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# The Dreams and the Power: Europe in the Age of Yalta

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by  
Josef Joffe

**P**ostwar Europe has been a succession of shattered dreams. Four decades after World War II there is no formal peace but, paradoxically, an order of unprecedented stability that has made a mockery of the dreams as well as of the nightmares. The worst of fears was renewed violence on a continent that almost consumed itself in the Thirty Years War between 1618 and 1648. Yet Europe, a fount of bloody strife for centuries, has become an island of peace amidst a rising tide of violent conflict in Asia, Africa and the Americas.

On the other hand, the very solidity of Europe's postwar order has also blunted the forces of change, peaceful or not. Even a fleeting glance backward reveals durability first and foremost: a highly viscous international system whose core elements have withstood the onslaught of reform, revisionism, and revolt. And it was not for lack of defiance that the postwar order endured. Indeed, the challenges were numerous, sweeping, in part even violent.

The first and oldest dream—of a “world restored”—evaporated almost at the very beginning of the postwar era. After the destruction of the Nazi empire, Europe rejoined the ranks of the great powers only *pro forma*. The true victors were not France or England but the United States and the Soviet Union. In the face of their overweening power, Europe's—and the world's—past masters had become *déclassé*. The task of upholding the Continent's order had now irrevocably fallen to its once remote flanking powers. Instead of a “concert” there was bipolarity which has endured to this day.

The challenges have all come to naught. Two bloody revolts against the political and pontifical empire of the Soviet Union—East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956—were squelched as thoroughly as the nonviolent attempts by Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1980-1981. In the West, the dream of a “European Europe,” whether in the state-centered version of de Gaulle or in the communitarian guise of the Eurocrats, has foundered against the very obstinacy of the nation-state de Gaulle so passionately invoked. The latest dream—the “Europe of Détente,” *circa* 1969-1979, reached its outer

limit when Jimmy Carter all but declared Cold War II in the aftermath of Afghanistan and when General Jaruzelski's troops moved to occupy their own country in 1981.

**The First Dream: A World Restored.** In the beginning, toward the end of World War II, there was the dream of Europe redivivus. After victory over Germany, the latest claimant to European hegemony, the traditional great powers like England and France would once more assume their traditional role in a Concert of Europe writ large. Given a suitable period of recovery, the heirs of Castlereagh and Talleyrand would throw their nations' weight into the global balance and thus smooth the way for the materialization of an even older dream: America's withdrawal from the travails of world order politics.

The decade from 1945 to 1955—from Germany's capitulation to Germany's integration into the two opposed alliance systems—did see the “world restored,” but in a dramatically different shape from the visions entertained by Roosevelt and Truman, Churchill and de Gaulle. Their dreams collided swiftly with the new realities of power which had thrust the Big Two into the heart of the Continent. From 1945 onward, Europe's stability was essentially managed *à deux*, and then by two outsiders whose previous involvement in the affairs of the Continent had been fitful at best. Instead of a Concert, there was the cold war; instead of an equilibrium among the nations, there was the tightening of bipolarity; instead of unity, there was partition.

Ironically, President Roosevelt thought the United States would soon withdraw from the affairs of the Continent and that American troops would not stay in Europe for more than two years.<sup>1</sup> Nor did he want the United States to assume the burden of “reconstituting France, Italy and the Balkans . . . . It is definitely a British task . . . .”<sup>2</sup> In that respect the American President was far less realistic than his rival Josef Stalin. The Soviet ruler foresaw the permanence of rule while the Americans, hankering once more after the blessings of insulation, saw only a fleeting period of occupation. “This war is not as in the past,” confided Stalin to Milovan Djilas in a famous conversation. “Whoever occupies a territory also imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise.”<sup>3</sup>

Stalin was right, and Roosevelt was wrong. America's and Soviet Russia's military presence, nicely symbolized by their forces joining at the Elbe River at the close of World War II, has turned into a fixture of the European landscape. The meeting marked the death of the old system and the birth of a new one. While the United States did not impose its system on “its” half of the Continent as did the Soviets on theirs, it is no coincidence that the perimeters of the opposing armies also defined the borders of two inimical socio-economic orders.

