Naval War College Review

Volume 36
Number 5 *September-October*

Article 5

1983

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This essay aims to take a fresh look at so-called "extended deterrence." In many ways a venerable problem, extended deterrence is attracting renewed attention as American and Soviet capabilities evolve and as a volatile world political situation challenges the structure, effects and uses of deterrence. The discussion unfolds in three sections. The first dissects the several kinds of logic that extended deterrence can embrace and at different times has embraced. The second argues that various developments are making deterrence more intertwined with the risk of escalation. The third illuminates a paradox that this development creates.

In its general meaning, extended deterrence refers to the extension of American protection over friends and allies, who are assumed otherwise to have insufficient capability to deter Soviet attack. Within this general meaning, the term has been used in several different senses, and some of the issues extended deterrence raises can be rapidly illuminated by distinguishing them. The goal is not to establish a single "right" definition but to clarify the ideas which extended deterrence has embraced, and to note some differing presuppositions and implications of each.

The earliest concept of extended deterrence was the threat to initiate nuclear strikes against the Soviet homeland, in the event the Soviets launched a major attack on Western allies or friends. Extended deterrence in this sense was enunciated by the Eisenhower administration in early 1954 under the name of "Massive Retaliation." Though this doctrine was manifestly a reaction against the painful Korean experience, that administration left deliberately ambiguous just how "major" another attack would have to be, before the United States would respond with a strategic strike.

Extended deterrence in this sense presupposed that the United States enjoyed such great strategic superiority that America did not need to fear Soviet nuclear reprisal. At the time the Massive Retaliation doctrine was enunciated this superiority existed. US bombers and deliverable bombs outnumbered their Soviet counterparts several times over. Moreover the Soviet bomber force was so small and so vulnerable to American air defense

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that the USSR's ability seriously to damage the United States was open to real question. As yet there were no missiles. Hence the threat of Washington initiating strategic strikes on the Soviet (or Chinese) homeland was credible.

In this sense of extended deterrence, the deterrent value of the central strategic systems was, in effect, "stretched" to cover nonstrategic and indeed nonnuclear possibilities for Soviet aggression. As one prominent advocate put it, "the dog we keep to lick the cat can lick the kittens too."

A second sense of the term developed not long thereafter. As the Soviet bomber force and stock of bombs grew during the 1950s, it became less plausible that the United States might initiate strategic strikes in response to any aggression other than, perhaps, a full-scale assault on Western Europe. But the United States was years ahead of the USSR in the development of nuclear weapons for battlefield use. A new doctrine called "Graduated Deterrence" was put forward. Now extended deterrence involved deploying nuclear weapons in-theater. Should the Soviets launch an attack on allies to whom this form of deterrence had been extended, these weapons would be used to destroy the invading forces and possibly their support units, reserves and logistics in their rear. In the late 1950s and since, the concept of extended deterrence has sometimes meant this threat of defeating a conventional attack in-theater with nuclear forces deployed there.

This version of the concept implied neither the use of central strategic systems nor attacks on targets within the USSR. The central threat hovered in the background, providing what now would be called a form of "escalation dominance." The opponent would not dare reply to the theater use of nuclear weapons with central strategic strikes on the United States or Western Europe, because he was adequately deterred at the central level by forces at least equal to his own.

Extended deterrence in this sense presupposed marked Western superiority in theater nuclear forces (TNF) and, in the background, at least rough parity in strategic forces. Again, at the time the idea was put forward this superiority existed. In this concept, the opponent is presumed either to have no TNF available, or to have TNF so few and/or so vulnerable that he would not dare to initiate theater nuclear war, while the West could do so at minimal or acceptable cost.

This situation no longer pertained in Europe from the early to mid-1960s on. But from time to time since, it has been suggested that in some other theater the West might enjoy this kind of marked in-theater superiority in TNF. Thus a second meaning for extended deterrence sometimes is the deterrence provided by strong in-theater TNF superiority.

The Kennedy administration introduced Flexible Response and its accompanying buildup of conventional and air/sealift forces. The administration argued that the USSR was rapidly catching up, at least in Europe, in theater nuclear weapons. Hence the West could no longer credibly deter

Soviet adventurism by threatening to initiate theater nuclear war. The West's conventional forces would have to be built up.

