as numerous other Douglas successes. His naval flying career included the AD which certainly gives him a visceral appreciation for the aircraft's character and performance in combat.

Like other World War II-vintage aircraft, the AD's creation has a legend of being designed virtually overnight. The author verifies the AD's original design process and the fact that it already existed in the rough in some of Ed Heinemann's earlier work. It was rushed into production and used to outfit several Navy and Marine squadrons following the war's end.

The invasion of South Korea in June 1950 saw the AD's rapid introduction into the air over the peninsula. ADs served admirably in both fighter and attack roles throughout the war and reputedly carried everything against the enemy except the kitchen sink until one even did that. Rausa details not only the experiences of many who flew the AD in Korea, but also the aircraft's continued development and evolution through various models.

With the redesignation of DoD aircraft in 1960, the AD received the more prominently known label, the A-1 Skyraider. Even before the name change, the "Able Dog" was introduced into another combat zone, both actual and potential. American pilots took ADs into Vietnam for use against the Viet Minh insurgents and several stayed to serve as instructors. As the Indochinese war heightened in the '60s, the A-1 continued to assume ever bigger roles in the fighting and flew throughout all of the Southeast Asia theater. Air Force Major Bernard Fisher gained the Medal of Honor for his A-1 exploits in the A Shau valley. The Skyraiders were critical to the successful team efforts in the helicopter recoveries of many downed airmen.

The author of *Skyraider* has written an excellent overview of the accomplishments of a durable combat airframe. To many it is only an airplane but Rausa echoes the sentiments of many who feel the A-1 possessed a life of its own. This story is well illustrated and chronicles an appreciation for a first class flying machine for those who flew it and those who have not.

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Kronenberg, Philip S. ed. *Planning U.S. Security*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1981. 214pp.

In 1980-81, the National Security Affairs Institute at the National Defense University sponsored a series of seminars which attempted

to "integrate aspects of planning U.S. security." Emphasizing the constraints on long-range planning, the sponsors hoped to arrive at "creative suggestions for improving the process and some tentative principles to guide U.S. national security policy." The seminar chairman, Philip Kronenberg, has assembled the conference papers and produced a volume which unfortunately falls quite short of the mark.

There is little evidence that Kronenberg and his colleagues have accomplished anything more than describing the complex organizational and bureaucratic constraints on efficient policy planning. That in itself is useful, but ultimately inadequate for the official who must plan beyond identification of the problem. Several of the chapters (particularly Kronenberg's) present excessively theoretical discussions which are neither relevant to the problems which the author identifies, nor useful to the reader who presumably expects a sophisticated treatment of a critical national security issue.

Several sections of this book, however, are quite thoughtful. Prominent among these is the chapter by Edward Luttwak "On the Need to Reform American Strategy." Luttwak, whose work on US military strategy is always distinguished and provocative, presents an interesting historical thesis with concrete examples. He argues that until 1945 the United States was able to do without any formulation of a "grand strategy," and that foreign policy successes in the past were due to

pragmatic, tactical, decisions which were quite appropriate considering the geopolitical circumstances of the time. That situation has been radically altered and Luttwak argues, sensibly, that without a "holistic approach" to strategy, the United States is unlikely to be as successful in the future as it has been in the past.

Luttwak also asserts that there should be a direct relationship between a grand strategic design and the infinite number of individual weapons procurement decisions which comprise the US defense program. Such decisions should, ideally, be weighed in the context of that larger strategy. The United States has not developed such a comprehensive strategy and as a result daily decisions are taken in a strategic vacuum where short-term advantage will always dominate the analysis.

Luttwak laments the tendency for US defense planners to ignore the need for long-term planning, and he identifies the "systems analyst" as the prime culprit. These cost-benefit experts rely on "mathematical criteria of choice" and other static indices, which ignore the two central concepts of warfare—firepower and maneuver. Luttwak concludes that the essence of strategy is "the rejection of the logic of efficiency," which governs much of the Pentagon's analytical effort.

Lawrence Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics (MRA&L) and a recognized author-

ity on defense organization and planning, presents an insightful discussion of "The System" stripping away the irrelevant veneer which suffocates much of this book. Korb sympathizes with Luttwak's condemnation of the cost analyst, concluding that such a dehydrated approach to national security planning can interfere with the formulation of effective policy, particularly in the long-term. Korb adopts a refreshingly realistic (and in this volume, unique) perspective on operating within the enormous bureaucratic and organizational constraints of the US Government. Korb supports the thesis that some change in the current system of defense planning is warranted, but advises against radical reorganization, both because there is a cyclical character to many of the current problems identified and because dramatic changes in organization may so shock the system as to have a detrimental effect.

With the exception of the Luttwak and Korb chapters, there is little else in this volume which the reader will find insightful. Kronenberg has labored long but produced, unfortunately, a book which contributes marginally to the professional literature.

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Collins, John M. *U.S. Defense Planning: a Critique*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. 337pp. \$30.00 paper \$11.95
Proper defense planning is essen-

tial to national security. This planning should be based on a concept or principle of how military, foreign policy, and economic resources are combined to support US national interest. John Collins' new book, *U.S. Defense Planning: a Critique*, begins with the above thesis, then describes in remarkable detail all the forces which affect theoretical defense planning in the "real world."

Collins opens with a severe criticism of the National Security Council's efforts to fulfill its stated mission: "coordinating national security matters," stating that NSC is preoccupied with operations to the exclusion of comprehensive long-range planning. He uses charts, graphs, diagrams, and extensive footnotes throughout the book which "document" his assessment. These are useful to the extent they provide another method of visualizing Collins' judgments, although often the charts or graphs are subjective, rather than objective, in their makeup.

Collins follows with a "wiring diagram" of the Executive and Defense Department and then the Legislative Branch, describing agency by agency their function, makeup, and shortcomings. He does this in detail, chronicling the performance of many of these agencies since World War II as to the degree of their effectiveness. Usually it is not high. He favors George C. Marshall, Henry Kissinger, General Maxwell Taylor, and to some degree Frank Carlucci. Few others receive praise.