Stalin and his successors imposed that congruence by dint of sheer force. The United States, the world's oldest and most successful democracy, encouraged a similar evolution by providing the Europeans with a shiny model, massive infusions of capital and a military shield against the apparent or real ambitions of the hegemonic power to the East. By delivering economic and military security *gratis*, the United States extended to Western Europe a "cushion of insulated space" (to use a term coined by Daniel Bell), which channelled Europe's unsettled energies into a series of benign outcomes. Democracy came to be associated with economic growth, and both were buttressed by the free gift of armed protection "made in USA."

Therein lies one of the roots of postwar stability in Europe. By permanently entangling itself in Europe's affairs, the United States solved two existential problems of the Continent in one fell swoop. It protected Western Europe against others and against itself. While holding the Soviet Union at bay, the United States, by dint of its sheer presence, muted conflicts between ancient rivals as *sine qua non* of future cooperation amongst them. By producing external security, the United States dispatched the prime structural cause of war among states: the autonomous search for a national defense.

Would France and Germany have put aside their "historical" enmity in the absence of a powerful guarantor who insured France against the consequences of West Germany's resurgence? In the end, the United States was the true "federator" of Europe—albeit with some unwitting help from Josef Stalin. Fashioning a framework that contained the Soviets while enveloping West Germany in a cocoon of constraint *plus* community, the United States played the vital role of "pacifier and protector"—by no means a small achievement of American diplomacy.<sup>4</sup> If that was "imperialism," it was a uniquely benign variant of congenital great power behavior. Could the "Pax Americana" have endured for so long if *au fonds*, it had not yielded a satisfactory arrangement for America's clients and partners?

The second pillar of the European order (as manifested first and foremost in its resistance to change) is of course the curse and blessing of nuclear weapons. With the risks of destruction suddenly looming astronomically larger than any possible spoils of war, the *ultima ratio* has lost its appeal for statesmen and adventurers alike. Nuclear weapons have severed the Clausewitzian continuity between war and politics. In a nuclear environment, the use of force can no longer be the natural adjunct of diplomacy because the prospect of a worldwide holocaust has permanently skewed the balance sheets by which nations calculate the profits and costs of war. Yet without war as the ultimate arbiter, situations and structures are bound to endure, even unjust and unnatural ones. "Today," as Pierre Hassner put it in a seminal article, "the existence of nuclear weapons tends to separate war and diplomacy, and while they increase the destructive

power of arms and the freedom of maneuver of diplomacy, to sterilize both as a factor of change.”<sup>5</sup>

Even the most acute minds “present at the creation” could not foresee the transformation of international politics the awesome might of nuclear weapons had wrought. In his memoirs, George F. Kennan mused: “Some day, it appeared to me, this divided Europe, dominated by the military presence of ourselves and the Russians, would have to yield to something more natural—something that did more justice to the true strength and interests of the intermediate European peoples themselves.”<sup>6</sup>

Those noble sentiments were expressed more than a generation ago. In the meantime, “justice,” “strength,” and “interests” have remained hostage to the same overwhelming forces that have also insured the peace. Indeed, the truly revolutionary fact of postwar history is precisely the absence of change on a continent that, prior to 1945, was racked by countless social, economic and military convulsions. After the great watershed of World War II, there is not a single border that was changed by either force or persuasion—in spite of numerous lingering territorial conflicts. Apart from the periphery (Spain, Portugal, Greece), regimes have endured on either side of the ideological divide—even in the face of mass disaffection as in the case of the CSSR and Poland and violent attacks as in East Germany and Hungary.<sup>7</sup>

***The Second Dream: Western Europe United.*** If the great powers of yore could no longer discharge their traditional tasks, would they fare better when marching in tandem? Given their impressive collective resources, the dream of a Europe united, taking its rightful place among the superpowers, certainly looked like a persuasive proposition.