A powerful Nato force would be able to defeat, and hence deter, even fairly substantial Soviet conventional attacks, but probably not the largest conventional assaults the USSR could mount. Such an attack would mean so great a commitment by both sides, though, and a war so large and destructive that a resort to theater nuclear and even central strategic forces might well ensue. The side finding itself losing would be likely to resort to nuclear weapons to avert complete defeat. Once the now-numerous nuclear weapons in Europe came into play, it would be hard to prevent escalation to all-out war.

Here was what amounted to a third kind of extended deterrence, and the term has been and continues to be used often in this sense. Deterrence of Soviet adventurism is provided initially by the threat of response with significant conventional forces, but ultimately by the threat of controlled or uncontrolled escalation.

Extended deterrence in this sense may or may not presuppose Western superiority in conventional forces in-theater. Sometimes this superiority exists. In many theaters outside Europe and the Middle East the United States enjoys, or would enjoy after mobilizing forces within a few days, significant conventional superiority over deployable Soviet forces. In many areas the United States continually enjoys naval superiority. Conventional superiority is the strongest form of what might be thought of as the Flexible Response version of extended deterrence. Here extended deterrence not only begins but ends with theater conventional superiority, and the threat of escalation remains in the background. The presumption of a more or less straightforward conventional "win" is one reason why analysts of deterrence have traditionally given little attention to scenarios in these theaters.

In at least three theaters—Europe, the Middle East, and the Korean Peninsula—it is unlikely that the United States could deploy conventional forces equal to the potential Soviet attack. Flexible Response has never included an entirely coherent or definite doctrine for such cases, but in one way or another it relies for any presumed success on the probability of escalation. There are a range of viewpoints on the role of escalation. At this point two major groupings will be mentioned.

Some analysts consider that extended deterrence in these cases requires "escalation dominance"—enough Western capability at most or all the higher levels of potential violence that the opponent cannot hope to do better by choosing deliberately to escalate to that level. This implies at least numerical parity, and perhaps a degree of Western superiority, in TNF and central strategic systems.

Other analysts believe that extended deterrence does not require superiority or even numerical parity in TNF and central systems. So long as

the West maintains secure forces, able to inflict devastating destruction upon the enemy (either in-theater or against his homeland), the deterrent threat will be adequate, according to this viewpoint. These forces do not have to be numerically equal to the opponent's to be secure, effective, and usable. The Soviets will presume that they can and will be used, and will be sufficiently deterred.

The "sufficiency" of the threat is not the only source of extended deterrence, according to this interpretation. Another source is the fear of unwanted, "uncontrolled," escalation. Again, escalation dominance and superiority or parity in forces are not required to arouse Soviet fear of uncontrolled escalation. The conflict may escalate rapidly because commanders find that they must use their nuclear weapons or lose them. Or uncontrolled escalation may ensue as a breakdown in c^3i makes it impossible for decision-makers to stay on top of events. Such factors can operate at least as easily on the side that has numerically fewer weapons as on the side that has more, and Soviet anticipation of these possibilities adds to deterrence.

The varieties of extended deterrence discussed thus far are more than twenty years old. A fourth concept of extended deterrence is discernible in the attention given in recent years to so-called "limited nuclear options." This version of extended deterrence has features in common with the three just discussed, yet is noticeably different.

Limited nuclear options (l.n.o.s—also called preprogrammed nuclear options) make possible the use of a few accurate nuclear weapons, arguably in ways that would represent something quite different from either general strategic war or theater nuclear war. Carrying out an l.n.o. is intended to be a highly controlled act, and one clearly demarcated in time and space. Although such a limited strike would destroy a counterforce or countervalue target of some importance to the Soviets, its primary effect would be symbolic and demonstrative. It would show resolve and will, and presumably arouse Soviet fear of the extreme consequences that could follow upon the further and more general use of nuclear weapons.

Implicit in official statements about limited nuclear options, and to some extent in the literature that mentions them, is a discernible idea of extended deterrence. The availability of l.n.o.s, and the increasing emphasis they have received in American strategic thought, yields a certain deterrent effect.

L.n.o.s by their nature are not intended for use in-theater in an ongoing theater nuclear war, nor are they part of conventional war. They are a way of expanding, perhaps dramatically, an ongoing conventional or nuclear war. They are an escalation measure *par excellence*. Being (it is assumed) so demarcated and so limited in effect, they arguably represent an escalation measure the United States might indeed be willing to execute. Their

limited nature makes the threat seem credible. Under many circumstances, the threat to carry out an l.n.o. might be more credible than a threat to resort to full-scale theater or strategic nuclear war.