Yet plausibility alone does not for unity make. Nor did Soviet pressure and American encouragement. Even though it was (and still is) easy to demonstrate that the European nation-state was no longer capable of living up to its economic, let alone its military, tasks in solitary autonomy, there remained the unbridgeable gap between necessity and achievement. As it turned out, the nation-state was far more obstinate than its detractors had hoped and far less obsolete than its prophets had feared.<sup>8</sup>

Here too, bipolarity and nuclear weapons provided the limiting factors to obsolescence. In prenuclear times, weak or moribund states were regularly swept away by the tides of history. They were ingested or carved up by the strong—as was Poland in the 18th century, hundreds of German principalities in the 19th century, and the Habsburg and Turkish empires in the twentieth.

Yet today, Liechtenstein survives along with Yugoslavia and Albania. The weak need not fear the strong because the strong stalemated each other while protecting their clients against the perils of power politics. If France, England, Germany, and Italy had been left to their own devices after World War II, they might indeed have pooled their sovereignties against the Soviet

Union—or, what is far more likely, they might have been “integrated” against their will under the sway of the Kremlin. Yet under the shelter of America’s power and America’s nuclear weapons, they faced neither stark choice.

With their existential problem solved, Europe’s nation-states could well afford their obstinacy, and thus their stubbornness proved stronger than the dreams which sought to emancipate Western Europe from the tutelage of the two.

There was, on the one hand, de Gaulle’s vision of a “European Europe,” freed at last from the “twin-hegemony” of the superpowers, which would restore the nation-state to its former grandeur. On the other hand, there was the communitarian version of European unity that beckoned the states to travel in the opposite direction: to relinquish their sovereignty for the sake of a West European superstate and its bureaucratic overlords. De Gaulle’s was a backward-looking utopia, the Eurocrats’ a forward-looking utopia, and both were appropriately anachronistic because they ignored some fundamental realities of power in the postwar world.

De Gaulle’s vision would have required his European confrères to return to their historical sources and to undo the tie that bound them to their mighty patron power across the sea. Yet the past was a murderous rivalry that had almost led to Europe’s self-destruction. How would Europe solve its twin problem—the containment of the Soviet Union and the control of Germany—without the strong hand of the United States?

Little wonder, then, that the most ambitious of Europe’s integration projects, the European Defense Community came to grief. It failed precisely because it offered no satisfactory answer to the problem of Germany resurgent in the absence of *America’s* integration into Europe’s defense. The Assemblée Nationale vetoed the EDC Treaty because France did not want to be left alone with its ancient rival and nemesis. And Nato succeeded precisely because it was built on America’s commitment to make its military presence in Europe permanent.

In the aftermath of the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle thought he did have the answer. France, now in the ascendant and armored with nuclear weapons, would take the United States’ place in simultaneously assuring and anchoring Germany. In the process, de Gaulle stumbled over his own logic. If nuclear weapons had made alliances obsolete, as Gaullist orthodoxy had it, then why should West Germany place greater faith in the puny nuclear force of its middle power neighbors across the Rhine? Moreover, if dependence was a fact of Germany life, it was far more honorable (and comfortable) to suffer the tutelage of remote superpower than the watchful benevolence of an old rival and potential inferior.

That dilemma has never stopped haunting Europe. Western Europe could only dispense with the United States if capable of fielding a deterrent force

commensurate with the Soviet threat. Yet such force could not do without the Germans. If it is true, as Gaullist logic has it, that *le nucléaire ne se partage pas*, that nuclear weapons protect only their possessors, then a European deterrent could not just be a French (or British) “loan”; it would have to include the Germans as participants. The ultimate implication of Gaullism, then, is a nuclearized Germany—which is precisely the one consequence France is not prepared to swallow. Given West Germany’s hefty resource edge, nuclear weapons provide the only badge of distinction that elevates France over its competitor-turned-*confrère*. It is not likely that the heirs of de Gaulle will relinquish that badge. Which is merely another, and more profoundly political way of reaffirming: *le nucléaire ne se partage pas*.