Thus a fourth variant of extended deterrence is the threat that the United States might execute one or more of its now-considerable menu of limited nuclear options. In response to a major conventional attack, or perhaps to a localized nuclear attack in some theater, the United States might respond not only with a local defense and counterattack, but also with a dramatic but limited nuclear escalation. This threat is implicit at all times in the fact of possessing (and giving considerable attention to) l.n.o.s; a specific threat might also be made explicitly in some intense crisis.

It is worth noting the features this concept of extended deterrence shares with the more traditional concepts discussed above. Elements of the US central strategic forces might be used to execute many of the l.n.o.s, and presumably many of the preprogrammed options involve some sort of strike within the USSR. These features overlap the first concept described above although the strikes would be highly limited rather than massive. It seems likely that some of the l.n.o.s already preprogrammed for American forces involve strikes in-theater, employing either elements of the central strategic forces or designated theater nuclear forces. These features overlap the second concept described above, although a limited strike would not constitute "theater nuclear war" and arguably might not start one. The deterrent effect of l.n.o.s resides almost entirely in the implicit threat of escalation they communicate, and this feature partially overlaps the third concept described above, which is part of Flexible Response. Specifically the deterrent aspect of l.n.o.s overlaps and extends that part of Flexible Response that stresses the threat of controlled or uncontrolled escalation if a local defense proves insufficient. Indeed, implicitly employing l.n.o.s as a deterrent can be seen as a kind of elaboration of the escalation-threat aspect of Flexible Response.

Four major variations on the theme of extended deterrence have been discussed so far. They are summarized on the adjacent chart, along with some especially notable requirements that must be met for each form of extended deterrence to be credible. What observations might now be offered on how the concept of extended deterrence has changed over time, and reasons for it?

Broadly speaking, the concept of extended deterrence has evolved over time in a way that has intertwined it more and more with the concept of escalation dynamics. Properly comprehending this development requires that a distinction be made between two sorts of "escalation."

Escalation sometimes refers to a deliberate *act*, usually a single act, of a nation at war, in which the scope or level of violence of a conflict is increased as a matter of choice. Escalation also sometimes refers to a *sequence* of events, in which one side's action triggers the other side's counteraction, followed by

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Concepts of Extended Deterrence

Significant Soviet attack on Western allies or friends is deterred by . . .	**Especially notable requirements for making the deterrent threat credible**
1. Extensive or massive strategic strikes on the opponent's homeland.	1. Real strategic superiority: the opponent's strategic counterstrike can do only modest damage at most.
2. Resort to theater nuclear war.	2. Real TNF superiority; the opponent has few and/or soft TNF capabilities in theater.
3. Flexible Response:	
3A. Conventional defense is clearly sufficient. (Most theaters well outside the Soviet periphery.)	3A. Conventional force superiority, at least after reinforcements arrive in theater and presuming no complete loss in theater before they arrive.
3B. Uncertain or probably losing conventional defense, with the threat of controlled or uncontrolled escalation thereafter. (Most theaters on or near the Soviet periphery.)	3B. According to some: escalation dominance and superiority or parity in numbers of weapons. According to others: secure weapons sufficient to devastate the opponent, with the explicit threat that escalation becomes increasingly likely to soar out of control as the level of violence rises.
4. Limited nuclear options.	4. Arguably more credible than the threatened resort to theater or central nuclear war.

the first side's counter to that, and so on, in an action-reaction process that may or may not find any natural stopping-point short of all-out war. (It is this latter sort of escalation that is usually being referred to when escalation "dynamics" are discussed.) Clearly there is an intimate relation between these sorts of escalation, since under many circumstances the single, deliberate act can turn out to be the first step in a sequence. The distinction is analytically useful nonetheless.

Without this distinction, one could only say about extended deterrence that it always involves the threat of some sort of escalation; a shift in emphasis over time would be less evident. Introducing the distinction illuminates the shift. The first two concepts of extended deterrence discussed above largely presuppose the former sort of escalation, while the latter two incorporate the latter sort as well. To threaten extensive strategic strikes on the Soviet homeland or a resort to theater nuclear war is to threaten a deliberate and massive escalation. Either step is a single act in a very real sense (even though it is not excluded that further escalation might follow later).