The functional utopia of the Eurocrats also foundered because it ignored the facts of power and the hold of history. “Europe,” as Stanley Hoffmann has noted in his “Lament of a Transplanted European,” “remains a collection of largely self-encased nation-states.”<sup>9</sup> It was one thing to merge industrial and agricultural sectors and then hope for the inevitable “spill-over” that would engender a self-perpetuating, inexorable march toward the unification of economies, politics and armies. It was quite another when the waves of that ostensibly apolitical process lapped ever more closely against the core of national sovereignty. It was hardly a mere spasm of outmoded *hauteur* when de Gaulle lowered the floodgates with a resounding bang in 1966—the year in which the Community of Six was to pass from unanimity to qualified majority voting, as laid down in the Rome Treaty. Hailed as historical breakthrough, the qualified-majority rule has now become a dusty footnote in the forgotten annals of European integration. Europe decides its course as nations have always done: in the shadow of each member’s veto.

Nor should this be a cause for puzzlement. If nations integrate because they are no longer masters over their own fate, why should they compound the problem by offering up their autonomy, damaged as it is, to an international body which might trample it even more thoroughly in the execution of majority rule? Precisely because the nation-state’s *sacro egoismo* has been battered by transnational forces beyond its reach, it strains to *recapture* control, not to yield it.

The history of European integration has rarely failed to illustrate that moral. The process lumbers on, and after each failure there is a fabled *relance*: as in Messina when the Treaty of Rome was fashioned in the wake of the EDC debacle, or in The Hague when the Six celebrated their new-found *élan* in the aftermath of de Gaulle. Yet neither the European Monetary System (EMS) nor popular elections to the European Parliament can disguise the fact that power over the core issues continues to rest in the hands of national governments.

The EMS is a particularly disheartening, and instructive, example for the supremacy of national interest over integrative ambitions. The System

enjoins governments to keep the value of their currencies within a narrow band of cross-parities. Theoretically, therefore, the EMS forces each country to tie its fiscal and monetary policy to that of every other country in the "snake." The outside world thus becomes the ultimate arbiter of one's own economic policy. And that is precisely what governments are loath to permit. Fiscal and monetary policy determines the pace of inflation and unemployment, the two factors that, in turn, largely determine the outcome of elections and the fate of governments.

In the spring of 1983, the EMS—in its worst crisis to date—was almost torn asunder because France, caught in the spiral of self-made inflation and currency depreciation, at first could not live up to its parity-preserving obligations under the EMS and then refused to devalue as radically as its partners demanded. In other words, a crisis arose that a truly communitarian system would have forestalled in the first place by imposing its discipline on the spendthrift. And it was resolved through the traditional ways of statecraft through a Franco-German *quid pro quo*. The *quid* had been Mitterand's not-so-tacit support for Chancellor Kohl during the German election campaign of 1983; the *quo* was the victor's repayment of that favor by way of West Germany's revaluation. It was two governments that struck a deal, and not the Community that imposed its will.

In foreign policy, the Europeans do occasionally speak with "one voice," but the message is neither clear nor loud; it is the mumbling of the lowest common denominator. "Europeanness" has not obliterated stubborn differences in style and interest. When President Mitterand calls upon Europe to "defend its internal market," German Chancellor Kohl retorts that "Europe cannot shield itself" from outside goods.<sup>10</sup> When Britain goes off to the South Atlantic to undo the Argentine occupation of the Falklands, there is at best only lukewarm support that begins to crumble when the fighting starts in earnest. Nor does Europe have the will and the military resources to back up its message with power. This is why Arabs and Israelis look to Washington when it comes to the weighty issues of war and peace in the Middle East.