Flexible Response does not involve escalation at all if the conventional defense is clearly sufficient, once that defense has been mounted. But where the adequacy of the conventional defense is uncertain, then Flexible Response incorporates the danger of escalation in a central way into its deterrent threat. The escalation threatened is substantially of the second sort. Limited nuclear options, viewed as a form of extended deterrence, also incorporate the same danger.

Let us pause a moment on how this second sort of escalation is incorporated into Flexible Response and into limited nuclear options. Flexible Response is not a highly coherent doctrine; different versions emphasize different aspects of escalation. The version emphasized by many Europeans, for example, emphasizes the threat of a single dramatic escalation, to all-out theater nuclear war and even to general strategic war. But most Americans have emphasized a sequence of smaller steps. In this version of Flexible Response, actions and reactions by both sides would cause the conflict to escalate sequentially, perhaps through a number of gradations of violence. Here much of the deterrent threat lies in the prospect (fearsome to both sides) that the conflict will "inexorably" march up the escalation ladder, or perhaps race up "out of control." This prospect, more than any specific *act* being threatened, presumably deters Soviet attack.

Limited nuclear options also incorporate into the implicit deterrent threat a suggestion of dangerous escalation dynamics. True, the execution of just one l.n.o. might itself be a very destructive, as well as very dramatic, single act of escalation. But if, as argued above, most of the impact of an l.n.o. resides in its symbolic effect, as a signal of will and resolve, then the hazard of further escalation is implicit. For what is the resolve being signaled, but the resolve to accept the risk of a higher level of nuclear destruction? The threat or execution of an l.n.o.—viewed as a deterrent effort and not simply as a way of destroying some immediate target(s)—is a commitment move in a kind of bargaining game. It is a statement that "we are so committed that we are prepared to impose on both sides the great danger of further nuclear escalation (by both sides)."

Thus the deterrent effect of l.n.o.s, like the deterrent effect of Flexible Response (in its usual American version especially) heavily incorporates the risk of further escalation into the threat. Both involve not only escalation in the first sense of the term developed above—the single deliberate act—but also escalation in the second sense, the dynamic sequence of events that neither side may be able fully to control.

Extended deterrence, in the versions of the concept summarized under #1 and #2 on the chart are older concepts that have limited relevance today. Extended deterrence in its Flexible Response version #3 is somewhat newer and still highly relevant today; and in its l.n.o. version #4 is newer still. These latter two versions are the versions that incorporate into the deterrent threat

the risk of escalation sequences being launched. Broadly speaking we may conclude that the evolution over time of the concept of extended deterrence has involved the concept more and more with the concept of escalation dynamics.

A major source of this evolutionary shift has been the growth of Soviet capabilities. The first two concepts of extended deterrence both depended on marked Western superiority in nuclear forces. As Soviet strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and other forces have developed more nearly to match Western forces, American strategists have been obliged to move away from concepts that presuppose Western force superiority, and toward other ways of making the threat credible. An alternative that presented itself was the exploitation of Western superiority in c^3i and air/sealift, and the greater flexibility in Western tactical doctrine, to develop the threat of controlled escalation inherent in Flexible Response. Later, similar superiorities help lead to the development of l.n.o.s.

It is natural, too, that any change over time toward a rough parity between any two power blocs will tend to shift deterrent concepts toward a greater emphasis on escalation. As long as one of the two blocs is markedly superior, it can simply invoke that superiority in its deterrent threats. When the two blocs become more equal in military power, each naturally must base its deterrent threats more upon its resolve and will. Thus the Soviets refer often to the devastating destruction they can visit upon the United States and Nato, should a conflict escalate toward central war; and the West build such escalation into its deterrent doctrines.

There is another important way, too, in which American concepts and efforts for extended deterrence have become more intertwined, as the decades have passed, with the risk of escalation. Development in this direction seems to be a necessary byproduct of the continuing advances in military technology. Since the 1950s the technical capabilities on each side have steadily grown in complexity, in the multiplicity of available options, and in the speed with which most options can be executed. Inevitably this draws attention to the diversity and importance of the escalation dimension of war. Several points are worth distinguishing here:

(1) In the 1950s there were only a relatively few ways in which US strategic forces could make a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. Reprogramming the forces for a different kind of strike would have taken days if not weeks. Some hours would have passed, too, between a decision to launch all strategic forces and the moment when the attack became irrevocable. Similar observations apply to Soviet strategic capabilities then.

The two sides' theater nuclear capabilities in Europe could also execute only a relatively few options, well into the 1960s. Limitations on c^3i and logistics also constrained the ways either side could fight either a theater nuclear or conventional war in Europe (or elsewhere).

As time has passed both sides have added more, and more types, of nuclear delivery systems: strategically, in Europe, and worldwide. Conventionally, too, they have added more capable attack aircraft, helicopter-carried forces, more mobile ground forces, a variety of advanced naval and ground missile systems (including cruise missile systems), vastly improved c^3i and logistics, and a multitude of other improvements and force modernizations.

The net effect has been to multiply the number and variety of attack options, and multiply greatly the number of ways in which a conflict could escalate. Depending on which capabilities on either side are used, are withheld, or are knocked out or degraded by enemy action, a conflict could escalate along a great many pathways. Which of these escalation paths a conflict takes or starts to take will have an enormous influence over whether and how it continues to escalate, as well as on the outcome.

(2) This increasing diversity and "richness" of the escalation possibilities is matched by the increasing speed with which a conflict may escalate. In the last couple of decades both sides have introduced in quantity into their forces supersonic attack aircraft, a variety of short and medium-range ballistic missiles, and more recently cruise missiles of several kinds. On both sides some of these systems threaten vulnerable forces of the enemy, creating the possibility that enemy commanders may take a "use them or lose them" attitude toward their own strike forces. Meanwhile, c^3i systems now provide commanders and high civilian officials with information which in both quantity and speed far surpasses what was possible even a decade ago.

The relatively high speed with which an attack can be made, and the very high speed of contemporary c^3i, have the effect of accelerating the speed with which conflicts may escalate, compared with the actual and hypothetical wars of, say, the 1960s. Commanders must expect that once war begins they may have very little time in which to make decisions of the most critical importance, and notably the decisions that mean escalating the level of violence.

(3) Related to the multiplying systems and options and the accelerating pace of likely wartime events and decisions, is a higher degree of uncertainty, at least in some important respects. This uncertainty flows in part simply from the number of enemy systems and the speed of events with which a commander may have to cope. It flows also from two attributes of the contemporary military challenge.

One is the increasing mobility of systems. The enemy's mobility means that a commander may not know just where an attack on his forces has been launched from. Even before the attack comes, when his own forces and c^3i are intact, he may not know the location of the most threatening enemy forces. Likewise the enemy may not know just where to aim his strike. The shift toward more mobile systems among nearly all the technically advanced nations alters the calculus of deterrence. Among other effects it places a high

premium on the real-time acquisition of tactical intelligence. Where this intelligence is lacking, inadequate or degraded by enemy action, commanders may face a highly uncertain calculus.

The other attribute of the contemporary military challenge that increases uncertainty is the mounting importance of the electronic balance. The 1973 Middle East war was the first in which the enormous value of electronic superiority was demonstrated in battle. An even more dramatic illustration was provided during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The superiority of a US-Israeli mix of electronic capabilities, plus some innovative Israeli tactics, yielded an astonishingly lopsided victory against some of the latest Soviet air defense technology.

A situation has not been created whose uncertainties have not yet been fully incorporated into deterrence theory. The essential features are these: First, in many possible conflict situations of the present and future, a very high premium accrues to a belligerent who enjoys marked electronic superiority. Second, that superiority may be gained through the acquisition or development of a *relatively* small range of specific capabilities. Third, it may be sufficient for those capabilities to differ from the opponent's mostly or entirely in degree rather than in kind. A breakthrough to a wholly new level or form of technology is not required. Fourth and perhaps most significantly, the real extent of either side's electronic capabilities against the other may not be known until the battle is actually engaged. These factors in combination mean that in the period prior to hostilities, when one or both sides presumably are trying to deter the other, decision-makers may be highly uncertain what the outcome of a trial by arms may be.

This section may be summarized this way: The problems presented by escalation dynamics have been increasingly intertwining themselves with deterrence over the last couple of decades in a variety of ways. The extended deterrence aspect of Flexible Response and of l.n.o.s incorporates implicit or explicit threats of controlled and uncontrolled escalation in ways that earlier concepts of extended deterrence did not. The growth of Soviet capabilities has increasingly meant that the West, unable to evoke decisive superiority in forces as the deterrent sanction, has had to give more emphasis to its capacity and willingness to demonstrate resolve, by means of a threat of escalation. Extended deterrence has also become more intertwined with escalation dynamics as a byproduct of technical developments: the multiplication of forces and hence of escalation possibilities; the increasing speed of possible wartime events and decisions; and increased uncertainties about how a conflict may develop.