"If the hostilities entailed by separate pasts appear to have evaporated, [Europe's] separate pasts have not."<sup>11</sup> As a result, de Gaulle's appeals to the grandeur of the nations' history was just strong enough to expose the apolitical and ahistorical pretensions of the Community's neo-functional utopia. The dream of a supranational European Community has merely begotten a Babel-like bureaucratic structure in Brussels that inspires little allegiance and only grudging consent. Breathtaking as it was, de Gaulle's vision of a "European Europe" stretching from the "Urals to the Atlantic" could not undo what the war had wrought: the projection of American and Soviet power into the heart of Europe.



**The Third Dream: The "Europe of Détente."** The latest in a succession of faltering dreams was the "Europe of Détente." It combined the state-centered ambitions of Gaullism with the benign vision of functionalism. Economic cooperation across the ideological divide would buttress political cooperation, muting those conflicts that had brought Europe stability at the price of partition.

At heart, that dream was the most subversive of them all. To elucidate this point, it is important to distinguish the American from the European, especially the West German, approach. While sharing similar premises, Americans and Europeans aspired to different consequences. If American détente policy (under Kissinger and Nixon) essentially sought to *stabilize* the status quo round the world, the Europeans set their sights much higher: on a status quo-*plus* that would significantly loosen bipolarity's hold over their Continent.

Fourteen years ago, *both* Europeans and Americans initially started out with the same tidy theory in hand. Together, they would cast a net of interdependence around the Soviets, enmeshing them in trade and technology transfers, credit lines, and arms control agreements. Having acquired a stake in cooperative relations with the West, the Soviet Union would behave according to Western standards—like any reasonable power that values peace and prosperity more highly than the costly pleasures of aggrandizement. The Kremlin, so the Kissingerian "linkage theory" went, would not risk the horn of capitalist plenty for a quick geopolitical grab here or there.

Yet Western Europe's and particularly West Germany's vision of détente was a good deal more ambitious. The stabilization of the military milieu through arms control and the quasi-ratification of the territorial status quo through the Eastern Treaties<sup>12</sup> was in fact to produce a status quo-*plus*. Secure in its possessions and lured by the steady promise of economic subsidies, the Soviet Union would relax its heavy grip on its hapless vassals, opening the way toward the progressive association of the two Germanies and peaceful change in Eastern Europe.

The problem with the more ambitious version of détente was not its failure. Rather, like West European integration, the process initially worked quite well, turning the Europe of the 1970s into an impressive laboratory of East-West cooperation. The contrast with the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s could not have been more dramatic. Instead of the Berlin Blockade (1948-49), there was the Quadripartite Accord of 1972 which at least quarantined a perennial trouble spot. Instead of the Berlin Crisis, culminating in the Berlin Wall (1958-61), there were burgeoning contacts across the divide, flanked by rapidly growing trade, the troop reduction talks in Vienna (MBFR) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

The real problem was that the process worked *too* well. As the events in Poland demonstrated, détente—instead of encouraging stable devolution—triggered the kind of snowballing change that ended in renewed repression.

Nor was the imposition of martial law in Poland a mere accident; it was in fact the fourth act in an ongoing European drama. The brief thaw after Stalin's death had set the stage for the East German revolt and its swift suppression by Soviet tanks. Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" campaign had provided the permissive conditions for the upheaval in Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956. In the late 1960s, West Germany's groping attempts at a "New Ostpolitik" proved just powerful enough to blur the image of German "revanchism" by which Moscow had usefully maintained bloc discipline. The hesitant thaw soon engendered the explosive "Prague Spring" of 1968 that was terminated a few months later by the invading armies of five Warsaw Pact countries.

It was no coincidence that the longest and most complete period of détente of the 1970s led to the most sweeping and profound challenge to the Soviet Union's pontifical supremacy in Eastern Europe. In East Germany, only a few hundred workers were in the vanguard of the 17 June 1953 revolt. In Hungary, already major groups in the army and the leadership turned against the Soviets. In Prague 12 years later, the reform forces captured almost the entire Communist establishment. Poland, finally, was swept away by a genuine mass movement (at the height of its power, Solidarity had some ten million members).