The developments just sketched have a somewhat paradoxical effect on the efficacy and utility of strategies of extended deterrence. At one level, the enormous growth of US and Western military capabilities might seem to be

cause for placing considerable confidence in the West's ability to employ strategies of extended deterrence. Never have Western capabilities been greater than they are today to carry out an impressive variety of well-planned escalation options (a major part of the deterrent threat in Flexible Response). The panoply of l.n.o.s available to the United States represents an especially potent set of options, the existence of which presumably should have an important deterrent effect.

It is true that Soviet military capabilities have also grown impressively in recent years. The Soviets now have capacities they did not earlier enjoy to escalate many kinds of conflicts. But US analysts could reasonably conclude that the West remains superior in its ability to carry out a highly diverse menu of escalation options. Quite apart from the force superiority the West enjoys in many theaters, the West is superior overall in its c^3i, in the discretion granted to local and theater commanders to take their own initiatives, and in other components of tactical flexibility. Leaving aside the perennial and ever-evolving arguments about just what forces may be needed in the more difficult theaters to deter their Soviet counterparts, real confidence might seem justified in the United States' ability to carry out the escalatory requirements of Flexible Response and l.n.o.s, and hence to sustain the deterrent threats they represent.

However, many of the developments sketched in the previous section also tend to undercut such confidence in important respects. The intertwining of extended deterrence and escalation dynamics leaves the credibility of the deterrent threat at least partially dependent upon the threatener's ability—or to be exact, his *perceived* ability—to manage the escalation process. European critics of the American interpretation of Flexible Response have always doubted the real ability of the United States to "fine tune" escalation, and the Soviets likely doubt it also.

Even when escalation potentials were fewer, simpler and slower than they are now, there were good reasons for doubting how well escalation could be controlled. The intense competitiveness of warfare and the many historical examples of conflicts that grew more violent than the belligerents originally intended suggested otherwise. In the early years of the nuclear era, many military and civilian specialists doubted that escalation could be contained, once weapons as destructive as nuclear weapons came into play.

The developments sketched above should increase that skepticism. The multiplication of new weapons, their delivery systems, and other military capabilities have greatly enlarged and complicated the number of possible escalation paths. The speed both of today's weapons and of today's c^3i could easily generate demands for extremely rapid decisions. Officials and commanders may not have time to think through the consequences of their actions for subsequent escalation. Increasing mobility of weapons platforms, and the high leverage exerted by the electronic balance introduce new uncertainties.

Thus the escalation dynamics of the 1980s are more complex, diverse and uncertain than those that theorists presupposed only a couple of decades ago. Insofar as strategies of extended deterrence rely upon explicit or implicit threats of *controlled* escalation, the credibility of the threat is thereby cast in some doubt. Under today's circumstances, potential enemies may not believe that the United States can successfully carry through a controlled escalation process.

What leaves an important measure of deterrent credibility is the potential for *uncontrolled* escalation. This is a form of deterrence that applies to both sides, because it flows from the nature of the weapons and support systems themselves. Insofar as decision-makers recognize the nature of the risk, they will be more cautious in undertaking actions that could launch a dangerous escalation.

In itself this idea is far from new. What deserves recognition is that technical developments are enhancing its importance. The continuing rapid advance and multiplication of military technologies are creating more numerous, complicated and uncertain escalation possibilities, and these in turn have their own deterrent effect. We have arrived at a point where a significant portion of the deterrence that inhibits major challenges to the status quo derives, not from the threats governments choose to make, but from a mutual appreciation of a mutual danger. A unilateral "deterrence by policy" is being supplemented by a shared "deterrence from escalation anxiety."

The paradox of extended deterrence in the 1980s is that the same technical developments that tend to undercut the credibility of making threats of controlled escalation enhance the possibility of uncontrolled escalation; and that the latter, properly appreciated, can have deterrent effect comparable to the former. The manifold possibilities and hazards of uncontrolled escalation must indeed be recognized for this effect to operate, but then recognition of a danger is always a necessary part of deterrence. A threat made by an act of policy must also be recognized to deter. Insofar as the proliferating hazards of uncontrolled escalation *are* recognized, the cause of deterrence will in fact be served.

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