Paradoxically, then, détente has been the single-most dangerous force of "subversion" in Eastern Europe. The loosening of the external environment was regularly followed by the loss of imperial control. There is also powerful relationship between the intensity and duration of détente on the one hand, and the depth and scope of revolutionary fervor on the other.

Given that correlation, détente worked even better than its most visionary prophets had dared to hope. Yet they, too, had underestimated the resilience and tenacity of bipolarity in Europe. No matter how promising each East European spring, it was regularly followed by an even more powerful freeze. Indeed, not only has the "counter-reformation" proved stronger in each case; it has also been able to rely on an ever-increasing "productivity of force."

The pernicious dialectics of détente are borne out by the historical record. In Hungary and East Germany, the Soviets still had to resort to brute violence. By 1968, the mere threat of force proved sufficient to undo the "Prague Spring." In Poland, finally, the Soviets did not even have to throw their (and their allies') armies into the fray; recentralization was achieved with an astounding economy of force—through Poland's occupation by its own troops. This progression betrays a dramatic improvement in the exchange rate between force and control, and it does not augur well for fashionable theories about the imminent collapse of the Soviet empire.

In the West, the impact of détente was far less cataclysmic because Nato, unlike the Warsaw Pact, is a voluntary association whose governments draw

their legitimacy from the consent of the governed. Yet its *esprit de corps* did suffer in the course of the 1970s, and predictably so. Leo Labedz, the long-time editor of *Survey*, once ironically referred to détente as a process of “competitive decadence,” a process that would necessarily weaken the bonds between the patron powers and their clients. Conversely, in the founding decade of the Alliance, the relative impotence of Western Europe and the perceived strength of the Soviet threat did impose a discipline that served to homogenize differences in situation, consciousness and interest—the stuff from which international politics and conflict is made.

In Western Europe, too, détente worked almost too well.<sup>13</sup> In the first place, the very success of the Alliance in maintaining the peace for almost four decades has obscured the building blocks that went into its foundation. The political elites “present at the creation” are now passing from the stage. Their successors, especially on the democratic Left, are now grappling with a potentially fatal fallacy: They confuse peace with an absence of threat; they see only the burdens of bipolarity and none of its blessings; they worry more about Western intentions than about Soviet capabilities.

Secondly, and precisely because détente has worked so well for the West Europeans, they have acquired new vulnerabilities along with their considerable profits. Diplomatic, economic and humanitarian ties are not easily sacrificed in times of tension, and these stakes yield a good deal of leverage to the Soviet Union. The gains of détente have become hostage to a benign East-West climate in Europe, and this explains why, in the aftermath of Afghanistan, the West Europeans (with Bonn in the vanguard) have sought to snatch as many pieces of détente as possible from the jaws of the rattled giants.

Third, it comes as no great surprise that the progress of détente has left a heavy imprint on the domestic bases of foreign policy in Western Europe. The decline of East-West hostility, the steady expansion of trade and travel, and the perception of ultra-stability along the East-West divide have realigned domestic priorities away from defense and toward public welfare and private prosperity—especially in the years of the secular recession that began in 1979.

The consequence of détente has been protracted conflict—between the Europeans and the United States as well as between governments and their constituents. In the aftermath of Afghanistan, the Allies have rarely stopped fighting each other: on pipelines and grain deals, on the proper approach to Poland and the Soviet Union, and over INF, SALT and burden-sharing.

Détente, then, has not only shaken the Soviet empire. It has also accelerated the continental drift between Europe and the United States and infused new strength into the fondest of Soviet hopes: the progressive dissociation between Washington and Western Europe, between societies and governments in the West, which allows the Soviet Union to play one against the other and to dictate the terms of the relationship to both.

**Policy Implications.** Stanley Hoffmann has described the post-nuclear world as a “stalemate system”—“dreams are [its] victims.”<sup>14</sup> Pierre Hassner, in outlining the “rules” of that system, wrote: “The nuclear balance seems characterized by the acceptance of stalemate, the diplomatic one by the search for flexibility; but the gap between both is narrowed by the fact that both remain abstract, the diplomatic combinations which reemerge look like the ghosts of yesterday’s realities; everybody can play with combinations of old alignments precisely because they do not affect reality.”<sup>15</sup>

The viscosity of the European system, its treacle-like resistance to change, is obviously the darker counterpart of its unprecedented military stability. The European peace tends to preserve injustice as well as liberty, it shields imperial structures as well as free nations.

In the East, the history of *détente* has shown that the process can never go far enough because it might just go too far. And the Soviet Union has shown that, for all its impressive weaknesses, it can count on a favorable, even improving exchange rate between force and control when it moves to recentralize its military and ideological glacis.

Whence it does not follow that the West should cease in its efforts to loosen the Soviet Union’s grip, let alone consecrate its possessions. Democratic nations make bad bed fellows in a latter-day “Unholy Alliance” dedicated to freezing the socio-political status quo. Yet in the wake of Afghanistan and Poland, the West should calculate the costs and benefits of *détente* more closely than at the threshold of the 1970s. The worst of all possible worlds is military dictatorship in Poland plus intolerable disintegration in the West. For the situation of the two camps is not really symmetrical. The Soviet Union will not withdraw from Europe, yet the United States might. The Soviet Union has regularly demonstrated that it can impose uniformity; the United States cannot. Without the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe will be better off; it is not clear that Western Europe will do so well in the absence of its transatlantic pacifier and protector.

If the East European prize is out of reach, then the West must carefully weigh the price to be paid for evolution in terms of Western dissolution. As Europe and the United States set to fighting each other over *détente* in the early 1980s, the balance sheet did not improve.

Conversely, the Allies did best when they marched not in lockstep, but in parallel. During the great *détente* push of 1969-1972, the United States and Europe did manage to harmonize their strategies for the profit of both. Washington paid attention to the interests of its West European cohorts as it struck a deal with the Soviet Union on SALT, ABM and (less successfully) on Vietnam. The West Europeans kept in mind the larger purposes of the Alliance as they launched their rapprochement with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the GDR. The complicated maneuver did not unfold without tensions, but in the end, the Allies did succeed in meshing the global

process with the regional and intra-German one. Indeed, without the tight synchronization of the three processes, Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik might have foundered far short of its objectives.

These lessons from history and structure might serve as useful reminders for the Allies as they prepare to map out a road from Cold War II to Détente II.

### Notes

1. Louis Halle, *The Cold War as History* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962), p. 82.
2. In a memorandum by Roosevelt to Acting Secretary of State Edwin R. Stettinius on 21 February 1954, as quoted in Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 340.
3. Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1962), p. 114.
4. Uwe Nerlich, "Western Europe's Relations with the United States," *Daedalus*, Winter 1979, p. 88.
5. Pierre Hassner, "The Nation State in the Nuclear Age," *Survey*, April 1968, p. 22.
6. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 464.
7. There are two ambiguous cases: France in 1958 when the Fourth Republic gave way to the semi-authoritarian regime of de Gaulle, and Poland in 1981 where effective power is now held not by the Communist Party but by the military.
8. Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," *Daedalus*, Summer 1966, pp. 862-915.
9. Stanley Hoffmann, "Fragments Floating in the Here and Now," *Daedalus*, Winter 1979, p. 2.
10. Chancellor Helmut Kohl, *The New York Times*, 5 December 1982, p. 3.
11. Hoffmann, "Fragments Floating in the Here and Now," p. 5.
12. In the 1970 treaties with Poland and the Soviet Union, Bonn essentially guaranteed the postwar borders without ratifying them; in the "Basic Treaty" with the GDR, the Federal Republic accepted the existence of a second German state without taking the final step of formal recognition.
13. For a more extended discussion of the following, see Josef Joffe, "The Enduring Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1981, pp. 835-851.
14. Stanley Hoffman, *Gulliver's Troubles* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 55.
15. Hassner, p. 22.

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